Daniel Bell 山東院長：一位中國大學小官僚的自白

《山東院長：一位中國大學小官僚的自白》

作者：丹尼爾·A·貝淡寧 (Daniel A. Bell)，2023年3月28日
https://www.amazon.ca/Dean-Shandong-Confessions-Bureaucrat-University/dp/0691247129/ref=

《金融時報》年度最佳圖書

深入了解中國學術界及其揭示的中國政治體製

2017年1月1日，丹尼爾·貝淡寧被任命為山東大學政治與公共管理學院院長，這是中國大陸曆史上第一位擔任政治學院院長的外籍院長。在《山東院長》一書中，貝淡寧記錄了他作為“小官僚”的經曆，深入剖析了中國學術界的運作方式及其揭示的中國政治體製。貝淡淡地回憶起一些零星的失誤和誤解，但貝淡淡地擔任院長一職，卻為觀察當今中國提供了一個獨特的視角。

貝淡淡既不是中國公民，也不是中國共產黨員，他因在儒家思想方麵的研究而被任命為院長——但他很快發現自己不得不應對一係列與學術或孔子無關的問題。這些問題包括：頭發顏色的重要性以及大學管理人員（無論男女）染發的盛行；山東的飲酒文化（每頓飯前都會無休止地舉杯暢飲）；以及激烈的學術精英競爭帶來的一些意想不到的後果。作為院長，他還麵臨著一些更重要的問題：黨委書記在大學中的角色；全國性的反腐運動及其對學術界的影響（貝淡淡地問道：“腐敗有什麽問題？”）；以及正式和非正式的審查製度。考慮到過去三十年來儒家思想在中國的複興，以及他所說的2008年以來的“共產主義回歸”，貝淡寧預測，中國的政治未來很可能由儒家思想和共產主義共同決定。

引言：山東省一位小官僚的自白（第1-20頁）

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f

我現在不是，也從未加入過中國共產黨。然而，我卻擔任著中國一所大學政治學院院長，該學院致力於培養學生和省級幹部，使他們成為共產黨官員服務國家：鑒於這項工作的政治敏感性，這通常是為中共黨員保留的職位。這令人感到意外。另一方麵，我是加拿大公民，在蒙特利爾出生長大，沒有任何中國血統。2017年1月1日，我被正式任命為……院長。

1 活力與活力（第21-29頁）

前國家主席胡錦濤或許是當代最乏味的領導人。他唯一有記錄的玩笑是在2007年訪問美國時。當時的新澤西州州長詹姆斯·麥格裏維對胡錦濤說，他看起來不像59歲的老實人。胡錦濤回答說：“中國很樂意分享這方麵的技術。”¹ 在中國，政治領導人使用染發劑由來已久。為什麽中國領導人要染發？這與共產主義意識形態無關。其根源可以追溯到中國曆史。在……

2 和諧秘書（第30-44頁）

我在中國與政府官員會麵時，經常被問到，為什麽我們在西方的形象如此糟糕？他們說：我們當然有很多問題。就人均GDP而言，我們仍然是一個相對貧窮的國家。貧富差距很大，汙染嚴重，腐敗問題嚴重，香港和新疆的動蕩局勢眾所周知。也許我們有時反應過度，地方官員經常濫用職權。但我們取得了一些進展，尤其是在扶貧和反腐敗方麵。在……之後，我們很好地應對了新冠疫情。

3 論集體領導（第45-64頁）

1966年至1976年的文化大革命是一場災難性的經曆，充斥著激進的民粹主義和瘋狂的個人崇拜。為了避免重蹈覆轍，一人獨裁，鄧小平和其他領導人建立了旨在限製“壞皇帝”出現的機製。統治者的任期限製旨在提供幫助：自1982年起，憲法規定國家主席連任不得超過兩屆。鄧小平在1997年去世前一直行使著巨大的幕後政治權力，這使得人們對正式退休的實際意義產生了懷疑。但江澤民和胡錦濤……

4 腐敗何罪？（第65-73頁）

在中國，腐敗是一切政治罪惡之源。從儒家觀點來看，最好的生活是以公職人員的身份服務社會，反之，最壞的生活則是將公款挪作他用。這種觀念影響了曆史。明朝為何覆滅？清朝為何覆滅？原因有很多，但腐敗的爆發式增長在破壞這些長期統治王朝的合法性方麵發揮了重要作用。為什麽中共能在中國內戰中擊敗國民黨？原因並非在於武器裝備的先進。一個重要原因……

