風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
摘自《複興美國》、《格林伯格地緣經濟研究中心》和《資本主義的未來》
詹姆斯·K·加爾布雷斯：美國主導的全球金融資本主義能否生存？
https://www.cfr.org/blog/james-k-galbraith-can-american-led-global-financial-capitalism-survive
人們對美國主導的經濟和地緣政治秩序的信任正在逐漸消退。俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以及美國對此作出的反應，無論其優點如何，都可能是壓垮美元儲備體係全球壟斷的最後一根稻草。
布魯塞爾 G7 峰會布魯塞爾 G7 峰會 Pool New/ Reuters
Roger W. Ferguson Jr. 和 James K. Galbraith 的博客文章，2022 年 5 月 3 日
作為外交關係委員會 (CFR) 未來資本主義項目的一部分，Roger W. Ferguson Jr. 邀請來自學術界、私營部門和政府的各類參與者撰寫一係列博客文章，以提供有關世界各地實踐中不同類型的資本主義、這些係統麵臨的挑戰及其在 21 世紀的未來的觀點。這篇文章來自 1980 年代初美國國會聯合經濟委員會執行主任 James K. Galbraith。他還在 1990 年代中期擔任中華人民共和國國家計劃委員會宏觀經濟改革首席技術顧問。加爾布雷斯教授目前是德克薩斯大學奧斯汀分校林登·約翰遜公共事務學院政府/商業關係係的 Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. 教授。
“資本主義能否生存？”這是偉大的經濟學家和政治反動派約瑟夫·熊彼特在 1942 年提出的問題。他的回答是否定的，但為時過早。
1989 年，我出版了我的第一本書，除了一個有先見之明的副標題“技術、金融和美國的未來”以及新興全球勞動分工的粗略層次結構外，這本書沒有什麽特別之處：先進技術強國、中等製造強國和資源型經濟體。
曆史上的美國兼具這三個層次，最初是英國工廠的棉花供應商，發展成為工業強國，並在 20 世紀中葉成為主導的金融和技術強國。在我父親的世界裏，在強大的工會和監管福利國家的製衡下，偉大的美國工業公司在布雷頓森林體係和原子彈的全球保護傘下整合了技術、金融、生產和資源。
但在 20 世紀 60 年代、70 年代和 80 年代，這一綜合地位逐漸減弱，部分原因是企業與勞工、金融與工業的政治鬥爭以及越南戰爭，部分原因是老齡化、過時以及德國、日本、後來的韓國和最後的中國的複蘇和崛起。在這些國家中，加爾布雷斯的工業公司繼續成為進步的工具和引擎。但在美國，勞工全麵失敗，金融和美元獲勝，“股東價值”大獲全勝——隨之而來的是工業中心地帶的衰落。
當時，我在聯合經濟委員會的前線任職，反對裏根總統和當時的美聯儲主席保羅沃爾克的政策。但後來，隨著冷戰的結束，我認為他們強行建立的世界也許會成功。如果不是因為布什、克林頓、小布什和奧巴馬總統的傲慢和暴力，以及我們金融領袖的自由主義幻想，世界也許會成功。
當時，我希望建立一個共生的一體化世界體係，由美國提供軍事安全、流動的穩定金融儲備資產、由全球人才組成的新技術孵化器，以及全球需求的很大一部分，實現亞當·斯密的原則“勞動分工受市場範圍限製”。另一個必要條件是全球信任美國的地位是通過明智的管理贏得的——通過和平世界中的全球凱恩斯主義。
自 20 世紀 90 年代初以來，人們對美國作為世界安全保障者的信任已經逐漸減弱。我們在後蘇聯俄羅斯的掠奪、對貝爾格萊德的轟炸、阿富汗的長期潰敗、伊拉克、利比亞、敘利亞和也門的破壞和政策失敗，以及——是的——2014 年烏克蘭的政變都發揮了作用。還有我們對中國在台灣、香港、新疆的“前瞻性戰略”。無論優劣如何，在這些問題上，牛頓定律都適用：行動引發反應。
2020 年，疫情暴露了全球供應鏈的脆弱性，首先是中斷生產，然後是堵塞分銷渠道，影響航運、半導體、汽車，而油價先是暴跌，然後反彈，引發通脹。然而，盡管金融管製過度放鬆，導致 2007-2009 年全球崩潰，但美元儲備體係幸存了下來。甚至很明顯，歐元、英鎊和瑞士法郎
我依靠美聯儲的互換額度來維持其穩定。
現在我們進入最後一幕。它的前奏是中國和俄羅斯的崛起，經曆了三個階段，中國用了四十年的時間從??貧窮走向強大，俄羅斯用了二十五年的時間從??資產剝離、去工業化、非軍事化、惡性通貨膨脹、人口崩潰和資本外逃中恢複過來。美國領導人在一定程度上理解了這些發展——至於俄羅斯，人們可能對此表示懷疑——他們將其視為威脅。對威脅的認知導致了……對威脅的認知。所以今天，我們有了一場戰爭。
美國對這場戰爭的反應必然是金融方麵的。正如拜登總統所說，沒有嚴肅的軍事選擇。因此，美國製裁寡頭，切斷俄羅斯銀行，凍結俄羅斯央行資產，而西方公司則逃離該國。對寡頭的製裁假定他們仍然享有葉利欽統治時期的影響力，但事實並非如此。其他製裁旨在通過平民人口來損害俄羅斯，這是一種令人厭惡的做法。但世界已經改變。對俄羅斯經濟的實際影響很小。另一方麵，對歐洲來說，他們冒著災難的風險，很明顯，在我寫這篇文章的時候，德國、奧地利、匈牙利和斯洛伐克已經退縮了。需要區分的是天然氣和空談。
