歐洲央行行長 Christine Lagarde 戰略評估 經驗教訓

歐洲央行行長 Christine Lagarde 戰略評估 經驗教訓

戰略評估：經驗教訓

Strategy assessment: lessons learned

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp250630_1~ba0ef03e6f.en.html

Sintra, 30 June 2025  辛特拉

歐洲央行行長克裏斯蒂娜·拉加德在歐洲央行2025年中央銀行論壇“適應變化：宏觀經濟轉型與政策應對”開幕式上的致辭

正如尼采所說：“我們的未來決定了我們今天的法律。”

四年前，當我們上次回顧我們的戰略時，我們的思維方式很自然地受到了近期曆史的影響：過去十年的低通脹，以及疫情的衝擊。

但正如尼采所警告的那樣，讓過去主導我們的思維是危險的。有時，正是我們對未來——盡管我們對此仍知之甚少——正在塑造我們的現在。

在那次評估之後不久，世界發生了我們未曾預料到的變化。

疫情過後，各國經濟重啟，帶來了重大的行業轉型。俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭引發了能源市場的根本性轉變。

地緣政治格局被顛覆，重塑了全球貿易。勞動力市場的結構性變化日益明顯——這主要受人口結構變化、技術轉型和工人偏好變化的驅動。

鑒於所有這些發展，我們戰略的基本麵依然保持良好——理應如此，因為一個健全的戰略必須能夠應對不斷變化的環境。

事實證明，我們2%的對稱通脹目標能夠有效地穩定預期，即使在近代經濟史上一些最嚴重、最持久的衝擊中也是如此。

我們的中期導向為吸收巨大衝擊提供了必要的靈活性——有助於降低通貨緊縮給經濟帶來的總體成本，同時仍能使通脹及時回升至目標水平。

因此，我們認為無需重新審視這些核心支柱——正因如此，我們將剛剛完成的這項工作稱為戰略評估而非回顧。

我們工作的核心主題是更新框架，以便貨幣政策能夠在我們麵臨的新型衝擊麵前繼續保持價格穩定。

今晚，在不低估其他經驗教訓的情況下，我想強調這項工作得出的三個關鍵結論。

它們涉及新環境的性質、我們如何評估由此產生的風險，以及我們如何調整反應函數以維護新世界中的價格穩定。

不斷變化的環境

最近幾周，一個詞主導了公眾辯論：不確定性。

這是我們戰略評估得出的首批關鍵結論之一：未來的世界更加不確定——而且這種不確定性可能會使通脹更加波動。

首先，我們看到明顯的跡象表明，供給衝擊正在變得更加頻繁。

歐洲央行工作人員基於模型的分析表明，在近期通脹飆升期間，此類衝擊在推動通脹方麵發揮的作用遠超過去二十年。即使在今天，供給側力量仍在雙向產生通脹風險。

其次，我們看到越來越多的證據表明，更頻繁的供應中斷導致企業更頻繁地調整價格，從而加劇了通脹波動。

這並非簡單地從近期衝擊中推斷出來。相反，它反映了企業在持續較高的不確定性條件下運營方式的結構性轉變。

研究表明，在這種環境下，企業往往會對衝擊（尤其是供應衝擊）做出更快的反應，以防範未來潛在的損失。[1] 與此同時，它們更有可能采取更靈活的定價策略，這意味著價格不僅可能對重大衝擊做出反應，也可能對較小的摩擦和局部擾動做出反應。[2]

第三，如果通脹波動加劇，我們可能會看到價格兩端都呈現非線性。

在我們上一次的戰略評估中，我們正確地關注了長期過低通脹環境下出現的非線性動態——利率最終會被推至其有效下限。這種限製反過來又會加劇通脹預期，並有可能造成一個自我實現的低通脹陷阱。我們對再次出現下行通脹衝擊的可能性保持警惕。

但近期經驗也揭示了上行方麵也存在非線性因素。

由於企業通常提價速度快於降價速度，更頻繁的價格調整意味著通脹可能會因大幅上行衝擊而迅速上升。如果工資隻是逐漸適應這些價格上漲——正如我們近年來所看到的那樣——那麽隨著工資增長緩慢跟上，通脹可能會在更長時間內保持在目標水平之上。這反過來又會增加通脹預期在上行過程中脫錨的風險。[3]