5 飲酒無度（第74-84頁）

孔子與亞裏士多德一樣，崇尚中庸之道：“中庸之道，德之上也”（《論語》6.29）。唯獨飲酒無節製（《論語》10.8）。愛德華·斯林格蘭（Edward Slingerland）認為：“孔子能隨心所欲地飲酒而不失節製，是其聖人之表。”¹ 孔子本人的自我評價則更為謙虛。他直到七十歲才能夠“從心所欲，不逾矩”，這或許暗示著他在此之前就逾矩了……

6 中國儒家思想教學（第85-94頁）

孔子（公元前551-479年），姓孔，尊稱“子”，是一位政治家、哲學家和詩人。但他受人尊敬的首要原因，是他作為教師的功績。曲阜孔廟雄偉的孔子雕像上方有句諺語：“萬世師表”。為什麽孔子——西方人稱之為孔子——被視為萬世師表呢？原因有很多。他創立了中國曆史上最早的高等教育形式，不分階級和家庭背景地教授學生。他最……

7 共產主義的回歸（第95-105頁）

2008年，我出版了一本書，宣稱馬克思主義意識形態在中國的終結¹。馬克思主義作為一種激勵人心的價值體係已經消亡。在中國，很少有嚴肅的思想家公開捍衛馬克思主義作為現代世界的指導思想。中國共產黨似乎隻是名義上的共產主義政黨，而且它越來越強調“中國特色”，即致力於實踐。

語序變革以及中國自身的文化傳統，例如儒家思想，都與此相關。我曾預言，中國共產黨很快就會更名為“中國儒家黨”。

諷刺的是，馬克思主義傳統在同一時期卷土重來，在官方和非官方圈子裏都如此。它……

8 正式和非正式的審查製度（第106-126頁）

約翰·斯圖爾特·密爾的《論自由》於1859年首次出版，是迄今為止最具影響力的言論自由辯護著作。鮮為人知的是，密爾更擔心的是“公眾輿論”，而非國家審查製度。正如密爾所言，輿論暴政“比許多政治壓迫更為可怕，因為它雖然通常不會受到如此嚴厲的懲罰，但卻留下了更少的逃脫途徑，更加深入地滲透到生活的細節中，奴役著靈魂本身。”¹ 是的，他寫作的時代是維多利亞時代的英國，而我們這個時代或許並非如此墨守成規。但……

9 中國式的學術精英政治（第127-137頁）

在選舉民主製中，誰來選擇政治領導人顯而易見：投票給他們的人民。有時我被問到：在政治精英政治中，誰來選擇領導人？在中國，我半開玩笑地回答說，是組織部。最高級別的任命由政治局委員決定。在最基層，人們通常可以投票選舉他們的村幹部。在這兩者之間，絕大多數公職人員是由中組部選拔的。中組部就像是世界上最大、最有權力的人力資源部門，負責管理各級各類機構約七千萬人事……

10 對“可愛”的批判（第138-148頁）

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f.14
為了塑造國際社會對中國的輿論，習近平主席告訴高級官員，中國需要展現一個更加“可信、可愛、受人尊敬”的中國形象¹。這一令人驚訝的提法不僅僅是呼籲淡化“戰狼”的論調。關鍵詞是“可愛”。² “可愛”的字麵意思是“可以愛”，官方媒體將其翻譯為“lovable”（可愛的）。但在日常用語中，“可愛”的意思是“可愛的”。

將“可愛”視為軟實力，乍一看似乎有些奇怪。但我們所能稱之為……的迅速傳播

11 象征性領導的案例（第149-160頁）

中國於1912年廢除了帝製。但君主製的理想並未消亡。儒家改革家康有為主張建立一個受憲法約束的象征性君主。1917年，康有為參與了清朝統治的複辟，但未能成功，這一主張遭遇挫折；而1949年中國共產黨的勝利似乎對君主製統治體係造成了致命打擊。然而，儒家思想的複興引發了人們對中國帝國曆史中理念和製度的重新思考。當代儒家思想家蔣慶在康有為的啟發下，強烈捍衛

The Dean of Shandong: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat at a Chinese University 

