"建立共同點": 尚達曼總統在美國紐約哥倫比亞大學世界領袖論壇加布裏埃爾·西爾弗紀念演講上的演講與對話記錄
2023 年 11 月 29 日
哥倫比亞大學校長 Minouche Shafik 女士
國際與公共事務學院院長 Keren Yarhi-Milo 女士
SIPA 名譽院長 Merit Janow 女士
法裏德·紮卡裏亞先生
女士們,先生們
感謝米努什總統的熱情介紹。
Minouche 談到她在過去 15 年或更長時間裏以不同的身份認識了我,從她擔任國際貨幣基金組織 DMD 開始。 我應該補充一點,在米努什的所有角色中,有一件事是不變的,那就是她的說服力。 她有能力讓人們聚集在一起解決問題。 我確信哥倫比亞大學也會出現這種情況。
我很高興不久前受邀與大家交談,但我特別高興此時來到這裏。 在與法裏德坐下來之前,讓我先說幾句話。
我們所熟悉的世界正在逐漸瓦解,並且不知道這將在哪裏結束。
我們首先必須認識到哪裏出了問題,以便進行重建,並為樂觀提供新的基礎。
從根本上來說,它與我們所看到的重大危機——戰爭和反人類行為、世界各地前所未有的洪水和幹旱——沒有關係。 它們各自的人力成本和經濟成本都是悲劇性的。 它們還進一步削弱了全球秩序。
但這不僅僅是壞事件和壞演員的問題。 我們必須看得更深入。 看看我們所處的世界中強大的不穩定暗流——地緣政治、生態,甚至我們社會內部的國內暗流。 它們往往是緩慢移動的暗流。 但如果我們繼續忽視這些暗流,我們隻是在等待下一次危機的到來。 我們將應對一場又一場的危機——這將給人類生命、生計以及民主國家和全球秩序的信譽帶來巨大代價。
在全球範圍內,我們看到基於規則的秩序正在衰落。 它表現在很多方麵。 世界上的衝突更加激烈、更加頻繁、更加持久。 對主權的更大威脅,特別是對小國而言。 高度一體化的全球經濟逐漸分裂。 我強調高度一體化,因為高度一體化經濟的分裂所帶來的代價比舊冷戰時期經濟分裂的代價要大得多,因為在一個並不是特別一體化的世界中。 這一次,將付出巨大的代價。
我們還看到人們對多邊主義喪失信心,尤其是發展中國家。
我們必須認識到社會本身正在發生的事情。 他們中的許多人變得比以前更加兩極分化。 它曾經被視為發展中國家的問題。 現在,這是整個成熟民主國家麵臨的一個問題——無論是不同的教育水平、不同的居住地區、不同的認同感、不同的種族,人們之間的分裂。 這種分離是非常令人不安的。
我們必須認識到我們麵臨的最終生存威脅——導致全球變暖加速、生物多樣性喪失以及最不為人所知的全球水危機或全球水循環不穩定的暗流。 全球變暖、生物多樣性喪失和全球水危機這三者共同導致了我們前所未見的極端情況。 去年,我們經曆了人類曆史上最嚴重的幹旱,以及一些最嚴重的洪水和野火。
危險的是,這些暗流——地緣政治和地緣經濟的分裂、國內的兩極分化以及世界生態的不穩定——都有可能跨越臨界點——導致不可逆轉和自我放大的變化,而且我們的發展方向具有高度的不可預測性。 結果。
這就是為什麽我們現在處於一個極度不確定的時代。 不僅僅是高風險,不僅僅是你可以建模或說的東西,嗯,這是一個糟糕的場景,我們必須找到一種對衝它的方法。 我們麵臨著深刻的不確定性和不可預測性,我們不知道這將在哪裏結束。
地緣政治分裂、國內兩極分化、社會和政治以及生態轉變等暗流正在相互交織。 它們相互交織在一起,使這個問題成為我們幾十年來見過的更加複雜的問題。
我們的中心任務必須是在這個充滿不確定性的時刻建立韌性和樂觀態度,並解決和扭轉這些暗流。 沒有完美的解決方案,但我們仍然可以采取大膽的行動來防止我們跨越這些臨界點,
並擊退那些導致我們進入一個極其不確定的世界的力量。
從地緣政治角度來看,美中關係至關重要。 這是緊張的中心軸,將決定我們是螺旋式下降還是穩定下來。 我們知道我們不再處於單極世界,但我們還沒有處於真正的多極世界。 我們當然還沒有進入一個穩定的多極化世界。 可能需要一些時間才能到達那裏。
但與此同時,美中關係確實需要穩定。 拜登總統和習主席最近的會麵暗示著關係的緩和,至少是關係惡化的軌跡得到了暫停。 但緊張的根本根源,即中美之間的技術和經濟競爭仍然存在。 美國和中國之間必須找到一些新的和解,即使在競爭的同時也必須找到戰略信任的新基礎。
世界各地的領導人也必須將和平視為本國人民利益的關鍵。 並認識到,隻有承認並尊重對方的需求,和平才有可能實現。 不消除恐怖主義和極端主義,就不會有和平。 但如果沒有公平的解決方案並為衝突各方帶來希望,也不會有和平。
第二,關於環境危機。 直到二十年前,人們還認為應對環境危機和氣候變化需要進行權衡——今天付出代價才能擁有更美好的未來。 可持續發展需要今天犧牲一些東西,犧牲一些增長。 那是舊的想法。
但我們現在知道,如果我們投資新技術、投資新的增長模式,就不存在真正的權衡。 這個轉型故事需要在很長一段時間內進行更高水平的投資,但這是可以做到的。 這意味著我們可以在全球經濟脫碳的同時保持增長,特別是在發展中國家。 我們必須轉變這種心態,投資於能夠使我們實現可持續增長的解決方案。 請記住,大部分投資都投向了現在必須從棕色向灰色、從灰色向綠色轉變的經濟部門。
全球金融體係並不缺乏用於這些投資的資源。 調動資源需要組織、改革多邊主義以及新的風險承擔方式,並在公共、私營和慈善部門之間公平分擔風險和回報。 可以辦到。
其次,解決國內暗流。 我們在全球範圍內的核心問題實際上在於國內社會和政治動態。
安格拉·默克爾 (Angela Merkel) 2010 年表示,我們在多元文化主義方麵徹底失敗了。 這並不是說多元文化主義失敗了,而是一體化失敗了。 事實上,在太多的社會中,我們在融合方麵完全失敗了。
太多的社會在種族融合和移民融合方麵失敗了。 不同教育程度、不同職業、不同行業、居住在城市、郊區、農村等不同地區的人之間越來越陌生,人與人之間的距離越來越遠,逐漸失去聯係。 相互之間的信任,以及對民主機構(包括政府)的信任。
在許多情況下,我們必須擺脫多元文化主義的概念,這種概念是一床被子,用不同顏色和線的補丁縫合在一起,形成社會的結構。 單獨的補丁隨著時間的推移,每個接縫處都容易磨損,並且織物會被拉開。 我們必須用社會中的不同線編織整個織物,以便我們的生活相互交織,並且我們沒有可以輕易撕開的不同碎片。
最廣泛地說,我們必須重新調整多邊主義和民主的運作方式,以重建樂觀情緒和韌性。
我們必須找到多邊主義在不完美的世界中發揮作用的方法。 世界不再是單極的,也尚未進入穩定的多極化。
多邊主義從來都不是理想的,也從來沒有真正被構建為強大的。 但今天對多邊主義的要求比以往任何時候都更大。 而且供應也較弱。 我們必須建立願意解決全球公域最緊迫挑戰的聯盟,並維護全球競爭中的遊戲規則。 並保持聯盟向新成員開放。
最後,我們必須重新定位我們的民主,使我們的政治不再那麽短期和孤立,從而使民主在實踐中更少分裂。
每個社會肯定有可能認識到投資全球公域符合其自身利益,因為我們都會受到其侵蝕的影響。 必須能夠認識到,今天進行長期投資,而不是積累均勻的資金,才符合每個社會的利益。