與此同時，美元儲備體係現在已經失去了全球壟斷地位。這場戰爭開始才兩個月，美國世界權力的一大支柱——一個以各種形式屹立了一個世紀的支柱——已經不再孤軍奮戰。一個非美元、非歐元的貿易區已經誕生。中國是這兩個體係的新關鍵。印度將在這兩個體係中發揮作用。德國及其歐洲鄰國也將如此，不管喜歡與否。從全球資本主義的角度來看，我們已經進入了多極世界。美國的外交政策製定者以創紀錄的速度創造了這個世界。
From Renewing America, Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, and The Future of Capitalism
James K. Galbraith: Can American-led Global Financial Capitalism Survive?
https://www.cfr.org/blog/james-k-galbraith-can-american-led-global-financial-capitalism-survive
Trust in the U.S.-led economic and geopolitical order has been eroding. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the U.S. response to it, whatever its merits, may be the last straw for the global monopoly of the dollar-reserve system.
G7 summit in Brussels Pool New/ Reuters
As a part of the Future of Capitalism Project at the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), Roger W. Ferguson Jr. is inviting a diverse range of participants from academia, private sector, and government to contribute to a series of blog posts to provide perspectives on the different types of capitalism in practice around the world, the challenges these systems face, and their future in the twenty-first century. This post comes from James K. Galbraith, executive director of the Joint Economic Committee, United States Congress in the early 1980s. He also served as chief technical adviser for macroeconomic reform to the State Planning Commission, People's Republic of China, in the mid-1990s. Professor Galbraith is currently the Lloyd M. Bentsen, Jr. chair in Government/Business Relations at the LBJ School of Public Affairs, at the University of Texas at Austin.
“Can Capitalism Survive?” was the question posed in 1942 by Joseph Schumpeter, a great economist and political reactionary. His answer was negative, but premature.
In 1989 I published my first book, unmemorable except for a prescient subtitle “Technology, Finance and the American Future,” and a rough hierarchy of the emerging global division of labor: Advanced Technological Powers, Intermediate Manufacturing Powers, and Resource-Based Economies.
