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一個屬於中國的世紀可能已經到來

KYLE CHAN 2025年5月19日

 

多年來，理論家們一直在設想一個“中國世紀”的到來：在那個世界裏，中國最終利用其巨大的經濟和技術潛力超越美國，重塑全球力量格局，使其以北京為中心。

 

那個世紀可能已經到來，而當曆史學家回顧時，他們很可能會指出，特朗普總統第二任期的前幾個月是中國拉開距離，把美國甩在後麵的分水嶺。

 

華盛頓和北京在特朗普的貿易戰中達成了沒有實質成果的暫時休戰，但這無關緊要。美國總統立即聲稱這是一場勝利，反而凸顯出特朗普政府和美國麵臨的根本問題：在與中國那場更為關鍵的的戰爭麵臨慘敗之際，美國卻在目光短淺地關注無關緊要的小規模衝突。

特朗普正在大肆破壞美國力量和創新的支柱。他的關稅正在危及美國公司進入全球市場和供應鏈的機會。他正在削減公共研究經費，削弱我們的大學，迫使有才華的研究人員考慮離開美國前往其他國家。他想縮減清潔能源和半導體製造等技術項目，並在全球大片地區消滅美國的軟實力。

 

中國的軌跡截然不同。

 

在鋼鋁、造船、電池、太陽能、電動汽車、風力渦輪機、無人機、5G設備、消費電子產品、活性藥物成分和高鐵等多個行業，中國的產量已經位居全球首位。預計到2030年，中國將占全球製造業的45%，接近一半。北京同樣非常關注贏得未來：今年3月，它宣布成立一個1萬億元的國家風險投資基金，對量子計算和機器人等尖端技術進行長期投資，並增加了公共研發預算。

 

中國的做法取得了驚人的成果。

 

今年1月，當中國初創公司深度求索推出其人工智能聊天機器人時，許多美國人突然意識到，中國可以在人工智能領域展開競爭。但是不止如此，這樣的“斯普特尼克時刻”還有很多。

 

特朗普的政治盟友埃隆·馬斯克曾將中國電動汽車製造商比亞迪當成笑話，但這家公司去年的全球銷量超過了特斯拉，正在世界各地建設新工廠，今年3月的市值超過了福特、通用和大眾汽車的總和。中國在藥物研發、尤其是癌症治療方麵正處於領先地位，2023年安裝的工業機器人數量超過了世界其他國家的總和。半導體是本世紀至關重要的大宗商品，也是中國長期以來的軟肋。在華為最近的突破性進展引領下，中國正在打造一條自給自足的供應鏈。關鍵是，中國在這些領域和其他重疊技術方麵的優勢正在創造一個良性循環，多個相互關聯領域的進步相互促進、相互提升。

 

然而，特朗普仍然執著於關稅。他似乎甚至沒有意識到中國構成的威脅有多大。在上周一兩國宣布同意削減貿易關稅之前，特朗普駁斥了他之前對中國商品征收的天價關稅會讓美國商店貨架空空如也的擔憂。他說，美國人隻要給孩子們少買幾個娃娃就可以了——這種把中國說成是玩具和其他廉價商品工廠的說法已經完全過時了。

 

美國需要認識到，無論是關稅還是其他貿易壓力，都無法讓中國放棄一直以來行之有效的國家主導型經濟政策，並突然采取美國人認為公平的工業和貿易政策。相反，北京正在加倍強化其國家主導的方式，以“曼哈頓計劃”的方式專注於實現高科技產業的主導地位。

 

中國也麵臨著嚴峻的挑戰。房地產市場的長期低迷繼續拖累經濟增長，盡管有跡象表明該行業可能最終正在複蘇。更長期的挑戰也迫在眉睫，比如勞動力萎縮和人口老齡化。但是，懷疑論者多年來一直在預測中國經濟的見頂和不可避免的衰退，卻每次都被證明是錯誤的。不管自由市場倡導者們是否認可，以國家為主導的中國體製的持久實力現在已經不可否認，它可以隨意轉向、改變政策和重新分配資源，以服務於國家的長遠利益。

 

特朗普對關稅等短期權宜之計的盲目癡迷在積極破壞美國強大之本，同時隻會讓一個由中國主導的世界更快到來。

 

如果兩國都按照目前的軌跡發展下去，中國很可能最終完全主導高端製造業，從汽車、芯片到核磁共振成像儀和商用飛機。人工智能霸主之爭將不是在美國和中國之間展開，而是在深圳和杭州等中國高科技城市之間展開。作為卓越的世界技術和經濟超級大國，中國的工廠將遍布世界各地，並將以中國為中心重新配置供應鏈。

 

相比之下，美國可能最終會成為一個嚴重衰落的國家。在關稅壁壘的庇護下，美國企業將幾乎隻向國內消費者銷售產品。國際銷售的損失將降低企業的收益，使企業用於投資業務的資金減少。由於美國製造成本的上升，美國消費者將隻能購買質量中等但比全球產品更貴的美國產品。工薪家庭將麵臨不斷上升的通貨膨脹和收入停滯。汽車製造業和製藥業等傳統高價值產業已流向中國；未來的重要行業也會隨之流失。想象一下全國範圍內都出現底特律或克利夫蘭那樣的情形。

 

要避免這種嚴峻的局麵，就意味著要做出本應顯而易見並已得到兩黨支持的政策選擇——今天就做：投資研發；支持學術、科技和企業創新；與世界各國建立經濟聯係；為國際人才和資本創造一個友好、有吸引力的環境。然而，特朗普政府在這些領域的做法恰恰相反。

 

本世紀究竟屬於中國還是美國，這取決於我們。但是，改變方向的時間已經不多。

In the Future, China Will Be Dominant. The U.S. Will Be Irrelevant.

