胡宗南在大陸最後的日子

胡宗南在大陸最後的日子 　　　胡宗南，字壽山，畢業於黃埔一期，是蔣介石最為器重的黃埔學生，可謂嫡係中的嫡係。在國民黨軍隊中，胡宗南有好幾個第一：黃埔畢業生中第一個軍長，第一個兵團總指揮，第一個戰區司令長官，第一個，也是唯一一個在國民黨軍隊離開大陸前獲三星上將的軍人。除了在軍隊中的顯赫地位，胡宗南和國民黨軍統的情治係統關係也非同一般。胡宗南和戴笠是生死之交，胡的妻子是戴笠一手培養並介紹。最近，旅居英國的張戎出了一本關於毛澤東的書。該書聲稱，胡宗南是潛伏在國民黨軍隊中的中共間諜，內戰期間，胡一直偷偷在為共產黨服務。國民黨兵敗大陸的最後日子，胡宗南是被迫被擁上了飛往台灣的飛機。這本書產生了很大的反響，也引起了胡宗南後人對這此說法的不滿。筆者在這裏簡單介紹一下胡宗南最後離開大陸日子的情形，看看胡宗南倒底真的是不是中共的間諜。 　　　1949年4月24日，中共克太原後，共軍的華北18，19兵團並入彭德懷的第一野戰軍，一野總兵力已達34萬多人，兵鋒直指西安，鹹陽。此時國共的三大戰役已結束，共軍已渡過長江，占領南京。國民黨在軍事上大勢已去。胡宗南權衡再三，隻好放棄西安，鹹陽，向秦嶺方向撤退。但蔣介石卻錯誤地審時度勢，命西北的二馬和胡宗南共同出擊，力圖收複西安，鹹陽。此一決策錯誤不僅沒有達到目的，反而使彭德懷乘機發起扶眉戰役，重創胡宗南部。胡損失精銳4萬3千多人，被迫退守秦嶺南麓。 　　　8月24日，蔣介石飛抵重慶，部署西南半壁江山的軍事大局。此時的胡宗南通過和時任川湘鄂綏靖公署主任宋希濂的商討，認為四川難以防守，國民黨應把軍隊集中在滇緬一帶，背托國外，也許還能堅持。但胡宗南的兩次進諫均遭到蔣介石的嚴斥。最後蔣介石親自布局，決定拒共軍於川境之外，以隴南和陝南為決戰戰場，欲使四川再次成為複興全國的基地。為此，蔣介石嚴令胡宗南堅守川陝邊境一線以防共軍入川。 　　　事實的發展證明，蔣介石的戰略布局完全是脫離現實，一廂情願。共軍入川根本出於蔣介石的防禦戰略預料之外。劉鄧佯裝由西北進攻，秦嶺一線僅由賀龍的十八兵團吸住胡宗南，劉鄧的二野主力卻暗中由湘入黔，再由黔入川。此時蔣介石才醒悟過來，急令胡宗南率兵南下，但為時已晚，後麵賀龍的十八兵團則緊跟胡宗南，也由陝入川。蔣介石在四川處於南北夾擊的狀態。11月底，共軍兵臨重慶城下，此時，蔣介石隻好給他最信任的胡宗南打電話，叫胡速調第一軍第一師來重慶機場保駕。11月30日，蔣介石由重慶飛往成都。這一次，胡宗南雖然奉命忠心保駕，但對蔣的決策仍有看法。據胡宗南的參謀長羅列回憶，胡當時說，我軍的失敗，就在於老是被動。重慶都守不住了，成都誰能保得牢？話雖如此，胡宗南對蔣介石的命令還是忠心執行。 　　蔣介石抵達成都的當天，１９４９年１１月３０日，立即召集軍政要員討論川西決戰的問題。此時蔣介石對劉文輝，鄧錫侯，潘文華等四川軍閥已根本不放心。而事實上這三人早已和中共地下黨有所聯絡，和雲南的盧漢也有約定，一旦時機成熟，即共同宣布起義。