風蕭蕭_Frank
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美國麵臨的威脅日益嚴重，而我們卻準備不足。以下是解決這一問題的方法
作者：簡·哈曼， 埃裏克·埃德爾曼 08/01/24
美國麵臨的國家安全威脅與冷戰甚至第二次世界大戰高峰時期一樣嚴重，而且更加複雜。我們今天還沒有準備好應對這些威脅，而且可能很快就會發現自己陷入了一場跨多個戰區的戰爭，與實力相當甚至接近實力相當的對手作戰，我們可能會輸掉這場戰爭。
這是我們主持的國會成立的一個委員會的主要發現，該委員會旨在審查 2022 年發布的當前國防戰略。我們兩黨一致的建議列出了現在避免這種結果所需的步驟。
我們的國家已經失去了數十年來無可爭議的軍事主導地位，尤其是在西太平洋。中國的軍事和工業實力可與我們匹敵，甚至在某些方麵超越了我們。俄羅斯的網絡和太空能力旨在阻止或阻止我們幹涉其在西太平洋的侵略行動。
盡管在烏克蘭遭受損失，俄羅斯還是通過全麵的戰時動員實現了轉型，並對北約構成威脅。中國和俄羅斯建立了“無限製”夥伴關係，並擁抱了流氓國家伊朗和朝鮮。俄羅斯獲得了繼續在烏克蘭戰鬥的手段；伊朗和朝鮮將獲得武器和專業知識，以及外交和經濟保護。這四個國家都試圖對抗美國的影響力，他們的結盟帶來了真正的風險，即三個戰場中的任何一個戰場上的衝突都可能演變成一場全球戰爭。
所有這些都發生在國防部難以滿足當前需求的時候。正如烏克蘭所表明的那樣，我們正在努力生產一場有限戰爭所需的武器和裝備，更不用說我們可能很快麵臨的全麵衝突了。我們的委員會建議采取一種新方法，更多地使用商用技術，充分擁抱我們的盟友和合作夥伴，並增加對製造能力和工業勞動力的投資。
盡管國防部的改革很難，但還不夠。要匹敵中國的力量，需要采取全麵綜合的方法，涉及國家力量的所有要素：美國軍方的力量與我們一流的創新基礎的真正夥伴關係，以及外交、經濟投資、網絡安全、貿易、教育、工業能力、公民參與和國際合作方麵的協調努力。
這一戰略在冷戰期間取得了成功，但自那以後，我們執行這一戰略的能力就萎縮了。我們要求軍方用太少的資源做太多的事情，讓新的威脅不斷積累，也讓我們政府的其他部門低估了自己在國家安全中的作用。
也有亮點。拜登政府擴大和加強了北約，並加強了與太平洋沿岸盟友和夥伴的關係。這一點至關重要，因為沒有盟友，美國就無法遏製或贏得未來的戰爭。通過資助和更好的信息共享、合作的工業關係和軍事出口來加強盟友，既有助於盟友，也有助於我們。
我們的商業部門是另一個巨大的戰略優勢。它在軍事創新方麵迅速超越了國防部，包括人工智能、機器人技術和自主性。然而，國防部的文化仍然依賴於內部研發和幾十年前的平台，這些平台更適合昨天的戰爭。烏克蘭正在迅速將新技術與舊係統整合在一起——隻需幾周，而不是幾年。俄羅斯已經吸取了這一教訓；我們也必須吸取教訓。
更好的技術意味著我們不需要將潛在對手的平台與平台相匹配，但美國的軍事結構仍然不足。由於政策決定和招募不足，美國軍隊是幾代人以來規模最小的。國防戰略呼籲一支能夠在一個戰區作戰並在其他戰區遏製侵略的部隊，這種做法已經過時了。我們已經卷入了歐洲和中東的戰爭，來自中國的威脅更大。
我們建議建立一支聯合部隊，能夠同時保衛國土、帶領盟友遏製中國，並帶領盟友和合作夥伴遏製俄羅斯和伊朗。這要求我們在軍事、外交和經濟方麵具有全球影響力，包括在全球南方，中國和俄羅斯在我們相對缺席的情況下正在獲得影響力。
如果沒有美國人民的支持，這一切都不可能實現，他們大多不知道也沒有準備好應對我們麵臨的危險，包括美國本土不再是避難所或免受攻擊。最終，公眾將不得不承擔所需的費用。
我們的國家安全預算必須比國防更廣泛，包括國務院、財政部、國土安全部、商務部、教育部和其他部門的關鍵任務。我們還必須更明智地花錢，而不是
隻是花更多的錢。這包括撤出不適合未來戰爭的遺產，並通過繼續決議退出執政。
為了克服冷戰的威脅，美國至少將 GDP 的 4.9% 用於國防。今天，我們的國防支出占 GDP 的 3%，我們用於償還債務利息的支出比國防支出還多。我們的委員會一致建議通過增加收入和改革福利支出來支付額外支出。
美國需要一種新的國家權力方法，以保持其在世界上的地位，並威懾並在必要時擊敗我們的對手。我們的委員會向國會和白宮推薦了這些變化，我們敦促總統競選團隊就我們麵臨的威脅以及如何應對這些威脅進行嚴肅的公開對話。緊急改變和增加支出是困難的；輸掉一場戰爭會更糟糕。
簡·哈曼 (Jane Harman) 擔任國家國防戰略委員會主席。她曾九屆擔任加利福尼亞州第 36 區眾議院議員。埃裏克·埃德爾曼是該委員會的副主席。他曾任駐土耳其和芬蘭大使以及國防部政策部副部長。
美國滑向“大國戰爭”預期需警惕
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317301.shtml?
