John Galbraith 新工業國家 New Industrial State

John  Galbraith 新工業國家 New Industrial State 1967 

Technostructure & the "The New Industrial State" by John Kenneth Galbraith

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=meQAKA8SD7w

2023年7月9日

This video reviews John Kenneth Galbraith's book, The New Industrial State. This book essentially makes the argument that capitalism depreciates toward a centrally planned system where the corporate sector and the state merge into a colluding technostructure.

新工業國家

約翰·肯尼斯·加爾布雷斯 1967 年出版的書。1972 年、1978 年和 1985 年出版了三個修訂版。

在書中，加爾布雷斯斷言，在現代資本主義社會的工業部門中，傳統的供需機製被大公司的規劃所取代，這些規劃使用廣告等技術，並在必要時進行垂直整合。

這本書延續了加爾布雷斯 1966 年的 BBC Reith 講座係列——一係列六次廣播，也名為《新工業國家》——他在其中探討了生產經濟學以及大公司對國家的影響。

加爾布雷斯認為，這是因為涉及先進技術的生產過程需要長期規劃（蘇聯社會也用類似的規劃來應對這些相同的技術挑戰），這涉及相當大的額外風險。加爾布雷斯認為，其結果之一是，古典經濟理論中普遍理解的完全競爭不再是對工業部門的有效解釋（盡管它在經濟中仍然由小公司主導的部門仍然有用）。

加爾布雷斯認為，“工業體係”——他指的是（一般而言）控製經濟關鍵部門約三分之二產出的公司——實際上是由技術結構而不是股東控製的；他聲稱技術結構的作用不是最大化利潤（因為這涉及失敗的風險），而主要是維持組織，作為次要目標，確保其進一步擴張。

他說，技術結構的一項主要目標是保持對公司的控製，因此它更喜歡通過留存利潤而不是銀行借款來融資；因此，股東的回報被降低，以確保公司不會冒著自力更生的風險。此外，工業體係的公司促進了非正式價格確定和價格穩定的製度，以確保長期規劃是可行的。

加爾布雷思還斷言，與小型企業最密切相關的傳統風險概念與大型工業企業和企業集團的相關性越來越小。加爾布雷思說，大型企業在獲得長期供應商和勞動合同方麵具有優勢，並且可以使用商品期貨等金融工具來緩解原材料價格的波動，從而降低了風險。大型工業企業對政府經濟和勞工政策的政治影響被認為是另一個因素，它往往會創造穩定的市場條件，而這對於企業的長期生產規劃是必不可少的。

《新工業國家》與加爾布雷思 1958 年的作品《富裕社會》涵蓋了大部分相同的內容，但大大擴展和延伸了這些思想。

<<<<<<>>>>>>>

約翰·肯尼斯·加爾布雷斯：新工業國家

https://beckassets.blob.core.windows.net/product/readingsample/317824/9780691131412_firstchapter.pdf

由普林斯頓大學出版社出版，版權所有 © 2007，普林斯頓大學出版社。保留所有權利。未經出版商書麵許可，不得以任何形式通過任何電子或機械方式（包括影印、錄製或信息存儲和檢索）複製本書的任何部分，但通過萬維網閱讀和瀏覽除外。用戶不得將此文件安裝在任何網絡服務器上。

關注課程使用和其他權限的鏈接。有關更多信息，請發送電子郵件至：
[e-mail]

1. 變革與規劃係統

現代經濟討論的一個好奇心是變革的作用。人們認為它非常偉大；列舉其形式或強調其範圍是為了表明對常識的把握令人放心。然而，並沒有太多變化。除了不滿者之外，所有人都認為美國的經濟體係是一個基本完美的結構。完善已經完善的東西並不容易。雖然發生了巨大的變化，但除了商品產量增加外，一切都與以前一樣。

至於變化，毫無疑問。本世紀，尤其是二戰開始以來，經濟生活的創新和變革無論以何種方式計算都是巨大的。最明顯的是越來越複雜和精密的技術應用於生產。

機器繼續取代原始的人力。而且，隨著它們被用來指導其他機器，它們越來越多地取代人類智力的原始形式。

八十年前，公司仍然局限於那些似乎必須大規模生產的行業——鐵路、蒸汽航行、煉鋼、石油開采和精煉、一些采礦。現在，它還銷售雜貨、磨穀物、出版報紙並提供公共娛樂，所有這些活動曾經都是個體業主或小公司的領域。最大的
公司部署了價值數十億美元的設備和數十萬名工人，分布在數十個地點，生產數百種產品。1974 年底，美國最大的 200 家製造企業（占所有製造企業的十分之一）擁有製造所用資產的三分之二，以及所有銷售額、就業和淨收入的五分之三以上。不僅集中度很高，而且集中度也很高。