這時蔣介石唯一可以相信和依靠的就隻有胡宗南了。如要說胡宗南是共產黨間諜，此乃活捉蔣介石的一個大好機會。而此時，中共的地下黨確有一個捉蔣行動。中共地下黨員，時任國民黨反情報隊隊長徐震球策反了95軍副軍長楊曬軒，在成都組織了近二百人的捉蔣敢死隊。準備從北校場的黃埔樓下手。後來又傳出蔣介石是住在商業街的勵誌社。敢死隊又在勵誌社附近重新部署。但12月7日胡宗南任命親信盛文為成都衛戍區總司令，接管成都的城防大權，劉文輝。鄧錫侯等連夜逃離成都到彭縣，並於12月9日通電宣布起義。12月9日成都各大報刊都報道，“蔣總裁昨已離蓉飛台”。中共地下黨的捉蔣敢死隊隻好停止計劃。其實，時隔一天，12月10日晚11點多鍾，蔣介石才在胡宗南的護送下從成都鳳凰山機場乘“美齡號”專機飛往台灣。如果說胡宗南是共產黨間諜，對11月30日到12月10日這段曆史是無法解釋的。這時的胡宗南要扣留蔣介石去北京邀功是易如反掌。劉文輝，鄧錫侯，潘文華的反蔣之心，已是路人皆知。胡要反蔣，豈不一拍即合？ 　　　對於胡宗南來說，死守西川是一個不可能的任務。此時他對共產黨的抵抗已經喪失決心。12月19日，宋希濂在峨眉附近被俘。蔣介石從台灣下令，叫胡宗南撤退到西昌死守。胡宗南對蔣的這一布署非常抵觸。成，渝兩地皆失，西昌焉能守住？12月23 日胡宗南從成都起飛，並沒有去西昌，而是飛到了海南。準備由海南飛台灣。蔣介石知道後對胡宗南嚴加痛斥，並派顧祝同專程飛到海南督促胡宗南再赴西昌。對於飛海南一事，胡宗南後來在台灣遭到彈劾時辨解說，從成都起飛後，因西昌天氣太差，所以改飛海南。如果說胡宗南真是共產黨間諜，一定不會飛海南而是改飛南京或上海。這是說胡宗南是共黨間諜難以解釋的第二個問題。 　　　西昌是胡宗南的傷心之地。胡宗南返回西昌後，把所有殘部加以整編，總共隻有一萬多人，但這時麵臨著共軍13個團的三麵包圍。雙方對峙了28天。這段時間，胡宗南的心情極為沮喪。他知道憑他這一萬多人要和氣勢如虹的共產黨軍隊抗衡根本不可能。他把自己關在邛海新村的房間裏，點上紅燭，在氤氳昏紅的光線中，時而繞室徘徊，時而抱頭痛哭。胡宗南實在想不通的是，他四十萬人馬，在幾個月間，沒打一場像樣的仗，就隻剩下這萬把人的部隊。但出於對國民黨的信念和對蔣介石的忠心，胡宗南準備戰至最後，以殺身成仁。 胡宗南最後離開西昌去台灣的情況，胡宗南的秘書長，軍統高級特務趙龍文後來在台灣有所回憶： 　　［三十九年（即1950年）三月二十五日晚上一時，參謀長羅列打電話給我。“睡了沒有？” “睡了，有事嗎？” “有事，請過來談一談。”…….. 我到參謀長室，冷梅（羅列字冷梅）正在寫遺書，看到我，把一張電報遞給我，說：“剛到的。” “ 總裁的電報。要我們轉進到海口，把部隊交給兵團一級的將領＂。我把電報念了出來，問羅列：“把部隊交給誰呢？” ＂問題就在這兒。率６９軍的兵團司令胡長青要在三天以後才可以到。別的人不能交。但部隊不能交，胡先生（胡宗南）就不能脫離這個險境。為了解這個結，隻有我來但任這個任務。