揚言“出兵台海”，美國為什麽不認為自己“違法”

揚言“出兵台海”，美國為什麽從來不認為自己“違法”？

田士臣 經士智庫創始人兼國際軍事行動法研究中心主任 2023-02-24 

【導讀】 "他們一方麵熱烈討論美國不可避免地對假定的兩岸衝突進行軍事幹預的情況，另一方麵似乎從不忘記批評中國政府'和平統一但不承諾放棄使用武力'的政策，然而他們始終忘記討論——或者說視而不見——的問題是：美國的這種幹預是否存在合法性和正義性。"

近日，解放軍退役上校、經士智庫創始人兼總裁在《南華早報》撰文指出，美國擊落中國無人民用飛艇，違反了《聯合國憲章》的基本原則，開了一個危險的先例。美方無端將中國維護主權的行為視作“侵略”，卻完全無視自身揚言“軍事幹涉台海”的行為是徹頭徹尾的“違法”。

以下為中文譯文及原文。

【文/田士臣 何柳】

正如美軍射擊中國氣球違反了聯合國禁止非法使用武力的原則一樣，美國如有任何對台海衝突的軍事幹預，都會使之成為中國領土的侵略者。

早在美國前眾議院議長南希·佩洛西竄訪台北之前，台灣問題就一直是美國政府官員以及國會、學術界和智庫人士深入、頻繁和定期辯論的話題。最新討論的焦點是新當選的眾議院議長麥卡錫可能竄訪台灣，以及中國國防部為其竄訪後果所做的軍事準備。

但是，他們一方麵熱烈討論美國不可避免地對假定的兩岸衝突進行軍事幹預的情況，另一方麵似乎從不忘記批評中國政府“和平統一但不承諾放棄使用武力”的政策，然而他們始終忘記討論——或者說視而不見——的問題是：美國的這種幹預是否存在合法性和正義性。

根據國際法，美國對兩岸衝突進行軍事幹預的法律依據是什麽？要回答這個問題，我們需要研究美國可能進行軍事幹預的原因。

智庫與美國專家的對話顯示，約80%的受訪者提到了“保衛民主”。另有15%的人援引了《與台灣關係法》(Taiwan Relations Act)，盡管這隻是美國的國內法。另外5%的人坦率地承認，從戰略上、地緣政治上和軍事上講，美國不能“失去”台灣。

關鍵問題是，這三類原因在國際法上是否站得住腳。根據《聯合國憲章》和國際習慣，合法使用武力的情況隻有兩種：一是聯合國安理會授權，二是自衛權。美國的三種軍事幹預的理由都不屬於合法使用武力的兩種情況。

所謂“保護民主”和“執行國內法”都不是禁止非法使用武力原則的合法例外。否則的話，任何國家都可以通過聲稱保護民主或通過製定國內法自由使用武力。

似乎沒有人質疑美國在兩岸衝突中使用武力的合法性，然而，一個國家使用武力收回其反叛省份——就像中國大陸和台灣的情況——卻被美國稱為“侵略”或“入侵”行為。

雖然這兩個詞在英語中是不同的，但在漢語中這兩個詞隻能被翻譯成同一個詞——侵略。這是一個分量很重的詞，人們傾向於把它等同於英語中的“侵略”（aggression）。

美國頻繁在台海周邊進行軍事演習（圖片來源：ICphoto）

但在國際法上，“侵略”一詞是有特定含義的，無論是1974年12月14日聯合國大會通過的《關於侵略定義的決議》（第3314號決議），還是國際刑事法院成員國於2010年6月12日通過的《羅馬規約》關於侵略罪的修正案，對侵略行為和侵略罪的認定有嚴格規定。

按照上述兩個國際文件共同確認的規定，“侵略行為”是指一國使用武力或以違反《聯合國憲章》的任何其他方式侵犯另一國的主權、領土完整或政治獨立的行為。

一個中國原則已經被國際社會通過聯合國決議確認，包括美國在內的世界上絕大多數與中國建立外交關係的主權國家也在雙邊層麵對此予以認可。既然台灣不是一個國家而隻是中國的一部分，中國恢複對台灣行使主權的行為，即使使用武力也是一個主權國家內部的使用武力，而非國與國之間的使用武力。