未來幾十年的負擔更大。 找到民主方式彌合分歧而不是擴大分歧必須符合我們自己的利益。
我們在這樣做時必須記住,我們所處的世界很容易在我們自己的社會和國際範圍內分裂。
我就到此為止。 我期待著與 Fareed 一起解開其中的一些內容。 謝謝。
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與法裏德·紮卡裏亞對話
法裏德:我想那是大約 25 年前的事了,當時我在新加坡,我開始了一項實踐,這是我在《外交事務》雜誌上進行的一次長時間采訪後得出的結論。 每次我在那裏都會與當時的國務資政李光耀待上幾個小時。 有一次他對我說,我們正在談論教育,他說,我們有一位聰明的年輕印度教育部長,你必須要見見。 我想好吧,我會做作業,然後我問我的朋友基肖爾·馬布巴尼(Kishore Mahbubani)是否願意與當時年輕、聰明的教育部長尚達曼(Tharman Shanmugaratnam)會麵,從那時起,他的地位當然越來越高。 我非常高興地看到,無論是在新加坡還是在世界範圍內,您能夠將自己塑造為真正的政治家知識分子,這非常罕見。 你很好地描述了國際秩序的磨損。 你可以看看俄羅斯和烏克蘭的局勢,也可以看看中東正在發生的事情。 你可以看看中國麵臨的挑戰。
但解決辦法是什麽? 因為,一方麵,解決方案似乎是美國本質上使用硬實力來威懾、打擊、扭轉這些破壞國際秩序的努力。 但這樣做當然會讓世界更加分裂,迫使各國選邊站隊。 這讓我們更難以想象一個大家都聚集在一起唱《Kumbaya》的共識世界。 但如果你不這樣做,俄羅斯的侵略就會持續下去,伊朗破壞中東秩序的努力也會繼續下去。 坦白說,中國欺淩很多亞洲國家的努力仍在繼續。 你如何穿針引線,這是為了維持一個法律和經濟貿易的世界以及你正在談論的各種事情,似乎你需要一些非常強硬的硬軍事力量,或者至少是背後的硬力量 它的。
主席:讓我從這個角度來回答法裏德非常有思想的問題。 首先,隻有在最需要的時候才很難在國際社會中獲得信任。 僅當需要在聯合國就俄羅斯-烏克蘭問題進行投票時,美國才很難獲得發展中國家足夠的支持。 很難召集所有人支持譴責哈馬斯的恐怖行為,並對加沙平民的狂轟濫炸表示憤慨。
當你最需要的時候,想要獲得國際社會的信任是非常困難的。 你必須通過在正常時期滿足各國的需求來做到這一點。 發展中國家的每個人都記得 COVID-19 期間發生的事情——疫苗分配的嚴重不平等、最富裕國家的嚴重庫存過剩。 每個人都記得這樣一個事實:世界對發展基礎設施的投資不足。 大家都記得,世界銀行等開發銀行資本不足,主要是大股東不希望看到增資時出現股權變動,不希望看到中國和新興市場。 世界占有更大的份額。
信任不是這樣建立起來的。 所以我想說,從各國出發,看看他們的需求,找到多邊或通過聯盟組織起來的方法,幫助他們滿足這些需求。 關鍵是,它實際上並不貴。 這些資源不是不能調動,而是可以調動。 世界上並不缺乏財政資源和專業知識來滿足廣大發展中國家的需求。 這是一個疏忽的問題。
法裏德:幾乎可以肯定,我們不會在氣候變化等問題上建立一個完美的國際合作世界。 我認為,你描述的其他一些生態挑戰是對人工智能等事物的監管。 我們隻是不處於美中、更不用說美俄達成協議的時刻,我們會說我們都將坐在桌子旁決定,這些是我們將在人工智能領域做的事情,這些是 我們不會做的事情。 我們將坐下來就碳排放問題達成一項協議。 有沒有一個可行且實際上還不錯的 B 計劃? 我之所以問這個問題,是因為讓我們麵對現實吧,這就是我們將要生活的世界,而不是 A 計劃。當中國在氣候問題上采取所需行動時,這就是 B 計劃,因為它覺得自己想要減少排放,因為 它不想有汙染。 它還希望建立綠色能源領域。 其他國家也這樣做——印度正在嚐試這樣做
在太陽能方麵,中國出於自身原因限製人工智能,美國和歐洲也這樣做。 還有一種不言而喻的,我稱之為隱形全球合作。 沒有人會承認他們在合作,但事實就是這樣。 那裏有一個我們可以想象的世界嗎? 因為對我來說,這確實是我們能得到的最好的。
主席:解決法裏德問題的一種方法是,B 計劃的替代方案是什麽? 由於您所描述的所有原因,A 計劃並不存在。 多邊主義的運作效果不佳。 美國和中國在基本麵、技術和經濟霸權方麵仍然存在分歧,還有很多其他原因。 真正的替代方案是 C 計劃,我們按原樣繼續下去,在某個時候,我認為這甚至會在 2030 年之前發生,最遲在 2035 年發生——情況會變得如此嚴重,因為我們已經跨越了某些臨界點—— 各國政府必須聚集在一起,說我們別再胡鬧了,我們現在必須采取行動。 到時候它會貴得多。 將會出現這樣的情況:一些國家的碳稅比其他國家高得多,一些國家的補貼比其他國家高得多,但無論哪種方式,都會更加昂貴,而且可能相當不公平。
所以,B 計劃,也就是你所說的,當我們不等到 2030 年或 2035 年時,我們現在就現實地接受,無論誰贏得美國下一次選舉或下一次選舉 反過來,美國不會引入碳稅製度。 但是,作為《減少通貨膨脹法案》一部分的補貼、愛爾蘭共和軍、對綠色技術的巨額補貼——經濟學家不喜歡這些東西,也不認為這是最好的解決方案——它們將幫助建立 新技術的規模化。 這些補貼對其他國家不公平,甚至看起來是保護主義,但它將擴大新技術的規模。 你需要這樣規模的投資來讓這些新技術降低成本並使其可行,世界其他地區最終將從中受益。
這可能會導致一場補貼競賽。 發展中國家將無法參與其中,甚至歐洲也可能無法像美國那樣大規模參與。 但它比 C 計劃好,因為 C 計劃是一個等待遊戲。 最好現在就沿著成本削減曲線下降,現在就投資於擴大新技術規模,就像太陽能領域那樣。 如果你看看中國在太陽能領域所做的事情,就會發現通過初始補貼和規模投資大幅降低了成本。
看看要使技術可行需要什麽。 我們不會按照經濟學家希望的方式在全球範圍內實現這一目標,即每個人都盡快將碳稅提高到 150 美元。 從理論上講,這是最有效的解決方案,但它不會發生。 因此,我們必須找到一些方法,讓有能力負擔得起的國家繼續前進。 在某個時候,美國將需要新的財政戰略和收入戰略來維持補貼。 但它現在正在做正確的事情,世界將因此受益。
法裏德:所以讓我概述一下我認為對於我們即將進入的世界來說是相當合理的,在這個世界裏,存在著更偉大的不平等,你認為你已經看到了不平等,但你並沒有看到不平等。 還沒看到什麽。 因為在人工智能和計算能力以及獲得所需規模的能源方麵,美國將處於領先地位,中國將位居第二,幾乎沒有其他國家。 坦率地說,我認為歐洲在很多方麵都落後了,隨著工業轉移到美國,歐洲正在去工業化,因為他們不僅獲得補貼,還獲得較低的稅收,他們的監管結構也較低。 正如你所說,全球變暖已經迫在眉睫。 調整的成本隻有富裕社會才能承擔,這樣紐約市就能夠修建堤壩——我的意思是,荷蘭人在16世紀就這麽做了——而孟加拉國則不會。 對於那些認為我們無法承受這種人類悲劇的人來說,我有消息要告訴你們,敘利亞內戰,你們會對世界能夠承受這一切的程度感到驚訝。
