中國對全球人權體係的影響

 

中國對全球人權體係的影響

China's Influence on the Global Human Rights System

SOPHIE RICHARDSON

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf 

2020 年 9 月 14 日——本文詳細介紹了中國當局尋求塑造全球規範和實踐的方式，並列出了各國政府和機構可以采取的步驟來扭轉……

評估中國在世界上日益增長的作用

執行摘要

中國政府與國際機構的更多接觸是否對全球人權體係有益？仔細研究其與聯合國人權機製的互動、追求無權利發展以及對全球言論自由的威脅，可以發現事實並非如此。在聯合國，中國當局正試圖改寫規範並操縱現有程序，不僅是為了最大限度地減少對中國政府行為的審查，也是為了實現所有政府的相同目標。發展中尊重人權的新興規範本可以借鑒中國政府對“一帶一路”倡議、亞洲基礎設施投資銀行和國家開發銀行的做法，但中國政府並沒有這樣做。中國當局現在將國內審查製度擴展到工作周邊社區，從學術界到僑民社區再到全球企業。

本文詳細介紹了中國當局尋求塑造全球規範和實踐的方式，並列出了各國政府和機構可以采取的扭轉這些趨勢的步驟，包括組建多邊、多年的聯盟，以平衡中國政府的影響。學術機構不僅應追求更好的披露與中國政府行為者的互動政策，還應緊急優先考慮來自中國的學生和學者的學術自由。公司有人權義務，應拒絕審查。

同樣重要的是，拒絕中國政府對人權威脅的策略不應懲罰來自中國各地或世界各地的華裔人士，確保中國境內的人權進步應成為優先事項。論文認為，許多行為者未能采取這些和其他措施，使得中國當局進一步侵蝕現有的普遍人權體係——並越來越享受有罪不罰的感覺。

引言

近年來，中國政府在聯合國和其他多邊機構中變得更加活躍，包括在全球人權體係中。它批準了幾項聯合國核心人權條約[1]，擔任聯合國人權理事會 (HRC) 成員，並派遣中國外交官擔任聯合國人權係統內的職務。中國發起了許多可能影響人權的舉措：它以促進經濟發展為口號創建了“一帶一路”倡議 (BRI) 和亞洲基礎設施投資銀行 (AIIB)，並已成為社交媒體平台和學術界的重要全球參與者。

中國是國際體係中最具影響力的參與者之一，如果中國高層領導人能夠認真（盡管不太可能）地致力於維護人權，那麽從經濟到信息等問題上采取這種新的行動，可能會帶來變革。但事實卻截然相反。[2] 特別是在習近平主席的領導下，中國政府不僅試圖消除聯合國人權機製對中國的審查，還希望消除該體係追究任何政府對嚴重侵犯人權行為責任的能力。[3] 北京越來越多地在世界各地追求不考慮人權的發展，並試圖利用民主國家機構的開放性來強加其世界觀並壓製批評者。

重要的是——特別是對於那些生活在民主國家並享有政治參與權、獨立司法權、自由媒體和其他正常運作機構權利的人們來說——回顧國際人權體係存在的原因。原因很簡單，因為國家往往無法保護和侵犯人權，特別是在缺乏補救和問責製度的國家。人們需要向政府直接控製範圍之外的機構求助。

北京不再滿足於僅僅拒絕對中國境內的人們進行問責：它現在試圖加強其他國家這樣做的能力，即使是在旨在在國內受到阻撓時在國際上提供某種正義的國際機構中。[4] 在學術界和新聞界，中國共產黨不僅試圖剝奪在中國境內進行研究或報道的能力，它還越來越多地試圖在世界各地的大學和出版物中進行研究或報道，懲罰那些研究或撰寫敏感話題的人。國家所進行的沒有權利的發展

在中國國內受到製裁的行為現在已成為一種外交政策工具，並被部署到世界各地。

北京在新冠疫情危機中拒絕遵守全球公共衛生需求和機構[5]，以及在香港問題上公然違反國際法[6]，這些都不應被視為異常現象。這些例子清晰而令人擔憂，表明中國政府不僅蔑視國際人權義務，而且還越來越多地試圖改寫這些規則，這可能會影響世界大部分地區人權的行使，從而給全世界人民帶來後果。中國當局擔心，在國外行使這些權利可能會直接威脅到黨的執政，無論是通過批評黨本身，還是根據既定的人權承諾追究北京的責任。

中國與聯合國人權體係
6 月，人權理事會成員國以 23 票讚成、16 票反對、8 票棄權的結果通過了中國關於“互利合作”的決議草案[7]。此次投票是兩年努力的結束，表明北京的目標和策略是通過既定程序和言論慢慢破壞規範，這對侵犯人權行為的問責產生了重大影響。這一努力在 2018 年顯現出來，當時中國政府提出了現在所謂的“雙贏”決議[8]，該決議旨在以“對話”承諾取代追究國家責任的想法，並忽略了獨立民間社會在人權理事會程序中的作用。當該決議被提出時，一些成員國對其內容表示擔憂。北京做了一些小的改進，加上當時人們認為該決議沒有實際後果，該決議以 28 比 1 的票數獲得通過。美國是唯一投反對票的政府。

中國 6 月份的決議試圖將國際人權法重新定位為國與國關係的問題，忽視了國家保護個人權利的責任，將基本人權視為談判和妥協的對象，並且不認為民間社會將發揮任何有意義的作用。中國 2018 年 3 月的決議涉及利用理事會的谘詢委員會，中國預計該委員會將出台一份支持該決議的研究報告。許多代表團對此表示擔憂，但對該決議持保留態度，棄權，等待谘詢委員會出台研究報告。

中國的意圖很快就變得清晰起來：它向谘詢委員會提交的提案 [9] 稱其自己的決議預示著“新型國際關係的建設”。[10] 提案聲稱人權被用來“幹涉”其他國家的內政，“毒害全球人權治理氛圍”。

這絕非巧合：中國一貫反對理事會追究各國對哪怕是最嚴重的侵犯人權行為的責任，而該提案令人震驚地提到了“所謂的普世人權”。盡管如此，令人鼓舞的是，2020 年 6 月有 16 個國家投票反對這項有害的決議，而 2018 年隻有一票反對，這表明全球對中國強硬而咄咄逼人的“合作”方式的擔憂日益增加。

該決議仍然通過，反映了中國對聯合國人權體係構成的威脅。2017 年，人權觀察記錄了中國操縱聯合國審查程序，騷擾和恐嚇不僅針對中國人權捍衛者，還針對聯合國人權專家和工作人員，並成功阻止獨立民間社會團體（包括不從事中國工作的組織）參與。[11]

2018 年，中國接受了第三次普遍定期審議 (UPR)，即審查所有聯合國成員國人權記錄的程序。盡管——或許是因為——自上次審議以來，中國當局對人權發起了非同尋常的攻擊，但中國外交官並沒有訴諸過去的一些做法。這些行為包括在審議中提供明顯虛假的信息，在發言者名單中充斥友好國家和政府組織的民間社會團體，並敦促其他國家政府對中國發表正麵評價。

這一次，中國還向聯合國官員施壓，要求他們從普遍定期審議材料中刪除一份聯合國國家工作隊提交的報告（具有諷刺意味的是，這份報告對中國政府的過往記錄給予了相當正麵的評價），[12] 向伊斯蘭合作組織成員國施壓，要求他們正麵評價中國對待維吾爾族穆斯林的方式，並警告其他國家政府不要參加關於新疆的小組活動。

到目前為止，中國一直拒絕接受人權事務高級專員和人權理事會幾個成員國的呼籲，要求對新疆嚴重侵犯人權行為進行獨立調查。

在中國，估計有 100 萬維吾爾族和其他突厥穆斯林仍被任意拘留。[13] 通常情況下，如此嚴重的侵犯行為已經引發了實際的問責程序，但中國的實力如此強大，以至於新疆危機爆發三年後，幾乎沒有任何進展。

2019 年 7 月，二十多個政府致信人權理事會主席——盡管他們不願在人權理事會上口頭呼籲——敦促進行調查。[14] 中國回應了一封由 37 個國家簽署的信，其中大部分是人權記錄不佳的發展中國家。11 月，一組類似的政府在聯合國第三委員會發表了類似聲明；[15] 中國回應了一封由 54 個國家簽署的信。[16]