1974 年底，最大的 200 家公司在所有製造業銷售額、就業和資產中所占的份額超過了 1955 年最大的 500 家公司所占的份額！

八十年前，公司是所有者的工具，也是他們個性的體現。這些領袖的名字——卡內基、洛克菲勒、哈裏曼、梅隆、古根海姆、福特——在全國聞名。他們現在仍為人所知，但

他們建立的藝術畫廊和慈善基金會以及從政的後代卻鮮為人知。

現在掌管這些大公司的那些人卻無人知曉。在整整一代人的時間裏，底特律和汽車行業以外的人都不知道通用汽車現任負責人的名字。和所有人一樣，他有時在用支票付款時必須出示身份證明。福特、埃克森和通用動力也是如此。現在經營大公司的人並不擁有企業的多少股份。

他們不是由股東選出的，而通常是由董事會選出的，董事會成員自戀地自己選出。

同樣，國家與經濟的關係發生了變化，這也是一個普遍現象。 1 William N. Leonard 的服務，“合並、工業集中和反壟斷政策”，《經濟問題雜誌》，第 10 卷，第 2 期（1976 年 6 月），第 356 頁。

2 第 1 章

聯邦、州和地方政府現在占所有經濟活動的五分之一到四分之一（1976 年為 22%）。1929 年，這一比例約為 8%。2 這遠遠超過了印度這樣一個自稱社會主義國家的政府份額，大大超過了瑞典和挪威這兩個古老的社會民主王國，與波蘭的份額並不完全不相稱，波蘭是一個共產主義國家，但該國農業發達，農業仍為私人所有。所有公共活動的很大一部分（約占政府在商品和服務上的所有支出的三分之一）用於國防和（小得多的項目）太空探索。即使是保守派也不認為這些支出是社會主義。在其他地方，命名法不太確定。

此外，在現在所謂的凱恩斯革命之後，國家承諾監管經濟中用於購買商品和服務的總收入。它力求確保足夠的資金

政府通過購買現有勞動力所能生產的任何東西來獲得權力。而且，政府更謹慎地，有時隻是通過咒語或祈禱，試圖阻止工資推高價格，阻止價格迫使工資持續上升。按照早期的標準，現代商品的生產相對可靠，但遠非完全可靠。

此前，從資本主義最早出現到希特勒戰爭開始，擴張和衰退交替出現，間隔不定，但進程穩定。商業周期已成為經濟研究的一個獨立主題；預測其進程並解釋其不規則性已成為《總統經濟報告》，1977 年，第 187 頁。

變革與計劃係統成為一種謙虛的職業，其中理性、占卜和巫術元素以一種在原始宗教中從未見過的方式結合在一起。二戰後的二十年裏，沒有嚴重的經濟衰退。七十年代中期出現了嚴重的經濟衰退，在住房等行業中非常嚴重。然而，人們普遍認為，這是一項旨在抑製通貨膨脹的蓄意政策的結果，那些最強烈地認為通貨膨脹仍然是一種自然現象的人是這項政策的責任人。

另外三個變化與既定的成就清單關係不大。首先，與商品銷售相關的說服和勸誡手段進一步大幅增長。就其成本和所掌握的才能而言，這項活動正日益與生產商品的努力相媲美。衡量人類對這種說服的接觸和敏感性本身就是一門蓬勃發展的科學。

其次，工會會員占勞動力的比例不再增加。它在 1956 年達到頂峰（25.2%），此後一直下降。

最後，高等教育入學人數大幅增加，同時提供高等教育的手段略有增加。

這被歸因於對大眾啟蒙的全新而深刻的關注。與工會工人比例下降一樣，它有著更深的根源。如果經濟體係隻需要數百萬文盲無產階級，那麽這些很可能就是他們所需要的。

這些變化，或者其中的大部分，已經被廣泛討論過。但通常的做法是將它們孤立地看待，這大大降低了它們的影響。

它們彼此相關，是結果的起因。

所有這些都是更大的變化矩陣的一部分。就其對經濟社會的影響而言，這個矩陣已經超過了其各部分的總和。

因此，人們提到了機器和複雜的技術。而這些又需要大量的資本投入。它們是由技術精湛的人設計和指導的。它們還涉及從生產決策到可銷售產品出現之間的時間大大增加。

這些變化既需要大型商業組織，也為大型商業組織提供了機會。隻有它才能部署必要的資本；隻有它才能調動必要的技能。它還可以做得更多。在結果出現之前投入大量的資本和組織需要有遠見，也需要采取一切可行措施確保預見的事情能夠發生。毫無疑問，通用汽車將比穿著西裝和鬥篷的人更能影響周圍的世界——它購買的價格和工資以及它出售的價格。