總統:或者蘇丹。
法裏德:現在是蘇丹。 或者你知道,埃塞俄比亞、也門。 為什麽這不是最合理的情況? 這是一個不平等更加嚴重的世界,回顧 20 世紀,我們實際上可能會認為它是一個黃金時代,在 20 世紀末、21 世紀初,你會看到全球不平等現象有所縮小,但情況即將急劇轉變。
主席:我認為這對於全球公域而言是不合理的。 因為無論是全球變暖,還是森林砍伐、生物多樣性喪失以及全球水循環失衡所帶來的所有其他後果,每個人都會受到影響。 孟加拉國發生了什麽
噓,撒哈拉以南非洲發生的事情,世界上距離西雅圖和華盛頓很遠的地區發生的事情,最終將影響全球氣候。 幸運的是,危機正在世界各地發生——幹旱、洪水、野火——所有這些都是由全球生態係統失衡造成的。
現在,民主國家麵臨的挑戰是要認識到,解決這個問題不僅僅是每次我們鄰國發生野火時收拾殘局的問題,而且還包括幫助撒哈拉以南非洲地區的問題。 這對民主國家來說是一個真正的挑戰——認識到遠方發生的事情符合你的利益,並試圖解決和補救。 對於更遙遠的未來——五年後、十年後、甚至五十年後,我們現在就開始為此做好準備,並努力避免最壞的情況,這符合我們的利益。
民主國家從來就不是這樣的。 他們從來沒有著眼於長遠,也從來沒有著眼於全球。 他們總是在相對較短的時間內在國內找到一些共識或平衡。 因此,從長遠來看,為了應對我們所有人都麵臨的全球挑戰,重新構建民主製度是全世界麵臨的一項核心挑戰。
法裏德:你看看歐洲的一項民意調查數據,我一直認為它很能說明問題,那就是當你問人們,他們是否對越來越高的福利支出水平感到滿意時,它與福利支出的程度成反比。 人口的異質性。 換句話說,越多的人長得像你,你就越能接受更高水平的福利支出。 越多的人看起來不像你,你就越不喜歡福利支出的想法。 這正是你的觀點,即在社區很容易被認同、認同和同情的情況下,民主和自由民主會容易得多。 這與我在打開它之前想問你的最後一件事有關——你說了一些關於多元文化主義及其失敗的非常有趣的事情。 我想請你思考如何讓多元文化主義發揮作用,因為你說默克爾的版本是一體化,但它不起作用。
總統:它沒有足夠的整合。 它基本上是一個多樣化的被子。
法裏德:現在,當我問李光耀是什麽讓多元文化主義在新加坡發揮作用時,他總是會說,看,我們有這些社區,但我們讓他們順其自然,我們希望他們保留自己的古老傳統。 我們不希望他們覺得自己是被迫的。 他們必須住在一起。 他們必須學習如何共同生活以及如何參與住房項目,但我們希望他們繼續學習自己的語言。 我們希望他們繼續保持自己的傳統,我們希望他們在公民空間中見麵。 你的意思是你想要一種用這些傳統的線編織而成的織物。 我碰巧認為你是對的,因為舊型號已經不再可用了。 現代性正在推動每個人前進到一個程度,以至於你不能讓這些社區完全保持(分開),即使在新加坡,異族通婚率也在上升得更高。 你自己就有一個多元文化的婚姻。 新加坡的舊模式似乎不適用於 30%、40% 的異族通婚。
那麽世界默克爾麵臨的巨大挑戰是,如何創造共同文化? 對此有答案的國家就是美國,因為我們沒有文化。 我們有一套共同的政治理念,你必須接受。 公平地說,在這一切的背後,有一種你必須接受的英國新教亞文化。 我們剛剛經曆了感恩節——那不是希臘節日,而是來到這裏的英國人的節日——但很大程度上是一種政治文化,你試圖讓人們融入其中。 在歐洲,這並不是造就歐洲國家的原因——造就歐洲國家的是這樣一種想法:“我們這個部落自古以來就生活在這些森林裏,順便說一句,我們殺死了生活在這片森林另一邊的部落 自古以來,我不知道你們阿爾及利亞人在這片森林裏做什麽”。 這一直是歐洲人麵臨的問題。 那麽你的解決方案是什麽?
總統:所以我在這一點上一半同意法裏德的觀點。 新加坡從未追求多元種族主義的熔爐概念。 但我們也沒有追求不同地區的多樣性,我們生活的地方,也讓人們生活的地方——生活在自己的社區,就像巴黎郊區的人一樣,你在不同的學校長大,你有自己的做法,但你 唱同樣的國歌。 我們也沒有這麽做。 實際上,我們采用了一種非常侵入式的集成模型。 將學校係統合並為一個全國學校係統。 大家都參加
相同的學校。 最具有侵入性的是,每個人都住在相同的社區,相同的公寓樓,訪問相同的市場,等待相同的公共汽車站,孩子們玩耍的相同遊樂場。這是一個非常侵入性的集成係統。 那個人就是李光耀。 因此,新加坡社會的結構是由我們所有的線編織而成的。 但他認識到,我們也認識到,它們是不同的線,它們是不同的顏色,甚至是不同的材料,但我們希望它們全部形成社會的共同結構。
歐洲想要一種被子,最初看起來非常好,因為它是一種充滿活力的被子。 多樣性非常明顯。 但當你開始受到來自社會外部或內部的拉扯時,每個補丁之間的接縫就會磨損。 即使是比歐洲一體化程度更高的英國,50%的穆斯林也生活在最底層的10%社區。 這不是一個一體化的社會。 然後我們來到美國,看似一體化,因為它缺乏你所說的文化,但存在種族隔離。 住房、社區中存在係統性的隔離,因此學校也存在有效的隔離。 這是社會經濟和種族的。 這些規則阻礙了住房整合。
我們無法真正互相教導對方什麽是必要的,因為我們來自不同的曆史——新加坡由於建國的不尋常開始,采取了一種非常侵入性的方法,將這些線編織成一個共同的結構,但認識到它們是不同的線。 人們確實希望保留自己的認同感、信仰、文化感。 它給你的生活帶來了一些意義,但你也是新加坡社會共同結構的一部分。 我越來越感覺到,隨著我們作為一個國家的前進,我們必須確保人們不僅將自己視為不同種族和宗教的人,不僅將自己視為擁有新加坡國籍,而且將自己視為具有新加坡國籍的人。 也分享彼此的文化。 對彼此的文化感興趣,說一點語言。 你們不需要會寫,甚至可能不會讀,但會說彼此的一些語言。 最重要的是,一起成長,互相交朋友。 你們可能會結婚,也可能不結婚。 但你們是朋友。 新加坡可以做到這一點。 但如果我們從一開始就沒有這種融合模式——在學校、住房和工作中,這是不可能的。
法裏德:非常有趣的是,這是約翰遜政府在公平住房政策期間所做的努力。 它撞上了白色的抵抗之牆。 如果你看看美國的住房,它會在 1971 年、1972 年左右實現一體化。當白人的強烈抵製變得非常強烈時,尼克鬆認識到了這一點,並利用了它,我們在這個國家的住房一體化水平處於相同水平。 從那時起,你知道,自 1971 年以來,我們今天並沒有比那時更加一體化。
總統:即使在傾向自由主義的州也是如此。
*****
問題和答案
如果中國和台灣發生軍事衝突,新加坡會怎麽做?
在技術進步和全球互聯互通正在重塑我們社會的時代,您對如何增強像我們這樣的年輕一代的能力並做好準備,不僅適應這些變化,而且在促進更加和諧、更加和諧的社會中發揮積極作用有何看法? 公平和可持續的全球未來?
我們都知道,新加坡堅定致力於維護國際規則和多邊關係,但我們也看到,去全球化已經發生,給我們帶來了很多挑戰。 那麽您認為新加坡如何促進區域合作?您已經為促進這種(合作)做出了哪些承諾或努力?
