Hugh White 揭露美國低估中國

澳大利亞教授休·懷特揭露美國低估中國

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

在本視頻中，休·懷特教授解釋了美國為何低估了中國的實力，以及這對未來全球領導力的影響。

在我看來，尤其是在與中國的競爭中，有兩個關鍵的區別。首先，中國比美國以前遇到過的任何同等競爭對手都強大，尤其是作為經濟強國，中國更加強大。我確實持有一種傳統的觀點，即經濟實力是國家實力的基礎。這並不是說中國不強大，美國也是一個非常強大的國家，但中國相對於美國的實力比自19世紀末美國首次涉足西半球以來的任何國家都要強大。中國的經濟規模遠遠大於美國，現在可能已經是冷戰高峰時期蘇聯相對於美國的兩倍，而且很可能還會進一步擴大。如果我們繼續低估中國在未來幾年的實力，那將是一個真正的錯誤，就像我們在過去25年裏一直低估中國一樣。我們今天麵臨這種困境，是因為我們長期以來低估了中國的力量。我可以說，我們已經我們太長時間高估了美國，理所當然地認為美國是世界上最強大的國家，擁有為所欲為的軍事實力。我們反複發現但似乎仍然沒有吸取教訓的是，盡管美國擁有強大的實力、創造力和所有優點，但它並不像我們想象的那樣強大，也不像我們期望的那樣強大。這意味著，麵對中國的實力和超越中國的野心，美國在亞洲保持領導地位的成本將非常高昂，甚至可能高於冷戰時期保持對蘇聯地位的成本，因為中國現在更強大了。另一方麵，美國麵臨的緊迫性比以前麵對同等競爭對手時要低，這是因為在過去，當美國著手擊敗例如威廉·德國時， 1917年，1941年納粹德國和日本，以及1948年蘇聯及之後的戰爭，在每一次戰爭中，他們都麵臨著真正有望主宰整個歐亞大陸的強國。任何主宰整個歐亞大陸的國家都足以威脅到美國在西半球的本土，這提供了一個非常深刻的、根本性的理由，解釋了為什麽美國應該準備好承擔與這些強國對抗的負擔和代價。但我認為很難說中國有這樣做的前景，因為盡管我對中國相當樂觀，但我認為中國擁有某種優勢，使其能夠主宰歐亞大陸其他國家的可能性非常低，因此，它能夠主宰歐亞大陸並在西半球威脅美國本土的可能性非常低，因此，美國擁有意願、動機和為了在東亞對抗中國，阻止中國成為東亞主要力量，而承擔更高的成本和風險，這種可能性很低，因為我不明白為什麽美國應該承擔這些成本和風險，而且，沒有真正的跡象表明他們這樣做。華盛頓有些人，包括國務卿和國防部長，都在談論新冷戰或類似的言論，但我認為他們仍然低估了中國。我沒有聽到他們清楚地認識到，這將有多大。他們沒有清晰地闡述一項戰略，能夠讓美國在對抗中國方麵獲得合理的成功前景。他們沒有明確認識到這將花費多少，也沒有明確說明為什麽美國必須承諾承擔這些成本。我甚至還沒有提到唐納德·特朗普，但特朗普是其中的重要組成部分，這不僅僅是因為他自己的政策，還因為他的當選反映了華盛頓特區外交政策精英的態度。而是由美國選民決定，因為最終，在自己的半球對抗像中國這樣強大的國家，其規模、成本和風險，都不是馬薩諸塞大道上幾個智庫能決定的，而是由全體美國人民決定。從唐納德·特朗普的當選，從共和黨建製派願意與他合作，以及從民主黨人身上，你都能看到在特朗普時代，民主黨試圖重新定義自身，而政治立場卻鮮有承諾維護美國的領導地位，而美國在亞洲的整個參與模式都依賴於此。鑒於這一切，澳大利亞人必須捫心自問，我們能有多大把握相信美國今天以及未來幾十年會承擔遏製中國的成本和風險？如果我錯了怎麽辦？如果他們真的決定承諾，我們又能有多大把握相信他們會成功？如果我錯了，而他們真的決定承諾，那麽我們將看到的是戰略競爭的升級，進一步加劇了我們在過去幾個月和幾年裏看到的急劇上升的趨勢。現在，華盛頓的每個人，以及澳大利亞的每個人，我想都希望，麵對這種情況，中國會……簡單地退縮，但我認為這再次低估了中國。決心的天平對中國有利，原因很簡單：地理上，我們現在談論的競爭是在東亞，如果競爭發生在西半球，我不會相信。中國有機會，但在中國後院，決心的平衡受地理因素影響很大，我認為中國先於美國退讓的可能性非常低，這意味著如果美國堅持承諾，戰爭的可能性就會上升，在這種情況下，像台灣這樣的問題，戰爭的可能性相當高。從某種意義上說，引發戰爭的問題是什麽並不重要，重要的是美國和中國將發現自己陷入了一場衝突，而衝突的根本驅動力在於誰是亞洲的主要力量，這是一種非常過時的霸權戰爭概念。如果發生這種情況，美國不會輕易取勝，事實上，我認為美國很可能根本不會贏，從某種意義上說，它不會輸，解放軍不會在美國沿著憲法大道前進，但它不會贏，如果不能贏得勝利，如果不能解決，亞洲的舊秩序無論如何都會被摧毀。此外，這場衝突升級為核衝突的可能性很高，而且很有可能演變成一場全麵核戰爭的可能性相當高，所以，如果真是這樣，如果我錯了，如果美國真的下定決心，那將直接導致亞洲和澳大利亞陷入在我看來非常嚴重的災難。無論美國是否下定決心，支持和鼓勵當前的美國政策是否符合澳大利亞的安全利益，我們也會這樣做。我剛才解釋了我們應該做什麽，我們將做什麽，我不知道。實際上，我們很容易繼續像現在這樣滑行，而不做出選擇。