評估風險分布

接下來的問題是：如果經濟環境變得更加動蕩，我們如何才能確保我們的經濟

評估是否更穩健？

巨大的衝擊可能引發反饋回路和非線性效應，這必然會導致更廣泛的可能結果。在一個不確定性更高的世界裏，用替代風險情景來增強基線預測就顯得尤為重要。

正因如此，我們評估的第二個關鍵結論是，貨幣政策需要采用係統性但又因地製宜的方法，將風險和不確定性納入考量。

歐洲央行多年來一直運用情景分析和敏感性分析——自全球金融危機以來，歐洲央行一直在部署內部情景分析，並在疫情期間首次發布。

但我們近年來的經驗凸顯了情景分析在高度不確定時期的特殊優勢。

一個明顯的例子是俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭及其造成的能源價格衝擊。在這種情況下，情景分析提供的洞見是我們基線預測和圍繞基線進行的標準敏感性分析都無法完全捕捉到的。

例如，在2022年3月——入侵發生僅幾周後——我們根據市場隱含的能源期貨價格，基線預測當年通脹率約為5%。敏感性分析顯示通脹率略高，約為5.5%。相比之下，烏克蘭戰爭情景已預示通脹率將超過7%，接近最終的年度8%以上。

與此同時，事後看來，發布情景分析有時可能有助於我們的政策製定和溝通。

例如，2021年疫苗接種速度和疫情後重啟的性質存在高度不確定性，包括歐元區乃至全球商品和服務行業的供需變化。[4]

情景分析本可以幫助說明可能的通脹結果範圍異常廣泛，並降低向公眾傳遞虛假確定性的風險。

因此，我們更新後的戰略致力於確保我們的政策決策不僅考慮最可能的通脹和經濟走勢，還考慮相關的風險和不確定性，包括通過恰當運用情景分析和敏感性分析。

反應函數

那麽，如果我們知道未來的道路可能更加不確定，我們的反應函數應該是什麽呢？

在我們上次的戰略評估中，我們明確承認了有效下限帶來的風險。我們的戰略聲明呼籲，當政策利率接近下限時，應采取“特別有力或持續”的行動。

這種“不對稱”的關注點源於政策空間的不對稱及其可能產生的下行通脹偏差。麵對巨大的通貨緊縮衝擊，下限持續製約著貨幣政策。

但近期通脹飆升揭示了上行非線性——隨之而來的是，需要一個雙側反應函數，無論是在力度方麵還是在持續性方麵。這是我們戰略評估的第三個關鍵結論。

這不是針對小幅或暫時的偏差做出反應，而是對可能在任一方向上脫錨通脹預期的通脹動態做出對稱的承諾。

當通貨緊縮衝擊有可能將政策利率推向下限時，盡早采取有力行動有助於最大限度地縮短接近該約束的時間。同樣，當通脹超調加劇了頻繁價格調整和分階段工資反應之間形成反饋回路的風險時，一開始就采取有力的緊縮措施是穩定預期的關鍵。

我們以前所未有的速度進行了曆史上最大的加息，開啟了最近的政策周期。我們的分析表明，如果我們沒有采取行動，通脹預期脫錨的可能性在2022年和2023年將超過30%。[5]

同時，這一政策周期也為最佳政策路徑提供了新的視角。

我們上次戰略評估的一個洞見是，當利率接近下限時，堅持可以取代強硬——有助於以更少的副作用實施必要的政策立場。然而，直到最近，這一概念才被廣泛應用於緊縮周期。

通常情況下，強力緊縮政策會呈現倒V型走勢——先快速加息，隨後相對迅速降息。但隨著利率進一步下行，進一步緊縮的成本和副??作用也會隨之增大。

此時，將重點從強力轉向持久性可能成為最佳選擇——即使原則上沒有限製政策空間的上限。

模型模擬支持這一觀點：強力和持久性可以相互替代，兩者都能夠實現必要的通貨緊縮。但與持續加息相比，持久性尤其有助於限製經濟和金融穩定成本。

這已在我們的自身經驗中得到證實。當我們

在我所說的“維持階段”之後，我們更加重視持續性維度。[6] 這使得通貨緊縮進程得以穩步推進，而所謂的“犧牲率”與以往的通貨緊縮時期相比仍處於曆史低位。[7]

