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理查德·沃爾夫 – 美國領導人對中國政策存在分歧
2023 年 8 月 4 日
https://braveneweurope.com/richard-d-wolff-u-s-leaders-are-split-on-china-policy
美國麵臨的困難現實是，隨著中國不斷邁向世界第一，美國對世界第二大經濟體的經濟依賴不斷加深。
理查德·D·沃爾夫 (Richard D. Wolff) 是馬薩諸塞大學阿默斯特分校經濟學名譽教授，也是紐約新學院大學國際事務研究生項目的客座教授
本文由獨立媒體研究所的一個項目“全民經濟”製作
一方麵，美國的政策旨在限製中國的經濟、政治和軍事發展，因為中國現已成為美國的主要經濟競爭對手，進而成為美國的敵人。 另一方麵，美國的政策力求確保美國公司在與中國的貿易和投資中獲得諸多利益。 美國關於兩國經濟“脫鉤”與“去風險”的溫和版本的爭論，雙方都體現了美國對華政策的分歧。
美國麵臨的困難現實是，隨著中國不斷邁向世界第一，美國對世界第二大經濟體的經濟依賴不斷加深。 同樣，中國近幾十年來驚人的快速增長使其陷入了與美國市場、美元和美國利率的複雜經濟相互依賴之中。 與此形成鮮明對比的是，蘇聯和俄羅斯都沒有給美國提供過與中國現在相比的經濟機會或競爭挑戰。 在這種背景下，請考慮世界銀行 2022 年俄羅斯、德國、中國和美國 GDP 數據：分別為 1.5 萬億美元、3.9 萬億美元、14.7 萬億美元和 20.9 萬億美元。
美國主要政黨和軍工聯合體的政治右翼長期以來一直主導著美國主流媒體如何對待美國的外交政策。 特別是在過去十年裏，媒體越來越多地指責中國積極擴大其全球影響力、國內獨裁主義以及針對美國的政策。 近幾十年來，大企業利益推動了一種截然不同的美國外交政策，優先考慮美國和中國之間的有利可圖的共存。 美國的政策在這兩個極點之間分裂和搖擺。 有一天，摩根大通銀行的傑米·戴蒙和美國財政部長珍妮特·耶倫前往北京支持利益共同點，而與此同時，拜登總統卻給習近平貼上了“獨裁者”的標簽。
冷戰的曆史和遺產使美國媒體、政治家和學者習慣於對共產主義及其與之相關的政黨和政府進行誇張的譴責。 右翼政治勢力一直渴望更新反蘇、冷戰邏輯和口號，用來反對中國政府和共產黨作為持續的惡棍。 舊問題（台灣和香港）和新問題（維吾爾人）標誌著一場持續的運動。
然而，隨著冷戰結束並隨著蘇聯的解體而崩潰，尼克鬆和基辛格重新與已經開始從未停止過的經濟發展浪潮的中國建立了聯係。 來自七國集團（G7）體係舊中心（西歐、北美和日本）的資本家紛紛向中國投資，從其相對較低的工資和快速增長的內部市場中獲利。 過去50年來，消費品和資本貨物從中國的工廠流向世界各地的市場。 中國深深地融入了全球供應鏈。 中國的出口帶來了美元支付的流入。 中國將其中許多美元借給美國財政部，為其不斷增長的預算赤字提供資金。 中國與日本一起成為全球最大債務國美國的兩大債權國。
中國將其積累的美元投資於美國國債，導致美國國債在過去半個世紀中快速上升。 這有助於美國保持低利率，從而推動美國經濟增長並從幾次經濟危機中複蘇。 中國相對低價的出口反映了其低工資和積極的政府發展支持。 這些年的大部分時間裏，對美國的出口有助於防止通貨膨脹。 反過來，低價格減少了雇員要求提高工資的壓力，從而支撐了美國資本家的利潤。 通過這些以及其他方式，美中關係深深植根於美國資本主義的運作和成功之中。 切斷這些聯係可能會給美國帶來非常不利的經濟後果。
此外，許多支持這種削減的建議都是無效的和不明智的幻想。 如果美國政府可以迫使美國和其他跨國公司關閉在中國的工廠，它們很可能會轉移到其他低工資的亞洲地區。 他們不會返回美國，因為美國的工資和其他費用太高，因此沒有競爭力。 他們要去的地方都需要從中國采購原料，中國已經是他們最具競爭力的生產國。 簡而言之，迫使資本家離開中國，對美國的幫助最小，對中國的傷害也最小。 對美國微芯片製造商關閉中國市場同樣是一個錯誤的幻想。 如果無法進入蓬勃發展的中國市場，美國公司將無法與其他未排除在中國市場之外的國家的芯片製造商競爭。
