中國向何處去 從成員身份到責任 2015

中國向何處去：從成員身份到責任？

https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm

羅伯特·B·佐利克，羅伯特·布魯斯·佐利克 Robert Bruce Zoellick（1953 —），生於伊利諾伊州內珀維爾，畢業於哈佛大學法學院。美國政治人物，曾任白宮副幕僚長、美國副國務卿和世界銀行行長。

在美中關係全國委員會的講話  紐約市  2005 年 9 月 21 日

今年早些時候，我有幸結識了中國改革論壇主席鄭必堅先生，他幾十年來一直擔任中國領導人的顧問。 我們在北京和華盛頓花了很多時間討論中國的發展曆程和中美關係。 我很幸運能夠認識這樣一位有思想的人，在中國發生巨大變革的時期，他通過中央黨校幫助影響了許多官員的觀點。

本月，在胡錦濤主席訪美之際，鄭先生在《外交》雜誌上發表了頭條文章《中國‘和平崛起’走向大國地位》。 今天晚上，我想通過分享我的觀點，讓大家了解當前中美之間的對話。

大約27年前，中國領導人認真審視了自己的國家，但並不喜歡他們所看到的一切。 中國剛剛擺脫文化大革命。 它極度貧窮，故意與世界經濟隔離，並且反對幾乎所有國際機構。 正如鄭先生所解釋的那樣，在鄧小平的領導下，中國領導人改變了方向，決定“擁抱全球化，而不是脫離全球化”。

美國兩黨七位總統都認識到這一戰略轉變，並致力於將中國融入國際體係。 1978年以來，美國還通過市場改革鼓勵中國經濟發展。

我們的政策非常成功：龍出現並加入了世界。 如今，從聯合國到世界貿易組織，從臭氧消耗協議到核武器協議，中國都是談判桌上的參與者。

中國經曆了非凡的經濟增長。 無論是在大宗商品、服裝、計算機還是資本市場，每天都能感受到中國的存在。

中國很大，正在成長，並將在未來幾年影響世界。

對於美國和世界來說，最根本的問題是——中國將如何利用其影響力？

為了回答這個問題，我們的政策不應隻限於為中國加入國際體係敞開大門：我們需要敦促中國成為該體係中負責任的利益相關者。

中國有責任加強使其成功的國際體係。 通過這樣做，中國可以實現鄭先生所確定的目標：“超越傳統的大國崛起方式”。

正如賴斯國務卿所說，美國歡迎一個自信、和平、繁榮的中國，中國認識到自己的增長和發展取決於與世界其他國家的建設性聯係。 事實上，我們希望與中國加強合作，使其不僅適應上個世紀製定的國際規則，而且與我們和其他國家一道應對新世紀的挑戰。

從中國的角度來看，與我們合作塑造未來的國際體係似乎更符合其國家利益。

如果不清楚為什麽美國應該建議與中國建立合作關係，請考慮其他選擇。 想象一下我們在未來幾年麵臨的廣泛的全球挑戰——恐怖主義和極端分子利用伊斯蘭教、大規模殺傷性武器擴散、貧困、疾病——並問問如果美國和中國合作還是不和，處理這些問題會更容易還是更困難。

五十年來，我們的政策是圍堵蘇聯，而蘇聯自身的內部矛盾卻在破壞它。 三十年來，我們的政策一直是建立中華人民共和國。 因此，今天的中國根本就不是 20 世紀 40 年代末的蘇聯：

它並不尋求傳播激進的反美意識形態。

雖然它還不是民主的，但它並不認為自己陷入了與全球民主的黃昏衝突中。

雖然有時是重商主義的，但它並不認為自己處於與資本主義的殊死搏鬥中。

最重要的是，中國不認為自己的未來取決於推翻國際體係的基本秩序。 事實上，恰恰相反：中國領導人已經決定，他們的成功取決於與現代世界的聯係。

如果冷戰的類比不適用，那麽 19 世紀歐洲遙遠的均勢政治也不適用。 21世紀的全球經濟是一塊緊密編織的織物。 我們相互聯係太緊密，不能試圖與中國保持一定距離，希望以犧牲中國為代價來推動亞洲其他大國的發展。