主席:關於台灣,首先如你所知,新加坡相信一個中國政策,多年來我們一直堅持這一政策。 我們處於一個不尋常的位置,與中國大陸和台灣都保持著非常良好的關係,這是雙方都理解的。 現在,如果發生衝突,我們如何反應取決於衝突是如何發生的。 但我想說更根本的是,現在人們試圖預測的內容太多了,就像一場室內遊戲:“中國會攻擊台灣嗎? 是2027年還是2035年? 習近平主席的真正目標是什麽?” 那個客廳遊戲太多了。 事實上,每一個認真的觀察者都知道,中國、台灣和美國都不想發生衝突。 這非常清楚。 我們必須盡一切努力防止任何可能引發衝突的挑釁或事故。 這就是任務,也符合中美兩國不希望發生衝突的利益。 從根本上來說,這意味著不會走向台獨。
第二個問題,一個關於技術進步的廣泛問題。 人工智能將帶來變革
遠遠超越之前的技術進步浪潮的方式。 人工智能可以為世界任何地方(包括發展中國家)的小型企業、個人帶來巨大的幫助。 但我們在人工智能方麵麵臨的挑戰是,認知階層的很大一部分,即從事審計工作、法律起草工作和一整套白領工作的人,可以通過人工智能更輕鬆、更快、更便宜地完成他們的工作。 如今這種情況正在加速發生。
因此,我們必須找到重新賦予每個人權力的方法——首先能夠使用人工智能作為工具,其次,如果他們真的失業了,因為有些人會失去工作,能夠搬家 繼續做其他事情。 在人工智能時代取得成功的社會是那些有能力持續投資於人們的社會,包括在他們職業生涯的中期,甚至是在他們職業生涯的後期。 這就是我們在新加坡所采取的行動。 我們稱之為未來技能。 但這需要持續的投入,而不是僅僅讓企業和個人來解決。 它需要全國性的措施和一些公共投資。 當你從一份工作轉到另一份工作時,它需要不斷的技巧,保留你之前建立的一些技能,並嚐試將其應用到新的領域。
人類固有的技能——情商和某些形式的創造力將受到重視,而這些技能仍然是最智能的機器所無法比擬的。 人力溢價仍然存在。 但我相信,人工智能有必要對勞動力和社會進行更大規模的調整; 它遠遠超出了計算機和互聯網革命所發生的事情。
Fareed:從某種意義上說,你的意思是這些孩子不會因為人工智能而失去工作。 他們把工作丟給了比他們更懂得如何使用人工智能的人。
總統:說得很對。 但它具有深遠的意義,因為它意味著當你從小長大時,你必須以各種可能的方式發展人類的互動、理解、情感上的感知、彼此之間的聯係——因為正是情商 機器做不到。 如果他們這樣做,他們將以更加機器人的方式來做。
第三個問題關於全球化與區域合作。 在這個不完美的世界中,我們保持全球一體化活力的方式之一是通過區域倡議。 我們正在亞洲這樣做,事實上新加坡處於這方麵的最前沿。 之內
東盟,並通過RCEP——一個非常大的貿易聯盟,盡管沒有CPTPP那麽深入——當然還有CPTPP,這是一個高標準的自由貿易協定。 因此,我們在亞洲的努力比大多數其他地區都更加努力,但我們仍保持開放的邊界。 保持幾何體開放且不固定。 英國很可能在明年年中加入 CPTPP。 這不是封閉的地區主義,而是開放的地區主義,是保持全球一體化的一種方式。
您談到共識是處理此類暗流的基本機製。 你的話語所指引的前進道路是清晰的,但管理職責卻並非如此。 所以,我的問題是我們如何促進全球南方的參與和共識? 世界那個地區有這麽多需求沒有得到滿足嗎? 我們如何創建一個包容性框架,然後才能提出這種共識概念? 謝謝。
我有一個關於人口老齡化的問題,因為新加坡將在2026年成為超級老齡化國家。所以,我想知道新加坡將如何在人口老齡化和移民問題以及勞動力市場發展之間保持平衡 。 太感謝了。
我的問題是關於臨界點,以及為什麽它們對於普通大眾來說通常是非常抽象和不真實的。 那麽,政府和學術界在讓這些臨界點對人們來說成為現實,以便采取真正的行動方麵可以發揮什麽作用呢?
主席:關於第一個問題,關於發展中國家以及我們如何達成共識——支持多邊主義的共識,支持市場經濟發展的共識。 首先,全世界必須認識到,撒哈拉以南非洲發生的事情符合我們所有人的利益。 未來 30 年,我們將看到世界人口大幅增長,其中大部分將來自撒哈拉以南非洲地區。 大多數人沒有意識到這一點。 那裏正在出現大量的年輕人口。 如果他們找到工作並且找到體麵的工作,那麽世界仍然是一個和平和繁榮的地方。 如果他們不這樣做,那麽你就會得到我所說的根本不確定性的新元素——強迫移民、全球健康紊亂的爆發以及一係列其他問題。 因此,我們必須利用世界銀行、非洲開發銀行、私營部門來投資非洲,以確保這一大部分人類能夠走上繁榮的階梯。 如果我們不這樣做,那就太糟糕了
很難指望他們能夠就應對全球挑戰達成共識。 如果你不提供基本電力(現在非洲很多人都缺乏這種電力),你就無法真正談論經濟脫碳。 你必須首先讓村莊通電,你必須處理基本問題。 幫助每個國家站穩腳跟,登上繁榮的階梯,這仍然是全球繁榮的基礎,而且有很多方法可以組織它。 它需要人們願意認識到這是國際社會所做的一項投資,而且這不僅僅是援助,而是投資。
關於新加坡成為超級老齡化社會的下一個問題是移民的作用。 我們將不得不繼續依賴移民,但我們必須以正確的速度進行,並引進適量的移民。 沒有一個社會可以簡單地向人們開放邊界。 它不同於商品,也不同於服務,正如法裏德早些時候暗示的那樣,沒有一個社會可以完全向世界各地的人們開放。 你必須以有節奏的方式去做。 最重要的是,你必須整合人員。 如果你不能很好地融入人們,你就必須停下來。 你不能繼續接納越來越多的人。
新加坡的重點是對能夠為經濟做出貢獻的人進行有節製的移民步伐,並找到讓他們融入社會的方法。 並為那些能安定下來的人幫助他們安定下來。 它必須仍然是一個讓新加坡人感到這是他們自己的國家,具有新加坡精神、新加坡人做事方式以及某種新加坡社會意義上的平等主義的國家。 我們必須保持這種狀態。
關於下一個問題,我認為思考這個問題的方法是,我們所處的世界的核心挑戰不是經濟周期。 各國央行和財政部將努力管理周期——繁榮變得過熱,收緊貨幣政策,收縮財政政策,然後一切就會恢複正常。 如果你正處於蕭條時期,你會想方設法增加政府支出、降低利率或注入更多資金。 那是一場循環遊戲。 但我們當今世界麵臨的挑戰與周期無關。 它們與宏觀經濟周期無關。
它們與經濟學家所說的供給側衝擊有關,但即使這聽起來也像是一個抽象概念。 它們真正關注的是衝突和戰爭、流行病、洪水、幹旱和其他與宏觀經濟完全無關的事物。 但經濟政策必須做出回應,而且是以更長期的方式。 不要等到危機來臨。 盡早投資以預防和應對危機。 因為如果你隻是等待危機的到來,那麽代價將非常高昂。 其次,它們給人類生命和生計造成了不可接受的代價。
因此,漸進且在財務上審慎的做法是盡早投資,以預防和應對危機。 我們知道下一次大流行即將到來。順便說一句,我們仍然盲目地進入它——尚未建立適當的全球監測係統; 非洲和許多其他發展中國家仍然缺乏所需的基本基礎設施和初級衛生保健,因此,當時機成熟時,您知道您可以將冷藏的疫苗運送到每個村莊,並將其送到某人的手臂上。 我們仍然沒有基礎設施。 價格不貴。 我們隻需要認真對待它。
我們現在正處於技術創新的新前沿,這就是你在上一個問題中提到的人工智能。 您如何看待新加坡作為一個以服務和貿易為重點的國家在這個新科技時代作為經濟強國保持戰略競爭力?