＂ “冷梅兄！” 我站起來緊緊握住他的手，“這是忠義凜然之舉，我深深地感佩！。。。。。。 我們坐吉普車到邛海，已是清晨2時。胡先生寓所燈光明亮。我們進了會客室，隻見胡先生左手夾了一包文件，右手拿了兩個玻璃杯，先衝著對我笑了笑，讓傳令兵倒了兩杯酒，對我說：“龍文兄，你是不應該留在此地的，早上就要走，這是我十年來的日記，請你帶到台灣，有空整理一下。＂ ．．．．． 大家坐下，茶幾上擺著五隻杯子。我作了幾句開場白：“服從命令是今天大義所在，此其一，共匪分路進兵，要活捉胡宗南，我們不能上當，此其二；反共不是一天可以完成，真正的鬥爭，要從今天開始，此其三。＂ 接著大家發言，這一場談話，一直發展到清晨４時，羅列參謀長最後發言，他用低沉的語氣，一句一句扣人心弦地說道： “當年漢高祖榮陽被困，假若沒有紀信代死，以後的曆史可能全變了。我們犧牲了多少人，對於曆史，沒有絲毫影響，胡先生犧牲了，將來７萬多的學生，３萬多的幹部，誰能號召起來，領導起來，再跟共匪作殊死的戰鬥？所以，我思量再三，決定我來作一個紀信。＂ 這幾句話，感動了我們大家，一致站起來，請求胡先生采納羅參謀長的意見。這可歌可泣的曆史，完成了“終於道義＂的信條。］ 趙龍文的這篇回憶有著那個時代的烙印，但畢竟反映出胡宗南最後離開大陸前的真實情形。在參謀長羅列提出要做紀信的第二天，１９５０年３月２６日，共產黨軍隊逼近西昌機場，胡宗南被迫乘飛機飛往台灣。 胡宗南到台灣後，麵臨著國民黨內一片追究戰爭失敗的責難。台灣監察院李夢彪等４６人聯名提出彈劾章，指責胡宗南保衛西南不力，又臨陣脫逃。為此，國民黨政府組成軍事法庭，要求依法審判胡宗南。最後還是蔣介石念其愚忠，插手其案，此案才不了了之。但從此後，胡宗南在台灣再也沒有風光過，成天節衣簡食，鬱鬱寡歡地呆在家中。１９６２年，胡宗南在病痛和憂鬱中去世。其妻葉霞翟博士在胡去世後寫了一本《天地悠悠》的回憶錄，詳細描寫了胡宗南晚年清苦寂寞的生活，文章頗為感人。其中有一段回憶令人印象深刻。胡愛喝一點小酒。每次小酌兩杯後，他總是兩眼淚汪汪，拍著椅子扶手說：“如果海上可以騎馬，我寧願帶一支騎兵，衝上大陸，去與共產黨決一死戰，不成功，則成仁。＂當然，海上不能騎馬，這始終隻是胡宗南將軍的一個夢。 張戎的書指胡宗南為中共間諜的根據，主要是胡在進兵延安後一係列不可思議的軍事失敗。但由軍事上的失敗來指稱一位馳騁沙場幾十年的軍人為敵方間諜是令人難以信服的。如果說胡的失敗不可思議，蔣介石的失敗就更不可思議。從１９４８年秋到１９４９年底，短短一年多一點的時間，國民黨的幾百萬裝備精良的大軍竟然灰飛煙滅，如此推理，蔣介石才是共產黨埋藏在國民黨中最大的間諜。 一個人著書立說一定要有根有據，踏實嚴謹。胡宗南間諜一說，涉及到胡宗南死後的蓋棺定論，涉及到要推翻從蔣介石到羅列，趙龍文，從戴笠到毛人鳳，再到胡的妻子葉霞翟等一係列重要當事人對胡宗南的判斷和評價，結論一定要謹慎。否則，無論是對死去的胡宗南及其同僚，還是對活著的胡的後人，都是不道德的。

