風蕭蕭_Frank
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拜登的中國戰略根本沒用，上了重要一課？
文章稱，幾十年來，美國一直為貿易和資本的全球化而歡呼，這在提高效率和降低消費者成本方麵帶來了巨大的好處。但在一個危險的世界裏，僅僅提高效率是不夠的。在美國和整個西方，中國的崛起正把其他目標帶到了前台。可以理解的是，官員們希望通過限製中國獲得可能增強其軍事實力的尖端技術來保護國家安全，並在中國保持控製的領域建立替代供應鏈。
結果是針對中國的關稅、投資審查和出口管製鋪天蓋地，先起初先由前任總統川普執政期間發起，現在拜登繼續這些政策。美國財政部長耶倫已前往德裏和河內宣傳“友岸外包”的好處，向公司老板們發出信號，表示從中國轉移是明智的。盡管這種“降低風險”的措施會降低效率，但這種想法認為，堅持對敏感產品進行限製會限製損害。額外的成本是值得的，因為美國將會更安全。
文章稱，這種新思維的後果現在正變得清晰起來。不幸的是，它既沒有帶來彈性，也沒有帶來安全性。在適應新規則的過程中，供應鏈變得更加複雜和不透明。而且，如果你仔細觀察，就會發現美國對中國關鍵投入的依賴依然存在。更令人擔憂的是，這一政策產生了反常的效果，促使美國的盟友與中國走得更近。
這一切可能會讓人感到意外，因為乍一看，這些新政策似乎取得了巨大的成功。中美之間的直接經濟聯係正在萎縮。2018年，美國從一組“低成本”亞洲國家進口的產品中，有三分之二來自中國;去年，數據降至僅超過一半。相反，美國轉向了印度、墨西哥和東南亞。
投資流動也在調整。2016年，中國公司在美國投資了驚人的480億美元;6年後，這一數字已縮水至僅31億美元。25年來，中國首次不再是中國美國商會(American Chamber of Commerce in China)大多數會員的三大投資目的地之一。在過去20年的大部分時間裏，中國聲稱在亞洲新外資項目中占有最大份額。去年，它收到的外資比印度和越南還少。
然而，深入挖掘，你會發現美國對中國的依賴仍然沒有改變。美國可能正在將其需求從中國轉移到其他國家。但這些地區的生產現在比以往任何時候都更加依賴中國的投入。例如，隨著東南亞對美國出口的增加，其從中國進口的中間投入品也呈爆炸式增長。中國對墨西哥的汽車零部件出口在過去五年中翻了一番，墨西哥是另一個受益於美國降低風險的國家。國際貨幣基金組織(IMF)發表的研究發現，即使在美國最渴望從中國轉移的先進製造業領域，那些打入美國市場最多的國家也是那些與中國工業聯係最密切的國家。供應鏈變得更加複雜，貿易變得更加昂貴。但中國的主導地位並未減弱。
發生了什麽?在最令人震驚的情況下，中國商品隻是被重新包裝，然後通過第三國運往美國。2022年底，美國商務部發現，東南亞的四家主要太陽能供應商對中國產品進行小規模加工，實際上是在規避對中國商品的關稅。在稀土金屬等其他領域，中國繼續提供難以替代的投入。
但更多時候，這種機製是良性的。自由市場隻是在適應，以找到最便宜的方式向消費者提供商品。在許多情況下，中國憑借其龐大的勞動力和高效的物流，仍然是最便宜的供應商。美國的新規則有能力改變自己與中國的貿易方向，但他們無法擺脫中國對整個供應鏈的影響。
因此，脫鉤在很大程度上是虛假的。更糟糕的是，拜登的做法還加深了中國與其他出口國之間的經濟聯係。這樣做，會使他們的利益與美國的利益對立起來。盡管有些國家的政府對中國日益強硬的姿態感到擔憂，但它們與亞洲最大經濟體的商業關係正在加深。《區域全麵經濟夥伴關係協定》(RCEP)是許多東南亞國家和中國於2020年11月簽署的一項貿易協定，它為近年來貿易蓬勃發展的中間產品創造了一種單一市場。
對許多較貧窮的國家來說，接受中國的投資和中間產品，並向美國出口製成品，是就業和繁榮的源泉。美國不願支持新的貿易協定是他們有時視其為不可靠夥伴的原因之一。如果要他們在中國和美國之間做出選擇，他們可能不會站在山姆大叔一邊。
將風險轉化為去風險
所有這些都給美國官員上了重要的一課。他們表示，他們希望精確地使用“小院高牆”來防範中國。但是，如果對關稅和限製的取舍沒有清晰的認識，風險就在於，每一次安全恐慌都讓院子變得更大，籬笆變得更高。到目前為止，激光聚焦的好處是虛幻的，而成本比預期的要高，這一事實強調了激光聚焦的必要性。
此外，這種方法越有選擇性，就越有可能說服貿易夥伴在真正重要的領域減少對中國的依賴。沒有它，去風險化不會讓世界變得更安全，反而會讓世界變得更危險。
Joe Biden's China strategy is not working
https://www.economist.com/leaders/2023/08/10/joe-bidens-china-strategy-is-not-working
Supply chains are becoming more tangled and opaque
On august 9th President Joe Biden unveiled his latest weapon in America’s economic war with China. New rules will police investments made abroad by the private sector, and those into the most sensitive technologies in China will be banned. The use of such curbs by the world’s strongest champion of capitalism is the latest sign of the profound shift in America’s economic policy as it contends with the rise of an increasingly assertive and threatening rival.