這還不是全部。高產量和高收入是先進技術、複雜有效的組織和社會中大群體有效索取收入的能力的成果，它們使很大一部分人口擺脫了物質匱乏的強迫和壓力。

變革和計劃係統

因此，他們的經濟行為在某種程度上變得可塑性強。沒有一個饑餓而清醒的人會被說服把最後一美元花在食物以外的任何東西上。但是，一個吃得好、穿得好、住得好、受到良好照顧的人可以在電動剃須刀和電動牙刷之間做出選擇。除了價格和成本外，消費者需求也受到管理。這增加了一個控製行為的重要因素。

當對技術開發的投資非常高時，錯誤的技術判斷或未能說服消費者購買產品可能會付出極其高昂的代價。如果

國家為更高級的技術發展買單，或為技術先進的產品保證市場。很容易找到適當的理由——國防、國家聲望、公眾的強烈需求，如石油產品的替代品。免於這種行為是社會主義的有害指控是自然而然的。因此，現代技術定義了現代國家日益增長的功能。

技術和相關的資本和時間要求也更直接地導致國家對需求的調節。一家公司在考慮改進汽車時，必須能夠說服人們購買它。同樣重要的是，人們能夠這樣做。這一點至關重要，因為必須提前投入大量的時間和金錢，而且產品在蕭條時期和繁榮時期都很容易進入市場。因此，必須穩定總需求。

富裕增加了對這種總需求穩定的需要。一個生活在生存邊緣的人必須花錢才能生存，他花的錢都花光了。收入充足的人可以儲蓄，但不能保證他的儲蓄會被其他人的支出或投資所抵消。此外，富裕社會的生產力和收入至少部分歸功於大型組織——公司。公司也可以選擇保留或儲蓄收入——並且可以以那些強迫他人節儉的人獨特的正義感來行使這一權利。不能保證個人和公司的儲蓄會被支出抵消。因此，在一個福利很好的社會中，支出和需求的可靠性不如貧窮的社會。當現代技術帶來的高成本和長期孕育需要更大的市場確定性時，它們就會失去可靠性。凱恩斯革命發生在曆史上其他變化使其不可或缺的時刻。與本章開頭提到的其他變化一樣，它與其他變化密切相關，也是其他變化的原因和結果。

III

在經濟學中，與小說和戲劇不同，過早地披露情節並沒有什麽壞處：本書的核心目的是將剛才提到的變化和其他變化視為一個相互關聯的整體。我大膽地認為，當人們像本書一樣努力看清現代經濟生活時，人們會更清楚地看到它。

我還想表明，在這種更大的變化背景下，促使人類努力的力量是如何變化的。這違背了所有經濟假設中最宏偉的假設，即人類在其經濟變革和計劃係統活動中受製於市場的權威。相反，我們擁有的經濟體係，無論其

正式的意識形態如何，在很大程度上都是計劃經濟。決定生產什麽的主動權不是來自主權消費者，他們通過市場發布指令，使生產機製服從於他們的最終意誌。

相反，它來自龐大的生產組織，該組織向前邁進，控製它所服務的市場，並進一步使客戶滿足其需求。並且，這樣做深深地影響了他的價值觀和信仰——包括不少將被動員起來反對當前論點的人。從這一分析得出的結論之一是，工業體係之間存在著廣泛的趨同。決定經濟社會形態的是技術和組織的必要性，而不是意識形態的形象。總體而言，這是幸運的，盡管它不一定會受到那些將智力資本和道德熱情投入到當前市場經濟形象作為社會計劃對立麵的人的歡迎。它也不會受到他們的信徒的歡迎，他們以更少的智力投入，舉著自由市場和自由企業的旗幟，從而將自由國家帶入政治、外交或軍事鬥爭。它也不會受到那些將計劃完全等同於社會主義的人的歡迎。這裏提出的思想以這樣或那樣的形式取得了進展。自 1967 年首次以目前的形式提出以來，已經取得了明顯的進展。但它們還不是共識的思想。