基於這一經驗，管理委員會認為，其應對機製的最佳描述是“需要采取適當有力或持續的貨幣政策行動，以應對通脹在任何一個方向上持續大幅偏離目標的情況”。

為此，我們所有的工具仍然在我們的工具箱中。但“適當”一詞至關重要，因為它強調了工具的選擇以及我們使用它們的強度必須體現比例。

結論

最後，我來總結一下。

我們的戰略評估一直在不斷演變，而非革命——事實上，其中的許多結論已經反映在我們當前的政策行為中。

麵對近期的通脹衝擊，我們最初采取了強有力的措施，隨後則持續采取行動，力求盡快將通脹率控製在目標水平，同時盡可能避免痛苦。

情景分析正在幫助我們更好地理解未來的各種風險，以及如何以最佳方式應對這些風險。

例如，我們對潛在美國進口關稅的情景分析幫助我們應對了充滿不確定性的全球貿易格局，同時也使我們能夠更清晰地傳達影響我們當前貨幣政策立場的雙重風險。

在6月份的上一次貨幣政策新聞發布會上，我將我們的貨幣政策立場描述為“處於良好狀態”。

在完成本次戰略評估後，我想補充一點，我們的貨幣政策戰略也處於良好狀態——經驗不斷強化，並更有能力應對未來的挑戰。

用尼采的話來總結一下：“知道為什麽而活的人，幾乎可以承受任何生存方式。”

即使我們周圍的世界發生了變化，我們也清楚自己的目標。我們將竭盡所能實現這一目標——確保歐洲人民的價格穩定。

Kase, H. 和 Rigato, R. (2025)，《歐元區的貨幣政策、供給衝擊和投入產出聯係》，油印本。

Arndt, S. 和 Enders, Z. (2024)，《不同通脹製度下的供給衝擊傳導》，工作論文係列，第938號，法國央行，1月；Khalil, M. 和 Lewis, V. (2024)，《不確定時期的產品周轉率和內生價格靈活性》，經濟政策研究中心討論論文係列，第18941號，巴黎和倫敦，3月22日。

Lagarde, C. (2025)，《新時代的穩健戰略》，在由歌德大學貨幣與金融穩定研究所主辦的第25屆“歐洲央行及其觀察者”會議上的演講，法蘭克福，3月12日。

Lagarde, C. (2021)，《非典型複蘇時期的貨幣政策》，在9月28日法蘭克福舉行的歐洲央行中央銀行論壇“超越疫情：貨幣政策的未來”上的演講。

Christoffel, K. 和 Farkas, M. (2025)，《管理通脹預期脫錨的風險》，歐洲央行工作論文係列，即將出版。

拉加德，C. (2024)，《構建對未來道路的信心》，在歐洲央行及其觀察員第24屆會議上的演講，該會議由法蘭克福歌德大學貨幣與金融穩定研究所主辦，美因河畔法蘭克福，3月20日。

德意誌聯邦銀行 (2024)，《全球通貨緊縮進程及其成本》，《月報》，7月。

Strategy assessment: lessons learned

https://www.ecb.europa.eu/press/key/date/2025/html/ecb.sp250630_1~ba0ef03e6f.en.html

Sintra, 30 June 2025

Introductory speech by Christine Lagarde, President of the ECB, at the opening reception of the ECB Forum on Central Banking 2025 "Adapting to change: macroeconomic shifts and policy responses"

As Nietzsche once observed, “it is our future that lays down the law of our today.”

When we last reviewed our strategy four years ago, our thinking was shaped – quite naturally – by the recent past: a decade of too-low inflation, compounded by the pandemic.

But as Nietzsche warned, there is a danger in letting the past dominate our thinking. Sometimes, it is the future – still dimly understood – that is already shaping our present.

And soon after that review, the world changed in ways we had not foreseen.

The reopening of our economies after the pandemic brought about major sectoral shifts. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine triggered a fundamental shift in energy markets.

The geopolitical landscape was upended, reshaping global trade. And structural changes in labour markets became increasingly apparent – driven by demographics, technological transformation, and evolving worker preferences.

Given all these developments, the fundamentals of our strategy have held up well – as they should, because a sound strategy must be robust to a changing environment.

Our symmetric 2% inflation target has proven effective in anchoring expectations – even through some of the most severe and persistent shocks in recent economic history.

And our medium-term orientation has provided essential flexibility to absorb an extremely large shock – helping to reduce the overall cost of disinflation to the economy, while still enabling a timely return of inflation to target.

We therefore saw no need to revisit these core pillars – which is why we refer to the exercise we have just concluded as a strategy assessment rather than a review.

The central theme of our work has been to update the framework so that monetary policy can continue to deliver price stability in the face of the new types of shocks we are confronting.

