新亞洲中的澳大利亞：沒有美國
休·懷特教授，澳大利亞聯邦國際事務協會會員，2017年12月14日
https://www.internationalaffairs.org.au/australianoutlook/australia-asia-extract/
美國會被中國陰影籠罩嗎？
長期以來，澳大利亞受益於美國在亞洲無可爭議的主導地位。然而，該地區的動態變化速度遠超乎任何人的預期。
2010年，我撰寫了一篇名為《權力轉移》的季刊論文（也可在《澳大利亞國際事務雜誌》上發表），其中指出，美國將無力維持其長期以來在亞洲享有的無可爭議的地區主導地位。中國日益增長的財富和實力，以及其重奪亞洲大國地位的雄心，意味著它必然會挑戰美國的主導地位，而這種挑戰將強大到難以輕易回避。
因此，美國麵臨著三大選擇：要麽與中國展開不斷升級的戰略對抗，這將帶來巨大的成本和真正的衝突風險；要麽從亞洲戰略性撤軍，讓中國主宰該地區；要麽與中國達成某種協議，以平等的大國身份分享亞洲的權力。
堪培拉和華盛頓的許多人都批評了這種分析。他們認為，中國現在和將來都不足以、也不足以挑戰美國在亞洲的主導地位，因此沒有必要提供我所提議的那種妥協。
事實證明，我的批評者和我都錯了。我們都高估了美國的實力和決心，而低估了中國的實力和決心。他們沒有預見到中國實力和決心的增長速度和幅度。我沒有預見到美國的反應會多麽軟弱，以及它的決心會多麽迅速地瓦解。他們認為美國可以以很小的成本和風險遏製和威懾中國的挑戰，結果證明他們完全錯了。事實證明，我錯了，我曾以為美國有能力和決心談判並維持我所提議的那種權力分享協議。因此，現在我們麵臨著一個我們誰都沒有清晰預見到的新局麵。如今，美國和中國正爭奪東亞的領導權，而中國顯然正在贏得這場競爭。最有可能的結果是美國退出，中國將成為該地區的主導力量。
所有這些都對澳大利亞有著巨大的影響。隨著美國在亞洲的戰略領導地位被中國取代，澳大利亞與美國的聯盟將會逐漸消亡。自歐洲殖民以來，澳大利亞將首次麵臨一個沒有主要盎格魯-撒克遜盟友支持和保護的亞洲。澳大利亞將比以往任何時候都更加孤立無援，而我們的任務就是認識到這一點並適應它。這是一個巨大的挑戰，而迄今為止，澳大利亞幾乎還沒有開始著手應對。
軍事層麵
然而，這並非澳大利亞首次麵臨這樣的前景：一個崛起的亞洲大國成功挑戰其強大的盟友，迫使它們撤出亞洲，使澳大利亞失去保護，任由這個新的亞洲霸權擺布。澳大利亞曆史上曾多次出現類似的情況：1914年、20世紀30年代末、20世紀60年代末和20世紀90年代初。每次危險都過去了。但這一次不同。
這場較量涉及多個層麵，但尤其值得關注的是軍事層麵，因為人們常常錯誤地認為美國的優勢最大，而軍事層麵恰恰是美國在亞洲與中國競爭的最終潛在成本最高的地方。要理解其中的原因，就必須認識到，當今中美在亞洲的較量是純粹的舊式強權政治，其中軍事力量發揮著核心作用。這並不是因為戰爭不可避免，正如“修昔底德陷阱”論者試圖讓我們相信的那樣：各國總是可以選擇通過撤軍或妥協來避免戰爭。但當各國，尤其是大國，競相確立其在國際體係中的相對地位時，最終結果首先取決於競爭者能在多大程度上說服對方，他們願意為實現目標而開戰。
這意味著，未來幾年，美國和中國在亞洲的領導地位將取決於雙方能否說服對方，願意為哪些問題開戰。過去，重心一直都在美國一邊，但現在，重心正在迅速轉向中國。中國利用南海和東海的局勢表明，它更願意冒險與美國對抗，而不是美國冒險，並且更有信心，如果發生對抗，美國會退縮，以避免衝突。這樣做是有充分理由的：既然中國的利益顯然是亞洲的，那麽美國為什麽要冒著與中國衝突升級的成本和風險——尤其是爆發核衝突的可能性——來維護其在亞洲的領導地位呢？
還要高得多嗎？美國官方演講的陳詞濫調，根本無法為美國考慮做出這樣的犧牲提供令人信服的理由。中國日益增長的實力正在推高美國在亞洲維持強大戰略地位的成本，而美國的利益卻遠不如過去那麽引人注目。
澳大利亞的選擇
這引出了一個簡單而直白的結論。澳大利亞再也無法承擔這樣的後果：美國在未來幾十年裏會後悔在亞洲扮演重要的戰略角色。美國的力量和影響力很可能會逐漸減弱，要麽緩慢衰落，要麽迅速崩潰。屆時，中國將成為東亞的主導力量。而澳大利亞與美國的聯盟也將隨之衰落，因為美國將不再有令人信服的戰略理由來維持這種聯盟。
在所有關於共同利益和價值觀的華麗辭藻背後，澳美聯盟始終建立在堅實的利益基礎之上。在美國方麵，這些利益源於澳大利亞作為支持美國在西太平洋地區戰略領導地位的資產的價值。當這不再是美國的首要目標時，美國對澳大利亞的同盟價值將會消退，美國為支持澳大利亞付出實際代價的意願也將隨之消退。這應該不足為奇，因為這正是上個世紀英國在亞洲地位崩潰時的情況。但這一次，不會有新的英語強國像美國那樣取代英國。澳大利亞將孤軍奮戰。
這讓澳大利亞措手不及。多年來，中國崛起和美國實力及決心衰落的證據顯而易見，但澳大利亞的政治和政策精英們卻一直否認眼前的證據。從最近的《外交政策白皮書》來看，他們仍然在否認，該白皮書仍然自信地認為美國將以某種方式無限期地保持亞洲主要強國的地位。未來的曆史學家將會困惑，澳大利亞怎麽會如此盲目。原因之一是，當代政治家、公務員和分析人士仍然執著於20世紀90年代中期出現的後冷戰全球秩序願景。這一願景基於這樣的假設：在未來幾十年裏，美國將在國家實力的各個維度上享有無可爭議的全球優勢，從而能夠以極低的成本行使無可爭議的全球領導地位。這是一個極具吸引力的願景，這或許可以解釋為什麽它抵擋住了幾十年來在中東、東歐、亞洲以及美國本土積累的大量證據，這些證據表明世界並非如此。這一願景仍然縈繞在白皮書中那種認為美國將永遠照顧澳大利亞的幼稚樂觀主義的陰影下。