您在幫助撒哈拉以南非洲投資可持續發展,特別是向綠色產業轉型方麵有何具體計劃?
考慮到印度和新加坡之間長期牢固的經濟聯係和文化聯係,您認為我們兩國的關係如何幫助向世界展示如何促進多元文化社會、文化多元化並最終建立多極社會?
總統:我的感覺是,人工智能將為新加坡帶來巨大的淨收益。 首先,回到讓勞動力中的每個人都能適應這一挑戰,我們是一個小社會,我們有一種在政府企業、工會和社區中的個人之間組織起來的方式,這樣你 可以觸及每一個人。 您可以向他們提供課程或模塊,為他們提供新技能,並幫助他們在職業生涯中不斷前進。 這樣我們就可以組織未來的技能,事實上,我們也打算這樣做。
其次,新加坡缺人。 人工智能實際上是一個推動者,因為它取代了一些新加坡人並不特別熱衷的工作。 例如,我們沒有足夠的人進行編程,而人工智能正在接管
編碼和編程的世界。 隻是給你舉個例子。
第三,我認為由於人工智能,每個領域的創新步伐都將加快。 新加坡的真正優勢在於它是世界上可以快速采用最新創新的地方之一。 您無需站在前沿創造突破性技術。 其中很多將來自矽穀和其他主要中心,其中一些將來自新加坡。 但新加坡必須很快成為一個可以采用新技術並使有趣的概念在商業上可行的地方。
我想說,在非洲,一個重要的機會是農產品。 世界將陷入糧食危機。 它還需要重新思考非洲和南亞的農業,值得注意的是,幾十年來,這些地區的農業基本沒有變化。 如果你看看農業生產力水平,或者南亞或撒哈拉以南非洲地區相同作物的產量,與美國相比,就會發現這是一個巨大的差異。 甚至灌溉係統也已有數百年曆史。 我們種植稻米等主食的方式已有數百年曆史。 因此,這是一個徹底改變農業的機會,使其成為經濟作物和出口作物,農民收入得到提高,同時我們通過不浪費太多水和處理汙染物質來應對全球共同麵臨的挑戰 水。 所以這在非洲是一個真正的機會,我隻是談論農產品行業。 還有其他機會,但非洲仍然沒有一體化。 非洲大陸自由貿易區(AfCFTA)的發展速度緩慢,確實需要給予更多關注。
關於印度。 印度和東南亞有著深厚的文化共性。 新加坡與印度的經濟關係正在蓬勃發展。 它是印度最大的投資者之一,這是一個你想進入的國家。
因此,新加坡在戰略上,並且由於創業活動的天然市場,深深地融入了中國、印度、東南亞、美國和歐洲。 我們與這些主要地區都有聯係,並且我們打算保持這種狀態。 這意味著與印度、中國和世界其他地區的持續接觸。
新加坡必須在這方麵努力工作,不斷向外看,不斷了解我們所在社會的需求和習俗。
29 November 2023
Ms Minouche Shafik, President of Columbia University
Ms Keren Yarhi-Milo, Dean of the School of International and Public Affairs
Ms Merit Janow, Dean Emerita of SIPA
Mr Fareed Zakaria
Ladies and gentlemen
Thanks you for your very kind introduction President Minouche.
Minouche spoke about her knowing me in her different incarnations over the last 15 years or more, beginning in her role as DMD of the IMF. I should add that one thing was constant in Minouche through all her roles, and that was her persuasive power. She had the ability to get people to come together to address issues. And I'm sure that's going to be the case at Columbia.
I was glad to be invited to speak to you some time ago, but am especially glad to be here at this time. Let me make a few remarks, before sitting down with Fareed.
The world we knew is gradually unravelling, and there's no telling where this will end.
We first have to recognise where we are going wrong, so as to rebuild, and provide new bases for optimism.
It doesn't fundamentally have to do with the major crises we are seeing - the wars and offenses against humanity, the unprecedented floods and droughts around the world. They are each tragic for their human costs, and for their economic costs. They also make further dents in the global order.
But it's not just about bad events and bad actors. We have to look deeper. Look at the powerful destabilising undercurrents in the world we are in – geopolitical, ecological and even the domestic undercurrents within our societies. They are often slow-moving undercurrents. But if we keep ignoring those undercurrents, we're just waiting for the next crisis to come. We will be responding to onecrisis after another - at great cost to human life, to livelihoods and to the credibility of both democracies and the global order.
Globally, we are seeing the ebbing of a rules-based order. It shows up in many ways. In more intense, more frequent and longer conflicts in the world. In the greater threat to sovereignty, particularly for smaller nations. And in the progressive fragmentation of what is a highly integrated global economy. And I emphasise highly integrated, because the fragmentation of a highly integrated economy comes at much greater cost than the economic bifurcation of the old Cold War era, in a world which wasn't particularly integrated. This time it will come at great cost.
We also see a loss of faith in multilateralism, particularly on the part of the developing world.
And we have to recognise what's happening within societies themselves. Many of them have become more polarised than they were. It used to be regarded as a developing country problem. It's now a problem across a whole range of mature democracies - that pulling apart of people, whether by different education levels, the different regions in which they live, different senses of identity, different ethnicities. That pulling apart is very troubling.
And we have to recognise the ultimate existential threat we face - the undercurrents that are leading to accelerated global warming, the loss of biodiversity, and least recognised, a global water crisis, or the destabilisation of the global water cycle. The three together - global warming, the loss of biodiversity and the global water crisis are leading to extremities on a scale that we haven't seen before. We had last year, the worst drought in human history, and some of the worst floods and wildfires.
Dangerously, each of these undercurrents – geopolitical and geoeconomic fragmentation, domestic polarisation, and destabilisation of the world’s ecology, are at risk of crossing tipping points – leading to irreversible and self-amplifying changes, with a very high degree of unpredictability as to where we end up.
That's why we are now in an era of radical uncertainty. Not just high risk, not just something you can model or say, well, this is a bad scenario, and we'll have to find a way of hedging against it. We face profound uncertainty, deep unpredictability, and we do not know where this will end.
And the undercurrents are compounding each other - the geopolitical fragmentation, the domestic polarisation, social and political, and the ecological shifts. They are compounding each other in ways which make this a more complex problem that we have seen in decades.
Our central task has to be to build resilience and optimism at this time of radical uncertainty, and to address and rollback these undercurrents. There are no perfect solutions, but there are bold actions which are still within our reach, to prevent us crossing these tipping points, and to roll back the forces that have led us into a radically uncertain world.
Geopolitically, the US-China relationship is central. That's the central axis of tension that will determine whether we spiral down or stabilise. We know we're not in a unipolar world anymore, but we are not yet in a truly multipolar world. And we are certainly not yet in a world of stable multipolarity. It may take some time to get there.
But in the meantime, the US-China relationship does require stability. The recent meeting between President Biden and President Xi hints at a thaw and is at very least a pause in what has been a trajectory of a worsening relationship. But the fundamental sources of tension, that technological and economic competition between the US and China, remain. Some new accommodation will have to be found between the US and China, some new basis for strategic trust even as they compete.
Leaders around the world will also have to view peace as essential to the interests of their own people. And to recognise that peace is only possible if you acknowledge and respect what the other side needs. There will be no peace without an end to terrorism and extremism. But there will also be no peace without solutions which are equitable and provide hope for all sides in a conflict.
Second, on the crisis of the environment. Even up till two decades ago, it was thought that dealing with the environmental crisis and climate change involved a trade-off - you pay a cost today in order to have a better future. Sustainability required sacrificing something today, sacrificing some growth. That was the old thinking.
But we now know that there is no real trade-off, if we invest in new technologies, and invest in new models of growth. That transition story requires higher levels of investment over a long period of time, but it can be done. It means we can keep growing, particularly in the developing world, whilst we decarbonise the global economy. We have to move into this mindset of investing in the solutions that will allow us to have sustainable growth. And remember, most of that investment is in the sectors of the economy that must now make a transition from brown to grey, and from grey to green.