其他大國也不會阻止中國，根據舊的客廳外交模式啟動和終止關係。 美國尋求與所有不威脅和平與安全的國家建立建設性關係。

那麽，如果過去的模式不適用，我們該如何看待21世紀初的中國呢？

雙方的認知存在鴻溝。 中國高級官員的首要任務是發展和現代化仍然麵臨巨大內部挑戰的中國。 中國領導人在為自己的成就感到自豪的同時，也認識到國家的弱點、農村貧困以及政治和社會變革的挑戰。 中國三分之二的人口——近9億人——生活在貧困的農村地區，大多以自給自足的農民為生，2億中國人每天的生活費不足一美元。 在中國，經濟增長被視為內部勢在必行，而不是對美國的挑戰。

因此，中國的國內工作顯然需要一個良好的國際環境。 當然，中國人希望受到尊重，並希望他們的觀點和利益得到認可。 但中國不希望與美國發生衝突。

然而，許多美國人擔心中國龍會噴火。 人們對中國充滿了焦慮。

美國商界在20世紀90年代將中國視為充滿機遇的土地，但現在的評價則更加複雜。 小公司擔心中國的競爭、猖獗的盜版、假冒和貨幣操縱。 就連規模較大的美國企業 — — 曾經是支持經濟參與的支柱 — — 也擔心中國的重商主義政策將試圖引導受控市場，而不是開放競爭性市場。 美國工人想知道他們是否能夠競爭。

中國需要認識到其他國家如何看待其行為。 中國與麻煩國家的介入往好裏說是對後果的無知，往壞裏說是更不祥的結果。 中國的行動 — — 再加上缺乏透明度 — — 可能會帶來風險。 中國將如何運用其力量的不確定性將導致美國和其他國家對衝與中國的關係。 許多國家希望中國追求“和平崛起”，但沒有一個國家會把自己的未來押在中國身上。

例如，中國快速的軍事現代化和能力的增強引發了人們對這種建設的目的以及中國缺乏透明度的質疑。 美國國防部最近關於中國軍事態勢的報告並不是對抗性的，盡管中國對此的反應是對抗性的。 美國的報告描述了事實，包括我們對中國軍隊的了解，並討論了替代方案。 如果中國想減少擔憂，就應該公開解釋其國防開支、意圖、學說和軍事演習。

人們對中國的看法也受到其不斷增長的經濟足跡的影響。 中國從加入開放的、以規則為基礎的國際經濟體係中獲益匪淺，美國市場對中國的發展戰略尤為重要。 許多人從這種貿易中獲益，包括數百萬美國農民和工人，他們生產中國如此貪婪消費的商品、零部件和資本貨物。

但沒有其他國家 — — 當然不是歐盟或日本 — — 會接受 1,620 億美元的雙邊貿易赤字，從而導致全球經常賬戶赤字達到 6,650 億美元。 中國 — — 以及其他向中國銷售產品的國家 — — 不能認為進入美國市場是理所當然的。 保護主義壓力日益增大。

中國比許多發展中國家更加開放，但重商主義的跡象越來越多，其政策尋求引導市場而不是開放市場。 如果中國作為在國際經濟問題上分擔責任的利益攸關方加強合作，美國將無法維持開放的國際經濟體係 — — 或美國國內對這一體係的支持。

例如，一個負責任的全球主要參與者不應容忍猖獗的知識產權盜竊和假冒行為，這兩者都打擊了美國知識經濟的核心。 中國承諾打擊從事這一行業的犯罪分子 — — 包括胡錦濤主席上周在紐約發表的聲明 — — 受到歡迎，但效果尚不明顯。 中國需要充分履行其對美國具有強大競爭優勢的市場的承諾，例如服務業、農業和某些製成品領域。 盡管中國的匯率政策過去提供了穩定性，但時代已經發生了變化。 中國今年的全球經常賬戶盈餘可能接近1500億美元，位居世界前列。

這表明中國最近的政策調整隻是第一步，但要讓市場適應失衡，還有很多工作要做。 中國也對與美國成功談判達成一項開放市場和擴大全球增長的世貿組織多哈協議有著強烈的興趣。