這實際上是係統性的欺騙，告訴美國我們支持他們，同時告訴中國我們不支持。這是澳大利亞目前的政策。我認為，我們能否解決這個問題？我們能否站出來，真正地說“不”，我們不會走這條路。美國正在談論追隨這條路，這將是困難的。由於膽怯和缺乏想象力，我們很容易陷入支持美國。

人們很容易說我們別無選擇，因為人們一直在說這完全是錯誤的。我們確實有選擇。我們確實有選擇，但我們還沒有做出選擇，呃，但是，我注意到的是，澳大利亞政府，包括現任政府，迄今為止，還沒有不認可美國將中國列為戰略競爭對手。我認為，他們還沒有這樣做，不是因為我剛才提出的某種戰略論點，而是因為一個更簡單的原因，比如蓬佩奧先生對中國憤怒的恐懼，以及這會對我們的貿易關係造成什麽影響。

但我認為這表明，他仍然希望蒙混過關，我認為政治雙方都是如此，這讓我想起了20世紀30年代，因為如果你看看澳大利亞在20世紀30年代末局勢惡化時的做法，澳大利亞仍然……澳大利亞政治領導人認識到，新加坡戰略，以及我們對英國的持續依賴，雖然我們如此堅定地致力於此，但……並沒有奏效，但我們根本……無法想象做其他任何事情。因此，我們滑向了新加坡的淪陷，這是我們國家曆史上最大的災難。那麽，我們應該怎麽做呢？有兩個可能性：

我們應該回到美國，並告訴他們，我們認為你們目前正在製定的政策不會奏效，但我們可以鼓勵他們製定一項行之有效的政策。可以想象，美國會製定一項承認中國日益增長的實力的政策，這種政策在美國願意付出努力的情況下是可持續的。這將使美國在亞洲的角色與我們過去所見的截然不同，但這對我們來說比美國撤軍要好得多，因為美國撤軍似乎是最有可能的選擇。我認為大約在2012年左右，澳大利亞本可以這樣做。嗯，我本來可以去那裏，為不同的模式辯護，如果你看看，例如，李顯龍今年6月1日在新加坡發表的重要演講，他就是談論這種事情，我們可以做到，也許我們應該這樣做，但我在這裏要告訴你，我認為時機已經過去，我認為成功的機會現在非常低，所以我們應該做什麽呢？我們應該做的是，做好準備，如果失敗了，我們能做到最好地管理我們的安全，這意味著準備好孤軍奮戰，非常感謝。

Australian Professor Hugh White Reveals US Underestimates China

Rise of Asia 2025年5月15日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DZ4a2Gf2YPY

In this video, Professor Hugh White explains why the United States has underestimated China’s power and what it means for the future of global leadership.