張家棟 2024年8月3日 複旦大學美國研究中心教授 bizopinion@globaltimes.com.cn
美國國防戰略委員會最近發布了一份關於2022年美國國防戰略（NDS）的報告。報告強調NDS“過時”，美國軍隊結構不正確，國家工業基礎“嚴重不足”，並聲稱這些缺陷使其無法同時應對“俄羅斯和中國”的雙重威脅。報告提出了“全要素動員”的解決方案，呼籲加強美軍在多戰區作戰的戰備能力。
蘭德公司的信息顯示，美國國防戰略委員會是根據美國2022財年國防授權法案成立的，主席是前眾議院情報委員會高級成員，並得到蘭德公司的分析和行政支持。因此，這份報告雖然不是美國政府的正式文件，但由於其代表了兩黨，仍然具有重要的參考價值。具體來說，這份報告和美國官員在過去兩年中的一些其他行動和言論，揭示了美國政策的幾條主線。
首先，美國軍事戰略有可能從和平預期轉向戰爭預期。冷戰結束後，美國對兩場同時發生的地區衝突有著長期的應對計劃，而不是與大國開戰的預期。基於這些考慮，美國打造了一支高度先進、機動靈活的軍事力量，強調全球部署和介入能力而非長期作戰能力。但隨著俄烏衝突長期化的趨勢，美國正在改變和調整此前的軍事戰略，更傾向於為“大國戰爭”做準備。
其次，美國進一步調整對中俄的態度。在俄烏衝突之初，美國戰略界傾向於區分中俄，避免在戰略層麵把中俄推到一起。但自2023年底以來，美國戰略界出現了將中俄視為幾乎單一威脅的趨勢。今年，美國前任和現任印太司令都發表了類似言論。一方麵，這表明美國試圖通過展示其對內對外“兩線作戰”的無畏姿態來塑造其依然強大的形象；另一方麵也表明華盛頓試圖通過強行將中俄掛鉤、誇大相關“威脅”來促進西方內部團結。
第三，試圖以戰爭預期帶動美國製造業複蘇。在這份報告中，美國國防戰略委員會特別關注國防工業的恢複和發展。客觀地說，和平時期國防製造業一般都處於相對低迷的狀態，與滿足戰時需求所需的“全速”狀態自然無法相比。因此，美國國防戰略委員會所謂美國國防工業不足以滿足“大國衝突需求”的說法，是故意裝傻。
第四，報告旨在促進國內民族團結。以此報告為最新例證，美國一些政客不斷強調跨黨派、跨階級動員的重要性，甚至借所謂“大國戰爭預期”來推動美國社會的共識與團結。在美國社會分裂和政治兩極分化加劇的背景下，他們自以為找到了一條快速團結國家的“捷徑”，但實際上，他們可能將自己置於危險境地，最終可能麵臨嚴重的反彈。
第五，表明華盛頓可能正在重新評估來自俄羅斯的軍事威脅。該報告認為，當前的美國國防戰略“低估了來自俄羅斯的威脅”，並建議增加美國在歐洲的軍事部署。在俄烏衝突持續的背景下，這些發現表明，美國一些人可能試圖提升俄羅斯在美國國家安全戰略中的優先級，強調來自俄羅斯的威脅是統一國內和外交政策共識的手段。
簡而言之，該報告建議增加對與中國和俄羅斯潛在衝突的軍事預期和準備。它提出，美國將需要做出重大改變和投資，甚至可能是“戰時動員”。目前尚不清楚這些建議將如何納入美國官方政策中
雖然這一報告可能引起爭議，但從該報告的兩黨立場以及近年來美國國內政界人士的類似表態來看，我們應保持警惕。我們必須警惕美國這些表態中隱含的戰爭隱患，做好輿論引導和戰略部署。我們必須保持定力，警惕落入美國國內極端反華勢力的陷阱，防止他們的極端言論成為現實。