中國的經濟增長推動了對能源的需求。 作為回應，中國的表現就好像它可以以某種方式“鎖定”世界各地的能源供應。 這不是實現能源安全的明智途徑。 此外，重商主義戰略會導致與損害中國聲譽並導致其他國家質疑其意圖的政權建立夥伴關係。 相反，市場策略可以減少波動性、不穩定性和囤積行為。 中國應與美國和其他國家合作開發多種能源，包括清潔煤炭技術、核能、可再生能源、氫能和生物燃料。 我們新的亞太清潔發展和氣候夥伴關係以及美國能源部和中國國家發展和改革委員會開展的雙邊對話為這種合作提供了切實可行的機製。 我們還應該鼓勵在世界更多地方開放石油和天然氣生產。 我們可以致力於節能和提高效率，包括為中國製造的許多電器製定標準。 通過IEA加強戰略儲備建設和管理。 我們在安全運輸路線和生產國的安全方麵也有共同利益。

各國開展外交都是為了促進本國利益。 負責任的利益相關者更進一步：他們認識到國際體係維持著他們的和平繁榮，因此他們努力維持該體係。 在外交政策中，中國有很多機會成為負責任的利益相關者。

最緊迫的機會是朝鮮。 自2003年主辦六方會談以來，中方發揮了建設性作用。 本周我們達成了一份聯合原則聲明，就“以和平方式實現可驗證的朝鮮半島無核化”的目標達成了一致。 但落實工作的艱巨性還在後麵，中國應該與我們分享有效、全麵履約的利益。

此外，朝鮮問題不僅僅涉及危險武器的擴散。 如果不進行廣泛的經濟和政治改革，朝鮮就會對自己和其他國家構成威脅。 現在是超越朝鮮半島長達半個世紀的停戰協定，實現真正和平、實現地區安全與發展的時候了。 沒有核武器的朝鮮半島為這一未來打開了大門。 大約三十年前，美國結束了在越南的戰爭。 今天，越南期待美國幫助其融入世界市場經濟體係，以便越南能夠改善人民的生活。 相比之下，有著50年冷停戰協議的朝鮮則落後得更遠。

北京也非常有興趣與我們合作，製止大規模殺傷性武器和運載此類武器的導彈的擴散。 危險擴散將破壞中國發展所需的良性安全環境和健康的國際經濟。

中國對伊朗核計劃的行動將表明中國對防擴散承諾的嚴肅性。 盡管我們歡迎中國通過對敏感技術實施新的出口管製來監管自己的行為，但我們仍然需要看到對違法者進行嚴厲的法律懲罰。

中國和美國可以在全球反恐鬥爭中共同做更多事情。 中國公民成為巴基斯坦和阿富汗恐怖襲擊的受害者。 中國可以幫助摧毀全球恐怖主義的供應線。 通過在聯合國的合作以及在中國銀行中搜查恐怖分子的資金，我們已經有了一個良好的開端，但我們還可以進一步擴大我們的合作。

中國承諾向阿富汗提供1.5億美元援助，向伊拉克提供2500萬美元援助。 這些承諾受到歡迎，我們期待著它們得到充分落實。 中國將通過後續承諾與兩國建立更牢固的關係。 其他國家正在協助伊拉克新政府進行重大債務減免，重點關注中國國有企業仍持有的70億美元伊拉克債務。

清晨在喀土穆跑步時，我看到中國人在打太極拳。 我懷疑他們來蘇丹是為了石油生意。 但中國從蘇丹得到的不僅僅是石油——它還應該為解決蘇丹的人類危機承擔一些責任。 它可以與美國、聯合國和其他國家合作，支持非洲聯盟的維和任務，向達爾富爾提供人道主義救援，並推動蘇丹衝突的解決。

在亞洲，中國已經發揮著更大的作用。 美國尊重中國在該地區的利益，承認多邊外交在亞洲的有益作用。 但如果中國尋求占據主導地位，人們的擔憂就會加劇。 相反，我們應該通過東盟地區論壇和亞太經合組織論壇，與東盟、日本、澳大利亞等國家共同努力，促進地區安全與繁榮。

中國在台灣問題上的選擇也將發出一個重要信息。 我們已經明確表示，我們的“一個中國”政策仍然以三個公報和《與台灣關係法》為基礎。 對中國來說，和平解決與台灣的分歧很重要。