北京還尋求確保更廣泛地討論人權問題隻通過日內瓦的人權機構進行，而不是其他聯合國機構，特別是安理會。中國認為，隻有人權理事會才有權審查這些案件——這是一種試圖限製討論最嚴重暴行的便捷方式。2018 年 3 月，中國反對時任人權事務高級專員紮伊德·拉阿德·侯賽因向安理會通報敘利亞問題[17]，2020 年 2 月，中國阻止了安理會就緬甸羅興亞族的困境通過一項決議。[18]

聯合國人權專家通常被稱為“特別報告員”，他們是審查和問責聯合國成員國人權問題的關鍵。他們常用的工具之一是訪問各國，但中國拒絕安排許多特別報告員訪問，包括那些負責任意拘留、處決或言論自由問題的特別報告員。[19]

中國允許專家就其認為會取得良好進展的問題進行訪問：2012 年的食物權問題、2014 年婦女歧視問題工作組以及 2016 年外債影響問題獨立專家的訪問。[20] 2016 年，中國允許時任極端貧困與人權問題特別報告員的菲利普·奧爾斯頓訪問，但由於當局跟蹤他並恐嚇與他交談過的人，奧爾斯頓提前結束了訪問。[21] 此後，中國隻允許老年人權利問題獨立專家在 2019 年底訪問。

中國還繼續阻止聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處在中國設立辦事處。雖然中國還有二十多個其他聯合國機構，但它們很少援引其促進人權的授權。

6 月底，50 名聯合國現任和前任特別程序（聯合國人權係統中最著名的獨立專家組）對中國的人權記錄發出了嚴厲的譴責，並呼籲立即采取行動。[22] 專家們譴責中國政府對新疆和西藏的宗教和少數民族進行“集體鎮壓”，鎮壓抗議活動，香港警方過度使用武力卻不受懲罰，對記者、醫務工作者和其他在 COVID-19 疫情爆發後試圖發聲的人進行審查和報複，以及針對全國各地的人權捍衛者。專家們呼籲召開一次關於中國的特別會議，任命一位專門的中國問題專家，並要求聯合國機構和各國政府敦促中國履行其人權義務。聯合國秘書長、人權事務高級專員和人權理事會是否會以及如何回應，還有待觀察。

盡管中國國內人權記錄糟糕，對聯合國人權體係構成嚴重威脅，但中國仍有望於 10 月再次當選人權理事會成員。如果沒有足夠多的有關國家致力於平衡這兩個問題，中國各地的人民和依賴該係統尋求補救和問責的人們將麵臨嚴重風險。

中國推動人權自由發展
在過去幾十年裏，活動家、發展專家和經濟學家在製定法律和規範義務方麵取得了進展，以確保經濟發展中尊重和問責人權。到 2010 年中國成為世界第二大經濟體時，包括世界銀行集團和國際貨幣基金組織在內的主要多邊機構已經通過了關於社區協商、透明度和其他關鍵人權問題的標準和保障政策。2011 年，聯合國通過了《工商企業與人權指導原則》。綜合起來，這些新興的全球規範本應為北京提供一個模板，使其在發展過程中明確尊重人權，但中國的開發銀行和“一帶一路”都沒有表現出這樣做的跡象。[23]

北京耗資數萬億美元的“一帶一路”基礎設施和投資計劃促進了中國進入 70 個國家的市場和自然資源

嚐試。由於替代投資者的頻繁缺席，“一帶一路”倡議為中國政府贏得了發展中國家的相當多的善意，盡管北京已經能夠將許多成本轉嫁給它聲稱要幫助的國家。

中國的運作方式似乎有助於加強“受益”國家的威權主義，即使民主國家和獨裁國家都利用了中國的“一帶一路”投資或監控出口。[24] 以“無附加條件”貸款而聞名的“一帶一路”項目在很大程度上忽視了人權和環境標準。[25] 它們幾乎不允許任何可能受到傷害的人提供意見，不允許使用任何大眾谘詢方法。幾內亞蘇阿皮蒂大壩和柬埔寨塞桑河下遊二號大壩都存在許多違規行為，這兩個大壩主要由中國國有銀行和公司資助和建造。[26]

為了修建水壩，數千名村民被迫離開祖傳的家園和農田，失去了食物和生計。許多重新安置的家庭沒有得到足夠的補償，也沒有獲得新土地的合法所有權。居民們給地方和國家當局寫了很多信，講述他們的處境，但大多毫無成效。一些項目是在容易滋生腐敗的幕後交易中談判的。有時，它們讓統治精英受益並鞏固統治地位，而讓該國人民背負巨額債務。

一些“一帶一路”項目臭名昭著：斯裏蘭卡的漢班托塔港，由於無法償還債務，中國收回了該港 99 年；或者肯尼亞修建蒙巴薩-內羅畢鐵路的貸款，政府試圖通過強迫貨運商使用該鐵路來償還這筆貸款，盡管有更便宜的替代方案。一些政府——包括孟加拉國、馬來西亞、緬甸、巴基斯坦和塞拉利昂的政府——已經開始放棄“一帶一路”項目，因為它們看起來不合經濟合理。[27]在大多數情況下，陷入困境的債務國都渴望得到北京的好感。在新冠疫情爆發後，中國就債務減免發表了一些聲明，但目前尚不清楚這在實際操作中將如何發揮作用。[28]

“一帶一路”貸款還為北京提供了另一個金融杠杆，以確保在主要國際論壇上支持中國的反人權議程，受援國有時會在主要論壇上與北京站在一起投票。麵對中國國內的鎮壓，以及對北京破壞國際人權機構的援助，其結果是，最好的結果是沉默，最壞的結果則是掌聲。例如，巴基斯坦總理伊姆蘭·汗的政府是“一帶一路”的主要接受國，他在訪問北京時對新疆的穆斯林同胞隻字未提，而他的外交官卻對“中國為照顧穆斯林公民所做的努力”大加讚揚。[29]

同樣，在北京免除喀麥隆數百萬債務後不久，喀麥隆也對中國發表了奉承的讚美之詞：提到新疆，喀麥隆稱讚北京“充分保護少數民族行使合法權利”，包括“正常的宗教活動和信仰”。[30] 中國的國家開發銀行，如中國國家開發銀行和中國進出口銀行，在全球的影響力日益擴大，但缺乏關鍵的人權保障。中國創辦的多邊亞投行也好不到哪裏去。它的政策要求其資助的項目透明、負責，並包括社會和環境標準，但不要求銀行識別和解決人權風險。[31]該銀行的 74 個成員國中，有許多政府聲稱尊重人權：包括法國、德國、荷蘭和瑞典在內的大部分歐盟國家，以及英國、加拿大、澳大利亞和新西蘭。

中國政府對全球言論自由的威脅

北京在中國境內的審查製度是有據可查的，其通過國家媒體在世界各地傳播宣傳的努力也是眾所周知的。但中國當局似乎不再滿足於這些努力，並正在擴大其野心。在習近平的領導下，中國當局越來越多地尋求限製或壓製被認為具有批判性的有關中國的討論，並確保他們的觀點和分析被世界各地的各種群體所接受，即使這意味著通過全球平台進行審查。

中國當局長期以來一直在監視和監控來自中國的學生和學者以及在世界各地校園研究中國的學生和學者。中國外交官還向大學官員抱怨，他們邀請達賴喇嘛等中國政府認為“敏感”的演講者來大學演講。過去十年，由於澳大利亞、加拿大、英國和美國對高等教育的政府資助減少，大學

大學在經濟上越來越依賴大量自費的中國學生，以及中國政府和企業實體。這使得大學容易受到中國政府的影響。

最終結果是什麽？2019 年，一係列嚴謹的報告記錄了一些不想惹惱中國當局的管理人員和學者的審查和自我審查。[32] 中國學生報告說，這些學生在課堂上說的話威脅了他們在中國的家人。

中國學者詳細描述了在國外被中國官員直接威脅不要在課堂講座或其他談話中批評中國政府的情況。

其他人描述說，中國學生在課堂上保持沉默，擔心他們的言論受到其他中國學生的監控並向中國當局報告。美國一所大學的一名中國學生總結了他對課堂監控的擔憂，他指出：“這不是一個自由的空間。”昆士蘭大學學生德魯·帕夫洛一直批評該校與中國政府的關係，他因自己的活動違反了大學的行為準則而麵臨停學處罰。[33]