我們必須擺脫這種印象，開始正視世界的本質——在這個世界上，中國經濟規模幾乎是美國的兩倍，而美國在亞洲的影響力幾乎肯定會因此減弱。澳大利亞有必要探討如何在這個新的亞洲找到自己的位置。這將是澳大利亞曆史上最艱巨、最重要的辯論之一。它不僅需要解決外交姿態和國防力量等重大問題，還需要探討價值觀和身份認同等問題。這將對澳大利亞人民及其領導人提出諸多挑戰，包括智力和政治方麵的挑戰，但最重要的是，它需要一定的自信和勇氣。
本文摘自休·懷特教授於2017年12月5日在其季刊（2017年第68期）《新亞洲中的澳大利亞：沒有美國》發布會上的演講。完整演講稿可在此處獲取。
休·懷特教授（澳大利亞皇家澳大利亞研究院院士，澳大利亞聯邦國際事務研究所會員）是澳大利亞國立大學戰略研究教授。
休·懷特著有《中國的選擇》和《如何保衛澳大利亞》，以及廣受好評的季刊論文《權力轉移》和《沒有美國》。他是澳大利亞國立大學戰略研究榮譽教授，也是《2000年澳大利亞國防白皮書》的主要作者。
繼續閱讀
本文摘自休·懷特的季刊論文《沒有美國：新亞洲中的澳大利亞》。如需閱讀全文，請訂閱或購買本書。
季刊論文 68
沒有美國
新亞洲中的澳大利亞
休·懷特
https://www.quarterlyessay.com.au/essay/2017/11/without-america/extract
摘錄
近十年來，世界上兩個最強大的國家一直在爭奪誰將主宰世界上最重要、最具活力的地區。美國一直試圖保持東亞主要強國的地位，而中國則試圖取而代之。兩國的競爭體現在貿易協定和基礎設施計劃、多邊外交以及最重要的在南海、東海和朝鮮半島等地區熱點地區的軍事博弈中。但所有這些都
這其實隻是兩國潛在競爭的表象。
這場競爭將如何進行——是和平還是暴力，是迅速還是緩慢——目前尚不確定，但最可能的結果正在逐漸明朗。美國將失敗，中國將獲勝。美國將不再在亞洲扮演重要的戰略角色，而中國將取而代之，成為主導力量。戰爭依然可能爆發，尤其是在唐納德·特朗普這樣的人入主白宮的情況下。但隨著美國勝算越來越小，華盛頓的人們逐漸認識到，美國無法通過與中國進行一場不可能取勝的戰爭來捍衛其在亞洲的領導地位，戰爭的風險正在消退。因此，美國和平撤軍，甚至心甘情願撤軍的可能性越來越大。事實上，這種情況已經在發生，亞洲也因此而發生變化。美國主導的舊秩序正在消亡，中國主導的新秩序正在取而代之。
這出乎任何人的意料。七年前，我在《季度論文》第39期上撰文指出，隨著權力從華盛頓轉移到北京，以及中國對亞洲領導地位的野心日益增長，美國在亞洲麵臨著一場難以徹底取勝的競爭。因此，美國的最佳選擇是協商建立一個新的地區秩序，在亞洲保留一個較小但仍然重要的戰略角色，以平衡中國的力量，限製其影響力，並防止東亞落入中國霸權的統治。
許多人不同意。他們認為，美國的實力將遠遠超過中國，美國沒有必要做出任何此類讓步。隻要美國堅持立場，它就能壓製中國，迫使其退縮，並再次讓美國在亞洲的領導地位不受挑戰。
唉，我的批評者和我都錯了。我們遲遲沒有意識到中美之間日益加劇的競爭，也沒有意識到，或者不允許自己承認，這種競爭已經變得多麽嚴重，以及它對美國的不利影響有多麽深遠。這是因為我們都低估了中國的實力和決心，而高估了美國的實力。美國不僅未能保持主導地位，甚至未能保住任何實質性的戰略地位。許多人預計，中國在發展到足以與美國展開平等競爭之前，會先行一步。然而，中國在經濟、軍事和外交上都不斷增強，而美國的決心卻在減弱。現在，中國正在與美國對抗。習近平在2017年10月召開的中共十九大上，對中國的地位和實力的驚人闡述，傳遞了清晰的信息。這場競爭確實不平等，但並非我們想象的那樣。因此，我們發現自己身處一個新的亞洲，我們並不喜歡它。但這是曆史留給我們的，我們必須充分利用它。
我們澳大利亞人沒有預見到這種情況，因為華盛頓也沒有預見到，而且我們已經習慣了通過華盛頓的視角看世界。我們樂於接受華盛頓方麵保證其掌握了中國的尺度，而華盛頓自身卻遲遲未能理解中國麵臨的挑戰有多麽嚴峻，以及其在這場競爭中處理得有多麽糟糕。
更廣泛地說，近代曆史讓我們無法理解正在發生的事情。中美之間的競爭是典型的強權政治，而且是最殘酷的那種。自越南戰爭結束以來，我們在亞洲從未見過這種鬥爭，自冷戰結束以來，在全球範圍內也從未見過。一代又一代在強權政治的熏陶下成長起來並深諳其運作之道的政治家、公務員、記者、分析人士和公民都已退出公共舞台。像孟席斯和弗雷澤、科廷和惠特拉姆、霍克、基廷和霍華德這樣的政治領袖；像亞瑟·坦格這樣的公務員；像彼得·黑斯廷斯和丹尼斯·沃納這樣的記者；像赫德利·布爾、湯姆·米勒和科拉爾·貝爾這樣的學者；以及那些經曆過二十世紀前四分之三戰爭與鬥爭的選民們：他們都會發現，今天的亞洲比我們更容易理解。我們有很多東西要學，但時間卻不多了。