美國、日本和中國需要針對地區和全球挑戰進行有效合作。 鑒於中國在二戰中遭受的慘重損失，我理解與日本的曆史問題的敏感性。 但正如我告訴我的中國同事的那樣，我也觀察到中國在講述曆史方麵存在一些相當大的差距。 當我參觀1931年“滿洲裏事件”遺址的“918”博物館時，我注意到，時間順序從1941年跳到了1945年8月蘇聯對日本的進攻，而忽略了1941年到1945年美國介入太平洋的情況！ 也許我們可以通過在曆史學家之間開展三向對話來開始消除一些誤解。

顯然，雙方有許多共同利益和合作機會。 但一些人表示，美國對民主的承諾將阻礙與中國的長期合作。 讓我來說明為什麽不必如此。

自由是美國的核心……作為一個國家，我們代表布什總統所說的不可談判的人類尊嚴要求。 正如我在香港生活 25 年來所看到的那樣，亞洲人也在要求更多的自由並建立了更多的民主國家。 事實上，胡主席和溫總理正在談論中國加強法治和發展民主製度的重要性。

我們不主張自由事業削弱中國。 相反，布什總統強調，9/11 的可怕經曆讓人們認識到，如果沒有自由，不健康的社會將會滋生致命的癌症。 布什總統在第二次就職演說中認識到民主製度必須反映不同社會的價值觀和文化。 正如他所說，“我們的目標……是幫助他人找到自己的聲音，獲得自己的自由，走自己的路。”

生為華人並不會讓人們反對民主——看看台灣充滿活力的政治就知道了。 日本和韓國成功地將儒家傳統與現代民主原則融為一體。

封閉的政治不可能成為中國社會的永久特征。 這根本不可持續——隨著經濟持續增長，富裕的中國人將希望在未來擁有更大的發言權，政治改革的壓力也越來越大：

中國有一個保護傘工會，但罷工卻一波又一波。
作為農民運動上台的政黨現在麵臨著農村的暴力抗議，特別是針對腐敗的抗議。
擁有強大警察權力的政府無法控製犯罪的蔓延。
中國的一些人認為，他們可以通過強調經濟增長和高漲的民族主義來確保共產黨對權力的壟斷。 這是危險且錯誤的。

中國需要和平的政治過渡，以使其政府對人民負責。 村委會和基層選舉是一個開始。 下一步可能會擴大範圍——也許擴大到縣和省。 中國需要改革司法製度。 它應該開放政府程序讓民間社會參與，並停止騷擾指出問題的記者。 中國還應該擴大宗教自由，並將紙麵上存在的權利保障變為現實 — — 但實際上並非如此。

女士們、先生們：我們如何應對中國崛起的力量是美國外交政策的核心問題。

在中國和美國，鄭和的“和平崛起”理念將引發激烈的爭論。 世界將關注行動的證據。

今晚我建議美國的回應應該是通過改變我們三十年的一體化政策來幫助促進建設性行動：我們現在需要鼓勵中國成為國際體係中負責任的利益相關者。 作為一個負責任的利益攸關方，中國將不僅僅是一個成員，它將與我們共同維護使其成功的國際體係。

作為利益相關者的合作並不意味著沒有分歧——我們會有需要處理的爭端。 但這種管理可以在一個更大的框架內進行，在這個框架內，各方認識到維持提供共同利益的政治、經濟和安全體係的共同利益。

為了實現中美關係的這一轉變，本屆政府 — — 以及其後的政府 — — 需要在國內建立支持的基礎。 這就是我今晚想加入你們的特別原因。 你聽到的聲音隻是通過恐懼的視角來看待中國。 但當我們將未來視為機遇，而不是當我們擔心未來可能帶來什麽時，美國就會成功。 為了現在取得成功，我們需要你們所有人向中國人民和你們的同胞施加壓力。

1972 年尼克鬆總統訪問北京時，我們與中國的關係是由我們雙方都反對的事物決定的。 現在我們有機會根據雙方的目的來定義我們的關係。

我們與中國有許多共同利益。 但僅僅建立在利益巧合之上的關係根基很淺。 建立在共同利益和共同價值觀基礎上的關係是深厚而持久的。 我們可以與今天的新興中國合作，就像我們為明天的民主中國而努力一樣。

發布於 2005 年 9 月 21 日

Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?

https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm

Robert B. Zoellick, Deputy Secretary of State
Remarks to National Committee on U.S.-China Relations
New York City
Sept 21, 2005

As Prepared for Delivery

Earlier this year, I had the pleasure of making the acquaintance of Mr. Zheng Bijian, Chair of the China Reform Forum, who over some decades has been a counselor to China’s leaders. We have spent many hours in Beijing and Washington discussing China’s course of development and Sino-American relations. It has been my good fortune to get to know such a thoughtful man who has helped influence, through the Central Party School, the outlook of many officials during a time of tremendous change for China.