目前，美國一些大學正麵臨聯邦當局的壓力，要求其披露學校或個別學者與中國政府機構之間的任何關係，其明確目標是打擊中華人民共和國的影響力和騷擾以及技術盜竊。澳大利亞、英國和美國的大學和學者因與涉嫌侵犯人權的中國科技公司或政府機構的關係被曝光而感到尷尬。2020 年 4 月，麻省理工學院在製定了更嚴格的合作準則後，與中國語音識別公司科大訊飛斷絕了合作關係，人權觀察記錄了科大訊飛侵犯人權的行為。[34]

其他學校也麵臨著批評中國政府的學生和捍衛中國政府的學生之間的緊張關係。2019 年 3 月，在加州大學伯克利分校舉辦的一場活動中，來自大陸的學生試圖大聲嗬斥正在討論新疆人權危機的演講者；9 月，香港民主活動家羅冠聰抵達耶魯大學攻讀研究生時，不明身份的人威脅他。[35]

但很少有大學（如果有的話）采取措施，保??證來自中國的學生和學者享有與其他大學相同的學術自由。[36] 未能解決這些問題意味著，對於一些大學來說，有關中國的辯論和研究被任意限製。

中國當局對僑民社區的監視和騷擾也不是一個新問題，但很明顯，獲得外國護照並不能保證言論自由權。甚至離開中國也變得更加困難：近年來，北京一直努力阻止某些群體離開中國，采取的手段包括拒絕或沒收他們的護照、加強邊境安全以防止藏人和突厥穆斯林逃亡，以及向柬埔寨和土耳其等國政府施壓，要求他們違反國際法義務強製遣返尋求庇護者。[37]

自 2017 年初以來，一些維吾爾人前往中國境外後返回，或隻是與國外的家人和朋友保持聯係，中國當局認為這些行為是犯罪行為。[38]

因此，即使是那些設法離開中國並在尊重人權的民主國家獲得公民身份的人也報告說，他們與仍在中國境內的家人斷絕了聯係，受到中國政府官員的監視和騷擾，並且由於害怕遭到報複，他們不願批評中國的政策或當局。有些人覺得自己無法參加公開集會，比如有關中國政治的講座或國會聽證會，因為害怕被拍照或以其他方式被人注意到自己出席了這些活動。另一些人則表示，他們接到中國當局的電話或 WhatsApp 或短信，告訴他們，如果他們公開批評中國政府，他們在中國的家人就會遭殃。

一名在歐洲獲得公民身份的維吾爾人說：“無論我在哪裏，無論我持有什麽護照。[中國當局] 都會在任何地方恐嚇我，而我對此毫無抵抗之力。” 即使是移民到加拿大等國家的漢族人也表示對中國政府深感恐懼，他們表示，雖然他們對中國侵犯人權的行為感到憤怒，但他們擔心，如果公開批評政府，他們的工作前景、商業機會和回國的機會將受到影響，或者他們的家人會因此受到傷害。

留在中國的家人將麵臨危險。[39]

鑒於此類騷擾主要源自中國，政府反擊此類騷擾的手段相對較弱。2018 年，美國聯邦調查局加強了對曾遭受中國政府騷擾的美國維吾爾族人的調查，2020 年 6 月通過的《維吾爾人權法案》將這項工作擴展到來自中國的各個僑民社區。[40]

中國當局還試圖通過審查全球平台上的對話來限製中國境外的言論自由。6 月，總部位於加州的公司 Zoom 承認，應中國當局的要求，該公司暫停了曾組織有關 1989 年天安門大屠殺的在線討論的美國活動人士的賬戶。[41] 雖然該公司恢複了美國人士的賬戶，但它表示無法拒絕中國當局要求其遵守“當地法律”的要求。

其他全球平台也啟用了審查製度。微信是中國的一個社交媒體平台，在全球擁有約 10 億用戶，其中 1 億來自中國境外，由中國公司騰訊擁有。[42] 中國政府和騰訊定期審查該平台上的內容，扭曲觀眾可以看到的內容。帶有“劉曉波”或“天安門大屠殺”字樣的帖子無法上傳，批評中國政府的帖子會被迅速刪除——即使那些試圖發布此類消息的人在國外。微信因其便捷的功能而廣受歡迎，但它也是中國當局控製全球用戶可以看到的內容的一種非常有效的方式。

這也影響到中國境外的政客可以對自己的選民說些什麽。世界各地的政客越來越多地使用微信與選區的中文使用者交流。 2017 年 9 月，加拿大國會議員 Jenny Kwan 就香港雨傘運動發表聲明，讚揚年輕的抗議者“為自己的信仰和社會的改善而站起來並奮鬥”。該聲明隨後發布在她的微信賬戶上，但後來被刪除。[43]

目前尚不清楚民主國家的政客是否或如何跟蹤北京審查其言論的努力。隨著中國在全球事務中發揮越來越重要的作用，各國政府需要迅速采取行動，確保民選代表與選民溝通的能力不受北京的左右。

人們再也不能假裝中國對獨立聲音的壓製止步於其邊境。
最後，北京還利用進入其市場的機會來審查從萬豪到梅賽德斯奔馳等公司。[44]中國國家電視台 CCTV 和騰訊（美國職業籃球聯賽的媒體合作夥伴，與該聯賽簽訂了價值 15 億美元的五年流媒體協議）表示，在休斯頓火箭隊總經理發推文支持香港民主抗議者後，他們不會轉播該隊的比賽。[45] 在北京的壓力下，大型跨國公司對自己或員工進行了審查。其他公司則解雇了那些表達了公司認為批評北京觀點的員工。公司在中國境內運營時遵守審查限製已經夠糟糕了。對全球員工和客戶實施這種審查則更糟糕。人們再也不能假裝中國對獨立聲音的壓製隻停留在其邊境了。

如果中國的政策不逆轉會發生什麽
——以及該怎麽做

未能阻止中國對國際人權體係、尊重權利發展的法律和實踐以及言論自由的攻擊，其後果簡單而嚴重。如果這些趨勢繼續不減，聯合國安理會將更不可能對嚴重的人權危機采取行動；一個為獨立行為者提供空間的普世人權體係的基本基礎將進一步削弱；中國當局（及其盟友）的有罪不罰現象將隻會增加。

嚴重侵犯人權的政府將知道他們可以無條件地依賴北京的投資和貸款。世界各地的人們將越來越需要謹慎批評中國當局，即使他們是尊重人權的民主國家的公民，或者在學術界等鼓勵辯論的環境中。

中國政府在 2020 年上半年的行為——拖延對 COVID-19 疫情的獨立調查，公然拒絕國際法決定對香港實施國家安全立法，甚至操縱美國人民的天安門紀念活動——似乎已經激發了反擊的勢頭。許多國家的議會成員呼籲

任命聯合國香港問題特使、各國政府就掩蓋新冠疫情向北京施壓、企業屈服於中國審查壓力等新聞屢見不鮮。

但這遠未形成遏製北京議程所必需的平衡力量，而北京的威脅現在已經清晰可見。為了保護聯合國人權係統免受中國政府的侵蝕，尊重人權的各國政府應緊急組建一個多年期聯盟，不僅要確保跟蹤這些威脅，還要做好準備，抓住一切機會予以反擊。這意味著提名聯合國專家職位的候選人，並指出認證製度中的障礙。

這意味著要征集和組織反對破壞規範的決議的反對意見，並動員盟友提名自己為人權理事會或區域集團選出的其他職位的候選人。中國的優勢在於資金雄厚，而且沒有周期性的政府更迭來妨礙其規劃能力；民主國家在這兩方麵都會遇到困難。但這裏的風險再高不過了——不僅僅是對中國 14 億人民，對全世界人民也是如此。

各國政府，特別是那些已經加入亞投行的政府，應該利用他們的聯合影響力，推動該機構采用完善的人權和環境原則和做法，以確保無濫用的發展。而加入“一帶一路”夥伴關係的各國政府應該仔細考慮後果，並確保他們做中國不願做的事情：提供充分的公眾谘詢，充分透明地說明對該國的財務影響，以及受影響人口拒絕這些發展項目的能力。