信仰繼續服從於工業必要性和便利性並不符合人類最偉大的願景。它也不是完全安全的。關於這種服從的性質及其危險，我也將詳細闡述。

IV
主題的界限是傳統的和人為的；任何人都不應將其用作排除重要內容的借口。在現代社會思想中，沒有什麽比公共政策決策應該以某種方式按照大學部門和課程劃分的觀念更持久的了。事實並非如此。

在政府中不存在純粹的經濟、政治甚至純粹醫學的判斷。人們也不能對這種努力的實際後果無動於衷，無論人們傾向於將這種漠不關心視為科學超脫的表現。

因此，在後麵的章節中，我將討論經濟變化對社會和政治行為的影響，以及補救和改革。如前所述，我得出的結論是，我們在思想上和行動上都成為了我們為服務自己而創造的機器的仆人，我相信其他人會覺得很有說服力。在許多方麵，這是一種舒適的奴役；有些人會驚奇地，甚至憤慨地看著任何提出逃避的人。有些人永遠不會滿足。我關心的是提出解放的一般路線。否則，我們將允許經濟目標過度壟斷我們的生活，並以犧牲其他更有價值的利益為代價。重要的不是我們商品的數量，而是生活的質量。

我們目前通過軍事手段來支持先進技術的方法極其危險。它可能會讓我們失去生存。我建議采用變革和計劃係統的替代方案。我們的教育係統也有可能過於服務於經濟目標，這也是一種危險。我建議采取保障措施。分析得出了關於個人與其辛勞以及社區與其計劃之間的關係的結論。這些也將被討論。我還討論了現代經濟對訓練有素、受過教育的人力資源的依賴所固有的未實現的政治機會。

所有這些都將在後麵的章節中討論。想要政治平台的人顯然必須努力向上爬。

V
美國商界領袖經常被這樣的想法所吸引：如果要讓這個係統生存下去，就必須對其特征進行更好的教育。在 60 年代中期和 70 年代中期，甚至對政府的懷疑也被壓製了，美國商務部開始為教育工作服務。原因在於，基於對現代企業日常觀察的經濟機構的公眾形象與高管慣常的自我辯護不符。毫不奇怪，高管對應該改變的是公眾形象而不是自己的形象的想法反應良好。商業辯護總是強調眾多企業之間的激烈競爭，這些企業都服從於市場。由此產生的教育總是以小企業為中心——商務部的一個特別引人注目的例子是兩個孩子在樹下經營檸檬水攤。4 換句話說，這種經濟教育認為，通過考察資本很少或沒有資本、由一兩個人指導、沒有複雜的公司結構和沒有工會的企業，可以最好地理解資本主義。它的吸引力部分在於它剝奪了公司高管的所有權力，包括做錯事的權力。它也有堅實的曆史根源：經濟生活始於小公司，資本很少，每個公司都在一個主人的指導下。

最後，一個係統的、內部一致的理論，即市場經濟中的競爭性企業理論，可用於解釋這一現象。這非常適合教學。

但這種對現代經濟體係的看法並沒有得到現實的認可。現在，除了少數懷舊、浪漫和順從的經濟學家之外，它也沒有真正得到認可。本章前麵提到的變化並沒有均勻地分布在經濟中。農業、卡車礦山、繪畫、音樂創作、大量寫作、專業、一些惡習、手工藝、一些零售貿易以及大量修理、清潔、翻新、美容和其他家庭和個人服務仍然屬於個體業主的領域。資本、先進技術、複雜組織和我們並非偶然地認為的現代企業的其他標誌是有限的或不存在的。

但大多數人現在認識到，這並不是經濟中發生上述變化的部分。同樣，它也不是經濟中

你知道你的經濟 ABC 嗎？ 《利潤與美國經濟》，美國商務部，1965 年。

變革與計劃係統將先進技術與大量資本的使用相結合，其中最顯著的表現是現代大公司。幾乎所有的通信、幾乎所有的電力生產和分配、銀行和保險、鐵路和航空運輸、大多數製造業和采礦業、相當一部分零售貿易和相當數量的娛樂都是由大公司進行或提供的。這些數字並不大；我們可以毫無錯誤地認為

大多數工作由幾百家、最多一兩千家大公司完成。這是我們自然而然地與現代工業社會聯係起來的經濟部分。

理解它就是理解最容易發生變化的部分，因此，它對我們的生活影響最大。智力的運用無可厚非，但理解經濟的其餘部分，就隻能理解相對程度正在縮小（盡管它不會消失）且最不容易發生變化的部分。

經濟的兩個部分——一方麵是技術動態、資本雄厚、組織高度完善的公司，另一方麵是數十萬小型傳統業主——非常不同。這不是程度上的差異，而是滲透到經濟組織和行為的各個方麵的差異，包括努力的動機本身。甚至在進一步製定之前，為以大公司為特征的經濟部分起個名字會很方便。一個是現成的；我將稱之為計劃係統。計劃係統反過來又是新工業國家的主要特征。12 第 1 章

The New Industrial State 

1967 book by John Kenneth Galbraith. Three revised editions appeared in 1972, 1978 and 1985.