This evening, without downplaying the other lessons learned, I would like to highlight three key conclusions that have emerged from this work.

They concern the nature of the new environment, how we assess the risks that arise from it, and how we have adjusted our reaction function to safeguard price stability in this new world.

The changing environment

One word has dominated the public debate in recent weeks: uncertainty.

And this is one of the first key conclusions from our strategy assessment: the world ahead is more uncertain – and that uncertainty is likely to make inflation more volatile.

First, we see clear signs that supply shocks are becoming more frequent.

Model-based analysis by ECB staff shows that, during the recent inflation surge, such shocks played a much greater role in driving inflation than they had over the previous two decades. And even today, supply-side forces continue to generate inflation risks in both directions.

Second, we see mounting evidence that more regular supply disruptions are leading firms to adjust prices more frequently – thereby contributing to greater inflation volatility.

This is not simply an extrapolation from the most recent shock. Rather, it reflects a structural shift in how firms operate under conditions of permanently higher uncertainty.

Research shows that, in such an environment, firms tend to react more quickly to shocks – especially supply ones – in order to protect against potential future losses.[1] At the same time, they are more likely to adopt more flexible pricing strategies, which means prices may respond not just to major shocks, but also to smaller frictions and local disruptions.[2]

Third, if inflation becomes more volatile, we could see non-linearities on both sides.

In our last strategy review, we rightly focused on the non-linear dynamics that emerge in a prolonged environment of too-low inflation – where interest rates are eventually pushed to their effective lower bound. That constraint can, in turn, feed into inflation expectations and risk creating a self-fulfilling low-inflation trap. And we remain alert to the possibility of renewed downside inflation shocks.

But recent experience has also revealed non-linearities on the upside.

Since firms are generally quicker to raise prices than to lower them, more frequent price adjustments mean inflation can rise quickly in response to large upside shocks. If wages then adjust only gradually to these price increases – as we saw in recent years – inflation may remain above target for longer as wage growth slowly catches up. This, in turn, can raise the risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring on the upside.[3]

Assessing the distribution of risks

The next question that follows is: if the economic environment becomes more volatile, how can we make our economic assessment more robust?

Large shocks can trigger feedback loops and non-linear effects that inherently give rise to a broader range of possible outcomes. In a world of higher uncertainty, it is all the more important to augment the baseline with alternative risk scenarios.

This is why the second key conclusion of our assessment is the need for monetary policy to take into account risks and uncertainty, using a systematic but context-specific approach.

The ECB has used both scenario and sensitivity analysis for many years – deploying internal scenarios since the global financial crisis and publishing them for the first time during the pandemic.

But our experience in recent years has underscored the particular strength of scenario analysis in times of elevated uncertainty.

A clear example is Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the resulting energy price shock. In that case, scenarios provided insights that neither our baseline projections nor standard sensitivity analyses around the baseline could fully capture.

For instance, in March 2022 – just a few weeks after the invasion – our baseline projected inflation at around 5% for that year, based on market-implied energy futures. The sensitivity analysis suggested a slightly higher figure of about 5.5%. In contrast, the Ukraine war scenario already pointed to inflation exceeding 7% – close to the final annual figure of over 8%.

At the same time, there were moments when – in hindsight – publishing scenarios could have supported both our policymaking and our communication.

One example was the high uncertainty in 2021 about the speed of vaccine rollout and the nature of post-pandemic reopening, including the sectoral shifts in supply and demand across goods and services sectors, both in the euro area and globally.[4]

Scenario analysis could have helped in illustrating that the range of possible inflation outcomes was unusually wide – and reduced the risk of projecting false certainty to the public.

This is why our updated strategy commits to ensuring that our policy decisions account not only for the most likely path of inflation and the economy, but also for the surrounding risks and uncertainty – including through the appropriate use of scenario and sensitivity analyses.

The reaction function

So what should our reaction function be, if we know that the road ahead is likely to be more uncertain?

In our last strategy review, we explicitly acknowledged the risks posed by the effective lower bound. Our strategy statement called for “especially forceful or persistent” action when policy rates are close to the lower bound.

This “asymmetric” focus was grounded in the asymmetry of policy space and the downward inflation bias it can produce. The lower bound continues to constrain monetary policy in the face of large disinflationary shocks.

But the recent inflation surge has revealed upside non-linearities – and with them, the need for a two-sided reaction function, both in terms of forcefulness or persistence. This is the third key conclusion of our strategy assessment.