各國政府應緊急考慮北京對本國言論自由的威脅。他們應該追蹤對公民的威脅，並通過定向製裁等工具最大限度地追究責任。學術機構不應僅僅滿足於製定更好的與中國政府行為者互動的披露政策，他們迫切需要確保校園裏的每個人都有平等的言論自由——任何低於這一標準的政策都是對其責任的嚴重拒絕。

公司在拒絕審查方麵應發揮作用。他們應該認識到，他們無法在北京的遊戲中取勝，特別是考慮到他們根據《聯合國工商企業與人權指導原則》負有尊重人權的責任。他們應該起草和推廣與中國打交道的行為準則，禁止參與或協助侵犯言論自由、信息自由、隱私權、結社權或其他國際公認的人權。強有力的共同標準將使北京更難排斥那些捍衛基本權利和自由的人。消費者和股東也將更有能力堅持要求公司不要屈服於審查製度作為在中國做生意的代價，並且他們永遠不應該從侵權行為中獲益或助長侵權行為。

最後，至關重要的是，這些限製中國政府對人權威脅的努力都不能反彈到中國各地或世界各地的華裔人士身上。 COVID-19 的迅速蔓延引發了一波種族主義反亞裔騷擾和襲擊，令人震驚的是，許多政府、政客和政策都落入了北京的陷阱，將中國政府、中國共產黨和中國人民混為一談。[46] 它們並不相同，中國人民的人權應繼續成為未來政策的核心。

參考文獻

“聯合國條約機構數據庫：中國”，聯合國人權高級專員辦事處，https:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=36&Lang=EN。
Kenneth Roth，“中國對人權的全球威脅”，（華盛頓特區：人權觀察，2020 年），https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global。
《國際倡導的代價：中國幹涉聯合國人權機製》（紐約：人權觀察，2017 年 9 月 5 日），https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs- international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights；Ted Piccone，“中國在聯合國人權領域的長期博弈”（華盛頓特區：布魯金斯學會，2018 年 9 月），https:// www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/。
Ted Piccone，“中國在聯合國人權領域的長期博弈。”
Sarah Zheng，“中國為何抵製對疫情起源進行獨立調查？”，《南華早報》，2020 年 5 月 16 日，https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084602/why-china- resisting-independent-inquiry-how-pandemic-started。
“香港：北京威脅采取嚴厲措施

“各國應反對中國關於‘互利合作’的不誠實決議”，人權觀察，2020 年 6 月 16 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/16/states-should-oppose-chinas-disingenuous-resolution-mutually-beneficial-cooperation。
約翰·費舍爾，“中國的‘雙贏’決議絕非如此”，人權觀察，2018 年 3 月 5 日，https://www. hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything。
“技術援助和能力建設在促進和保護人權的互利合作中的作用”，聯合國人權理事會，https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/TheRoleTechnicalAssistance.aspx。
安德裏亞·沃登，“中國在聯合國人權理事會的雙贏：不僅僅是人權”，Sinopsis，2020 年 5 月 28 日，https://sinopsis.cz/en/worden-win-win/。
“聯合國：中國封鎖活動人士、騷擾專家”，人權觀察，2017 年 9 月 5 日，https://www.hrw. org/news/2017/09/05/un-china-blocks-activists-harasses-experts。
“聯合國：中國以威脅回應人權審查”，人權觀察，2019 年 4 月 1 日，https://www.hrw。 org/news/2019/04/01/un-china-responds-rights-review-threats。
“聯合國：人權機構需要加強對新疆侵犯人權行為的調查”，人權觀察，2020 年 3 月 12 日，https:// www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/un-rights-body-needs-step-xinjiang-abuses。
“聯合國：前所未有的聯合呼籲中國結束對新疆的侵犯人權行為”，人權觀察，2019 年 7 月 10 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/un-unprecedented-joint-call-china-end-xinjiang-abuses。
索菲·理查森，“聯合國對中國新疆政策的史無前例的批評”，人權觀察，2019 年 11 月 14 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/14/unprecedented-un-critique-chinas-xinjiang-policies。

路易斯·夏博諾，“中國在新疆的虛假信息長城倒塌”，人權觀察，2019 年 11 月 20 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/20/chinas-great-misinformation-wall-crumbles- xinjiang。

“程序性投票阻止安理會舉行關於敘利亞人權狀況的會議，高級專員通報情況”，聯合國，2018 年 3 月 19 日，https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13255.doc.htm。
聯合國未按照命令對緬甸羅興亞人采取行動”，半島電視台，2020 年 2 月 4 日，https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/fails-action-order-myanmar-rohingyas-200205020402316.html。
“查看 1998 年以來人權理事會特別程序的國家訪問：中國”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits.aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en；“專題任務”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en。
“各國人權狀況：中國”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/CNIndex.aspx。
“極端貧困與人權問題特別報告員訪華報告”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/HRC/35/26/Add.2；菲利普·奧爾斯頓，“訪華結束聲明”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，2016 年 8 月 23 日，https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=20402&LangID=E。
“聯合國專家呼籲采取果斷措施保護中國的基本自由”，聯合國人權事務高級專員辦事處，2020 年 6 月 26 日，https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E。
“中國：‘一帶一路’項目應尊重人權”，人權觀察，2019 年 4 月 21 日，https://www. hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-road-projects-should-respect-rights。
Sheena Chestnut Greitens，“應對中國全球監控出口需求”，（華盛頓特區：布魯金斯學會，2020 年 4 月），https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas- global-surveillance-exports/。
索菲·理查森 (Sophie Richardson) 和休·威廉姆森 (Hugh Williamson)，“中國：一帶一路，諸多義務”，人權觀察，2017 年 5 月 12 日，https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/12/china-one-belt-one-road-lots-obligations。
“‘我們拋棄一切’：幾內亞蘇阿皮蒂大壩對流離失所社區的影響”，（紐約：人權觀察，2020 年 4 月），https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/16/were-leaving-everything- behind/impact-guineas-souapiti-dam-displaced-communities。
尼拉姆·迪奧 (Neelam Deo) 和阿米特·班達裏 (Amit Bhandari)，“對一帶一路的強烈反對”，Gateway House，2018 年 5 月 31 日，https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bri-debt-backlash/。
孫雲，“中國對非洲的債務減免：新興審議”，布魯金斯學會，2020 年 6 月 9 日，https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/06/09/chinas-debt-relief-for-africa-emerging- deliberations/。

China's Influence on the Global Human Rights System

SOPHIE RICHARDSON

https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2020/09/FP_20200914_china_human_rights_richardson.pdf

 

Sep 14, 2020 — This paper details the ways Chinese authorities seek to shape norms and practices globally, and sets out steps governments and institutions can take to reverse ...

Assessing China's Growing Role in the World

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Is the Chinese government’s greater engagement with international institutions a gain for the global human rights system? A close examination of its interactions with United Nations human rights  mechanisms,  pursuit of rights-free development, and threats to the freedom of expression worldwide suggests  it  is  not. At the United Nations, Chinese authorities are trying   to rewrite norms and manipulate existing procedures not only to minimize scrutiny of the Chinese government’s conduct, but also to achieve the same  for all governments. Emerging norms on respecting human rights in development could have informed the Chinese government’s approach to the Belt and Road Initiative, the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and national development banks, but they have not. Chinese authorities now extend domestic censorship to communities around the work, ranging from academia to diaspora communities to global businesses.

This paper details the ways Chinese authorities seek to  shape  norms  and  practices  globally,  and   sets  out steps governments and institutions can take to reverse these trends, including forming multilateral, multi-year coalitions to serve as a counterweight to Chinese government influence. Academic institutions should not just pursue better  disclosure  policies  about interactions with Chinese government actors, they should also urgently prioritize the academic freedom of students and scholars from and of China. Companies have human rights obligations and should reject censorship.

Equally important, strategies to reject the Chinese government’s threats to human rights should not penalize people from across China or of Chinese descent around the world, and securing human rights gains inside China should be a priority. The paper argues that many actors’ failure to take these and other steps allows Chinese authorities to further erode the existing universal human rights system — and to enjoy a growing sense of impunity.