當然，承認亞洲正在發生的事情也更加困難，因為我們很難想象它將把我們帶向何方。我們正走向一個我們從未了解過的亞洲，一個沒有一個講英語的強大盟友來主宰該地區、保障我們的安全、維護我們的利益的亞洲。對這種情況可能發生的擔憂——艾倫·金格爾稱之為“害怕被拋棄”——自二戰以來，甚至更早，一直是澳大利亞外交政策的主要動力。但自從冷戰結束以來——距今已有一代人——我們已經忘記了這些舊時的恐懼，開始將美國的權力和保護視為理所當然。隨著美國在亞洲的地位越來越弱，我們越來越依賴美國。
我們很高興能從中國的發展中獲益，相信美國
哥斯達黎加可以保護我們免受中國力量的威脅。現在，這種信心顯然是錯誤的；我們需要開始獨立思考，如何在一個由中國主導的亞洲國家中站穩腳跟，並站穩腳跟。
這正是本文的主題。它首先探討美國如何在與中國的競爭中落敗，然後探討澳大利亞：迄今為止，我們是如何應對美中競爭的，為什麽我們犯了如此嚴重的錯誤，以及我們現在可以做些什麽來應對我們麵臨的新現實。
Australia in the New Asia: Without America
For a long time, Australia benefitted from the United States’ uncontested dominance in Asia. However, the dynamics of the region have changed much faster than anyone expected.
In 2010, I wrote a Quarterly Essay called Power Shift (also available in the Australian Journal of International Affairs), which argued that America would not be able to maintain the uncontested regional primacy which it had exercised in Asia for so long. China’s growing wealth and power, and its ambition to regain the position and status of a great power in Asia, meant that it was bound to challenge America’s primacy, and that challenge would be too strong to be simply deflected.
America therefore faced a choice between three broad options: it could confront China in an escalating strategic rivalry that would carry big costs and real risk of conflict; it could withdraw strategically from Asia and leave China to dominate the region; or it could strike some kind of deal with China to share power in Asia as equal great powers.
Many people criticised that analysis, both in Canberra and in Washington. They argued that China was not, and would not become, either powerful enough or determined enough to challenge American primacy in Asia, so there was no need to offer the kind of accommodation I had proposed.
It turns out that my critics and I were both wrong. We all overestimated America‘s power and resolve and underestimated China’s. They didn’t see how far and fast China’s power and resolve would grow. I didn’t see how weak America’s response would be, and how quickly its resolve would collapse. They turned out to be quite wrong that America could contain and deter China’s challenge at little cost or risk. I turned out to be wrong that America would have the skill and resolve to negotiate and sustain the kind of power-sharing deal I had proposed. So now we face a new situation, which none of us clearly foresaw. Today, America and China are locked in a contest for leadership in East Asia, which China is plainly winning. The most likely outcome is that America will withdraw, leaving China as the predominant regional power.