It seems to me in particular that the in the case of the contest with China there are two key differences the first is that China is stronger than any of the peer competitors would be peer competitors that the United States has ever faced before it's stronger as an economic power in particular and I do take an old-fashioned view that economic weight is the foundation of national power that is not to say that China that America isn't strong too it's a very strong country but China is stronger relative to the United States than any country has ever been since the United States
first poked its nose out of the Western Hemisphere at the end of the 19th century its economy is far far bigger probably already now twice as big as the Soviet Union's was relative to America's at the height of the Cold War and is likely to grow much bigger still we would make a real mistake to keep on underestimating China's power for the
next few years as we have done so consistently for the last 25 years we face this predicament today because we've underestimated China's power for so long and I might say we've overestimated the United States for too
long taken it for granted that the
United States is by definition the
world's strongest state by definition
has military power to do whatever it
likes what we've discovered repeatedly
but still don't seem to have learned
from is that the United States for all
its strength and power and creativity
and all the good things about it is not
the power we thought it was and the
power we hoped it would be and what that
means is that the cost to the United
States of preserving its leadership in
Asia in the face of China's power and
ambition to overtake it is going to be
very high it will be co comparable to
and perhaps higher than the cost of
preserving its position vis the Soviet
Union during the cold war because China
is stronger now the other side of the coin is that
the imperatives to the United States are
lower than than they were in previous
enterprises when it confronted um peer
competitors and that's because in the
past when the United States has set out
to defeat for example Wilhham Germany in
1917 or the Nazis and the Japanese in
1941 or the Soviets in 19 48 and onwards
they confronted in each of those
episodes powers which had a real
prospect of dominating the whole of the
Eurasian land mass and any country that dominates the
whole of the Eurasian land mass is
easily going to be strong enough to
threaten the United States at home in
the Western Hemisphere that provided a
very deep fun foundational reason why
the why the United States should be
prepared to bear the burdens and pay the
cost of confronting those very powerful
states but I think it's hard to argue
that China has a prospect of doing that
because although I am pretty bullish
about China I think the chances of China
having a kind of preponderance that
would allow it to dominate the other
countries in Eurasia are very low
therefore the chance of it being able to
dominate Eurasia and threaten the United
States at home in the Western Hemisphere
are very low and therefore the chance of
the United States having the will the
motive the purpose to pay those higher
costs and risks in order to confront
China in East Asia to prevent China
becoming the primary power in East Asia
is pretty low because I just don't see
why the United States should commit
itself to those costs and risks and
moreover there's no real sign that they
are there are people in Washington including
the Secretary of State and the Secretary
of Defense who talk of a new cold war or
language like it but I think they still
underestimate China i don't hear from
them a clear understanding of how big
that will be a clear articulation of a
strategy that would deliver America a
reasonable pro prospect of success in
confronting China no clear recognitions of how much that
will cost and no clear statement of why the
United States has to commit itself to
paying those costs and I haven't even mentioned
Donald Trump but Trump is an important part of
this not because not just because of his
own policies but because of what his
election tells us about the attitude not
of the foreign policy elites in Washington DC but of American voters
because in the end a national effort on
the scale and cost and risk required to
confront a country as powerful as China
in its own hemisphere is not something
that can be decided by a few people in
think tanks up and down Massachusetts
Avenue it needs to be decided by the
American people as a whole and what you
see from the election of Donald Trump
what you see from the willingness of the
Republican establishment to go along
with him and what you see on the
Democrat side of politics as the
Democrats try to redefine themselves in
the Trump era is very little commitment
if any to preserving the US leadership
role upon which this whole model of
American engagement in Asia depends in
the light of all this Australians have
to ask themselves how confident can we
be that America today and in the decades
to come will commit to the costs and
risks of containing China and what if I'm