[Drpaulpyrh]

Hu Tsung Nan was not a Spy in Chiang Camp

[新闻评论] I am a retired engineer/scientist and university professor who specializes in research, development and design of advanced military systems for over 30 years . In the research and development stage I had to read, evaluate and analyze various battle field maneuvers, strategic planning and combat tactics. The reading materials covered past and current war tactics from guerilla warfare to modern high tech weapon systems. I have a Bachelor’s degree from the University of Toronto in 1951, Master and Doctorate degrees from the University of Pennsylvania. I believe that I am highly qualified to judge what historical fact in war and peace was and what was not.

Upon my retirement I have been reading a number of unclassified books published by various publishers. Recently I came upon a book written by Mrs. Halliday (Ms. Jung Chang) and Mr. Halliday, entitled “Mao, The Unknown Story”. While looking at the photographs in that book, I noticed pictures embedded in Chapter 29 and reasons why Chiang Kai Shek lost the civil war to Mao Tse Tung. It stated that the main reason was due to “four top sleepers” planted in Chiang’s government. General Hu Tsung Nan was mentioned among the four sleepers. So I reviewed the entire section of Chapter 29 and discovered that there was nothing to base your allegation that Hu Tsung Nan was a communist spy in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp.

In my experience, there is nothing that could verify that allegation in classified or unclassified documents, telegrams, and staff reports in General George Marshall’s Missions to China (to mediate a peace agreement between Chiang’s and Mao’s camps). Needless to say I cannot use classified, because I’m not certain that General Marshall’s reports, telegrams, and notes written in that era have all been declassified or not. There were a lot of other reports about Chinese participation in World War II and Civil War written by various US and UK generals and reporters also. Not a single indication to that effect.

The writer’s allegation that Hu was a mole planted by Mao in Chiang’s camp was based on hearsay and rumors and should not be treated as historical facts


Here is my analysis to counter the writer’s conviction that General Hu Tsung Nan was a mole in Chiang Kai Shek’s camp planted by Mao. To begin with there was not a single person mentioned in Chapter 29 who suspected General Hu was a mole planted by Mao. As a historian Mr. Jon Halliday should not use his own hunch based on some comments made by unnamed Mao’s radio man to convict an honorable national hero of Nationalist China as a traitor to his country and his leader. The oath of ethics of Historians Association to report true historical facts without imposing his or her own opinions let alone to convict someone with intentions. To put untrue stories as fact in a chapter and highlight the false accusation must be utterly beyond your and/or any true dedicated historian’s apprehensions.

Among the persons mentioned in the section relating to General Hu in Chapter 29, the only believable statement can be attributed to Major General David Goodwin Barr. General Barr, the Chief of the U.S. Military Advisory Group in China observed that Hu “prevailed on” Chiang to reinforce his Xian garrison to an extent which was later to prove disastrous to the Nationalists in East Central China; key losses there were “a direct result of a shift of forces to the west,” where, Barr noted, they were either useless or destroyed. General Barr never said anything that General Hu could be a mole planted by Mao. To move troops from one theater to another theater happens all the time during a war . General Barr was a talented staff officer but not a strong combat troop commander. Less than two years later while he was in Korea as Commander of U.S. 7th Infantry Division under Major General Edward M. “Ned” Almond, Commander of X Corps, directly under General Douglas MacArthur. He himself was a “yes” man to his superiors. It was his troop who spearheaded to the Manchurian border town, Hyesanjin-on-the-Yalu on November 20, 1950. When his soldiers reached the Yalu River, General MacArthur told General Almond, “Heartiest congratulations, Ned, please tell David Barr that the 7th Division hit the jackpot.” The Joint Chiefs of Staff has given MacArthur specific orders to stay far away from Yalu River, but MacArthur ignores the orders. A couple days later, on November 24, the X Corp under General Almond including the 7th Infantry Division were encircled by the Chinese Communist Army. Thousands and thousands of U.S. soldiers were either killed or captured by the Chinese Communists. Exactly the same fate encountered by General Hu Tsung Nan’s army in 1948. General Hu occupied the Red Capital at Yenan for a whole year before they were forced to abandon the city. The U.S. Army only reached the Yalu River for four days and was forced to retreat all the way back to South Korea and even the capital of South Korea, Seoul, was reoccupied by the North Korean and Chinese Communists. Nobody would say that General Douglas McArthur was a traitor who deliberately sacrificed his soldiers and officers.