There is no lack of resources in the global financial system for these investments. Mobilising the resources requires organisation, reforming multilateralism, and a new approach to risk-taking, with an equitable sharing of risks and rewards between the public, private and philanthropic sectors. It can be done.
Next, addressing the domestic undercurrents. Our core problems globally are really in domestic social and political dynamics.
Angela Merkel said in 2010 that we had utterly failed in multiculturalism. What it meant was not that multiculturalism failed, but that integration had failed. Indeed, across too many societies, we have utterly failed in integration.
Too many societies have failed in ethnic integration and immigrant integration. And are seeing a growing unfamiliarity between people with different educational levels, people in different professions or walks of life, or who live in different parts of the country – the cities, suburbs, rural areas - a growing distance between people, and a gradual loss of trust amongst each other, and trust in the institutions of democracy, including government.
We have to move away in many cases from a concept of multiculturalism that was about a quilt, with patches of different colours and threads, stitched together to form the fabric of society. Separate patches, that over time, are vulnerable to fraying at each of their seams, and the fabric is pulled apart. We've got to weave the entire fabric with the different threads within our societies, so that our lives are interwoven with one another, and we do not have different patches that can be easily pulled apart.
Most broadly, we have to reorient the ways in which both multilateralism and democracies function, to rebuild optimism and resilience.
We must find ways for multilateralism to work in an imperfect world. In a world that is no longer unipolar, and not yet in a stable multipolarity.
Multilateralism was never ideal, and never truly constructed to be strong. But the demands on multilateralism today are greater than ever before. And the supply is weaker. We have to build coalitions of the willing to address the most urgent challenges of the global commons, and to preserve rules of the game in global competition. And keep the coalitions open to new members.
Finally, we have to reorient our democracies, so that our politics is less short-term and less insular, and so that democracy is less divisive in practice.
It must surely be possible for each society to recognise that it is in its own interests, to invest in the global commons, because we're all going to be affected by its erosion. It must be possible to recognise that it's in each societies’ interests to invest in the long-term today, rather than pile up an even larger burden in the decades to come. And it must be in our own interests to find ways in which democracy bridges differences, rather than widens them.
And we have to do this remembering that we are in a world where we can be very easily pulled apart, within our own societies and internationally.
I'll stop there. And I look forward to unpacking some of this with Fareed. Thank you.
*****
Dialogue with Fareed Zakaria
Fareed: I think it’s about 25 years ago now that I was in Singapore, and I had begun a practice, came out of a long interview I did in Foreign Affairs. Every time I was there spending a few hours with Lee Kuan Yew, who was at that time the Senior Minister. And he says to me at one point, we're talking about education and he says, We've got this bright young Indian Minister of Education you have to meet up. And I thought okay, I will do my homework and I asked my friend Kishore Mahbubani if he would set up a meeting with the then-young, bright Minister of Education Tharman Shanmugaratnam who has of course ascended to higher and higher stratospheres ever since. And it has been an enormous pleasure to see both in Singapore but in the world, the way that you have been able to establish yourself as a genuine statesman intellectual which is very rare. You described very well the fraying of the international order. You can look at Russia-Ukraine, and you can look at what's going on in the Middle East. You can look at China's challenges.
But what is the solution? Because, on the one hand, the solution seems to be that the United States essentially use hard power to deter, combat, reverse these efforts to fray the international order. But of course in doing that, it divides the world more, it forces countries to pick sides. It makes it more difficult to imagine a kind of consensual world in which everyone comes together and sings Kumbaya. But if you don't do that, the Russian aggression stands, Iran's efforts to unravel a Middle East order continue. And China's efforts to frankly, bully a lot of Asian countries continue. How do you thread this needle, which is in order to sustain a world of law and economic commerce and the kinds of things you're talking about, it seems like you need some very tough hard military power or at least hard power at the back of it.
President: Let me take this angle in responding to Fareed’s very thoughtful question. First, it's very hard to summon up trust within the international community only when you need it most. It's very hard for the US to summon up enough support from the developing world only when you need a vote in the UN on Russia-Ukraine. Very hard to summon up support for everyone to both condemn Hamas’ terrorist acts, as well as to express umbrage against the indiscriminate bombing of civilians in Gaza.
It's very hard to just summon up trust in the global community when you need it most. You've got to do it by addressing the needs of nations in normal times. Everyone in the developing world remembers what happened during COVID-19 - the gross inequity in the distribution of vaccines, the vast over-stocking in the wealthiest countries. Everyone remembers the fact that the world has under-invested in the basics of development. Everyone remembers that the World Bank and other development banks have been under-capitalised, mainly because the largest shareholders don't want to see a change in shareholding which will come about when you increase capital, don’t want to see China and the emerging world take on larger shares.
Trust doesn't get built that way. So I would say, start from where countries are, look at their needs, and find ways of organising ourselves multilaterally or through coalitions, to help them address those needs. And the point is, it's not actually expensive. It's not as if these resources can't be mobilised, they can be mobilised. There's no lack of financial resources and expertise in the world to address the needs of the large bloc of developing nations. It's been a matter of neglect.
Fareed: We are almost certainly not going to have a kind of perfect world of international cooperation around things like climate change. Some of the other ecological challenges you describe, I would argue, are regulation of something like artificial intelligence. We're just not in a moment of US-China, let alone US-Russia accord where we are going to say we're all going to sit around the table and decide, these are the things we will do in AI, these are the things we won't do. We're going to sit around the table and come up with an agreement on carbon emissions. Is there a viable Plan B that is actually not too bad? And the reason I ask this because let's face it, this is the world we're going to live in, not Plan A. It is Plan B when China does what it needs to on climate because it feels it wants to reduce emissions, because it doesn't want to have pollution. It also wants to build up the green energy sector. Others do the same - India trying to do that with solar, China reining in AI for its own reasons, the US and Europe do it. And there's a certain kind of unspoken, what I would call stealth global collaboration. Nobody will admit that they're cooperating, but that is in fact what's happening. Is there a world there that we can imagine? Because it does feel to me, that's the best we're gonna get.
President: One way of addressing Fareed’s question is, what's the alternative to Plan B? Plan A doesn't exist for all the reasons you prescribed. Multilateralism is not functioning very well. The US and China still don't see eye to eye on the fundamentals, on technological and economic supremacy, and there are many other reasons. The real alternative is Plan C, where we carry on as we are, and at some point, which I think will happen even before 2030, at the very latest 2035 - the situation would have gotten so grave because we have crossed certain tipping points - that governments will have to get together and say let's stop fooling around, we're going to have to do something now. And it's going to be far more expensive then. It’ll be a situation where some countries have much higher carbon taxes than others, some have much larger subsidies than others, but either way it's going to be much more expensive and probably quite unfair.
So Plan B, which is what you were talking about, when we don't wait till 2030 or 2035, is where we accept now that realistically, under any scenario of who wins the next elections in the United States or the one the next time round, you're not going to get a system of carbon taxes introduced in the US. But the subsidies that are part of the Inflation Reduction Act, the IRA, the very large subsidies for green technologies – the things which economists don't like, and don’t think are the first-best solution - they are going to help build scale in new technologies. The subsidies are unfair to other countries, it even looks protectionist, but it's going to build scale in new technologies. And you need that scale of investment to get these new technologies down the cost abatement curve and make them viable, which the rest of the world eventually benefits from.
It may lead to a subsidy race. Developing countries aren't going to be able to engage in it, even Europe is probably not going to be able to engage in this on the same scale as the US. But it's better than Plan C because Plan C is a waiting game. It’s better to go down that cost abatement curve now, invest now in getting new technologies scaled, the way that it was done in solar. If you look at what China did in solar, to bring the cost down significantly through initial subsidies and going for scale investments.
Look at what's necessary to get technologies viable. We are not going to get there globally the way economists would like, where everyone goes up to a $150 carbon tax as soon as possible. That's theoretically the most efficient solution, but it's just not going to happen. So we've got to find some ways in which countries that can afford it move ahead. At some point the US is going to need a new fiscal strategy and a revenue strategy to sustain the subsidies. But it's doing the right thing now and the world will benefit for it.