中美關係作為全球最重要的雙邊關係，不會輕易陷入個別美國政客試圖挑起的“新冷戰”甚至“熱戰”。兩國關係的複雜性和國際環境的不斷變化，導致中美關係中存在著多種聲音。中國必須時刻警惕一些極端聲音所暴露出的危險動向，比如華盛頓一些人所鼓吹的“大國戰爭”預期進一步轉向。同時，我們要把握大局，不被極端言論帶偏，繼續推動中美關係朝著積極的方向發展。
縱觀世界曆史，許多衝突或戰爭往往是由誤判或誤算引發的。美國國內不少人不斷鼓吹對華強硬立場，試圖在這個問題上形成某種戰略共識，但實際上，美國國內對如何處理對華關係的聲音仍然多元且具有可塑性。我們要繼續爭取那些理性的進步力量，同時對極端激進的言論保持警惕和批判。
委員會就美國麵臨的威脅發出嚴重警告
08/02/2024
國會委托的一個委員會的領導人表示，需要“采取重大而緊急的行動”來讓美國為今天麵臨的國家安全威脅做好準備。
“我們的委員會一致認為，對美國國家安全和我們利益的威脅比二戰以來的任何時候都大，也比冷戰時期更加複雜，”美國國防戰略委員會主席簡·哈曼和副主席埃裏克·埃德爾曼在參議院軍事委員會的書麵證詞中表示。
該委員會還表示，陸軍規模太小，無法完成其控製對手和增強聯合部隊能力的任務。 “烏克蘭戰爭的教訓表明，美國陸軍需要在關鍵領域擴大其部隊結構——特別是防空、反無人機係統、電子戰和遠程火力——這些領域適用於所有戰區，包括西太平洋應急行動，”委員會在報告中表示。
此外，“公眾不知道威脅有多大，也沒有動員起來應對，”哈曼 7 月 30 日告訴委員會。“公眾支持對於實施我們需要做出的改變至關重要。兩黨和政府的領導人都需要向公眾說明情況並獲得他們的支持。”
哈曼曾任國會議員，領導伍德羅·威爾遜國際學者中心 10 年。她曾擔任中央情報局、國家情報局局長、國防部、國土安全部和國務院的顧問委員會成員。
該委員會建議五角大樓和其他政府機構“從根本上改變”其工作方式，同時敦促美國全麵擁抱其合作夥伴和盟友，並更好地與私營部門技術進行整合。
委員會的幾名成員曾在 2018 年國防戰略委員會任職，該委員會敲響了美國正在失去決定性軍事優勢的警鍾，該委員會的聯合主席埃德爾曼說。“六年後，威脅更加嚴重，我們未能跟上步伐，”他說。
埃德爾曼曾任美國駐芬蘭和土耳其大使，現任戰略與預算評估中心顧問。他之前還曾在國務院、國防部和白宮擔任高級職務。
哈曼和埃德爾曼警告說，可能會發生“近期戰爭，也可能會失敗”，並指出中國、俄羅斯、伊朗和朝鮮之間的夥伴關係是“我們尚未考慮到的重大戰略轉變”。
哈曼和埃德爾曼表示，中國被國防部領導人稱為美國的“步調挑戰”，而中國“在某些方麵超越了美國”。
“中國的網絡能力、太空資產、不斷增長的戰略力量和全麵現代化的常規力量旨在阻止美國介入台灣海峽或南海或東海，”他們說。“中國已經滲透到我們的關鍵基礎設施網絡中，通過爭奪我們的後勤、破壞電力和水資源，以及以其他方式奪走美國在國內長期享有的庇護所，來阻止或阻止美國的行動。”
委員會表示，俄羅斯在入侵烏克蘭後重新崛起，也繼續構成威脅。他們說，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京“尋求重新確立俄羅斯的大國地位，並樂於破壞世界穩定。”
哈曼和埃德爾曼表示，國防部不能也不應該自己提供國防。 “需要采取一種真正‘全要素’的方法來協調和利用國防部、其他行政部門、政府和私營部門的資源。
US faces growing threats, and we're woefully unprepared. Here's how to fix that.