For decades America cheered on the globalisation of trade and capital, which brought vast benefits in terms of enhanced efficiency and lower costs for consumers. But in a dangerous world, efficiency alone is no longer enough. In America, and across the West, China’s rise is bringing other aims to the fore. Understandably, officials want to protect national security, by limiting China’s access to cutting-edge technology that could enhance its military might, and to build alternative supply chains in areas where China maintains a vice-like grip.
The result is a sprawl of tariffs, investment reviews and export controls aimed at China, first under the previous president, Donald Trump, and now Mr Biden. Janet Yellen, America’s treasury secretary, has travelled to Delhi and Hanoi to tout the benefits of “friendshoring”, signalling to company bosses that shifting away from China would be wise. Although such “de-risking” measures would lower efficiency, the thinking goes, sticking to sensitive products would limit the damage. And the extra cost would be worth it, because America would be safer.
All this may come as a surprise, because, at first glance, the new policies look like a smashing success. Direct economic links between China and America are shrivelling. In 2018 two-thirds of American imports from a group of “low-cost” Asian countries came from China; last year just over half did. Instead, America has turned towards India, Mexico and South-East Asia.
Investment flows are adjusting, too. In 2016 Chinese firms invested a staggering $48bn in America; six years on, the figure had shrunk to a mere $3.1bn. For the first time in a quarter of a century, China is no longer one of the top three investment destinations for most members of the American Chamber of Commerce in China. For the best part of two decades, China claimed the lion’s share of new foreign-investment projects in Asia. Last year it received less than India or Vietnam.
Dig deeper, though, and you find that America’s reliance on China remains intact. America may be redirecting its demand from China to other countries. But production in those places now relies more on Chinese inputs than ever. As South-East Asia’s exports to America have risen, for instance, its imports of intermediate inputs from China have exploded. China’s exports of car parts to Mexico, another country that has benefited from American de-risking, have doubled over the past five years. Research published by the imf finds that even in advanced-manufacturing sectors, where America is keenest to shift away from China, the countries that have made most inroads into the American market are those with the closest industrial links to China. Supply chains have become more complex, and trade has become more expensive. But China’s dominance is undiminished.
What is going on? In the most egregious cases, Chinese goods are simply being repackaged and sent via third countries to America. At the end of 2022, America’s Department of Commerce found that four major solar suppliers based in South-East Asia were doing such minor processing of otherwise Chinese products that they were, in effect, circumventing tariffs on Chinese goods. In other areas, such as rare-earth metals, China continues to provide inputs that are hard to replace.
More often, though, the mechanism is benign. Free markets are simply adapting to find the cheapest way to supply goods to consumers. And in many cases China, with its vast workforce and efficient logistics, remains the cheapest supplier. America’s new rules have the power to redirect its own trade with China. But they cannot rid the entire supply chain of Chinese influence.
Much of the decoupling, then, is phoney. Worse, from Mr Biden’s perspective, his approach is also deepening the economic links between China and other exporting countries. In so doing, it perversely pits their interests against America’s. Even where governments are worried about the growing assertiveness of China, their commercial relationships with the biggest economy in Asia are deepening. The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, a trade deal signed in November 2020 by many South-East Asian countries and China, creates a sort of single market in precisely the intermediate goods in which trade has boomed in recent years.
For many poorer countries, receiving Chinese investment and intermediate goods and exporting finished products to America is a source of jobs and prosperity. America’s reluctance to support new trade agreements is one reason why they sometimes see it as an unreliable partner. If asked to choose between China and America, they might not side with Uncle Sam.
Putting the risk into de-risking
All this carries important lessons for American officials. They say that they want to be precise in how they guard against China using a “small yard and high fence”. But without a clear sense of the trade-offs from their tariffs and restrictions, the risk is that each security scare makes the yard bigger and the fence taller. The fact that the benefits have so far been illusory and the costs greater than expected underscores the need for laser focus.
Moreover, the more selective the approach, the greater the likelihood that trading partners can be persuaded to reduce their reliance on China in the areas that really matter. Without it, de-risking will make the world not safer, but more dangerous. ■
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This article appeared in the Leaders section of the print edition under the headline "Costly and dangerous"