美國資本主義需要大部分中國出口產品的流入，並需要融入中國市場。 美國大型銀行需要進入中國快速增長的市場，否則歐洲、日本和中國的銀行最終將超越美國銀行。 即使美國能夠迫使或操縱七國集團銀行加入美國主導的退出中國的行列，中國的銀行及其在印度、俄羅斯、巴西和南非（金磚國家）的盟友的銀行也將控製其獲得有利可圖的融資的機會。 中國的增長。 從GDP總量來看，金磚國家的經濟體係已經超過了七國集團的經濟體係，而且差距還在不斷拉大。
如果美國在沒有核戰爭的情況下在經濟、政治和/或軍事上恢複對中國的冷戰遠征，結果可能會導致美國資本主義出現重大混亂、損失和代價高昂的調整。 當然，核戰爭的風險更大。 除了美國右翼的極端分子之外，沒有人願意冒這樣的風險。 美國的七國集團盟友肯定不這麽認為。 他們已經在想象自己在一個兩極世界中所期望的未來，這個世界分為衰落和崛起的霸權，或許還有其他國家的反霸權集團。 世界大多數國家都認識到中國的持續增長和擴張是當今世界經濟的主要動力。 大多數人同樣將美國視為反對中國崛起為全球超級大國的主要對手。
中美關係觀察人士有多少？ 衝突失誤是其根源和塑造者位於兩個超級大國內部雇主與雇員階級衝突的極端緊張和矛盾之中。 美國的這些階級衝突回應了這個基本問題：誰的財富、收入和社會地位將不得不承擔適應霸權衰落成本的主要負擔？ 過去30-40年的財富向上再分配會持續、停止還是逆轉？ 美國各地日益高漲的勞工鬥誌和美國右翼準法西斯主義的複興是否預示著即將到來的鬥爭？
中國的顯著提升迅速將農村、貧困、農業經濟轉變為城市、中等收入和工業經濟。 西歐的平行轉型持續了幾個世紀，並引發了深刻、痛苦和暴力的階級鬥爭。 在中國，這一轉變花費了幾十年的時間，因此可能造成更深刻的創傷。 那裏會爆發類似的階級鬥爭嗎？ 它們是否已經在中國社會的表麵下建立起來了？ 全球南方可能是全球資本主義——由雇主與雇員之間的生產核心所定義的體係——最終走向其利潤最大化崇拜的終結之地嗎？
美國和中國的經濟體係都是圍繞工作場所組織組織起來的，其中少數雇主支配著大量受雇雇員。 在美國，這些職場組織大多是私營企業。 中國呈現出一種混合體製，企業既有私營企業，也有國有企業，但兩種類型的工作場所組織共享雇主與雇員的組織。 該組織的典型特征是雇主階層積累的財富遠遠多於雇員階層。 此外，富有的雇主階層也可以而且通常也確實購買了主導的政治權力。 由此產生的經濟和政治不平等會引發緊張、衝突和社會變革。
這一現實在美國和中國都已經確立。 例如，美國自 2009 年以來一直沒有提高每小時 7.25 美元的聯邦最低工資。兩個主要政黨都有責任。 耶倫發表講話，哀歎美國不平等現象日益加深，但這種現象仍在繼續加深。 按照指責受害者的傳統，美國資本主義傾向於將貧困歸咎於窮人。 習近平還公開擔心不平等現象加劇：對於自稱社會主義的國家來說可能更為緊迫。 盡管中國已采取重大措施來減少最近極端的經濟不平等，但這些不平等仍然是一個嚴重的社會問題。 美中衝突不僅取決於兩國內部的階級衝突和鬥爭，也取決於兩國之間的政策。
中國正在適應美國分裂政策方針的曲折。 它為兩種可能發生的情況做好了準備：激烈的經濟民族主義助長的殘酷競爭可能包括軍事戰爭或共同計劃的和平經濟共存。 當中國等待美國決定如何引導美國經濟的未來時，中國的增長可能會持續下去，趕上並超越美國的全球經濟足跡。 中國過去30年取得的驚人的經濟增長成就確保了中國卓越的私營和國有企業的混合經濟，並受到強大政黨的監督和服從。 一個焦慮的世界正等待著資本主義的下一個篇章，資本主義總是危險地不平衡的階級鬥爭和民族鬥爭。
Richard D. Wolff – U.S. Leaders Are Split on China Policy
The difficult reality for the United States is economic dependence on the world’s number two economy that deepens with China’s relentless march toward becoming the world’s number one.