The historical United States laminated all three layers, beginning as supplier of cotton to British mills, progressing to industrial strength and emerging in the mid-twentieth century as the dominant financial and technological power. In my father's world, the great American industrial corporation, countervailed by strong unions and a regulatory welfare state, integrated technology, finance, production and resources, under the global umbrella of Bretton Woods and the atomic bomb.
But through the 1960s, 70s, and 80s this comprehensive position eroded, partly from the political struggle of business against labor, finance against industry, and the Vietnam war – and partly from aging, obsolescence, and the recovery and rise of Germany, Japan, later Korea, and finally China. In each of these, the Galbraithian industrial firm continued to be the tool and engine of advance. But in the United States there was a comprehensive defeat of labor, a victory for finance and the dollar, the triumph of “shareholder value”—and a consequent decline of the industrial heartland.
At the time, from my post on the front lines at the Joint Economic Committee, I opposed the policies of President Reagan and Paul Volcker, the then-chair of the Federal Reserve. But I thought afterwards, as the Cold War ended, that the world they forced into being might have succeeded. It might have, but for the arrogance and violence of Presidents Bush, Clinton, Bush Jr., and Obama, and for the libertarian fantasies of our financial leaders.
I hoped, back then, that a symbiotic, integrated world system might be made to work, with the United States providing military security, a liquid and stable financial reserve asset, incubators for new technologies staffed by worldwide talent, and also a large share of global demand, realizing Adam Smith's principle that “the division of labor is limited by the extent of the market.” The other requisite was global confidence that the privileges of the American position were earned by a wise stewardship—by a global Keynesianism in a peaceful world.
Trust in the United States as a guarantor of world security has eroded since the early 1990s. Our predations in post-Soviet Russia, the bombing of Belgrade, the long debacle in Afghanistan, the destruction of and policy failures in Iraq, Libya, Syria, and Yemen, and—yes—the 2014 coup in Ukraine all played a role. Also our “forward strategy” toward China, over Taiwan, Hong Kong, Xinjiang. Irrespective of merits, in these matters a Newton's Law applies: actions beget reactions.
In 2020 the pandemic exposed the fragility of the global supply chain, first by interrupting production, then by clogging distribution channels, with effects on shipping, semiconductors, automobiles, while oil prices first slumped and then rebounded, generating inflation. Yet through it all, and despite abusive deregulation of finance, leading to global crash in 2007-2009, the dollar-reserve system survived. It even became clear that the euro, the pound, and the Swiss franc all depend for their stability on swap lines from the Federal Reserve.
We come now to the final act. Its prelude is the rise of China and Russia, in tandem, through all the three stages, from poverty to power over forty years in China's case and in the case of Russia back from asset-stripping, deindustrialization, demilitarization, hyperinflation, demographic collapse, and capital flight in twenty-five years. To the extent that America's leaders understood these developments—and with respect to Russia one may doubt it—they saw them as threats. The perception of threat begets... the perception of threat. And so today, we have a war.
The U.S. response to that war is necessarily financial. There is no serious military option, as President Biden has stated. Therefore the U.S. sanctions oligarchs, cuts off Russian banks, and freezes Russian central bank assets, while Western firms flee the country. The sanctions on oligarchs presuppose they still enjoy the influence they wielded under Yeltsin, which they do not. The other sanctions aim to damage Russia through its civilian population, a repellent practice. But the world has changed. The actual effects on Russia's economy are minor. Against Europe on the other hand they risk catastrophe, so clearly that already, as I write, Germany, Austria, Hungary and Slovakia are backing down. The distinction to draw, is that between natural gas and hot air.
And meanwhile, the dollar-reserve system has now lost its global monopoly. It's been just a two months since the start of this war, and already one great remaining pillar of American world power—a pillar that has stood for a century in various forms—no longer stands alone. A non-dollar, non-euro trading region has been born. China is the new linchpin of both systems. India will play in both. And so will Germany and its neighbors in Europe, like it or don't. From the standpoint of global capitalism, we have already entered the multipolar world. The foreign policy makers of the United States have created it—in record time.