Discussion

In it, Galbraith asserts that within the industrial sectors of modern capitalist societies, the traditional mechanism of supply and demand is supplanted by the planning of large corporations, using techniques such as advertising and, where necessary, vertical integration.

The book followed Galbraith's 1966 series of BBC Reith Lectures – a series of six radio broadcasts, also titled The New Industrial State – in which he explored the economics of production and the effect large corporations could have over the state.

Galbraith argues that this is made necessary by the long-term planning required for production processes involving advanced technology (and that these same technological challenges were answered with similar types of planning in Soviet societies) which involve substantial additional risk. One of the results of this is, according to Galbraith, that perfect competition as generally understood in classical economic theory is no longer a useful explanation of the industrial sector (although it is still useful in sectors of the economy that are still dominated by small firms).

Galbraith argues that the "industrial system" – by which he means (in general terms) the companies which control around two-thirds of output in key sectors of the economy – are controlled in practice by a technostructure rather than shareholders; he claims that the technostructure does not act to maximise profit (as that involves the risk of failure) but principally to maintain the organisation and, as a secondary aim, to ensure its further expansion.

He says that a key aim of the technostructure is to maintain its control over the company, and so it prefers financing via retained profits to bank borrowing; thus returns to shareholders are lowered to ensure the company does not risk its self-reliance. Furthermore, the companies of the industrial system facilitate a system of informal price fixing and price stability to ensure long-term planning is feasible.

Galbraith also asserts that the traditional notions of risk most closely associated with small enterprise become less relevant to large industrial enterprises and conglomerates. Risk is diminished, Galbraith says, by advantages large enterprises have in securing longer-term supplier and labor contracts, and by the use of financial instruments such as commodity futures to mitigate volatility in raw materials prices. Political influence of large industrial concerns in governmental economic and labor policy is cited as another factor that tends to create the stable market conditions that are necessary for corporations' long-term planning of production.

The New Industrial State covers much of the same ground as Galbraith's 1958 work, The Affluent Society, but substantially expands and extends those ideas.

<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>

John Kenneth Galbraith: The New Industrial State

https://beckassets.blob.core.windows.net/product/readingsample/317824/9780691131412_firstchapter.pdf

is published by Princeton University Press and copyrighted, © 2007, by Princeton
University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers.

Follow links for Class Use and other Permissions. For more information send email to:
[e-mail] 

1. Change and the Planning System

A curiosity of modern economic discussion is the role of change. It is imagined to be very great; to list its forms or emphasize its extent is to show a reassuring
grasp of the commonplace. Yet not much is supposed to change. The economic system of the United States is accepted by all but the malcontent as a largely perfect
structure. It is not easy to perfect what has been perfected. There is massive change but, except as the output of goods increases, all remains as before.

As to the change there is no doubt. The innovations and alterations in economic life in this century, and more especially since the beginning of World War II, have, by any calculation, been great. The most visible has been the application of increasingly intricate and sophisticated technology to the production of things.

Machines have continued to replace crude manpower. And increasingly, as they are used to instruct other machines, they replace the cruder forms of human intelligence.

Eighty years ago the corporation was still confined to those industries—railroading, steam navigation, steel-making, petroleum recovery and refining, some mining—where, it seemed, production had to be on a large scale. Now it also sells groceries, mills grain, publishes newspapers and provides public entertainment, all activities that were once the province of the individual proprietor or the insignificant firm. The largest
firms deploy billions of dollars’ worth of equipment and hundreds of thousands of men in scores of locations to produce hundreds of products. At the end of 1974, the largest 200 manufacturing enterprises in the United States—one tenth of one percent of all manufacturing firms—had two thirds of all assets used in manufacturing and more than three fifths of all sales, employment and net income. Not only is the concentration great but so is the rate at which it proceeds.

At the end of 1974, the largest 200 had a greater share of all manufacturing sales, employment and assets than the largest 500 had in 1955!