Richard D. Wolff is professor of economics emeritus at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst, and a visiting professor in the Graduate Program in International Affairs of the New School University, in New York
This article was produced by Economy for All, a project of the Independent Media Institute
On the one hand, U.S. policy aims to constrain China’s economic, political, and military development because it has now become the United States’ chief economic competitor and thus enemy. On the other hand, U.S. policy seeks to secure the many benefits to the United States of its companies’ trade with and investments in China. U.S. debates over “decoupling” the two countries’ economies versus the milder version of the same thing—“de-risking”—exemplify, on both sides, U.S. policy’s split approach to China.
The difficult reality for the United States is economic dependence on the world’s number two economy that deepens with China’s relentless march toward becoming the world’s number one. Likewise, China’s stunningly rapid growth over recent decades entangled it in a complex economic codependence with the U.S. market, the U.S. dollar, and U.S. interest rates. In stark contrast, neither the Soviet Union nor Russia ever offered the U.S. economic opportunities or competitive challenges comparable to what China now does. In this context, consider World Bank 2022 data on GDPs in Russia, Germany, China, and the United States: $1.5 trillion, $3.9 trillion, $14.7 trillion, and $20.9 trillion, respectively.
The political right wings of both major U.S. political parties and the military-industrial complex have long prevailed in shaping how U.S. mainstream media treat the country’s foreign policies. Over the last decade especially, the media has increasingly accused China of aggressively expanding its global influence, of authoritarianism at home, and of policies targeting the United States. Over recent decades, big business interests promote a quite different U.S. foreign policy prioritizing profitable coexistence between the United States and China. U.S. policy splits and oscillates between these two poles. One day Jamie Dimon of JPMorgan Chase bank and U.S. Treasury Secretary Janet Yellen go to Beijing to support mutuality of interests while at the same time, President Biden labels Xi Jinping a “dictator.”
The history and legacy of the Cold War accustomed U.S. media, politicians, and academics to traffic in hyperbolic denunciations of communism plus parties and governments they link to it. Right-wing political forces have always been eager to update anti-Soviet, Cold War logics and slogans for use against China’s government and Communist Party as continuing villains. Old (Taiwan and Hong Kong) and new issues (Uyghurs) mark an ongoing campaign.
Yet as the Cold War wound down and then collapsed with the USSR’s demise, Nixon and Kissinger reconnected with a China already launched on an economic development surge that never stopped. Capitalists from the system’s old centers in the G7 (Western Europe, North America, and Japan) poured investments into China to profit from its relatively much lower wages and its rapidly growing internal market. Over the last 50 years, consumer goods and capital goods flowed out of factories in China to markets around the world. China became deeply entangled in global supply chains. Exports from China brought an inflow of payments in U.S. dollars. China lent many of those dollars back to the U.S. Treasury to fund its growing budget deficits. China joined Japan as the two major creditor countries of the United States, the world’s greatest debtor country.
China’s investment of its accumulating dollars in U.S. Treasury bonds helped to enable the fast-rising U.S. national debt over the last half-century. That helped keep U.S. interest rates low to fuel U.S. economic growth and its recoveries from several economic crashes. China’s relatively low-priced exports reflected its low wages and active government development supports. Those exports to the United States helped prevent inflation over most of those years. In turn, low prices reduced pressures from employees for higher wages and thereby supported U.S. capitalists’ profits. In these and still other ways, U.S.-China connections became deeply embedded in the functioning and success of U.S. capitalism. Cutting those connections would risk very adverse economic consequences for the United States.