This month, in anticipation of President Hu’s visit to the United States, Mr. Zheng published the lead article in Foreign Affairs, "China’s ‘Peaceful Rise’ to Great Power Status." This evening, I would like to give you a sense of the current dialogue between the United States and China by sharing my perspective.

Some 27 years ago, Chinese leaders took a hard look at their country and didn’t like what they saw. China was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution. It was desperately poor, deliberately isolated from the world economy, and opposed to nearly every international institution. Under Deng Xiaoping, as Mr. Zheng explains, China’s leaders reversed course and decided "to embrace globalization rather than detach themselves from it."

Seven U.S. presidents of both parties recognized this strategic shift and worked to integrate China as a full member of the international system. Since 1978, the United States has also encouraged China’s economic development through market reforms.

Our policy has succeeded remarkably well: the dragon emerged and joined the world. Today, from the United Nations to the World Trade Organization, from agreements on ozone depletion to pacts on nuclear weapons, China is a player at the table.

And China has experienced exceptional economic growth. Whether in commodities, clothing, computers, or capital markets, China’s presence is felt every day.

China is big, it is growing, and it will influence the world in the years ahead.

For the United States and the world, the essential question is – how will China use its influence?

To answer that question, it is time to take our policy beyond opening doors to China’s membership into the international system: We need to urge China to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.

China has a responsibility to strengthen the international system that has enabled its success. In doing so, China could achieve the objective identified by Mr. Zheng: "to transcend the traditional ways for great powers to emerge."

As Secretary Rice has stated, the United States welcomes a confident, peaceful, and prosperous China, one that appreciates that its growth and development depends on constructive connections with the rest of the world. Indeed, we hope to intensify work with a China that not only adjusts to the international rules developed over the last century, but also joins us and others to address the challenges of the new century.

From China’s perspective, it would seem that its national interest would be much better served by working with us to shape the future international system.

If it isn’t clear why the United States should suggest a cooperative relationship with China, consider the alternatives. Picture the wide range of global challenges we face in the years ahead – terrorism and extremists exploiting Islam, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, poverty, disease – and ask whether it would be easier or harder to handle those problems if the United States and China were cooperating or at odds.

For fifty years, our policy was to fence in the Soviet Union while its own internal contradictions undermined it. For thirty years, our policy has been to draw out the People’s Republic of China. As a result, the China of today is simply not the Soviet Union of the late 1940s:

• It does not seek to spread radical, anti-American ideologies.
• While not yet democratic, it does not see itself in a twilight conflict against democracy around the globe.
• While at times mercantilist, it does not see itself in a death struggle with capitalism.
• And most importantly, China does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system. In fact, quite the reverse: Chinese leaders have decided that their success depends on being networked with the modern world.

  If the Cold War analogy does not apply, neither does the distant balance-of-power politics of 19th Century Europe. The global economy of the 21st Century is a tightly woven fabric. We are too interconnected to try to hold China at arm’s length, hoping to promote other powers in Asia at its expense. Nor would the other powers hold China at bay, initiating and terminating ties based on an old model of drawing-room diplomacy. The United States seeks constructive relations with all countries that do not threaten peace and security.

  So if the templates of the past do not fit, how should we view China at the dawn of the 21st Century?

  On both sides, there is a gulf in perceptions. The overwhelming priority of China’s senior officials is to develop and modernize a China that still faces enormous internal challenges. While proud of their accomplishments, China’s leaders recognize their country’s perceived weaknesses, its rural poverty, and the challenges of political and social change. Two-thirds of China’s population – nearly 900 million people – are in poor rural areas, living mostly as subsistence farmers, and 200 million Chinese live on less than a dollar a day. In China, economic growth is seen as an internal imperative, not as a challenge to the United States.

  Therefore, China clearly needs a benign international environment for its work at home. Of course, the Chinese expect to be treated with respect and will want to have their views and interests recognized. But China does not want a conflict with the United States.