BY JANE HARMAN AND ERIC EDELMAN, OPINION CONTRIBUTORS - 08/01/24
The national security threats against the U.S. are as significant as and more complex than they were at the height of the Cold War or even World War II. We are not prepared to meet these threats today and could, in very short order, find ourselves in a war across multiple theaters with peer and near-peer adversaries that we could lose.
This is the key finding of a commission established by Congress, which we chaired, to review the current National Defense Strategy, published in 2022. Our bipartisan, unanimous recommendations lay out the steps needed now to avoid this outcome.
Our country has lost its decades-long uncontested military dominance, especially in the Western Pacific. China’s military and industrial strength rivals and in some ways outpaces our own. Its cyber and space capabilities are designed to deter or prevent us from interfering with its aggressive actions in the Western Pacific.
Despite losses in Ukraine, Russia has transformed itself through a full wartime mobilization and threatens NATO. China and Russia have forged a “no-limits” partnership and they have embraced rogue states Iran and North Korea. Russia receives the means to keep fighting in Ukraine; Iran and North Korea stand to gain weapons and expertise, along with diplomatic and economic protection. All four states seek to counter U.S. influence and their alignment presents a real risk that conflict in any of their three theaters would become a global war.
All this comes when the Department of Defense is struggling to meet current demands. As Ukraine demonstrates, we’re straining to produce the weapons and equipment needed for one limited war, let alone the all-out conflict we could soon face. Our commission recommends a new approach, greater use of commercially available technology, fully embracing our allies and partners, and an increased investment in manufacturing capacity and our industrial workforce.
Change at the Defense Department, as hard as that is, will not be enough. Matching China’s strength requires a fully integrated approach involving all elements of national power: the strength of the U.S. military in true partnership with our first-class innovation base, plus a coordinated effort involving diplomacy, economic investment, cybersecurity, trade, education, industrial capacity, civic engagement and international cooperation.
This strategy was successful in the Cold War but since then our ability to execute it has atrophied. We have asked the military to do too much with too little, allowed new threats to accumulate, and allowed other elements of our government to under-prioritize their own role in national security.
There are bright spots. The Biden administration has expanded and strengthened NATO and enhanced relationships with allies and partners across the Pacific. This is critical as the U.S. cannot deter or win future wars without our allies. Strengthening them, through funding and better information sharing, cooperative industrial relationships and military exports, helps them and us.
Our commercial sector is another enormous strategic advantage. It rapidly outpaces the Defense Department at military innovation, including AI, robotics and autonomy. Yet the Defense Department’s culture still relies on internal research and development and decades-old platforms better suited to yesterday’s wars. Ukraine is integrating new technology rapidly with older systems — on the order of weeks, not years. Russia has learned this lesson; we must as well.
Better technology means we need not match our potential adversaries platform to platform, but still the U.S. force structure is insufficient. The U.S. military is the smallest it has been in generations due to policy decisions and recruitment shortfalls. The National Defense Strategy is outdated in calling for a force able to fight in one theater and deter aggression elsewhere. We are already involved in wars in Europe and the Middle East, with a larger threat looming from China.
We recommend a Joint Force able to simultaneously defend the homeland, lead allies in deterring China, and spearhead allies and partners to keep Russia and Iran in check. This demands a worldwide presence — military, diplomatic and economic — including across the Global South, where China and Russia are gaining influence in our relative absence.
None of this is possible without the support of the American people, who are largely unaware and unprepared for the dangers we face, including that the U.S. homeland is no longer a sanctuary or immune from attack. Ultimately, the public will have to shoulder the cost of what is needed.
Our national security budgets must be broader than Defense and include the critical missions at the departments of State, Treasury, Homeland Security, Commerce, Education and others. We also must spend smarter, not just spend more. That includes divesting from legacy ill-suited to future warfare and quitting governing through continuing resolutions.
To overcome the threats of the Cold War, the U.S. spent at minimum 4.9 percent of GDP on defense. Today, we are at 3 percent of GDP and we spend more servicing the interest on debt than we do on defense. On a unanimous basis, our commission recommends paying for additional spending by raising revenues and reforming entitlement spending.
A new approach to national power is needed for the United States to retain its position in the world and deter and, if necessary, defeat our adversaries. Our commission recommends these changes to Congress and the White House and we urge both presidential campaigns to conduct a serious public conversation about the threats we face and how to deal with them. Urgent change and increased spending are difficult; losing a war would be far worse.