March 28 2023 by Daniel A. Bell (Author)
https://www.amazon.ca/Dean-Shandong-Confessions-Bureaucrat-University/dp/0691247129/ref=

A Financial Times Best Book of the Year

An inside view of Chinese academia and what it reveals about China’s political system

On January 1, 2017, Daniel Bell was appointed dean of the School of Political Science and Public Administration at Shandong University—the first foreign dean of a political science faculty in mainland China’s history. In The Dean of Shandong, Bell chronicles his experiences as what he calls “a minor bureaucrat,” offering an inside account of the workings of Chinese academia and what they reveal about China’s political system. It wasn’t all smooth sailing—Bell wryly recounts sporadic bungles and misunderstandings—but Bell’s post as dean provides a unique vantage point on China today.

Bell, neither a Chinese citizen nor a member of the Chinese Communist Party, was appointed as dean because of his scholarly work on Confucianism—but soon found himself coping with a variety of issues having little to do with scholarship or Confucius. These include the importance of hair color and the prevalence of hair-dyeing among university administrators, both male and female; Shandong’s drinking culture, with endless toasts at every shared meal; and some unintended consequences of an intensely competitive academic meritocracy. As dean, he also confronts weightier matters: the role at the university of the Party secretary, the national anticorruption campaign and its effect on academia (Bell asks provocatively, “What’s wrong with corruption?”), and formal and informal modes of censorship. Considering both the revival of Confucianism in China over the last three decades and what he calls “the Communist comeback” since 2008, Bell predicts that China’s political future is likely to be determined by both Confucianism and Communism.

INTRODUCTION: Confessions of a Minor Bureaucrat in Shandong Province(pp. 1-20)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f

I AM NOT NOW nor at any time have ever been a member of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yet I serve as dean of a large faculty of political science in a Chinese university that trains students and provincial cadres to serve the country as Communist Party officials: It’s typically a post reserved for members of the CCP, given the political sensitivity of the work. That’s part of the surprise. The other part is that I’m a Canadian citizen, born and bred in Montreal, without any Chinese ancestry. On January 1, 2017, I was formally appointed dean of the...

1 Dye and Dynamism(pp. 21-29)

FORMER PRESIDENT HU JINTAO is perhaps the most boring leader in modern times. His only recorded joke came when he was visiting the United States in 2007. The then-governor of New Jersey, James McGreevey, told Hu—whose hair was jet-black—that he did not look his fifty-nine years. Hu replied: “China would be happy to share its technology in this area.”¹ The use of hair dye for political leaders has a long history in China. Why do Chinese leaders dye their hair? It has nothing to do with communist ideology. The roots go way back in Chinese history. In the...

2 The Harmony Secretary(pp. 30-44)

WHEN I MEET public officials in China, I’m often asked, why is our image so bad in the West? They say: Of course we have many problems. We’re still a relatively poor country in terms of GDP per capita. There’s a big gap between rich and poor, pollution is bad, corruption is a problem, and everybody knows about restlessness in Hong Kong and Xinjiang. Perhaps we’ve overreacted at times and local officials often abuse their power. But we’ve made some progress, especially in terms of poverty alleviation and combatting corruption. We did a good job of dealing with Covid after...

3 On Collective Leadership(pp. 45-64)

THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION, from 1966 to 1976, was a disastrous experience with radical populism and a crazed personality cult. To avoid a repeat experience of arbitrary one-man dictatorship at the top, Deng Xiaoping and other leaders established mechanisms meant to limit the possibility of a “bad emperor.” Term limits for rulers were meant to help: As of 1982, the constitution stipulated that the president could not serve more than two consecutive terms. Deng Xiaoping continued to exercise substantial behind-the-scenes political power until his death in 1997, casting doubt on the practical implications of formal retirement. But Jiang Zemin and Hu...

4 What’s Wrong with Corruption?(pp. 65-73)

IN CHINA, corruption is the mother of all political evils. From a Confucian perspective, the best life involves serving the community qua public official and, conversely, the worst life involves misuse of public funds for private or family purposes. Such ideas influence history. Why did the Ming Dynasty collapse? Why did the Qing Dynasty collapse? There are many reasons, but the explosive growth of corruption had an important role to play in undermining the legitimacy of these long-lasting dynasties. And why did the CCP defeat the KMT in China’s civil war? It wasn’t due to superior weaponry. An important reason...