INTRODUCTION

In recent years, the Chinese government has become considerably more active in a wide range of United Nations and other multilateral  institutions,  including in the global human rights system. It has ratified several  core  U.N.  human  rights  treaties,[1] served  as  a member of the U.N. Human Rights Council  (HRC), and seconded Chinese diplomats to positions within the U.N. human rights system. China has launched a number of initiatives that can affect human rights: It has created the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) under the mantra of promoting economic development, and it has become a significant global actor in social media platforms and academia.

This new activism on issues from economics to information by one of the most consequential actors   in the international system, if underpinned by  a serious (albeit unlikely) commitment among senior Chinese leaders to uphold human rights, could have been transformative. But the opposite has happened.[2] Particularly under President Xi Jinping’s leadership, the Chinese government does not merely seek to neutralize U.N.  human  rights  mechanisms’  scrutiny  of China, it also aspires to neutralize  the  ability  of  that system to hold any government accountable for serious human rights violations.[3] Increasingly Beijing pursues rights-free development worldwide, and tries to exploit the openness of institutions in democracies to impose its world view and silence its critics.

It is crucial — particularly for people who live in democracies and enjoy the rights to political participation, an independent judiciary, a free media, and other functioning institutions —  to  recall  why  the international human rights system exists. Quite simply, it is because often states fail to protect and violate human rights, particularly in countries that lack systems for redress and  accountability.  People  need to appeal to institutions beyond their government’s immediate control.

Beijing is no longer content simply denying people accountability inside China: It now seeks to bolster other countries’ ability to do so even in the international bodies designed to deliver some semblance of justice internationally when it is blocked domestically.[4] Within academia and journalism, the Chinese Communist Party seeks not only to deny the ability to conduct research or report from inside China, it increasingly seeks to do so at universities and publications around the world, punishing those who study or write on sensitive topics. The rights-free development the state has sanctioned inside China is now a  foreign  policy  tool being deployed around the world.

Beijing’s resistance to complying with global public health  needs  and  institutions  in  the  COVID-19 crisis,[5] and its blatant violation of international  law  with respect to Hong Kong,[6] should not be seen as anomalies. They are clear and concerning examples of the consequences for people worldwide not only of a Chinese government disdainful of international human rights obligations but, increasingly, also seeking to rewrite those rules in ways that may affect the exercise of human rights around much of the world. Chinese authorities fear that the exercise of these rights abroad can directly threaten the party’s hold on power, whether through criticism of the party itself or as a result of holding Beijing accountable under established human rights commitments.

 

 

CHINA AND THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

In June, Human Rights Council member states adopted China’s proposed resolution on “mutually beneficial cooperation” by avoteof 23-16, with eight abstentions.[7] This vote capped a two-year effort that is indicative of Beijing’s goals and tactics of slowly undermining norms through established procedures and rhetoric, which have had significant consequences on  accountability for human rights violations. The effort became visible in 2018 when the Chinese government proposed what is now known as its “win-win” resolution,[8] which set out to replace the idea of holding states accountable with a commitment to “dialogue,” and which omitted a role for independent civil society in HRC proceedings. When it was introduced, some member states expressed concern at its contents. Beijing made minor improvements and, along with the perception at the time that the  resolution  had  no  real  consequences,  it was adopted 28-1. The United States was the only government to vote against it.

China’s June resolution seeks to reposition international human rights law as a matter of state-to-state relations, ignores the responsibility of states to protect the rights of the individual, treats fundamental human rights as subject to negotiation and compromise, and foresees no meaningful role for civil society. China’s March  2018 resolution involved using the council’s Advisory Committee, which China expected would produce a study supporting the resolution. Many delegations expressed concern, but gave the resolution the benefit of the doubt, abstaining so they could wait to see what the Advisory Committee produced.

China’s  intentions soon became clear: Its submission [9] to  the Advisory Committee hailed its own resolution  as heralding “the construction of a new type of international relations.”[10] The submission claims that human rights are used to “interfere” in other countries’ internal affairs, “poisoning the global atmosphere of human rights governance.”

This is hardly a coincidence: China has routinely opposed efforts at the council to hold states responsible for even the gravest rights violations, and the submission alarmingly speaks of “so-called universal human rights.” It is nonetheless encouraging that 16 states voted against this harmful resolution in June 2020, compared with only one vote against in 2018, signaling increasing global concern with China’s heavy-handed and aggressive approach to “cooperation.”

That the resolution nonetheless passed reflects the threat China poses to the U.N. human rights system. In 2017, Human Rights Watch documented China’s manipulation of U.N. review processes, harassment, and intimidation of not only human rights defenders from China but also  U.N.  human  rights  experts and staff, and its successful efforts to block the participation of independent civil society groups, including organizations that do not work on China.[11]

In 2018, China underwent its third Universal Periodic Review (UPR), the process for reviewing all U.N. member states’ human rights records. Despite — or perhaps because — Chinese authorities had since China’s previous review opened an extraordinary assault on human rights, Chinese diplomats did  not just resort to some of its past practices. These had included providing blatantly false information at the review, flooding the speakers’ list with friendly states and government-organized civil society groups, and urging other governments to speak positively about China.

This time around China also pressured U.N. officials to remove a U.N. country team submission from the UPR materials (ironically that report was reasonably positive about the government’s track record),[12] pressured Organisation of Islamic  Cooperation  member  states  to speak positively about China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims, and warned other governments not to attend a panel event about Xinjiang.

 

China has so far fended off calls by the high commissioner for human rights and several HRC member states for an independent investigation into gross human rights abuses in Xinjiang, the region in China where an estimated one million Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims remain arbitrarily detained.[13] Typically, violations of this magnitude would have already yielded actual accountability proceedings, but China’s power is such that three years into the Xinjiang crisis there is little forward movement.

In July 2019, two dozen governments sent a letter to the Human Rights Council president — though they were unwilling to make the call orally on the floor of the HRC — urging an investigation.[14] China responded with a letter signed by 37 countries, mostly developing states with poor human rights records. In November, a similar group of governments delivered a similar statement at the Third Committee of the U.N.;[15] China responded with a letter signed by 54 countries.[16]

Beijing also seeks to ensure that discussions about human rights more broadly take place only through the human rights bodies in Geneva, and not other

U.N. bodies, particularly the Security Council. China contends that only the HRC has a mandate to examine them — a convenient way of trying to limit discussions even on the gravest atrocities. In March 2018, it opposed a briefing by then-High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad al Hussein to the Security Council on Syria,[17]   and in February 2020 it blocked   a resolution at the Security Council on the plight of Myanmar’s ethnic Rohingya.[18]

U.N.  human  rights   experts,   typically   referred   to   as “special rapporteurs,” are key to reviews and accountability of U.N. member states on human rights issues. One of their common tools is  to  visit  states, but China has declined to schedule visits by numerous special rapporteurs, including those  with  mandates  on arbitrary detention, executions, or freedom of expression.[19]

It has allowed visits by experts on issues where it thought it would fare well: the right to food in 2012, a working group on discrimination against women  in 2014, and an independent expert on the effects   of foreign debt in 2016.[20] In 2016, China allowed a visit by Philip Alston, then the special rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights, who ended his visit early when authorities followed him and intimidated people he had spoken to.[21 ] Since that time, China has only allowed a visit by the independent expert on the rights of older people in late 2019.

China also continues to block the Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights from having a presence in China. While there are two dozen other U.N. agencies in China, they have rarely invoked their mandate to promote human rights.

In late June, 50 U.N. current and former special procedures — the most prominent group of independent experts in the U.N. human rights system — issued a searing indictment of China’s human rights record and call for urgent action.[22] The  experts  denounced the Chinese government’s “collective repression” of religious and ethnic minorities in Xinjiang and  Tibet, the repression of protest and impunity for excessive use of force by police in Hong Kong, censorship and retaliation against journalists, medical workers, and others who sought to speak out following the COVID-19 outbreak, and the targeting of human rights defenders across the country. The experts called for convening a special session on China, creating a dedicated expert on China, and asking U.N. agencies and governments  to press China to meet its human rights obligations. It remains to be seen whether and how the U.N. secretary-general, the high commissioner for human rights, and the Human Rights Council will respond.