wrong how sure can we be that they will
succeed if they if I'm wrong and they do
decide to commit because if I'm wrong if
America really is committed then what
we'll see is escalating strategic
rivalry further steps up the trend the
very sharply rising trend that we've
seen in the last few months and years
now everyone in Washington and everyone
in Australia I guess would hope that
that in the face of that China would
simply back off but I think that
underestimates China again the balance
of resolve favors China for the simple
geographical reason that the contest
we're talking about is one in East Asia
if the contest was in the Western
Hemisphere I wouldn't give China a
chance but in China's backyard where the
balance of resolves is so strongly
shaped by geography I think the chances
of China backing off before America does
are very low that means if America
sticks to the to the commitment the
chance of war goes up it's quite high in
this scenario over an issue like Taiwan
in a sense what it doesn't really matter
what the issue that starts it is what's
important is is that the US and China
will find themselves fighting a conflict
whose essential driver is the question
as to which of them is the primary power
in Asia a very old-fashioned conception
of a hegmonic war if that happens America will not win
easily in fact I think the chances are
America will not win at all it won't
lose in a sense the PLA is not going to
march down the constitution constitution
avenue in the United States but but it
will not win and in and in failing to win in
failing to resolve the old order in Asia
will be destroyed anyway moreover the
chance of that conflict escalating to a
nuclear conflict is quite
high and the chance of that becoming a
full-scale nuclear exchange is quite
high so if so if I'm wrong if America is
committed that leads Asia and Australia
directly to what looks to me like a very
serious catastrophe in neither case
whether America's committed or it isn't
are Australia's security interests
served by supporting and encouraging
current US policy so will we anyway i've just
explained what we should do what will we
do i don't know actually it's it's very easy for us to keep
trying to slide along as we're doing at
the moment without making a choice on
this being actually systemically
duplicitous telling the United States
that we are supporting them and telling
the Chinese that we're not that is
Australia's policy today i think whether we can resolve that
whether we can come out and actually say
no we're not going to go down this path
the United States is is is talking about
following is going to be hard it's very
easy to slide into supporting the United
States through timidity and a lack of
imagination it's easy to say we have no
choice as people keep on saying that's
simply wrong we do have a choice we do
have a choice we haven't yet made that choice yet uh
and the but but what it what is notable
to me is that Australian government so
far including the present government
have not have have so far failed to
endorse the American designation of
China as a strategic rival they haven't
done so yet not I think because of a
kind of strategic argument I've just
unfolded but for the simpler reason
going back to Mr pompeo of fear of China's anger and what
it would mean for our trade
relationships but I think what that
shows is he's still hoping to muddle
through and I think this is true of both
sides of politics and that does remind
me of the 1930s because if you look at
what Australia did as things darkened in
the in the late 1930s australia still
Australian political leaders recognized
that the Singapore strategy the
continuing dependence on the United
Kingdom to which we are so heavily
committed was not working but we simply
couldn't imagine doing anything else and
so we slid into the fall of Singapore
and the biggest catastrophe in our
national history so what should we
do well two possibilities one is that we
should go back to the United States and
say we don't think the policy you're
working on at the moment is going to
work but we can encourage them to
develop one that will and it is possible
to imagine a US policy which recognized China's growing
power which was sustainable at an effort
at a level of effort the United States
is prepared to commit it would be a very
different US role in Asia than one we've
seen in the past but it would be much
better for us than than the United
States withdrawing which seems to be the
most likely alternative i think there
was a time around about 2012 when Australia could have done that
could have gone out there and argued for
that different model and if you look at
for example what Lee Shenlong was
talking about his big speech in
Singapore on the 1 of June this year
that was the kind of thing he was
talking about and we could we could do
that and maybe we should but I'm here to
tell you I think the time has passed i
think the chances of that succeeding is
now very low so what should we do
instead prepare for how best we can
manage our security if that fails which
means prepare to stand alone thank you
very much