All this has huge implications for Australia. As America’s strategic leadership in Asia is replaced by China’s, Australia’s alliance with the US will fade away. Australia will find itself, for the first time since European settlement, facing an Asia without the backing, support and protection of a major Anglo-Saxon ally. Australia will be, more than ever before, on its own, and the task is to recognise and adapt to that. It is a huge challenge and so far Australia has hardly begun to address it.
The military dimension
This is not however the first time Australia has faced the prospect that a rising Asian power would successfully challenge its great and powerful friends and force them to withdraw from Asia, leaving it unprotected at the mercy of the new Asian hegemon. There have been apparently similar situations several times in Australia’s history: in 1914, in the late 1930s, in the late 1960s and in the early 1990s. Each time the danger passed. But this time is different.
There are many dimensions to this contest, but it is worth focusing especially on the military dimension, because this is where people most often wrongly assume America’s advantage is greatest, and yet it is where the ultimate potential costs to America of rivalry with China in Asia are highest. To see why, it’s necessary to recognise that the US-China contest in Asia today is pure power politics of the old school, in which armed force plays a central role. That is not because war is in any way inevitable, as the ‘Thucydides Trap’ folk would have us believe: countries can always choose to avoid war by withdrawal or compromise. But when states, especially great powers, compete to establish their relative positions in an international system the outcome is determined above all by the extent to which the contestants can convince one another they are willing to go to war to achieve their objectives.