Despite its poor human rights record at home, and a serious threat to the U.N. human rights system, China is expected to be reelected to the Human Rights Council in October. Absent a critical mass of concerned states committed to serving as a counterweight to  both problems, people across China and people who depend on this system for redress and accountability are at serious risk.

 

CHINA’S PUSH FOR RIGHTS- FREE DEVELOPMENT

For the last several decades, activists, development experts, and economists have made gains in creating legal and normative obligations  to  ensure  respect  and accountability for human rights in economic development. By the time China became the world’s second-largest economy in 2010, major multilateral institutions including the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund had already adopted standards and safeguards policies on community consultation, transparency, and other key human rights issues. In 2011, the United Nations adopted the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. Taken together, these emerging global norms should have afforded Beijing a template to pursue development with clear respect for human rights, but neither China’s development banks nor BRI shows signs of doing so.[23]

Beijing’s trillion-dollar BRI infrastructure and investment program facilitates Chinese access to markets and natural resources across 70 countries. Aided by the frequent absence of alternative investors, the BRI has secured the Chinese government considerable good- will among developing countries, even though Beijing has been able to foist many of the costs onto the countries that it is purporting to help.

China’s methods of operation appear to have the  effect of bolstering authoritarianism in “beneficiary” countries, even if both democracies and autocracies alike avail themselves of China’s BRI investments or surveillance exports.[24] BRI projects — known for their “no strings” loans — largely ignore human rights and environmental standards.[25] They allow little if any  input from people who might be harmed, allowing for no popular consultation methods. There have been numerous violations associated with the Souapiti Dam in Guinea and the Lower Sesan II Dam in Cambodia, both financed and constructed mainly by Chinese state-owned banks and companies.[26]

To build the dams, thousands of villagers were forced out of their ancestral homes and farmlands, losing access to food and their livelihoods. Many resettled families are not adequately compensated and do not receive legal title to their new land. Residents have written numerous letters about their situation to local and national authorities, largely to no avail. Some projects are negotiated in backroom deals that are prone to corruption. At times they benefit and entrench ruling elites while burying the people of the country under mountains of debt.

Some BRI projects are notorious: Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port, which China repossessed for 99 years when debt repayment became impossible,  or  the loan to build Kenya’s Mombasa-Nairobi railroad, which the government is trying to repay by forcing cargo transporters to use it despite cheaper alternatives. Some governments — including those of Bangladesh, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, and Sierra  Leone  —  have begun backing away from BRI projects because they do not look economically sensible.[27] In  most  cases, the struggling debtor is eager to stay in Beijing’s good graces. In the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic, China has made some pronouncements on debt relief, yet it remains unclear on how that will actually work in practice.[28]

BRI loans also provide Beijing another financial lever to ensure support for China’s anti-rights agenda in key international forums, with recipient states sometimes voting alongside Beijing  in  key  forums.  The  result   is at best silence, at worst applause, in the face of China’s domestic repression, as well as assistance to Beijing as it undermines international human rights institutions. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, for example, whose government is a major BRI recipient, said nothing about his fellow  Muslims  in  Xinjiang  as he visited Beijing, while his diplomats offered over-the- top praise for “China’s efforts in providing care to its Muslim citizens.”[29]

Similarly, Cameroon delivered fawning statements of praise for China shortly after Beijing forgave it millions in debt: Referencing Xinjiang, it lauded Beijing for  “fully protect[ing] the exercise of lawful rights of ethnic minority populations” including “normal religious activities and beliefs.”[30] China’s national development banks, such as the China Development Bank and the Export-Import Bank of China, have a growing global reach but lack critical human rights safeguards. The China-founded multilateral AIIB is not much better.  Its policies call for transparency and accountability in the projects it finances and include social and environmental standards, but do not require the bank to identify and address human rights risks.[31] Among the bank’s 74 members are many governments that claim to respect rights: much of the European Union including France, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden, along  with and the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand.

 

 

CHINESE GOVERNMENT THREATS TO FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION WORLDWIDE

Beijing’s censorship inside China is well documented, and its efforts to disseminate propaganda through state media worldwide are well known. But Chinese authorities no longer appear content with these efforts and are expanding their ambitions. Under Xi Jinping’s leadership, Chinese  authorities  increasingly  seek to limit or silence discussions about China that are perceived to be critical, and to ensure that their views and analyses are accepted by various constituencies around the world, even when that entails censoring through global platforms.

Chinese authorities have long monitored and conducted surveillance on students and academics from China and those studying China on campuses around the world. Chinese diplomats have also complained to university officials about hosting speakers  — such as the Dalai Lama — whom the Chinese government considers “sensitive.” Over the past decade, as a result of decreasing state funding to higher education in Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, universities are increasingly financially dependent on the large number of fee-paying students from China, and on Chinese government and corporate entities. This has made universities susceptible to Chinese government influence.

The net result? In 2019, a series of rigorous reports documented censorship of and self-censorship by some administrators and academics who did not want to irk Chinese authorities.[32] Students from China have reported threats to their families in China in response to what those students had said in the classroom.

Scholars from China detailed being directly threatened outside the country by Chinese officials  to  refrain  from criticizing the Chinese government in classroom lectures or other talks.

Others described students from China remaining silent in their classrooms, fearful that their speech was being monitored and reported to Chinese authorities by other students from China. One student from China at a university in the United States summed up his concerns about classroom surveillance, noting: “This isn’t a free space.” Drew Pavlou, a student at the University of Queensland who has been critical of the school’s ties to the Chinese government, is facing suspension on the grounds that his activism breached the university’s code of conduct.[33]

Some universities in the  United  States  are  now  under pressure from federal authorities to  disclose  any ties between the schools or individual  scholars  and Chinese government agencies, with the stated objective of countering People’s Republic of China influence efforts and harassment as well as the theft   of technology. Universities and scholars in Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United  States  have   been embarrassed by revelations over their ties to Chinese technology firms or government agencies implicated in human rights abuses. In April 2020 the Massachusetts Institute of Technology broke off a relationship with Chinese voice recognition firm iFlytek— whose complicity in human rights violations Human Rights Watch documented — after adopting tighter guidelines on partnerships.[34]

Other schools have grappled with tensions between students who are critical of the Chinese government and those who defend it. Students from the mainland tried to shout down speakers at a March 2019 event   at the University of California at Berkeley who were addressing the human rights crisis in Xinjiang, or in September when unidentified individuals threatened the Hong Kong democracy activist Nathan Law as he arrived for graduate studies at Yale.[35]

But few — if any — universities have taken steps to guarantee students and scholars from China the same access to academic freedom as others.[36] The failure to address these problems means that for some debates and research about China are arbitrarily curtailed.

 

Surveillance and harassment of diaspora communities by Chinese authorities is also not a new problem, but   it is clear that securing a foreign passport does not guarantee the right to freedom of expression. Even leaving  China  has  become  more  difficult:  Beijing  has worked hard in recent years to prevent certain communities from leaving the country through tactics such as denying or confiscating their passports, tightening border security to prevent Tibetans and Turkic Muslims from fleeing, and pressuring other governments from Cambodia to Turkey to forcibly return asylum seekers in violation of their obligations under international law.[37]

Since early 2017, some Uyghurs who have traveled outside China and returned, or simply remained in contact with family and friends outside the country, have found that Chinese authorities deem that conduct criminal.[38]

As  a  result,  even   individuals who have managed to leave China and obtain citizenship in rights- respecting democracies report that they are cut off from family members still inside China, are monitored and  harassed   by Chinese government officials, and are reluctant to criticize Chinese policies or authorities for fear of reprisals. Some feel they cannot attend public gatherings, such as talks on Chinese politics or Congressional hearings, for fear of being photographed or otherwise having their presence at those events noted. Others describe being called or receiving WhatsApp or text messages from authorities inside China telling them that if they publicly criticize the Chinese government their family members inside China will suffer.