Jane Harman chairs the Commission on the National Defense Strategy. She represented California’s 36th District in the House of Representatives for nine terms. Eric Edelman is the vice chair of the Commission. He was previously ambassador to Turkey and Finland and under secretary of Defense for Policy.
US sliding toward the expectation of a "great power war" requires vigilance
https://www.globaltimes.cn/page/202408/1317301.shtml?
By Zhang JiadongPublished: Aug 03, 2024
A recent report on the 2022 US National Defense Strategy (NDS) was released by the US National Defense Strategy Commission. The report highlighted that the NDS is “out of date,” the US military is not correctly structured and the nation's industrial base is "grossly inadequate," and claimed that these shortcomings make it impossible to simultaneously confront the dual "threat of Russia and China.” The report proposed a solution called "all elements of national power" and called for strengthening the US military's readiness to operate across multiple theaters of war.
Information from the RAND Corporation shows that the US National Defense Strategy Commission was created under the US 2022 fiscal year National Defense Authorization Act, with the chair being a former senior member of the House Intelligence Committee, and receiving analytic and administrative support from the RAND Corporation. Therefore, while this report is not an official US government document, it still holds significant reference value due to its bipartisan representation. Specifically, this report, along with some other actions and statements by US officials in the past two years, reveals several throughlines in US policy.
Firstly, there is the possibility that the US military strategy is shifting away from an expectation of peace to an expectation of war. After the end of the Cold War, the US had long-term plans for dealing with two simultaneous regional conflicts, rather than the expectation of war with major powers. Based on these considerations, the US built a highly advanced and mobile military force, emphasizing global deployment and intervention capabilities rather than long-term combat capabilities. However, with the trend toward a prolonged Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US is changing and adjusting its previous military strategy, leaning more toward preparing for “great power wars.”
Secondly, the US is further adjusting its attitude toward China and Russia. At the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, the US strategic community tended to differentiate between China and Russia to avoid pushing them together at a strategic level. However, since the end of 2023, there has been a trend in the US strategic community to treat China and Russia as an almost singular threat. This year, both former and current US Indo-Pacific Commanders have made similar remarks. On one hand, this indicates that the US is trying to shape its image as still strong by showing that it is not afraid of "fighting on two fronts" internally and externally; on the other hand, it also suggests that Washington intends to promote internal unity in the West by forcibly linking China and Russia and exaggerating related "threats."
Thirdly, there is an attempt to use war expectations to drive the revival of the American manufacturing industry. In this report, the US National Defense Strategy Commission pays particular attention to the recovery and development of the defense industry. Objectively speaking, in peacetime, defense manufacturing typically operates at relatively low levels, which naturally cannot be compared to the "full throttle" state required to meet wartime demands. Therefore, the US National Defense Strategy Commission's claim that the American defense industry is not sufficient to meet the “demands of great power conflict” is a deliberate act of pretending to be ignorant.
Fourth, the report aims to promote domestic national unity. With this report as the latest example, some politicians in the US have been emphasizing the importance of bipartisan and cross-class mobilization, even using the so-called expectation of a "great power war" to promote consensus and unity in American society. Amid growing social division and political polarization in the US, they believe they have discovered a "shortcut” to unite the country quickly. However, in reality, they may be placing themselves in a risky situation and could ultimately face a serious backlash.
Fifth, it indicates that Washington may be reassessing the military threat from Russia. This report suggests that the current US defense strategy "understates the threat from Russia" and recommends increasing US military deployments in Europe. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict, these findings reveal that some in the US may be attempting to elevate Russia's priority in the US national security strategy, emphasizing the threat from Russia as a means to unite domestic and foreign policy consensus.
In short, this report suggests increasing military expectations and preparations for potential conflict with China and Russia. It proposes that the US will need to make major changes and investments, possibly even “wartime mobilization.” It is unclear how these recommendations will be incorporated into official US policy, but the bipartisan nature of the report and similar statements from domestic politicians in recent years serve as a reminder to remain vigilant. We must be cautious of the potential for war implied in these US statements and prepare public opinion and strategic plans accordingly. Additionally, we must maintain our composure, be wary of falling into the trap set by the extreme anti-China faction in the US, and prevent their extreme rhetoric from becoming a reality.