May 19, 2025  By Kyle Chan

Mr. Chan is a researcher at Princeton University who focuses on Chinese industrial policy.

For years, theorists have posited the onset of a “Chinese century”: a world in which China finally harnesses its vast economic and technological potential to surpass the United States and reorient global power around a pole that runs through Beijing.

That century may already have dawned, and when historians look back they may very well pinpoint the early months of President Trump’s second term as the watershed moment when China pulled away and left the United States behind.

It doesn’t matter that Washington and Beijing have reached an inconclusive and temporary truce in Mr. Trump’s trade war. The U.S. president immediately claimed it as a win, but that only underlines the fundamental problem for the Trump administration and America: a shortsighted focus on inconsequential skirmishes as the larger war with China is being decisively lost.

Mr. Trump is taking a wrecking ball to the pillars of American power and innovation. His tariffs are endangering U.S. companies’ access to global markets and supply chains. He is slashing public research funding and gutting our universities, pushing talented researchers to consider leaving for other countries. He wants to roll back programs for technologies like clean energy and semiconductor manufacturing and is wiping out American soft power in large swaths of the globe.

 

 

China’s trajectory couldn’t be more different.

It already leads global production in multiple industries — steel, aluminum, shipbuilding, batteries, solar power, electric vehicles, wind turbines, drones, 5G equipment, consumer electronics, active pharmaceutical ingredients and bullet trains. It is projected to account for 45 percent — nearly half — of global manufacturing by 2030. Beijing is also laser-focused on winning the future: In March it announced a $138 billion national venture capital fund that will make long-term investments in cutting-edge technologies such as quantum computing and robotics, and increased its budget for public research and development.

The results of China’s approach have been stunning.

When the Chinese start-up DeepSeek launched its artificial intelligence chatbot in January, many Americans suddenly realized that China could compete in A.I. But there have been a series of Sputnik moments like that.

The Chinese electric carmaker BYD, which Mr. Trump’s political ally Elon Musk once laughed off as a joke, overtook Tesla last year in global sales, is building new factories around the world and in March reached a market value greater than that of Ford, GM and Volkswagen combined. China is charging ahead in drug discoveries, especially cancer treatments, and installed more industrial robots in 2023 than the rest of the world combined. In semiconductors, the vital commodity of this century and a longtime weak point for China, it is building a self-reliant supply chain led by recent breakthroughs by Huawei. Critically, Chinese strength across these and other overlapping technologies is creating a virtuous cycle in which advances in multiple interlocking sectors reinforce and elevate one another.

Yet Mr. Trump remains fixated on tariffs. He doesn’t even seem to grasp the scale of the threat posed by China. Before the two countries’ announcement last Monday that they had agreed to slash trade tariffs, Mr. Trump dismissed concerns that his previous sky-high tariffs on Chinese goods would leave shelves empty in American stores. He said Americans could just get by with buying fewer dolls for their children — a characterization of China as a factory for toys and other cheap junk that is wildly out of date.

The United States needs to realize that neither tariffs nor other trade pressure will get China to abandon the state-driven economic playbook that has worked so well for it and suddenly adopt industrial and trade policies that Americans consider fair. If anything, Beijing is doubling down on its state-led approach, bringing a Manhattan Project-style focus to achieving dominance in high-tech industries.

 

 

China faces its own serious challenges. A prolonged real estate slump continues to drag on economic growth, though there are signs that the sector may be finally recovering. Longer-term challenges also loom, such as a shrinking work force and an aging population. But skeptics have been predicting China’s peak and inevitable fall for years, only to be proved wrong each time. The enduring strength of a state-dominated Chinese system that can pivot, change policy and redirect resources at will in service of long-term national strength is now undeniable, regardless of whether free-market advocates like it.

Mr. Trump’s blinkered obsession with short-term Band-Aids like tariffs, while actively undermining what makes America strong, will only hasten the onset of a Chinese-dominated world.

If each nation’s current trajectory holds, China will likely end up completely dominating high-end manufacturing, from cars and chips to M.R.I. machines and commercial jets. The battle for A.I. supremacy will be fought not between the United States and China but between high-tech Chinese cities like Shenzhen and Hangzhou. Chinese factories around the world will reconfigure supply chains with China at the center, as the world’s pre-eminent technological and economic superpower.

America, by contrast, may end up as a profoundly diminished nation. Sheltered behind tariff walls, its companies will sell almost exclusively to domestic consumers. The loss of international sales will degrade corporate earnings, leaving companies with less money to invest in their businesses. American consumers will be stuck with U.S.-made goods that are of middling quality but more expensive than global products, owing to higher U.S. manufacturing costs. Working families will face rising inflation and stagnant incomes. Traditional high-value industries such as car manufacturing and pharmaceuticals are already being lost to China; the important industries of the future will follow. Imagine Detroit or Cleveland on a national scale.

Avoiding that grim scenario means making policy choices — today — that should be obvious and already have bipartisan support: investing in research and development; supporting academic, scientific and corporate innovation; forging economic ties with countries around the world; and creating a welcoming and attractive climate for international talent and capital. Yet the Trump administration is doing the opposite in each of those areas.

 

 

Whether this century will be Chinese or American is up to us. But the time to change course is quickly running out.

 

 

Kyle Chan is a postdoctoral researcher at Princeton University who focuses on technology and industrial policy in China. He also writes the High Capacity newsletter on the same topics.