One Uyghur who had obtained citizenship in Europe said: “It doesn’t matter where I am, or what passport I hold. [Chinese authorities] will terrorize me anywhere, and I have no way to fight that.” Even Han Chinese immigrants to countries like Canada described deep fear of the Chinese government, saying that while they are outraged by the human rights abuses in China,  they worry that if they criticize the government openly, their job prospects, business opportunities, and chances of going back to China would be affected or that their family members who remain in China would be in danger.[39]

Governments have relatively weak means to push back against this kind of harassment, given that it originates largely in China. In 2018, the Federal Bureau of Investigation stepped up its outreach to Uyghurs in the United States who had been targets of Chinese government harassment, and the Uyghur Human Rights Act, adopted in June 2020, expands that work across various diaspora communities from China.[40]

Chinese authorities also seek to limit freedom of expression beyond China’s borders by censoring conversations on global platforms. In June, Zoom, a California-based company, admitted that it had — at the request of Chinese authorities — suspended the accounts of U.S.-based activists who had organized online discussions about the 1989 Tiananmen massacre.[41] While the company reinstated the accounts of people based in the United States, it said it could not refuse Chinese authorities’ demands that it obey “local law.”

Other global platforms have also enabled censorship. WeChat, a Chinese social media platform with about  one billion users worldwide, 100 million of them outside China, is owned by the Chinese company Tencent.[42] The Chinese government and Tencent regularly censor content on the platform, skewing what viewers can see. Posts  with  the  words  “Liu  Xiaobo” or “Tiananmen massacre” cannot be uploaded, and criticisms of the Chinese government are swiftly removed — even if those trying to post such messages are outside the country. WeChat is wildly popular for its easy functionality, but it is also a highly effective  way for Chinese authorities to control what its users worldwide can see.

It also affects what politicians outside China can say to their own constituents. Politicians around the world increasingly use WeChat to communicate with Chinese speakers in their electorates. In September 2017, Jenny Kwan, a member of the Canadian parliament, made a statement regarding the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong in which she praised the young protesters who “stood up and fought for what they believe in, and for the betterment of their society”; that statement was subsequently posted on her WeChat account — only to be deleted.[43]

 

It is unclear whether or how politicians in democracies are tracking Beijing’s efforts to  censor  their  speech. As China plays an ever-more prominent role in global affairs, governments need to move swiftly to ensure that elected representatives’ ability to communicate with their constituents is not subject to Beijing’s whims.

One can no longer pretend that China’s suppression of independent voices stops at its borders.

Finally, Beijing also leverages access to its market to censor companies ranging from Marriott to Mercedes Benz.[44] Chinese state television, CCTV, and Tencent, a media partner of the National Basketball Association with a five-year streaming deal worth $1.5 billion, said they would not broadcast Houston Rockets games  after the team’s general manager tweeted in support of Hong Kong’s pro-democracy protesters.[45] Under pressure from Beijing, major international companies have censored themselves or staff members. Others have  fired  employees  who  have  expressed  views  the companies perceive as  critical  of  Beijing. It is bad enough for companies to abide by censorship restrictions when operating inside China. It is much worse to impose that censorship on their employees and customers around the world. One can no longer pretend that China’s suppression of independent voices stops at its borders.

 

WHAT HAPPENS IF CHINA’S POLICIES ARE NOT REVERSED

— AND WHAT TO DO

The consequences for failing to  stop  China’s  assault on the international human rights system, and on law and practice around rights-respecting development  and on the freedom of expression are simple and  stark. If these trends continue unabated, the U.N. Security Council will become even less likely to take action on grave human rights crises; the fundamental underpinnings of a universal human  rights  system  with room for independent actors will further erode; and Chinese authorities’ (and their allies’)  impunity  will only grow.

Serious rights-violating governments will know they can rely on Beijing for investment and loans with no conditions. People around the world will increasingly have to be careful whether they criticize Chinese authorities, even if they are citizens of rights-respecting democracies or in environments like academia, where debate is meant to be encouraged.

Chinese government conduct over the first half  of 2020 — its stalling into an independent investigations into the COVID-19 pandemic, its blatant rejection of international law in deciding to impose national security legislation on Hong Kong, even its manipulation of Tiananmen commemorations for people in the United States — appears to have galvanized momentum to push back. Members of parliaments from numerous countries are calling for the appointment of a U.N. special envoy on Hong Kong, governments are pressuring Beijing over a COVID-19 cover up, and companies’ capitulation to Chinese pressure to censor are regular news items.

But this is far from creating the kind of counterweight necessary  to  curb  Beijing’s  agenda,  whose  threat can now be seen clearly. To protect the U.N. human rights system from Chinese government erosions, rights-respecting governments  should  urgently  form  a multi-year coalition not only to ensure that they are tracking these threats, but also to prepare themselves to respond to them at every opportunity  to  push  back. This means nominating candidates for U.N. expert positions and calling out obstructions in the accreditation system.

This means canvassing and organizing objections to norm-eroding resolutions,  and  mobilizing allies to put themselves forward as candidates for the HRC or other selections made by regional blocs. China has the advantages of deep pockets and no periodic changes in government to encumber its ability to plan; democracies will struggle with both. But here the stakes could not be higher — not just for the 1.4 billion people in China, but for people around the world.

Governments, especially those that have joined the AIIB, should use their joint leverage to push the institution to adopt well-established  human  rights and environmental principles and practices to ensure abuse-free development. And governments entering into BRI partnerships should carefully consider the consequences and ensure that they do  what  China  will not: provide adequate public  consultation,  and  full transparency about the financial implications for the country, and the ability of affected populations to reject these development projects.

Governments should urgently consider Beijing’s threats to the freedom of expression in their own countries. They should track threats to citizens, and pursue accountability to the fullest extent through tools like targeted sanctions. Academic institutions should not content themselves merely with better disclosure policies about interactions with Chinese government actors, they need urgently to ensure that everyone on their campuses has equal access to freedom of expression — any less is a gross rejection of their responsibilities.

Companies have a role to play in rejecting censorship. They should recognize that they cannot win playing Beijing’s game,  especially  given  their  responsibility  to respect human rights under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human  Rights.  They should  draft  and  promote  codes  of  conduct  for dealing with China that  prohibit  participation  in  or facilitation of infringements of the right to free expression,  information,  privacy,  association,  or  other internationally recognized human rights. Strong common standards would make it more difficult for Beijing to ostracize those who stand up for basic rights and freedoms. Consumers and shareholders would  also be better placed to insist that the companies not succumb to censorship as the price of doing business  in China, and that they should never benefit from or contribute to abuses.

Finally, it is critical that none of these efforts to limit the Chinese government’s threats to human rights rebound on people across China or of Chinese descent around the world. The rapid spread of COVID-19 triggered a wave of racist anti-Asian harassment and assaults, and an alarming number of governments, politicians, and policies are falling  into  Beijing’s  trap of conflating the Chinese government, the Chinese Communist Party, and people from China.[46] They are not the same, and the human rights of people in China should remain at the core of future policies.

 

REFERENCES

1. “UN Treaty Body Database: China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https:// tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/15/TreatyBodyExternal/Treaty.aspx?CountryID=36&Lang=EN.
2. Kenneth Roth, “China’s global threat to human rights,” (Washington, DC: Human Rights Watch, 2020), https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2020/country-chapters/global.
3. “The Costs of International Advocacy: China’s Interference in United Nations Human Rights Mechanisms,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/report/2017/09/05/costs- international-advocacy/chinas-interference-united-nations-human-rights; Ted Piccone, “China’s long game on human rights at the United Nations,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, September 2018), https:// www.brookings.edu/research/chinas-long-game-on-human-rights-at-the-united-nations/.
4. Ted Piccone, “China’s long game on human rights at the United Nations.”
5. Sarah Zheng, “Why is China resisting an independent inquiry into how the pandemic started?,” South China Morning Post, May 16, 2020, https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3084602/why-china- resisting-independent-inquiry-how-pandemic-started.
6. “Hong Kong: Beijing threatens draconian security law,” Human Rights Watch, May 2, 2020, https://www.hrw. org/news/2020/05/22/hong-kong-beijing-threatens-draconian-security-law.
7. “States should oppose China’s disingenuous resolution on ‘mutually beneficial cooperation,’” Human Rights Watch, June 16, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/06/16/states-should-oppose-chinas-disingenuous- resolution-mutually-beneficial-cooperation.
8. John Fisher, “China’s ‘win-win’ resolution is anything but,” Human Rights Watch, March 5, 2018, https://www. hrw.org/news/2018/03/05/chinas-win-win-resolution-anything.
9. “The role of technical assistance and capacity-building in fostering mutually beneficial cooperation in promoting and protecting human rights,” United Nations Human Rights Council, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/ HRBodies/HRC/AdvisoryCommittee/Pages/TheRoleTechnicalAssistance.aspx.
10. Andrea Worden, “China’s win-win at the UN Human Rights Council: Just not for human rights,” Sinopsis, May 28, 2020, https://sinopsis.cz/en/worden-win-win/.
11. “UN: China blocks activists, harasses experts,” Human Rights Watch, September 5, 2017, https://www.hrw. org/news/2017/09/05/un-china-blocks-activists-harasses-experts.
12. “UN: China responds to rights review with threats,” Human Rights Watch, April 1, 2019, https://www.hrw. org/news/2019/04/01/un-china-responds-rights-review-threats.
13. “UN: Rights body needs to step up on Xinjiang abuses,” Human Rights Watch, March 12, 2020, https:// www.hrw.org/news/2020/03/12/un-rights-body-needs-step-xinjiang-abuses.
14. “UN: Unprecedented joint call for China to end Xinjiang abuses,” Human Rights Watch, July 10, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/07/10/un-unprecedented-joint-call-china-end-xinjiang-abuses.
15. Sophie Richardson, “Unprecedented UN critique of China’s Xinjiang policies,” Human Rights Watch, November 14, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/14/unprecedented-un-critique-chinas-xinjiang- policies.