5 Drinking without Limits(pp. 74-84)

CONFUCIUS, LIKE ARISTOTLE, favored a moderate approach to life: “The Middle Way is the highest level of virtue” (Analects 6.29). With one notable exception: “only with regard to alcohol did [Confucius] set no limits” (Analects 10.8). According to Edward Slingerland, “the fact that Confucius could drink to his heart’s content but never became unruly is a sign of his sagehood.”¹ Confucius himself was more modest in his self-assessment. He could “follow what [his] heart desired, without transgressing what was right” only at the age of seventy (Analects 2.4), with the implication that he transgressed what was right before then, perhaps...

6 Teaching Confucianism in China(pp. 85-94)

KONGZI (551–479 BCE)—family name Kong (孔)，with “zi” (子)as an honorific title—was a politician, philosopher, and poet. But he is revered first and foremost for his role as a teacher. The saying above the imposing Kongzi statue at the Confucius temple in Qufu is “萬世師表,” which can be translated as “The Model Teacher for Ten Thousand Generations.” Why is Kongzi—known as Confucius in the West—regarded as the teacher of teachers? There are several reasons. He established the earliest form of higher education in China’s history and taught students regardless of class or family background. His most...

7 The Communist Comeback(pp. 95-105)

IN 2008, I published a book proclaiming the end of Marxist ideology in China.¹ Marxism was dead as a motivating value system. Few serious thinkers in China openly defended Marxism as a guiding ideology for the modern world. The Chinese Communist Party seemed to be communist in name only, and it increasingly emphasized “Chinese characteristics,” meaning commitment to pragmatic change and to China’s own cultural traditions such as Confucianism. I predicted that the CCP would soon be renamed the Chinese Confucian Party.

Ironically, the Marxist tradition mounted its comeback at the same time, in both official and unofficial circles. It...

8 Censorship, Formal and Informal(pp. 106-126)

JOHN STUART MILL’S On Liberty, first published in 1859, is the most influential defense of free speech ever written. What is less well known is that Mill worried more about “public opinion” than about state censorship. As Mill puts it, the tyranny of public opinion is “more formidable than many kinds of political oppression, since, though not usually upheld by such extreme penalties, it leaves fewer means of escape, penetrating much more deeply into the details of life, and enslaving the soul itself.”¹ Yes, he was writing in Victorian England and our time may not be as conformist. But it’s...

9 Academic Meritocracy, Chinese-Style(pp. 127-137)

IN AN ELECTORAL DEMOCRACY, it’s clear who chooses the political leaders: the people who vote for them. I’m sometimes asked: Who chooses the leaders in a political meritocracy? In China, I respond, only half-jokingly, it’s the Organization Department (組織部). The most senior-level appointments are decided by Politburo members. At the lowest level, people usually get to vote for their village leaders. In between, the large bulk of public officials are selected by the Organization Department, which is like the world’s largest and most powerful human resources department, responsible for approximately seventy million personnel assignments across all forms and levels of...

10 A Critique of Cuteness(pp. 138-148)

https://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctv321jd2f.14
IN A BID TO SHAPE international public opinion about China, President Xi Jinping told senior officials that the country needed to present a more “credible, loveable, and respectable” image of China.¹ This surprising formulation is more than a call to tame down the “Wolf Warrior” rhetoric. The key word is “可愛” (ke ai).² Ke ai literally means “can love” and it is translated by official media as “lovable.” But ke ai means “cute” in everyday usage.

The idea of “cuteness” as soft power may seem odd on the face of it. But the rapid spread of what we can term...

11 The Case for Symbolic Leadership(pp. 149-160)

CHINA ABOLISHED THE imperial system in 1912. But the ideal of monarchy didn’t die. The Confucian reformist Kang Youwei argued for the establishment of a symbolic monarch bound by constitutional constraints. The cause was set back when Kang participated in the abortive restoration of the Qing ruler in 1917, and the Chinese Communist Party’s victory in 1949 seemed to deliver the fatal blow to the system of monarchical rule. But the revival of Confucianism has led to the reconsideration of ideals and institutions from China’s imperial past. The contemporary Confucian thinker Jiang Qing, inspired by Kang Youwei, strongly defends the...