  Nevertheless, many Americans worry that the Chinese dragon will prove to be a fire-breather. There is a cauldron of anxiety about China.

  The U.S. business community, which in the 1990s saw China as a land of opportunity, now has a more mixed assessment. Smaller companies worry about Chinese competition, rampant piracy, counterfeiting, and currency manipulation. Even larger U.S. businesses – once the backbone of support for economic engagement – are concerned that mercantilist Chinese policies will try to direct controlled markets instead of opening competitive markets. American workers wonder if they can compete.

  China needs to recognize how its actions are perceived by others. China’s involvement with troublesome states indicates at best a blindness to consequences and at worst something more ominous. China’s actions – combined with a lack of transparency – can create risks. Uncertainties about how China will use its power will lead the United States – and others as well – to hedge relations with China. Many countries hope China will pursue a "Peaceful Rise," but none will bet their future on it.

  For example, China’s rapid military modernization and increases in capabilities raise questions about the purposes of this buildup and China’s lack of transparency. The recent report by the U.S. Department of Defense on China’s military posture was not confrontational, although China’s reaction to it was. The U.S. report described facts, including what we know about China’s military, and discussed alternative scenarios. If China wants to lessen anxieties, it should openly explain its defense spending, intentions, doctrine, and military exercises.

  Views about China are also shaped by its growing economic footprint. China has gained much from its membership in an open, rules-based international economic system, and the U.S. market is particularly important for China’s development strategy. Many gain from this trade, including millions of U.S. farmers and workers who produce the commodities, components, and capital goods that China is so voraciously consuming.

  But no other country – certainly not those of the European Union or Japan – would accept a $162 billion bilateral trade deficit, contributing to a $665 billion global current account deficit. China – and others that sell to China – cannot take its access to the U.S. market for granted. Protectionist pressures are growing.

  China has been more open than many developing countries, but there are increasing signs of mercantilism, with policies that seek to direct markets rather than opening them. The United States will not be able to sustain an open international economic system – or domestic U.S. support for such a system – without greater cooperation from China, as a stakeholder that shares responsibility on international economic issues.

  For example, a responsible major global player shouldn’t tolerate rampant theft of intellectual property and counterfeiting, both of which strike at the heart of America’s knowledge economy. China’s pledges – including a statement just last week by President Hu in New York – to crack down on the criminals who ply this trade are welcome, but the results are not yet evident. China needs to fully live up to its commitments to markets where America has a strong competitive advantage, such as in services, agriculture, and certain manufactured goods. And while China’s exchange rate policy offered stability in the past, times have changed. China may have a global current account surplus this year of nearly $150 billion, among the highest in the world. This suggests that China’s recent policy adjustments are an initial step, but much more remains to be done to permit markets to adjust to imbalances. China also shares a strong interest with the United States in negotiating a successful WTO Doha agreement that opens markets and expands global growth.

  China’s economic growth is driving its thirst for energy. In response, China is acting as if it can somehow "lock up" energy supplies around the world. This is not a sensible path to achieving energy security. Moreover, a mercantilist strategy leads to partnerships with regimes that hurt China’s reputation and lead others to question its intentions. In contrast, market strategies can lessen volatility, instability, and hoarding. China should work with the United States and others to develop diverse sources of energy, including through clean coal technology, nuclear, renewables, hydrogen, and biofuels. Our new Asia Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate – as well as the bilateral dialogue conducted by the U.S. Department of Energy and China’s National Development and Reform Commission – offer practical mechanisms for this cooperation. We should also encourage the opening of oil and gas production in more places around the world. We can work on energy conservation and efficiency, including through standards for the many appliances made in China. Through the IEA we can strengthen the building and management of strategic reserves. We also have a common interest in secure transport routes and security in producing countries.

  All nations conduct diplomacy to promote their national interests. Responsible stakeholders go further: They recognize that the international system sustains their peaceful prosperity, so they work to sustain that system. In its foreign policy, China has many opportunities to be a responsible stakeholder.

  The most pressing opportunity is North Korea. Since hosting the Six-Party Talks at their inception in 2003, China has played a constructive role. This week we achieved a Joint Statement of Principles, with an agreement on the goal of "verifiable denuclearization of the Korean peninsula in a peaceful manner." But the hard work of implementation lies ahead, and China should share our interest in effective and comprehensive compliance.