Eighty years ago the corporation was the instrument of its owners and a projection of their personalities. The names of these principals—Carnegie, Rockefeller, Harriman, Mellon, Guggenheim, Ford—were known across the land. They are still known, but for
the art galleries and philanthropic foundations they established and their descendants who are in politics.

The men who now head the great corporations are unknown. Not for a generation have people outside Detroit and the automobile industry known the name of the current head of General Motors. In the manner of all men, he must, on occasion, produce identification when paying by check. So with Ford, Exxon and General Dynamics. The men who now run the large corporations own no appreciable share of the enterprise.

They are selected not by the stockholders but, in the common case, by a board of directors which, narcissistically, they selected themselves.

Equally it is a commonplace that the relation of the state to the economy has changed. The services of 1 William N. Leonard, “Mergers, Industrial Concentration, and
Antitrust Policy,” Journal of Economic Issues, Vol. X, No. 2 (June 1976), p. 356.

2 Chapter 1

federal, state and local governments now account for between one fifth and one quarter (in 1976, 22 percent) of all economic activity. In 1929, it was about
eight percent.2 This far exceeds the government share in such an avowedly socialist state as India, considerably exceeds that in the anciently social democratic
kingdoms of Sweden and Norway and is not wholly incommensurate with the share in Poland, a Communistcountry which, however, is heavily agricultural and which has left its agriculture in private ownership. A very large part of all public activity (about one third of all government spending on goods and services) is for national defense and (a much smaller item) the exploration of space. These outlays are not regarded even by
conservatives as socialism. Elsewhere the nomenclature is less certain.

Additionally, in the wake of what is now called the Keynesian Revolution, the state undertakes to regulate the total income available for the purchase of goods and services in the economy. It seeks to ensure sufficient purchasing power to buy whatever the current labor force can produce. And, more cautiously, sometimes only by incantation or prayer, it seeks to keep wages from shoving up prices and prices from forcing up wages in a persistent upward spiral. By earlier standards the production of goods in modern times has been relatively, though far from completely, reliable.

Previously, from the earliest appearance of capitalism until the beginning of Hitler’s war, expansion and recession had followed each other at irregular intervals but in steady procession. The business cycle had become a separate subject of economic study; the forecasting of its course and the explanation of its irregularities had Economic Report of the President, 1977, p. 187.

Change and the Planning System become a modest profession in which reason, divination and elements of witchcraft had been combined in a manner not elsewhere seen save in the primitive religions. In the two decades following World War II, there was no serious depression. In the mid-seventies there was a sharp recession, very severe in such industries as housing. By wide agreement, however, it was the result of a deliberate act of policy to arrest inflation, those holding most vehemently that inflation was
still a natural phenomenon being those responsible for the policy.

Three further changes are less intimately a part of the established litany of accomplishment. First, there has been a further massive growth in the apparatus of
persuasion and exhortation that is associated with the sale of goods. In its cost and in the talent it commands, this activity is coming increasingly to rival the effort
devoted to the production of goods. Measurement of the exposure, and susceptibility, of human beings to this persuasion is itself a flourishing science.

Second, union membership as a proportion of the labor force is no longer increasing. It reached a peak (of 25.2 percent) in 1956 and has since declined.

Finally, there has been a large expansion in enrollment for higher education, together with a somewhat more modest increase in the means for providing it.

This has been attributed to a new and penetrating concern for popular enlightenment. As with the fall in the proportion of workers enrolled by unions, it hasdeeper roots. Had the economic system need only for 3 Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1969 (United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics), Bulletin No. 1630, p. 351;

Handbook of Labor Statistics, 1976 (United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics), Bulletin No. 1905, p. 297.

4 Chapter 1
II
millions of unlettered proletarians, these, very plausibly, are what would be provided.
These changes, or most of them, have been much discussed. But to view them in isolation from each other, the usual practice, is greatly to minimize their effect.

They are related to each other as cause to consequence.

All are part of a yet larger matrix of change. In its effect on economic society this matrix has been more than the sum of its parts.

Thus mention has been made of machines and sophisticated technology. These require, in turn, a heavy investment of capital. They are designed and guided by technically sophisticated men. They involve, also, a greatly increased elapse of time between any decision to produce and the emergence of a salable product.

From these changes come both the need and the opportunity for the large business organization. It alone can deploy the requisite capital; it alone can mobilize
the requisite skills. It can also do more. The large commitment of capital and organization well in advance of result requires that there be foresight and also that all feasible steps be taken to ensure that what is foreseen will transpire. It can hardly be doubted that General Motors will be better able to influence the world around
it—the prices and wages at which it buys and the prices at which it sells—than a man in suits and cloaks.