Moreover, many proposals favoring such cutting are ineffective and ill-informed fantasies. If the U.S. government could force United States and other multinational corporations to close up shop in China, they would most likely move to other low-wage Asian locations. They would not return to the United States because its wages and other expenses are too high and thus non-competitive. Where they do go will entail sourcing inputs from China, already their most competitive producer. In short, forcing capitalists to leave China will help the United States minimally and hurt the Chinese minimally as well. Closing off the China market for U.S. microchip-makers is likewise a faulty fantasy. Without access to the booming Chinese market, U.S.-based companies will be uncompetitive with other chip-makers based in countries not closed out of the Chinese market.
U.S. capitalism needs the inflow of most Chinese exports and needs inclusion in China’s markets. U.S. megabanks need access to China’s fast-growing markets or else European, Japanese, and Chinese banks will eventually outcompete the U.S. banks. Even if the United States could force or maneuver G7 banks to join a U.S.-led exit from China, China’s banks and those of its allies in India, Russia, Brazil, and South Africa (the BRICS) would control access to the profitable financing of China’s growth. In terms of aggregate GDPs, the BRICS are already a bigger economic system, taken together, than the G7 taken together, and the gap between them keeps widening.
Were the United States to pursue its resumed Cold War crusade against China—economically, politically, and/or militarily without nuclear warfare—the results could risk major dislocations, losses, and costly adjustments for U.S. capitalism. With nuclear warfare, of course, the risks are still larger. Other than extreme parts of the U.S. right wing, no one wants to take such risks. The United States’ G7 allies surely do not. Already they are imagining their desired futures in a bipolar world split between falling and rising hegemons and perhaps counterhegemonic groupings of other nations. Most of the world recognizes China’s relentless growth and expansion as the major dynamic of today’s world economy. Most likewise see the United States as the major antagonist tilting against China’s rise into a global superpower position.
What many observers of the China-U.S. clash miss are those of its causes and shapers located in the extreme tensions and contradictions besetting the employer-employee class conflicts within both superpowers. Those class conflicts in the United States respond to this basic question: whose wealth, income, and social position will have to bear the major burden of accommodating the costs of declining hegemony? Will the redistribution of wealth upward across the last 30-40 years persist, be stopped, or be reversed? Are rising labor militancy across the United States and the quasi-fascistic resurging U.S. right wing foretastes of struggles to come?
China’s remarkable ascension rapidly transformed a rural, poor, agricultural economy into an urban, middle-income, and industrial economy. The parallel transformation in Western Europe took centuries and occasioned profound, bitter, and violent class struggles. In China, the transformation took a few decades and was likely the more profoundly traumatic for that reason. Will similar class struggles erupt there? Are they building beneath the surface of Chinese society already? Might the Global South be where global capitalism—the system defined by its employer-versus-employee productive core—goes finally to play the endgame of its profit-maximization fetish?
Both the United States and China display economic systems organized around workplace organizations where a small number of employers dominate a large number of hired employees. In the United States, those workplace organizations are mostly private enterprises. China displays a hybrid system whose enterprises are both private and state-owned and operated, but where both types of workplace organizations share the employer-versus-employee organization. That organization typically features the employer class accumulating far more wealth than the employee class. Moreover, that wealthy class of employers can and usually does buy dominant political power as well. The resulting mix of economic and political inequality provokes tensions, conflicts, and social change.
That reality is already well established in both the United States and China. Thus, for example, the United States has not raised its federal minimum wage of $7.25 per hour since 2009. Both major political parties are responsible. Yellen gives speeches bemoaning the deepening inequalities in the United States, but the deepening persists. In the tradition of blaming the victim, American capitalism tends to fault the poor for their poverty. Xi Jinping also worries openly about deepening inequalities: likely more urgent in nations calling themselves socialist. Even though China has taken significant steps to reduce its recently extreme economic inequalities, they remain a serious social problem there too. The U.S.-China clash depends as much on each nation’s internal class conflicts and struggles as it depends on their policies toward one another.
China adjusts to the twists and turns in the United States’ split policy approach. It prepares for both eventualities: cutthroat competition abetted by intense economic nationalism possibly including military warfare or a conjointly planned peaceful economic coexistence. As China awaits the United States’ decisions on which way to guide the United States’ economic future, China’s growth will likely continue, matching and then surpassing the United States’ global economic footprint. China’s stunning economic growth success across the last 30 years secures China’s remarkable hybrid economy of private and state enterprises supervised by and subordinated to a powerful political party. An anxious world awaits the next chapter in capitalism’s always dangerously uneven mix of class and national struggles.