Fareed: So let me outline what I think is quite plausible in terms of the kind of world we're going into, which is a world in which there is an even greater, and you think you've seen inequality, you ain't seen nothing yet. Because between AI and computing power and access to the kind of scale of energy you need, the US is going to be in a league of its own, China is going to be second, there are going to be few other countries. Frankly, I think Europe gets left behind in in many ways, Europe is de- industrialising as industries moved to the US because they get not only subsidies, they get lower taxes, they get lower regulatory structure. And as you say, global warming is already upon us. The cost of adjustment is one that will only be able to be borne by a rich society, so that New York City will be able to build dykes - I mean, the Dutch did it in the 16th century - Bangladesh will not. And for those who think we cannot sustain the kind of human tragedy that this involves, I have news for you, the Syrian civil war, you'd be surprised at the extent to which the world can sustain all this.
President: Or Sudan.
Fareed: Sudan right now. Or you know, Ethiopia, Yemen. Why is that not the most plausible scenario? A world of much starker inequality, and that we might look back on the 20th century as actually a kind of golden age where the late 20th, early 21st century, you saw a narrowing of global inequality, but it's about to turn pretty sharply.
President: I think it’s not plausible when it comes to the global commons. Because whether it is global warming or all the other consequences coming about from deforestation, loss of biodiversity, and the imbalance in the global water cycle, everyone is going to be affected by it. What happens in Bangladesh, what happens in Sub-Saharan Africa, what happens in parts of the world that are very far away from Seattle and Washington, are eventually going to affect the global climate. And that is the fortunate part of it, that the crises are coming everywhere in the world - droughts, floods, wildfires - all caused by the global ecosystem going out of balance.
Now the challenge is for democracies to recognise that solving it isn't just a matter of picking up the pieces each time there's a wildfire in our own neighbourhood, but also a matter of helping say Sub-Saharan Africa. And that's a real challenge in democracies - to recognise that something happening far away is in your interests to try to address and to remedy. And something that's a little further out in the future - five years from now, 10 years from now, even 50 years from now, it’s in our interest now to start preparing for it, and trying to avoid the worst.
Democracies were never wired that way. They were never wired to look at the long term, and they were never wired to look at the global. They were always about finding some consensus or balance domestically, for a relatively short period of time. So rewiring democracies for the long term, and for the global challenges that we all face, is a central challenge around the world.
Fareed: You look at one piece of polling data out of Europe that I've always thought is so telling, which is when you ask people, whether they are comfortable with higher and higher levels of welfare spending, it relates inversely with the degree of heterogeneity of the population. In other words, the more people look like you, the more comfortable you are with higher levels of welfare spending. The more people don't look like you, you don't like the idea of welfare spending. And it gets to exactly your point, which is that democracy and liberal democracy is much easier in a circumstance where the community is one that is very easy to identify and identify yourself with and empathise with. And it relates to the last thing I want to ask you before I open it up - you said something very interesting about multiculturalism and how it failed. And I want to ask you to think about the way to make multiculturalism work, because you said Merkel's version was integration and it didn't work.
President: It didn't have enough integration. It was basically a diverse quilt.
Fareed: Now, when I would ask Lee Kuan Yew what made multiculturalism work in Singapore, he would always say, look, we have these communities, but we let them be, we want them to retain their old traditions. We don't want them to feel that they have been forced into it. They have to live together. They have to learn how to live together and in the housing projects, but we want them to continue to learn their languages. We want them to continue to have their traditions and we want them to meet in a civic space. What you are saying is you want a fabric that's woven with the threads of each of these traditions. I happen to think you're right in the sense that that old model is not really available anymore. Modernity is pushing everyone forward to an extent that you can’t have these communities staying completely (apart), intermarriage rates even in Singapore are rising much higher. You yourself have a multicultural marriage. The old model for Singapore seems to be one that isn't going to be applicable if you have 30, 40 per cent inter-marriage.
So then the great challenge that the Merkels of the world face is, how do you create a common culture? And the one country that has an answer here is the US, because we have no culture. We had a shared set of political ideas that you have to buy into. There is, to be fair (that) behind all that, there was a kind of Protestant English subculture that you had to buy into. We just went through things Thanksgiving - that is not a Greek Festival, that was a festival of Englishmen who came here - but there's largely a political culture that you're trying to get people to assimilate around. In Europe, that was not what made European countries - what made European countries was the idea “we, this tribe has lived here in these forests for age immemorial and by the way, killed the tribe that lived on the other side of this forest for age immemorial, and what you Algerians are doing in this in this forest I don't know”. And that has been the problem for the Europeans. So what's your solution?
President: So I half-agree with Fareed on this. Singapore never went for a melting pot concept of multiracialism. But neither did we go for the quilt of diversity in different patches, where we live and let live - live in your own neighbourhoods like they do in the banlieus in Paris, you grow up in different schools, and you have your own practices but you sing the same national anthem. We didn't go for that either. We actually went for a very intrusive model of integration. Combining the school systems into one national school system. Everyone attends the same schools. And most intrusively, everyone lives in the same neighbourhoods, same housing apartment blocks, visits the same markets, same bus stop that you wait at, same playgrounds your kids mess around in. That was a very intrusive system of integration. That was Lee Kuan Yew. So the fabric of Singapore society was woven by all our threads. But he recognised, and we recognise, that they are different threads, they are different colours, even different materials, but we want them all to form a common fabric of society.
Europe went for a quilt and it looked very good initially, because it was a vibrant quilt. The diversity was very apparent. But the moment you start getting pulls on that fabric, coming from outside your society or from within, the seams between each of the patches frays. Even Britain - more integrated than Europe - even in Britain, 50 per cent of all Muslims live in the bottom 10 per cent of neighbourhoods. It's not an integrated society. And then we come to the United States, seemingly integrated because it lacks a culture as you say, but there is segregation. There is segregation in housing, in neighbourhoods, that is systematic, and as a result there's effective segregation by schools. It’s socio-economic and its ethnic. And the rules deter housing integration.
We can't really lecture each other on what's necessary because we come from different histories - Singapore by force of an unusual start to nationhood went for a very intrusive approach of weaving those threads together into a common fabric but recognising that they were different threads. And people did want to retain their own sense of identity, their faith, a sense of their own culture. It gave you some meaning in life, but you were part of a common fabric of Singapore society. And more and more I do feel as we go forward as a country, we've got to make sure that people don't just see themselves as persons of different races and religions, not just see themselves are sharing a Singaporean nationality, but as sharing each other's cultures as well. Taking an interest in each other's cultures, speaking a bit of language. You don't need to be able to write, maybe not even read, but speak some of each other's languages. Most importantly, grow up together, make friends with each other. You might get married or not get married to each other. But you’re friends. And Singapore can do that. But it would not have been possible had we had not had that model of integration from the start – in schools, housing, at work.
Fareed: Very interestingly, this was the Johnson administration's effort during the fair housing policies. And it hit a wall of white resistance. And if you look at housing in America, it gets integrated till about 1971, 1972. When the white backlash becomes very strong, Nixon recognises it, plays on it, and we are at the same level of housing integration in this country. Since then, you know, since 1971, we are no more integrated today than we were then.
President: Even in the liberal leaning states.
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Question and Answer
President: On Taiwan, first of all as you know, Singapore believes in the One China policy and we have been consistent about that through the years. We are in the unusual position of having very good relations with both China and Taiwan, which are understood by both. Now, how we react if there were to be a conflict depends on how the conflict came about. But I would say more fundamentally that there's too much of a parlour game now of people trying to predict: “Is China going to attack Taiwan? Is it 2027 or 2035? What are President Xi Jinping’s real objectives?” There's too much of that parlour game. The fact of the matter is, every serious observer knows that neither China nor Taiwan nor the United States wants a conflict. That's very clear. And we have to do everything we can to prevent any provocation or accident that could provoke a conflict. That's the task, and it abides by the interests of both China and the US in not wanting a conflict to take place. And fundamentally, that means no move to Taiwan independence.