Nor is this all. The high production and income which are the fruits of advanced technology, complex and effective organization and the ability of large groups in the society to make effective their claim on income have removed a great part of the population from the compulsions and pressures of physical want.

Change and the Planning System 

In consequence, their economic behavior has become in some measure malleable. No hungry man who is also sober can be persuaded to use his last dollar for anything but food. But a well-fed, well-clad, wellsheltered and otherwise well-tended person can be
persuaded as between an electric razor and an electric toothbrush. Along with prices and costs, consumer demand has become subject to management. This adds an important further element of control over behavior.

When investment in technological development is very high, a wrong technical judgment or a failure in persuading consumers to buy the product can be extremely expensive. The cost and associated risk can be greatly reduced if the state pays for more exalted
technical development or guarantees a market for the technically advanced product. Suitable justification— national defense, national prestige, deeply felt public
need, as for alternatives to petroleum products—can readily be found. Exemption from the damaging charge that the action is socialist is automatically forthcoming. Modern technology thus defines a growing function of the modern state.

Technology and associated requirements in capital and time also lead even more directly to the regulation of demand by the state. A corporation, contemplating an automobile of revised aspect, must be able to persuade people to buy it. It is equally important that people be able to do so. This is vital where heavy advance commitments of time and money must be made and where the product could as easily come to market in a time of depression as of prosperity. So there must be stabilization of overall demand.

Affluence adds to the need for such stabilization of aggregate demand. A man who lives close to the margin of subsistence must spend to exist and what he 6 Chapter 1 spends is spent. A man with ample income can save, and there is no assurance that what he saves will be offset by the spending or investment of others. Moreover, a rich society owes its productivity and income,at least in part, to large-scale organization—to the corporation. Corporations also have the option of retaining or saving from earnings—and can exercise it with the unique sense of righteousness of men who are imposing thrift on others. There is no guarantee that this personal and corporate saving will be offset by spending. In consequence, in a community of much wellbeing, spending and hence demand are less reliable than in a poor one. They lose their reliability precisely
when high costs and the long period of gestation imposed by modern technology require greater certainty of markets. The Keynesian Revolution occurred at the moment in history when other change had made it indispensable. Like the other changes with which this chapter began, it is intimately a cause and consequence of yet other change.

III

In economics, unlike fiction and the theater, there is no harm in a premature disclosure of the plot: the central purpose of this book is to see the changes just mentioned and others as an interlocked whole. I venture to think that modern economic life is seen much more clearly when, as here, there is such effort to see it whole.

I am also concerned to show how, in this larger context of change, the forces inducing human effort have changed. This assaults the most majestic of all economic assumptions, namely that man, in his economic Change and the Planning System activities, is subject to the authority of the market. Instead we have an economic system which, whatever its
formal ideological billing, is, in substantial part, a planned economy. The initiative in deciding what is to be produced comes not from the sovereign consumer who, through the market, issues the instructions that bend the productive mechanism to his ultimate will.

Rather it comes from the great producing organization which reaches forward to control the markets that it is presumed to serve and, beyond, to bend the customer to its needs. And, in so doing, it deeply influences his values and beliefs—including not a few that will be mobilized in resistance to the present argument. One of the conclusions that follows from this analysis is that there is a broad convergence between industrial systems. The imperatives of technology and organization, not the images of ideology, are what determine the shape of economic society. This, on the whole, is  fortunate, although it will not necessarily be welcomed by those whose intellectual capital and moral fervor are invested in the present image of the market economy as the antithesis of social planning. Nor will it be welcomed by their disciples, who, with even smaller intellectual investment, carry the banners of free markets and free enterprise and therewith, by definition, of the free nations into political, diplomatic or military battle. Nor will it be welcomed by those who identify
planning exclusively with socialism. The ideas here offered have, in one form or another, been gaining ground. There has been visible movement since they were first offered in the present form in 1967. But they are not yet the ideas of the consensus.

The continuing subordination of belief to industrial necessity and convenience is not in accordance with the greatest vision of man. Nor is it entirely safe. On the
8 Chapter 1 nature of this subjugation, and its dangers, I shall also dwell at some length.

IV
The boundaries of a subject matter are conventional and artificial; none should use them as an excuse for excluding the important. Nothing so persists in modern social thought as the notion that decisions on public policy should somehow divide along the lines of university departments and curricula. They do not.