中國怎麽可能會是國際法上的“侵略行為”呢？然而，如果美國進行軍事幹預，它將是侵略者，違反了聯合國禁止在國際關係中使用武力的基本原則入侵中國領土。

默許美國可能進行非法的軍事幹預，同時質疑中國政府使用武力的合法權利，隻會加劇對國際法中美國例外論已經猖獗的容忍。

這不僅引發了對西方道德操守的質疑，也破壞了《聯合國憲章》所載的集體安全體係，該體係的宗旨是“使子孫後代免於在我們的一生中兩次給人類帶來無盡痛苦的戰禍”。

美軍擊落因不可抗力進入美國領空的中國無人民用飛艇，又開了一個危險的先例，違反了《聯合國憲章》關於禁止非法使用武力的基本原則。

即使美國想擊落氣球，它也應該動用執法機構來執行這項任務。鑒於中國外交部多次表示氣球是一艘無人駕駛的中國民用飛艇，美國使用其軍事執法機構而不是民事執法機構明顯違反了《聯合國憲章》第2(4)條。

我們希望美方注意到這一條的規定：“所有成員國在其國際關係中不得威脅或使用武力侵犯任何國家的領土完整或政治獨立。”

【本文作者田士臣為經士智庫創始人兼國際軍事行動法研究中心主任，何柳為上海政法學院助理研究員。】

英文原文：

Long before former US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi’s high -pro?le visit to Taipei, the Taiwan issue had been deeply, frequently and regularly debated by US government ofcials, and those in Congress, academia and think tanks.

The latest discussion focuses on a possible visit by newly elected House Speaker Kevin McCarthy and the Defence Department’s military preparations for the consequences of such a visit.

But as they hotly debate the scenario of an inevitable US military intervention in a hypothetical cross -strait con?ict, they forget to discuss – or they turn a blind eye to – the legality and justness of such an intervention. Yet they never seem to forget to criticise the Chinese government for its policy of peaceful reuni?cation with Taiwan while not abandoning the right to use force.

What legal basis does the US have, under international law, to intervene militarily in a cross -strait con?ict? To answer this, we need to examine the reasons for a possible US military intervention.

Think-tank dialogues with US experts show that about 80 per cent cite the protection of democracy. Another 15 per cent cite the Taiwan Relations Act, although this is merely US domestic law. The other 5 per cent frankly admit that, strategically, geopolitically and militarily, the US cannot aford to “lose” Taiwan.

The critical issue is whether these three categories of argument hold water under international law. This, as re?ected in the UN Charter and international custom, only prescribes two scenarios for the    legitimate use of force: UN Security Council authorisation or the right of self-defence. None of the three US categories of defence falls into either of the two scenarios for the legitimate right to use force.

Neither protecting democracy nor implementing domestic law is a lawful exception to the general prohibition against the use of force. If they were, any country could freely use force by claiming to be protecting democracy or through the enactment of a domestic law.

And while no one seems to question the legality of the use of force by the US in case of a cross -strait con?ict, a motherland using force to take back its rebellious province – as would be the case for mainland China and Taiwan – is termed an act of “aggression” or an “invasion” .

Although those two words are diferent in English, there is only one word for both in Chinese – qin lue (侵略). This is a weighty word and people tend to equate it with aggression.

But the term “aggression” has a speci?c meaning in international law, whether in the resolution on the “de?nition of aggression” adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 14, 1974, or in the     amendment to the Rome Statute on the crime of aggression, adopted by the member states of the International Criminal Court on June 12, 2010. The determination of an act of aggression and the crime of aggression are strictly regulated.

In accordance with the provisions of the two international instruments, an “act of aggression” refers to the use of force by a state against the sovereignty, territorial integrity or political independence of another state or in any other manner contrary to the UN charter.

The one-China principle has been con?rmed by the international community through UN resolutions. It has also been recognised at the bilateral level by most sovereign nations, including the United States, which conducts diplomatic relations with China. Since Taiwan is not a country but part of China, even if the Chinese government uses force to restore its sovereignty over Taiwan, it would be a sovereign act rather than one between states.

How could that be taken as an act of aggression under international law? If the US were to intervene militarily, it would be the aggressor, violating the UN’s fundamental principle against the use of force in international relations, in invading Chinese territory.

Acquiescence to a potentially unlawful US military intervention while questioning the Chinese government’s legitimate right to use force only adds to the already rampant tolerance of American exceptionalism in international law.

This has not only led to questions about the moral integrity of the West, but has also destroyed the collective security system enshrined in the UN Charter, which was designed “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind” .

The US military, in shooting down an unmanned Chinese civilian airship that had ended up in US airspace due to force majeure, has set another dangerous precedent, violating the fundamental principle of the UN Charter on the prohibition of the use of force.

Even if the US wanted to neutralise the balloon, it should have employed its law enforcement agencies to carry out the mission. Given that China’s foreign ministry has repeatedly said the balloon was an unmanned Chinese civilian airship, America’s use of its military instead of civilian law enforcement agencies is a clear violation of Article 2 (4) of the UN Charter.

This states, and we hope the US takes note, that: “All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state. ”