As the world’s most important bilateral relationship, the China-US relationship will not easily fall into the new Cold War or even hot war that some individual American politicians are trying to provoke. The complexity of the relationship between the two countries and the constantly changing international environment have led to a variety of voices in this relationship. China must always remain vigilant about the dangerous trends exposed by some extreme voices, such as the further shift toward expectations of a “great power war" advocated by some in Washington. At the same time, we must grasp the overall situation, not be led astray by extreme rhetoric, and continue to shape the China-US relationship in a positive direction.
Throughout world history, many conflicts or wars have often been sparked by misjudgments or miscalculations. Many in the US continue to clamor for a tougher stance against China and attempt to create a certain strategic consensus on this issue, but in reality, voices within the US on how to handle relations with China remain diverse and malleable. We must continue to strive for those rational and progressive forces, while remaining vigilant and critical of extreme and radical rhetoric.
The author is a professor with the Center for American Studies at Fudan University. bizopinion@globaltimes.com.cn
COMMISSION ISSUES DIRE WARNING ABOUT THREATS FACING US
“Significant and urgent action” is needed to prepare the United States for the national security threats it’s facing today, said the leaders of a commission tasked by Congress.
“Our commission believes unanimously that the threats to U.S. national security and our interests are greater than at any time since World War II and are more complex than during the Cold War,” Jane Harman and Eric Edelman, the chair and vice chair, respectively, of the Commission on the National Defense Strategy of the United States, said in written testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.
The commission also said the Army is too small for its mission of dominating adversaries and enabling the joint force. “Lessons from the Ukraine war demonstrate that the U.S. Army needs to expand its force structure in key areas—particularly air defense, counter–unmanned aerial systems, electronic warfare, and long-range fires—that are applicable across theaters, including in a Western Pacific contingency,” the commission says in its report.
Additionally, “the public has no idea how great the threats are and is not mobilized to meet them,” Harman told the committee July 30. “Public support is critical to implement the changes we need to make. Leaders on both sides of the aisle and across government need to make the case to the public and get their support.”
Harman is a former member of Congress who led the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for 10 years. She has served on advisory boards for the CIA, director of national intelligence and the departments of defense, homeland security and state.
Recommending “fundamental change” in the way the Pentagon and other government agencies do business, the commission also urges a full embrace of America’s partners and allies and better integration with private sector technology.
Several members of the commission served on the 2018 National Defense Strategy Commission, which sounded the alarm that the U.S. was losing its decisive military edge, said Edelman, who was that group’s co-chair. “Six years later, the threats are more serious, and we have failed to keep pace,” he said.
A former U.S. ambassador to Finland and Turkey, Edelman is counselor at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously also served in senior positions in the State Department, DoD and the White House.
Harman and Edelman warned that there is potential for “near-term war, and potential that we might lose,” citing the partnership between China, Russia, Iran and North Korea as a “major strategic shift that we haven’t yet accounted for.”
China, which DoD leaders have called the U.S.’ “pacing challenge,” is “in some ways outpacing the United States,” Harman and Edelman said.
“China’s cyber capabilities, space assets, growing strategic forces and fully modernized conventional forces are designed to keep the United States from engaging in the Taiwan Strait or the South or East China Seas,” they said. “China has infiltrated our critical infrastructure networks to prevent or deter U.S. action by contesting our logistics, disrupting power and water, and otherwise remove the sanctuary that the United States has long enjoyed at home.”
Russia also continues to be a threat, as it has reconstituted after its invasion of Ukraine, the commission said. Russian President Vladimir Putin “seeks to re-assert Russia as a great power and is happy to destabilize the world to do it,” they said.
DoD cannot—and should not—provide for the national defense itself, Harman and Edelman said. “A truly ‘all elements of national power’ approach is required to coordinate and leverage resources across DoD, the rest of the executive branch, the private sector, civil society and U.S. allies and partners,” they said.
For its part, DoD must change how it works with the technology sector, they said. “DoD is operating at the speed of bureaucracy when the threat is approaching wartime urgency. DoD’s structure is optimized for research and development for exquisite, irreplaceable platforms when the future is autonomy, AI and large numbers of cheaper, attritable systems,” Harman and Edelman said.
The military also is too small for today’s needs and tomorrow’s challenges, the commission found. It also warned about the current recruiting challenges facing the force.
“The joint force is at the breaking point of maintaining readiness today. Adding more burden without adding resources to rebuild readiness will cause it to break,” they said. “The United States must spend more effectively and more efficiently to build the future force, not perpetuate the existing one. We have to cancel legacy programs. Additional resources will also be necessary. Congress should pass a supplemental appropriation to begin a multiyear investment in the national security innovation and industrial base.”
Read the commission’s report here.
