風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
作者：澤內爾·加西亞 2024 年 1 月 20 日
自2013年習近平主席宣布“一帶一路”倡議以來，中國已在全球數千個項目投資超過1萬億美元。 這解決了全球南方部分預計的基礎設施投資缺口； 然而，這也引發了中美及其合作夥伴之間的重大地緣政治和地緣經濟競爭。 因此，這些參與者中的許多人都訴諸於推廣自己的經濟走廊來與“一帶一路”倡議“競爭”，希望減輕他們認為的中國日益增長的影響力。
這種方法在三個方麵沒有達到目的。 首先，由於國內和國際利益相關者的影響，“一帶一路”的製定和實施已經並將繼續處於碎片化狀態，這使得北京很難單方麵獲取地緣政治和地緣經濟影響力。 其次，一些旨在與“一帶一路”倡議競爭的走廊早於“一帶一路”倡議，並促進了“一帶一路”倡議的出現。 第三，這些走廊可能是互補的，而不是徹底的競爭對手。
傳統觀點將“一帶一路”視為中國的一項大戰略，正在重塑國際體係以使其有利於自己。 這一論點隱含的是，由於中國在中國貸款和投資中的作用，中國可以通過“一帶一路”產生地緣政治和地緣經濟影響力。
然而，“一帶一路”的起源和演變表明它從根本上來說是支離破碎的。 “一帶一路”倡議起源於20世紀90年代的省級倡議。 這種國內動態仍在持續，因為省級官員仍然是塑造“一帶一路”項目製定和實施方式的關鍵角色。 甚至國有企業在這一過程中也發揮著至關重要的作用。 在國際上，參與國對於決定在本國選擇和實施哪些“一帶一路”項目也至關重要。 因此，盡管中國官員可能希望從“一帶一路”倡議中獲取地緣政治和地緣經濟利益，但有證據表明，這兩個因素限製了他們有效實現這一目標的能力。
盡管存在這些限製，美國及其合作夥伴仍然宣布了競爭性舉措。 諷刺的是，其中一些舉措早於“一帶一路”倡議，並為其發展發揮了促進作用。 日本在東南亞推動的東西經濟走廊和南部經濟走廊就是如此。
這兩條走廊均已納入日本自由開放的印太戰略。 然而，它們起源於 1998 年，是美日主導的亞洲開發銀行大湄公河次區域 (GMS) 經濟合作計劃的一部分，該計劃自 1992 年啟動以來就有中國各省份的參與。 中印緬經濟走廊、中國-中南半島經濟走廊和中緬經濟走廊始於雲南和廣西的省級倡議，並自20世紀90年代以來通過GMS投資得到加強。
雖然這個案例並不能說明所有基礎設施舉措，但它確實暴露了討論中固有的緊張關係：這些“競爭”走廊實際上可能是互補的。 從參與國的角度來看尤其如此。 畢竟，如果一座發電廠是由中國企業通過中國資本建造的，而一個工業園區是由日本企業利用日本資本建造的，那麽最終的效果就是這些項目有可能解決參與國的能源和工業能力問題。
從支持者的角度來看，也存在互補性。 以上麵的例子為例，日本資助和建造的工業園區自然會受益於可靠的能源供應，無論是美國還是中國資助和建設它。 這從印度擬議的東海岸經濟走廊中可以明顯看出，該走廊很可能直接或間接受益於已建立的“一帶一路”和大湄公河次區域走廊。 此外，現實情況是，“一帶一路”和“競爭”走廊沿線的項目是通過中國和外部貸款機構提供資金的，並且通常是通過跨國合資企業運營的，從而使簡單化的競爭框架變得複雜化。
這三點的含義是顯而易見的。 首先，“一帶一路”的碎片化限製了中國官員單方麵獲取地緣政治和經濟利益的能力，並允許參與國發揮更大的作用。 這表明美國及其合作夥伴表達的擔憂可以通過加強與“一帶一路”及其合作夥伴的接觸來部分解決。
參與國。
其次，“一帶一路”倡議與美國及其合作夥伴提出的各種基礎設施倡議之間的互補性可能比人們通常認為的更多。 這意味著應更多地關注這些舉措如何利用特定提案的積極成果來造福提案國和東道國，以及如何減輕一些負麵成果。
純粹競爭性的經濟舉措框架不太可能引人注目，特別是考慮到全球南方基礎設施投資差距日益擴大。
China's Belt and Road and Its Alternatives: Competing or Complementary?