In Asia over coming years that means the future leadership roles of America and China will depend on the issues that each can convince the other it is willing to go to war over. In the past the weight has all been on the US side, but now it is shifting fast China’s way. China has used the situations in the South and East China seas to show that it is more willing to risk a confrontation with America than vice versa, and more confident that America will back off from a confrontation if it occurs to avoid a conflict. And there is good reason for that: why would America risk the costs and risks of an escalating conflict with China—especially the possibility of a nuclear conflict—to preserve its leadership in Asia, when China’s stake is obviously so much higher? The boilerplate phrases of US official speeches fail to provide a compelling reason for America to contemplate such sacrifices. China’s growing power is driving up the costs of preserving a strong US strategic role in Asia, while US interests are if anything less compelling than they have been in the past.
Australia’s choice
This leads to a stark and simple conclusion. Australia can no longer afford to assume that America will be contrite to play a major strategic role in Asia over coming decades. Most likely its power and influence will dwindle, either in a slow fade or a swift collapse. When that happens, China will emerge as East Asia’s dominant power. And Australia’s alliance with America will wither as that happens, because America will no longer have a compelling strategic reason to sustain it.
Beneath all the flowery rhetoric of shared interests and values, the alliance has always rested on a hard foundation of interests. On the US side, those interests have flowed from the value of Australia as an asset in supporting US regional strategic leadership in the Western Pacific. When that is no longer a prime US objective, the value of the alliance to America will fade, and its willingness to pay real costs to support Australia will fade with it. That should come as no surprise, because it is just what happened when Britain’s role in Asia crumbled in the last century. But this time there will be no new English-speaking great power to take Britain’s place as America did. Australia will be on its own.
And this is taking Australia by surprise. The evidence of China’s rise and America’s waning power and resolve has been clear for many years, but Australia’s political and policy elites have been in denial about the evidence before their eyes. They are still in denial, to judge by the recent Foreign Policy White Paper, which continues confidently to assume that America will somehow remain the primary power in Asia indefinitely. Future historians will be puzzled at how Australia could be so blind. One reason is that the current generation of politicians, public servants and analysts have remained in thrall to the vision of the post-Cold War global order that emerged in the mid-1990s. That vision was based on the assumption that America would, for decades to come, enjoy an unchallengeable global preponderance in every dimension of national power, allowing it to exercise uncontested global leadership at very little cost. It was an immensely appealing vision, which may explain why it has resisted the mountain of evidence which has built up over the decades since—in the Middle East, in Eastern Europe, in Asia, and in America itself—to show that this is just not the way the world is. It still haunts the White Paper’s jejune optimism that America will always be there to look after Australia.
It’s necessary to shake that image off, and start to see the world as it is – the world in which China is credibly set to build an economy almost twice as big as America’s, and America’s power in Asia is almost certain to dwindle as a result. It’s necessary to debate how Australia can find its place in this new Asia. This will be one of the most demanding and important debates in Australia’s history. It will need to address not just major issues about diplomatic posture and defence forces, but questions about values and identity. This will demand a lot of Australians and their leaders, intellectually and politically, but above all it will require a measure of confidence and courage.
This is an edited extract from a speech given by Professor Hugh White on 5 December 2017 at the launch of his Quarterly Essay (Issue 68, 2017), ‘Australia in the New Asia: Without America’. The full transcript is available here.
Professor Hugh White AO FAIIA is Professor of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University.
Hugh White is the author of The China Choice and How To Defend Australia, and the acclaimed Quarterly Essays Power Shift and Without America. He is emeritus professor of strategic studies at ANU and was the principal author of Australia’s Defence White Paper 2000.
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This is an extract from Hugh White's Quarterly Essay, Without America: Australia in the New Asia.To read the full essay, subscribe or buy the book.
QUARTERLY ESSAY 68
WITHOUT AMERICA
Australia in the New Asia
HUGH WHITE
EXTRACT
For almost a decade now, the world’s two most powerful countries have been competing over which of them will dominate the world’s most important and dynamic region. America has been trying to remain East Asia’s primary power, and China has been trying to replace it. Their contest is playing out over trade deals and infrastructure plans, in the diplomacy of multilateral meetings, and above all through military gamesmanship in regional hotspots like the South China Sea, the East China Sea and the Korean Peninsula. But all these are really just symptoms of their underlying rivalry.