This is not about reacting to small or temporary deviations, but about a symmetric commitment to respond to inflation dynamics that could de-anchor inflation expectations in either direction.

When disinflationary shocks risk pushing policy rates towards the lower bound, acting forcefully early on helps minimise the time spent near that constraint. Likewise, when inflation overshoots raise the risk of a feedback loop between frequent price adjustments and staggered wage responses, forceful tightening at the outset is key to anchoring expectations.

We began our recent policy cycle with historically large rate hikes delivered at an unprecedented pace. Our analysis shows that, had we not acted, the probability of inflation expectations de-anchoring would have exceeded 30% in 2022 and 2023.[5]

At the same time, this policy cycle also offered new perspectives on optimal policy paths.

One insight from our last strategy review was that, when rates are near the lower bound, persistence can substitute for forcefulness – helping to deliver the necessary policy stance with fewer side effects. Until recently, however, this concept had not been widely applied to tightening cycles.

Typically, forceful tightening follows an inverted V-shape – with rapid rate increases followed by relatively swift cuts. But as rates move deeper into restrictive territory, the costs and side effects of further tightening also grow.

At that point, it can become optimal to shift the focus from forcefulness to persistence – even if, in principle, there is no upper bound constraining policy space.

Model simulations support this insight: forcefulness and persistence can act as substitutes, both capable of delivering the necessary disinflation. But persistence, in particular, can help limit the economic and financial stability costs compared with continued rate increases.

This was borne out in our own experience. When we entered what I described as the “holding phase”, we placed greater weight on the persistence dimension.[6] This allowed the disinflation process to advance at a steady pace, while the so-called “sacrifice ratio” remained historically low compared with previous disinflation episodes.[7]

Reflecting this experience, the Governing Council considers that its reaction function is best described as requiring “appropriately forceful or persistent monetary policy action in response to large, sustained deviations of inflation from the target in either direction.”

To this end, all our instruments remain available in our toolkit. But the word “appropriately” is important, as it underscores that the choice of instruments, and the intensity with which we use them, must reflect proportionality.

Conclusion

Let me conclude.

Our strategy assessment has been an exercise in evolution, not revolution – and in fact, many of its conclusions are already reflected in our current policy conduct.

We responded to the recent inflation shock with initially forceful and then persistent action, aiming to steer inflation back to target as swiftly as necessary, but as painlessly as possible.

And scenario analysis is helping us to better understand the range of risks ahead – and how best to respond to them.

For example, our scenarios on potential US import tariffs have helped us navigate an uncertain global trade landscape, while also enabling us to communicate more clearly the two-sided risks shaping our current monetary policy stance.

At our last monetary policy press conference in June, I described our monetary policy stance as being “in a good place”.

Following the conclusion of this strategy assessment, I would add that our monetary policy strategy is also in a good place – strengthened by experience, and better equipped for the challenges of the future.

To close the circle with Nietzsche: “he who has a why to live can bear almost any how.”

Even as the world changes around us, we know our purpose. And we will do whatever is necessary to deliver on it – ensuring price stability for the people of Europe.

1. Kase, H. and Rigato, R. (2025), “Monetary Policy, Supply Shocks, and Input-Output Linkages in the Euro Area”, mimeo.

2. Arndt, S. and Enders, Z. (2024), “The Transmission of Supply Shocks in Different Inflation Regimes”, Working Paper Series, No 938, Banque de France, January; Khalil, M. and Lewis, V. (2024), “Product turnover and endogenous price flexibility in uncertain times”, CEPR Discussion Paper Series, No 18941, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Paris and London, 22 March.

3. Lagarde, C. (2025), “A robust strategy for a new era”, speech at the 25th “ECB and Its Watchers” conference organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 12 March.

4. Lagarde, C. (2021), “Monetary policy during an atypical recovery”, speech at the ECB Forum on Central Banking “Beyond the pandemic: the future of monetary policy”, Frankfurt am Main, 28 September.

5. Christoffel, K. and Farkas, M. (2025), “Managing the risks of a de-anchoring of inflation expectations”, Working Paper Series, ECB, forthcoming.

6. Lagarde, C. (2024), “Building confidence in the path ahead”, speech at The ECB and its Watchers XXIV Conference, organised by the Institute for Monetary and Financial Stability, Goethe University, Frankfurt am Main, 20?March.

7. Deutsche Bundesbank (2024), “The global disinflation process and its costs”, Monthly Report, July.