The second question, a broad question about technological advancement. AI is going to be transformative in ways that go well beyond previous waves of technological advancement. AI can be very empowering for the small enterprise, for the individual, anywhere in the world, including the developing world. But the challenge we face with AI is that a significant part of the cognitive class, people doing auditing work, legal drafting, a whole set of white-collar jobs - can have their jobs done much more easily, faster and cheaper by AI. And that that's happening today at an accelerating pace.
So we've got to find ways in which we re-empower every individual - first to be able to use AI as a tool, but second, if they do lose their jobs, because some will lose their jobs, to be able to move on to something else. And the societies that succeed in an AI era are those that are going to have the ability to invest continually in people including in the middle of their career, or even at the later stages of their career. That's what we've embarked on in Singapore. We called it SkillsFuture. But it requires continuous investment, and not just leaving it to enterprises and individuals to sort this out. It requires a national approach, and some public investment. And it requires constant niftiness, as you move from one job to another, retaining some of the skills you built before and trying to apply it to a new area.
There will be a premium on the intrinsic human skills - EQ and some forms of creativity that are still beyond the most intelligent machines. There will still be that human premium. But I believe a more large-scale adjustment in workforces and societies is going to be necessary with AI; it goes well beyond what happened with computers and the Internet revolution.
Fareed: In a sense what you're saying is these kids won't lose their jobs to AI. They lose their jobs to somebody who knows how to use AI better than they do.
President: That’s quite right. But it has profound implications because it means as you grow up from young, you’ve got to develop in every possible way that very human activity of interacting, understanding, sensing each other emotively, associating ourselves with each other –because it's that EQ that the machines can't do. And if they do it, they'll do it in a more robotic fashion.
Third question on globalisation and regional cooperation. In this imperfect world, one of the ways in which we keep global integration alive is through regional initiatives. We're doing it in Asia, and in fact Singapore is very much at the forefront of that. Within
ASEAN, and through the RCEP - a very large trade alliance, although not as deep as the CPTPP - and of course through the CPTPP, which is a high standard free trade agreement. So we are pushing very hard in Asia, more than in most other regions, but we are keeping the boundaries open. Keeping the geometry open and not fixed. The UK is joining the CPTPP very likely by the middle of next year. It is not a closed regionalism but open regionalism, and is a way to keep global integration afloat.
President: On the first question about the developing world and how we build consensus – consensus in favor of multilateralism, consensus in favor of let's say market-based economic development. First, the whole world has to recognise that what happens in Sub Saharan Africa is in all our interests. We're going to see a very large increase in the world's population in the next 30 years, and most of it is going to come from Sub Saharan Africa. Most people don't realise that. A huge bulge of young population that is coming up there. If they get jobs and decent jobs, then the world remains a peaceful place and a prosperous place. If they don't, then you get a new element of the radical uncertainty I was talking about - forced migration, outbreaks of global health disorders, and a whole set of other problems. So, we've got to invest in Africa, using the World Bank, using the African Development Bank, using the private sector, to ensure that this large part of humanity is able to get on a ladder of prosperity. And if we don't do it, it's very hard to expect them to have a consensus in favour of tackling global challenges. If you don't provide basic electricity, which is now lacking for large numbers of people in Africa, you can't really talk about decarbonisation the economy. You've got to first electrify the villages, you got to deal with the basics. Helping every country get on its feet, get on that ladder of prosperity, that’s still the basis for global prosperity and there are ways of organizing it. It requires a willingness to recognise that this is an investment the global community makes, and it’s not simply about aid, but about investment.
On the next question about Singapore becoming a super-aged society, the role of immigration. We will have to continue to rely on immigration, but we will have to do it at the right pace and bring in the right quantity of immigrants. No society can simply open its borders to people. It's different from goods, it’s different from services, as Fareed was hinting at earlier, no society can be completely open to people from all over the world. You've got to do it at a measured pace. And critically, you've got to integrate people. And if you're unable to integrate people well, you just have to stop. You can't keep taking in more and more people.
Singapore's emphasis is on both a measured pace of immigration for people who are able to contribute to the economy, and to find ways in which they can be integrated. And for those who can settle down to help them settle down. It must remain a country where Singaporeans feel, this is their own country, with a Singaporean ethos, Singaporean ways of going about things in a certain Singaporean egalitarianism in the social sense. We’ve got to stay that way.
On the next question, I think the way to think about it, is that we're in a world where the central challenge is not about economic cycles. Central banks and ministries of finance will try to manage the cycles - you have a boom that's getting too hot, you tighten monetary policy, you contract fiscal policy, and things come back down to normal. If you're in a depression, you find ways to boost government spending, lower interest rates or pump in more money. That was a cyclical game. But the challenges we face in the world today are not about cycles. They're not about macroeconomic cycles.
They're about what the economists call supply side shocks, but even that sounds like an abstraction. What they're really about are conflicts and wars, pandemics, floods, droughts, and other things that are quite separate from macroeconomics. But economic policy has to respond, and in a way that is more long-term. Don't wait for crises to come. Invest early to prevent and prepare for crises. Because if you just keep waiting for crises to come, they're extremely expensive. And secondly, they exact an unacceptable cost to human life and livelihoods.
So the progressive and financially prudent thing to do is to invest early to prevent and prepare for crises. We know the next pandemic is coming in. We’re still flying blind into it by the way – a proper system of global surveillance hasn't been set up; Africa and many other parts of the developing world are still lacking the basic infrastructure and primary health care required so that when the time comes, you know you can ship the vaccine in cold storage into every village and get it into someone's arm. We still don't have the infrastructure. It's not expensive. We just need to get down to it.
President: My sense is that AI will be a big, net plus for Singapore. First, going back to that challenge about enabling everyone in the workforce to be able to adjust, we are a small society, and we've got a way of organising ourselves between government businesses, unions, and individuals in the community, such that you can reach every individual. You can make available to them courses or modules that give them new skills, and help them keep moving in their careers. So we can organise the skills of the future and in fact, we intend to do so.
Second, Singapore’s short on people. And AI is actually an enabler because it replaces some jobs that Singaporeans are not particularly keen on doing. We don't have enough people doing programming, for instance, and AI is taking over the world of coding and programming. Just to give you an example.
Thirdly, I think the pace of innovation is going to increase in every sector because of AI. And what Singapore's real strength has to be that it is one of the places in the world where you can very quickly adopt the latest innovations. You don't need to be there at the frontier creating the breakthrough technologies. A lot of it is going to come from Silicon Valley and other major hubs, an some of it will come from Singapore. But Singapore has to be very quick off the mark as a place where you can adopt new technologies and make an interesting concept commercially viable.
On Africa, I would say, a major opportunity is in agrifood. The world is going to run into a food crisis. And it requires rethinking agriculture in both Africa and South Asia, where it has been left largely unchanged, remarkably, for decades now. If you look at levels of productivity in agriculture, or the yields for the same crops in South Asia or Sub- Saharan Africa, compared to say the United States, it's just a vast difference. Even systems of irrigation are centuries old. The way in which we grow staples like rice are centuries old. So this is an opportunity to revolutionise agriculture, so that it becomes a cash crop and an export crop, farmers’ incomes are improved, and we address the challenges of the global commons at the same time by not wasting so much water and disposing of polluted water. So it's a real opportunity in Africa, and I'm just talking about the agrifood industry. There are other opportunities as well, but Africa is still not integrated. The African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) has been slow in the uptake and it really needs to be given a lot more attention.
On India. India and Southeast Asia have deep cultural commonalities. Singapore’s economic relationship with India is booming. It is one of the largest investors in India, It's a country that you want to be in.
So Singapore is strategically, and because of the natural market of entrepreneurial activity, deeply plugged into China, India, Southeast Asia, and the United States and Europe. We are plugged into each of these major regions and we intend to keep it that way. And it means constant engagement in India, in China and in the rest of the world.
Singapore has to work hard at that, keep looking outward, and keep understanding the needs and the mores of the societies that we're operating in.