In government there are no exclusively economic, political, not even any purely medical judgments. Nor can one be indifferent to the practical consequences of an effort such as this, whatever the tendency to celebrate such indifference as a manifestation of scientific detachment.

Accordingly, in the later chapters I turn to the effect of economic change on social and political behavior, and to remedy and reform. As noted, I am led to the
conclusion, which I trust others will find persuasive, that we are becoming the servants in thought, as in action, of the machine we have created to serve us. This is, in many ways, a comfortable servitude; some will look with wonder, and perhaps even indignation, on anyone who proposes escape. Some people are never content. I am concerned to suggest the general lines of emancipation. Otherwise we will allow economic goals to have an undue monopoly of our lives and at the expense of other and more valuable interests. What counts is not the quantity of our goods but the quality of life.

Our present method of underwriting advanced technology by resort to military justification is exceedingly dangerous. It could cost us our existence. Here I suggest
Change and the Planning System alternatives. There is also danger that our educational system will be too strongly in the service of economic goals. Here I suggest safeguards. The analysis leads to conclusions on the relation of the individual to his toil and the community to its planning. These also are discussed. And I deal with the unrealized political opportunities that are inherent in the dependence of the modern economy on trained and educated manpower.

This all comes in the later chapters. The man who wants a political platform must obviously work his way up the stairs.

V
Recurrently American business leaders are captured by the thought that if the system is to survive, there must be much better education as to its character. In the mid-sixties and again in the mid-seventies, even suspicion of government was suppressed, and the
United States Department of Commerce was brought into the service of the educational effort. The reason is that the public image of economic institutions, based on everyday observation of modern corporate enterprise, does not conform to the executive’s accustomed defense of himself. Not surprisingly, he reacts well to the thought that it is the public image, not his own, that should be changed. The business defense invariably emphasizes the vigorous competition of numerous firms, all subordinate to the market. The resulting education as invariably centers on the small enterprise—in a particularly compelling example from the Department of Commerce, it was on the operation of a lemonade stand conducted by two children under the trees.4 This economic education holds, in other words, that capitalism can best be understood by examining enterprises with little or no capital, guided by one or two people, without the complications of corporate structure and where there is no union. Part of its appeal is in the way it removes from the corporate executive all power, including the power to do anything wrong. It also has firm historical roots: economic life began with small firms, with small capital, each one under the guiding hand of a single master.

Finally, a systematic and internally consistent theory, that of the competitive firm in the market economy, is available for the explanation. This lends itself well to
pedagogy.

But this view of the modern economic system is not sanctioned by reality. Nor is it now really sanctioned—a nostalgic, romantic and acquiescent minority apart—by economists. The changes mentioned earlier in this chapter have not spread themselves evenly over the economy. Agriculture, truck mines, painting, musical composition, much writing, the professions, some vice, handicrafts, some retail trade and a large number of repairing, cleaning, refurbishing, cosmetic and other household and personal services are still in the province of the individual proprietor. Capital, advanced technology, complex organization and the other hallmarks of what we have come, not accidentally, to consider modern enterprise are limited or absent.

But this, most now recognize, is not the part of the economy wherein occur the changes just mentioned. Equally it is not the part of the economy which

Do You Know Your Economic ABC’s? Profits and the American Economy, United States Department of Commerce, 1965. 

Change and the Planning System combines advanced technology with massive use of
capital and of which the most conspicuous manifestation is the modern large corporation. Nearly all communications, nearly all production and distribution of
electric power, banking and insurance, rail and air transportation, most manufacturing and mining, a substantial share of retail trade and a considerable amount of entertainment are conducted or provided by large firms.The numbers are not great; we may think without error of most work being done by a few hundred, at the most a thousand or two, large firms.

This is the part of the economy which, automatically, we identify with the modern industrial society.

To understand it is to understand that part which is
most subject to change and which, accordingly, is most
changing our lives. No exercise of intelligence is to be
deplored but to understand the rest of the economy is
to understand only that part which is diminishing in
relative extent (though it will not disappear) and which
is least subject to change.

The two parts of the economy—the world of the
technically dynamic, massively capitalized and highly
organized corporations on the one hand and of the
hundreds of thousands of small and traditional proprietors on the other—are very different. It is not a difference of degree but a difference which invades every aspect of economic organization and behavior, including
the motivation to effort itself. It will be convenient,
even in advance of more formulation, to have a name
for the part of the economy which is characterized
by the large corporations. One is readily at hand;
I shall refer to it as the Planning System. The planning
system, in turn, is the dominant feature of the New
Industrial State.
12 Chapter 1