16. Louis Charbonneau, “China’s great misinformation wall crumbles on Xinjiang,” Human Rights Watch, November 20, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/20/chinas-great-misinformation-wall-crumbles- xinjiang.
17. “Procedural vote blocks holding of Security Council meeting on human rights situation in Syria, briefing by High Commissioner,” United Nations, March 19, 2018, https://www.un.org/press/en/2018/sc13255.doc.htm.
18. UN fails to take action on order against Myanmar on Rohingya,” Al Jazeera, February 4, 2020, https://www. aljazeera.com/news/2020/02/fails-action-order-myanmar-rohingyas-200205020402316.html.
19. “View country visits of special procedures of the Human  Rights  Council  since  1998:  China,”  United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewCountryVisits. aspx?visitType=all&country=CHN&Lang=en; “Thematic Mandates,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://spinternet.ohchr.org/ViewAllCountryMandates.aspx?Type=TM&lang=en.
20. “Human rights by country: China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https:// www.ohchr.org/EN/countries/AsiaRegion/Pages/CNIndex.aspx.
21. “Report of the Special Rapporteur on extreme poverty and human rights on his mission to China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, https://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?si=A/ HRC/35/26/Add.2; Philip Alston, “End-of-mission statement on China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, August 23, 2016, https://www.ohchr.org/en/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews. aspx?NewsID=20402&LangID=E.
22. “UN experts call for decisive measures to protect fundamental freedoms in China,” United Nations Human Rights Office of the High Commissioner, June 26, 2020, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/ DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=26006&LangID=E.
23. “China: ‘Belt and Road’ projects should respect rights,” Human Rights Watch, April 21, 2019, https://www. hrw.org/news/2019/04/21/china-belt-and-road-projects-should-respect-rights.
24. Sheena Chestnut Greitens, “Dealing with demand for China’s global surveillance exports,” (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, April 2020), https://www.brookings.edu/research/dealing-with-demand-for-chinas- global-surveillance-exports/.
25. Sophie Richardson and Hugh Williamson, “China: One belt, one road, lots of obligations,” Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/05/12/china-one-belt-one-road-lots-obligations.
26. “’We’re Leaving Everything Behind’: The Impact of Guinea’s Souapiti Dam on Displaced Communities,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, April 2020), https://www.hrw.org/report/2020/04/16/were-leaving-everything- behind/impact-guineas-souapiti-dam-displaced-communities.
27. Neelam Deo and Amit Bhandari, “The intensifying backlash against BRI,” Gateway House, May 31, 2018, https://www.gatewayhouse.in/bri-debt-backlash/.
28. Yun Sun, “China’s debt relief for Africa: Emerging deliberations,” The Brookings Institution, June 9, 2020, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2020/06/09/chinas-debt-relief-for-africa-emerging- deliberations/.
29. Maya Wang, “Pakistan Cares About the Rights of All Muslims—Except Those Oppressed by its Ally, China,” Newsweek, April 17, 2019, https://www.newsweek.com/china-muslims-pakistan-imran-khan-1399044.
30. Nick Cumming-Bruce, “China Rebuked by 22 Nations Over Xinjiang Repression,” The New York Times, July 10, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/10/world/asia/china-xinjiang-rights.html.

31. “China: New bank’s projects should respect rights,” Human Rights Watch, June 24, 2016, https://www.hrw. org/news/2016/06/24/china-new-banks-projects-should-respect-rights.
32. “China: Government threats to academic freedom abroad,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/21/china-government-threats-academic-freedom-abroad; Sheena Chestnut Greitens and Rory Truex, “Repressive experiences among China scholars: New evidence from survey data,” The China Quarterly 242, (June 2020): 349-375, https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/ china-quarterly/article/repressive-experiences-among-china-scholars-new-evidence-from-survey-data/ C1CB08324457ED90199C274CDC153127.
33. Tim Swanston, “Drew Pavlou, critic of University of Queensland’s links to Chinese Government bodies, suspended for two years,” ABC News (Australia), May 29, 2020, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2020-05-29/ drew-pavlou-suspended-university-queensland/12302350.
34. Will Knight, “MIT cuts ties with a Chinese AI firm amid human rights concerns,” Wired, April 21, 2020, https://www.wired.com/story/mit-cuts-ties-chinese-ai-firm-human-rights/; “China: Voice biometric collection threatens privacy,” Human Rights Watch, October 22, 2017, https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/10/22/china- voice-biometric-collection-threatens-privacy.
35. Sophie Richardson, “The Chinese Government Cannot Be Allowed to Undermine Academic Freedom,” Human Rights Watch, November 8, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/11/08/chinese-government- cannot-be-allowed-undermine-academic-freedom.
36. “Resisting Chinese Government Efforts to Undermine Academic Freedom Abroad: A Code of Conduct for Colleges, Universities, and Academic Institutions Worldwide,” Human Rights Watch, https://www.hrw.org/sites/ default/files/supporting_resources/190321_china_academic_freedom_coc_0.pdf.
37. “One passport, two systems,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, July 2015), https://www.hrw.org/ report/2015/07/13/one-passport-two-systems/chinas-restrictions-foreign-travel-tibetans-and-others; “Thailand: More Uighurs face forced return to China,” Human Rights Watch, March 21, 2014, https://www.hrw. org/news/2014/03/21/thailand-more-uighurs-face-forced-return-china.
38. “’Eradicating Ideological Viruses’: China’s Campaign of Repression Against Xinjiang’s Muslims,” (New York: Human Rights Watch, September 2018), https://www.hrw.org/report/2018/09/09/eradicating-ideological- viruses/chinas-campaign-repression-against-xinjiangs.
39. Yaqiu Wang, “Why Some Chinese Immigrants Living in Canada Live in Silent Fear,” Human Rights Watch, March 4, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/03/04/why-some-chinese-immigrants-living-canada-live- silent-fear.
40. Edward Wong, “Uighur Americans Speak Against China’s Internment Camps. Their Relatives Disappear,” The New York Times, October 18, 2018, https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/18/world/asia/uighur-muslims-china- detainment.html.
41. Yaqiu Wang, “China’s Zoom bomb,” Human Rights Watch, June 16, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/ news/2020/06/16/chinas-zoom-bomb.
42. Yaqiu Wang, “How China’s censorship machine crosses borders — and into Western politics,” Human Rights Watch, February 20, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/02/20/how-chinas-censorship-machine-crosses- borders-and-western-politics.
43. Ibid.
44. Kenneth Roth, “China’s global threat to human rights.”

45. Kenneth Roth, “For NBA’s quandary over China, stand with human rights,” Human Rights Watch, October 8, 2019, https://www.hrw.org/news/2019/10/08/nbas-quandary-over-china-stand-human-rights.
46. “Covid-19 Fueling Anti-Asian Racism and Xenophobia Worldwide,” Human Rights Watch, May 12, 2020, https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/05/12/covid-19-fueling-anti-asian-racism-and-xenophobia-worldwide