Ray Dalio? 世界脫鉤美國 變革即將到來

Ray Dalio? 世界脫鉤美國 變革即將到來

為時已晚：變革即將到來

It's Too Late: The Changes Are Coming 

Ray Dalio  https://x.com/RayDalio/status/1916967796065423688

為時已晚：變革即將到來
一些人認為，隨著更多談判的展開以及對如何合理安排關稅機製的深入思考，關稅問題將會逐漸平息。然而，我現在聽到越來越多不得不應對這些問題的人說，現在已經太晚了。例如，許多對美出口商以及與美國有貿易往來的其他國家的進口商都表示，他們不得不大幅減少與美國的貿易往來，因為他們認識到，無論關稅如何變化，這些問題都不會消失，大幅減少與美國的相互依存度是一個必須提前規劃的現實。最明顯的是，無論下一輪貿易談判結果如何，在華的美國生產商和投資者、與美國人有業務往來的中國生產商和投資者、在美國與中國人有業務往來的美國生產商和投資者，以及在美國與美國人有業務往來的中國生產商和投資者，現在都必須製定替代計劃。雖然現在人們普遍認識到，需要盡量減少美中之間的相互依存和對衝突的擔憂，但這種觀點正越來越被大多數國家中與美國打交道的大多數人所接受，他們正在處理與貿易關係、資本市場關係、地緣政治關係和軍事關係相關的大多數問題。
盡管尚未完全意識到這一點，但人們也越來越意識到，美國作為世界上最大的製成品消費國和最大的債務資產生產國（為其過度消費提供資金）的地位是不可持續的，因此，假設人們可以出售和借給美國，並用其持有的美國債務以硬通貨（即未貶值的美元）償還，這是天真的想法，所以必須製定其他計劃。
簡單地說，巨大的貿易和資本失衡正在造成不可持續的條件和被切斷的巨大風險，因此必須降低這種失衡——即過度失衡+去全球化=縮小貿易和資本失衡。
更廣泛地說，我想說的是，根據我的許多指標，情況似乎如下：
1）我們正處於貨幣秩序、國內政治和國際秩序崩潰的邊緣，原因是不可持續的、糟糕的基本麵顯而易見且難以衡量；
2）導致這些日益嚴重的混??亂局麵的事件發展與曆史上多次發生的事件發展相似，因此，這一次看起來像是貨幣、國內政治和社會以及國際地緣政治秩序如何演變的古老故事的當代版本；
3）美國麵臨著越來越大的風險，即美國將逐漸被其他各國所繞過，這些國家將適應與美國的這種分離，並圍繞美國建立新的聯係；
4）如果以最佳方式管理這些情況，結果將比以最壞的方式管理要好得多。
在我看來，最好的辦法是冷靜、分析和協調地進行設計和實施，將不平衡和自給自足的需求視為共同的挑戰，從而產生需要進行“完美”的去杠杆和再平衡。例如，正如我在新書《國家如何破產：大周期》中所解釋的那樣，解決美國政府債務問題有一個“三部分，3%的解決方案”，這將帶來比我們目前所走的道路好得多的結果。不幸的是，迄今為止，我們還沒有看到更好的辦法，反而看到了令人不安的爭鬥和動蕩，這些正在吸取的教訓正在導致不可逆轉的不良後果。
出於這些原因，我擔心我們已經錯過了了解和妥善規劃世界秩序重大變化的理想時機，並認為投資者、政策製定者和其他決策者需要停止根據日常市場波動和政策聲明來改變他們的觀點和立場，而是應該冷靜、明智地，最好是合作地應對世界秩序的這些重大根本性變化。

It's Too Late: The Changes Are Coming 

Ray Dalio

https://x.com/RayDalio/status/1916967796065423688

Some people believe that the tariff disruptions will settle down as more negotiations happen and greater thought is given to how to structure them to work in a sensible way.  However, I am now hearing from a large and growing number of people who are having to deal with these issues that it is already too late.  For example, many exporters to the United States and importers from other countries that trade with the U.S. are saying they have to greatly reduce their dealings with the United States, recognizing that whatever happens with tariffs, these problems won't go away, and that radically reduced interdependencies with the U.S. is a reality that has to be planned for. Most obviously, American producers and investors in China, Chinese producers and investors in China that deal with Americans, American producers and investors in the United States that deal with Chinese, and Chinese producers and investors in United States that deal with Americans must now go about making alternative plans, regardless of what the next round of trade negotiations are like.  While this need to minimize U.S. - China interdependence and worry about conflict is now broadly recognized, this view is now becoming more commonly believed by most people in most countries who are dealing with most issues related to trade relations, capital markets relations, geopolitical relations, and military relations with the United States.

Though not yet fully realized, it is also increasingly being realized that the United States' role as the world's biggest consumer of manufactured goods and greatest producer of debt assets to finance its over-consumption is unsustainable, so assuming that one can sell and lend to the U.S. and get paid back with hard (i.e. not devalued) dollars on their U.S. debt holdings is naive thinking, so other plans have to be made.

Said more simply, enormous trade and capital imbalances are creating unsustainable conditions and major risks of being cut off, so they must come down -i.e., excessive imbalances + deglobalization = smaller trade and capital imbalances.

More broadly, what I am saying is that, based on many of my indicators, it appears that:

1) we are on the brink of the monetary order, the domestic political and the international world orders breaking down due to unsustainable, bad fundamentals that can be easily seen and measured,

2) the progression of events leading to these increasing disorders is similar to those that have progressed many times throughout history, so this one looks like a contemporary version of the old story of how monetary, domestic political and social, and international geopolitical orders change,

3) there is a growing risk that the United States, imposing these challenges to deal with, will increasingly be bypassed by a world of countries that will adapt to these separations from the United States and create new synapses that grow around it, and

4) if these circumstances are managed in the best ways, the outcomes will be much better than if they are managed in the worst ways

In my opinion, what would be best is calm, analytical, and coordinated engineering and implementation, with the imbalances and the needs for self-sufficiencies treated as shared challenges, to produce the “beautiful" deleveragings and rebalancings that need to take place. For example, as explained in my new book,

How Countries Go Broke: The Big Cycle

, there is a "3-Part, 3-Percent Solution" to dealing with the U.S. government debt problem that would lead to much better results than the path that we appear to be on. Unfortunately, thus far we haven’t seen the better ways and have instead seen disturbing fighting and volatility that are teaching lessons that are leading to irreversible bad consequences.

For these reasons, I fear that we are moving beyond the ideal time to be knowledgeable about and properly plan for these big changes in the world order, and believe that investors, policy makers, and other decision-makers need to stop undulating their views and positions in reaction to the day-to-day market moves and policy announcements and instead deal with these big fundamental changes in the world order calmly, intelligently, and, ideally, cooperatively.