Promoting various economic corridors as “alternatives” to the BRI misses the mark, for three reasons.
This approach misses the mark on three accounts. The first is that the formulation and implementation of the BRI has been, and continues to be, fragmented due to domestic and international stakeholders, thus making it difficult for Beijing to unilaterally extract geopolitical and geoeconomic influence. The second is that some of the corridors meant to compete with the BRI predate it and have facilitated its emergence. The third is that these corridors may be complementary rather than outright competitors.
Conventional accounts frame the BRI as a Chinese grand strategy that is reshaping the international system to its favor. Implicit in that argument is that China can generate geopolitical and geoeconomic influence through the BRI due to its role in Chinese lending and investment.
However, the origins and evolution of the BRI indicate that it is fundamentally fragmented. The BRI originated from provincial-level initiatives dating back to the 1990s. This domestic dynamic continues because provincial officials remain key players in shaping the way in which BRI projects are formulated and implemented. Even state-owned enterprises play a vital role in this process. Internationally, participant countries are also crucial in determining which BRI projects are selected and implemented in their countries. Consequently, while Chinese officials may desire to extract geopolitical and geoeconomic benefits from the BRI, evidence suggests that these two factors limit their capacity to do so effectively.
Despite these limitations, the United States and its partners have moved forward with announcing competing initiatives. Ironically, some of these initiatives predate the BRI, and have played a role in facilitating its development. This is the case with the East-West Economic Corridor and the Southern Economic Corridor promoted by Japan in Southeast Asia.
Both corridors have been incorporated into Japan’s Free and Open Indo Pacific strategy. However, they originated in 1998 as part of the U.S.-Japan-led Asian Development Bank’s Greater Mekong Subregion (GMS) Economic Cooperation Program, which has had Chinese provincial participation since its inception in 1992. The groundwork of what makes up the BRI’s Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor, the China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, and the China-Myanmar Economic Corridor began with Yunnan’s and Guangxi’s provincial initiatives, and have been enhanced by GMS investment since the 1990s.
While this case is not illustrative of all infrastructure initiatives, it does expose an inherent tension in the discourse: that these “competing” corridors may in fact be complementary. This is especially true from the perspective of the participant countries. After all, if a power plant is built through Chinese capital by Chinese firms, and an industrial park is built with Japanese capital by Japanese firms, the net effect is that these projects have the potential to address the participant country’s energy and industrial capacity.
There is also complementarity from the proponent’s perspective. Using the example above, a Japanese-funded and built industrial park naturally benefits from access to reliable energy supplies regardless of whether the United States or China funds and builds it. This is evident from India’s proposed East Coast Economic Corridor, which is likely to benefit directly and indirectly from established BRI and GMS corridors. Furthermore, the reality is that projects along the BRI and “competing” corridors are funded through Chinese and external lenders, and are often operated through multinational joint ventures, thus complicating simplistic competitive framings.
The implications of these three points are clear. First, the fragmentation of the BRI limits the ability of Chinese officials to unilaterally extract geopolitical and economic benefits and allows for greater agency on the part of participant countries. This indicates that the concerns expressed by the United States and its partners can be partially managed through greater engagement with the BRI and its participant countries.
Second, there may be more complementarity than often assumed between the BRI and the various infrastructure initiatives proposed by the U.S. and its partners. This means that greater attention should be paid to how these initiatives can leverage the positive outcomes of a given proposal to the benefit of the proponent and host country, as well as how to mitigate some of the negative outcomes.
A purely competitive framing of economic initiatives is unlikely to be salient, especially given the growing gap in infrastructure investment in the Global South.