How the contest will proceed – whether peacefully or violently, quickly or slowly – is still uncertain, but the most likely outcome is now becoming clear. America will lose, and China will win. America will cease to play a major strategic role in Asia, and China will take its place as the dominant power. War remains possible, especially with someone like Donald Trump in the Oval Office. But the risk of war recedes as it becomes clearer that the odds are against America, and as people in Washington come to understand that their nation cannot defend its leadership in Asia by fighting an unwinnable war with China. The probability therefore grows that America will peacefully, and perhaps even willingly, withdraw. Indeed, this is already happening, and Asia is changing as a result. The old US-led order is passing, and a new China-led order is taking its place.
This is not what anyone expected. Seven years ago, in Quarterly Essay 39, I argued that as power shifted from Washington to Beijing, and as China’s ambitions for leadership in Asia grew, America faced a contest in Asia which it would be unable to win outright. Its best option, therefore, would be to negotiate a new regional order, retaining a lesser but still substantial strategic role in Asia which would balance China’s power, limit its influence and prevent East Asia falling under Chinese hegemony.
Many people disagreed. They argued that America’s power would remain so much greater than China’s that it was unnecessary for America to make any such concessions. By holding firm, it could face down China, convince it to back off and leave American leadership in Asia unchallenged once more.
Alas, my critics and I were both wrong. We were slow to see the growing rivalry between America and China, and we didn’t recognise, or permit ourselves to acknowledge, how serious the rivalry has become, and how badly it has been going for America. That is because we all underestimated China’s power and resolve, and overestimated America’s. Not only is America failing to remain the dominant power, it is failing to retain any substantial strategic role at all. Many expected that China would falter before it grew strong enough to challenge America on anything like equal terms. Instead, China has kept growing stronger, economically, militarily and diplomatically, and America’s resolve has weakened. Now it is China that is facing down America. That was the clear message of Xi Jinping’s remarkable assertion of China’s status and power at the Nineteenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China, in October 2017. The contest is indeed unequal, but not in the way we thought. So we find ourselves in a new Asia, and we do not like it. But that’s the hand history is dealing us, and we must make the best of it.
We in Australia haven’t seen this coming, because Washington hasn’t seen it coming and we have got into the habit of seeing the world through Washington’s eyes. We have been happy to accept Washington’s assurances that it has China’s measure, and Washington itself has been slow to understand how serious China’s challenge has become and how badly it has mishandled the contest.
More broadly, our recent history has left us ill-equipped to understand what is happening. The contest between America and China is classic power politics of the harshest kind. We have not seen this kind of struggle in Asia since the end of the Vietnam War, or globally since the end of the Cold War. The generations of politicians, public servants, journalists, analysts and citizens who grew up with power politics and knew how it worked have left the public stage. Political leaders like Menzies and Fraser, Curtin and Whitlam, and Hawke, Keating and Howard; public servants like Arthur Tange; journalists like Peter Hastings and Dennis Warner; academics like Hedley Bull, Tom Millar and Coral Bell; and the voters who lived through the wars and struggles of the first three-quarters of the twentieth century: they would all find Asia today much easier to understand than we do. We have a lot to learn and not much time to learn it.
And of course it has been harder to acknowledge what has been happening in Asia because it has been so difficult to imagine where it is taking us. We are heading for an Asia we have never known before, one without an English-speaking great and powerful friend to dominate the region, keep us secure and protect our interests. The fear that this might happen – the “fear of abandonment,” as Allan Gyngell calls it – has been the mainspring of Australian foreign policy since World War II, and indeed long before. But since the Cold War ended – a generation ago now – we have forgotten those old fears and begun to take American power and protection for granted. We have come to depend more and more on America as its position in Asia has become weaker and weaker.
We have been happy to get rich off China’s growth, confident that America can shield us from China’s power. Now it is clear that confidence has been misplaced; we need to start thinking for ourselves about how to make our way and hold our corner in an Asia dominated by China.
That is what this essay is about. It looks first at how America is losing the contest with China, and then at Australia: how we have responded to the US–China contest so far, why we have got it so wrong, and what we can do now to manage the new reality we face.