Chang and Holliday mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan struck up a friendship with Chiang’s intelligence chief, Tai Li. The fact is General Hu did not strike up a friendship with Tai Li when Tai was Chiang’s Intelligence Chief. They were friends when General Hu was still a school teacher in his home town Shao Fong way before he went to Wampoa Military Academy in 1924. Tai Li went to the Wampoa Military Academy in 1926. By 1927 General Hu was already a National hero in China. During that time, Mao was not even a leader or prominent member of the Communist Party. During the Second Northern Expedition the National Army took over Shanghai on March 21, 1927. On the afternoon of March 22, Hu Tsung Nan assembled regiment and battalion officers and armed soldiers rode captured vehicles for a tour of the city, intruded onto British and French Extra- territories and drove by the Racing Course and through Nanking Road. The British and French were daunted by the National Army’s valor and Shanghai citizens fervor dared not stop the parade in spite of the fact during the battle for Shanghai they had 23,000 soldiers in Shanghai and dispatched over ninety warships toward Nanking. It just to show who was more famous between Hu and Mao during that time.

During the so-called Long March of the Chinese Communists, General Hu’s army was one of the groups of the Nationalists Forces to pursue the Communists. The Communists were driven out of their so-called Soviet Territory. They had about 100,000 men but by the time they reached Yenan, there were only about 10,000 men left. 40,000 to 50,000 of Communists army were either killed or captured by Hu Tsung Nan’s Army. When they were facing extinction by the Nationalists, Mao managed to persuade General Chang Hsueh Liang to detain Chiang Kai Shek in Xian during their military meeting and demanded that Chiang Kai Shek to stop fighting the Communists and form a united front to resist the Japanese aggression. The Communists army was officially designated as the 8th National Corp during the Sino-Japanese War. During that period both Chinese Communists and the Nationalists armies were under the same Commander, Chiang Kai Shek.

The writers mentioned that “a man named Hu Kung Mien was appointed by Hu Tsung Nan as his representative to Mao. That man, Hu K’ung Mien, was commonly assumed to be a communist during that time. “Because of this relationship between General Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien,” you declared that General Hu Tsung Nan must be a mole planted by Mao. This statement is utterly without merit. When General Hu was at Wampoa Military Academy, a number of instructors and cadets had dual Nationalist and Communist party memberships. That was because Dr. Sun Yat-Sen, founder of Whampoa Academy, allowed them to have dual party memberships in order to appease the Soviet Union as it was funded by the Soviet Union. Chou En-Lai was political director and Hu K’ung Mien was head of the security guide of the academy. A lot of students knew both of them and had contacts with them. That was the only relationship between Hu Tsung Nan and Hu K’ung Mien which we could say so for sure. We could not say that they have a close friendship as suggested by you.

The authors stated that Mao was able to move around Yanan freely when Yenan was occupied by General Hu’s army without being captured by Hu therefore General Hu must be Mao’s mole. This assumption was utterly without foundation. The territories around Yenan were like today’s Pakistan and Afghanistan’s border full of caves and rocks. The whole area was still under Communists control. Besides, any knowledgeable military analyst would know that deception during the war is simply part of military technique and the leader such as Mao must show his subordinates that he is strong and confident when they are facing military setbacks. When his cook said that Mao was doing business as usual, it was only his observation. Neither the cook nor the radio man ever mentioned that Hu Tsung Nan was a mole there. You said that Hu did not capture Mao when Mao was only 150 Km away from Yenan was because he was a “Sleeper” of Mao is totally wrong. Four years after we occupied Afghanistan we still have not captured Osama Bin Laden, or his assistant Ayman al-Zawahiri. We could not even capture Abu Musab al-Zarquawi in Iraq. No one ever allege that our Military Commander of Middle East, General John P. Abizaid, must be a “Sleeper” planted by Osama Bin Laden.

Based on the above analysis, I proposed to the Random House Publisher, Mr. Dan Franklin, to remove the statement on Hu Tsung Nan, since the section related to General Hu Tsung Nan being a mole or sleeper, in Chapter 29, is definitely untrue it should be deleted from Chapter 29.