  Moreover, the North Korea problem is about more than just the spread of dangerous weapons. Without broad economic and political reform, North Korea poses a threat to itself and others. It is time to move beyond the half century-old armistice on the Korean peninsula to a true peace, with regional security and development. A Korean peninsula without nuclear weapons opens the door to this future. Some 30 years ago America ended its war in Viet Nam. Today Viet Nam looks to the United States to help integrate it into the world market economic system so Viet Nam can improve the lives of its people. By contrast, North Korea, with a 50 year-old cold armistice, just falls further behind.

  Beijing also has a strong interest in working with us to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles that can deliver them. The proliferation of danger will undermine the benign security environment and healthy international economy that China needs for its development.

  China’s actions on Iran’s nuclear program will reveal the seriousness of China’s commitment to non-proliferation. And while we welcome China’s efforts to police its own behavior through new export controls on sensitive technology, we still need to see tough legal punishments for violators.

  China and the United States can do more together in the global fight against terrorism. Chinese citizens have been victims of terror attacks in Pakistan and Afghanistan. China can help destroy the supply lines of global terrorism. We have made a good start by working together at the UN and searching for terrorist money in Chinese banks, but can expand our cooperation further.

  China pledged $150 million in assistance to Afghanistan, and $25 million to Iraq. These pledges were welcome, and we look forward to their full implementation. China would build stronger ties with both through follow-on pledges. Other countries are assisting the new Iraqi government with major debt forgiveness, focusing attention on the $7 billion in Iraqi debt still held by Chinese state companies.

  On my early morning runs in Khartoum, I saw Chinese doing tai chi exercises. I suspect they were in Sudan for the oil business. But China should take more than oil from Sudan – it should take some responsibility for resolving Sudan’s human crisis. It could work with the United States, the UN, and others to support the African Union’s peacekeeping mission, to provide humanitarian relief to Darfur, and to promote a solution to Sudan’s conflicts.

  In Asia, China is already playing a larger role. The United States respects China’s interests in the region, and recognizes the useful role of multilateral diplomacy in Asia. But concerns will grow if China seeks to maneuver toward a predominance of power. Instead, we should work together with ASEAN, Japan, Australia, and others for regional security and prosperity through the ASEAN Regional Forum and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

  China’s choices about Taiwan will send an important message, too. We have made clear that our "one China" policy remains based on the three communiqués and the Taiwan Relations Act. It is important for China to resolve its differences with Taiwan peacefully.

  The United States, Japan, and China will need to cooperate effectively together on both regional and global challenges. Given China’s terrible losses in World War II, I appreciate the sensitivity of historical issues with Japan. But as I have told my Chinese colleagues, I have observed some sizeable gaps in China’s telling of history, too. When I visited the "918" museum at the site of the 1931 "Manchurian Incident," I noted that the chronological account jumped from 1941 to the Soviet offensive against Japan in August 1945, overlooking the United States involvement in the Pacific from 1941 to 1945! Perhaps we could start to ease some misapprehensions by opening a three-way dialogue among historians.

  Clearly, there are many common interests and opportunities for cooperation. But some say America’s commitment to democracy will preclude long-term cooperation with China. Let me suggest why this need not be so.

  Freedom lies at the heart of what America is… as a nation, we stand for what President Bush calls the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. As I have seen over the 25 years since I lived in Hong Kong, Asians have also pressed for more freedom and built many more democracies. Indeed, President Hu and Premier Wen are talking about the importance of China strengthening the rule of law and developing democratic institutions.

  We do not urge the cause of freedom to weaken China. To the contrary, President Bush has stressed that the terrible experience of 9/11 has driven home that in the absence of freedom, unhealthy societies will breed deadly cancers. In his Second Inaugural, President Bush recognized that democratic institutions must reflect the values and culture of diverse societies. As he said, "Our goal… is to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, and make their own way."

  Being born ethnically Chinese does not predispose people against democracy – just look at Taiwan’s vibrant politics. Japan and South Korea have successfully blended a Confucian heritage with modern democratic principles.

  Closed politics cannot be a permanent feature of Chinese society. It is simply not sustainable – as economic growth continues, better-off Chinese will want a greater say in their future, and pressure builds for political reform:

• China has one umbrella labor union, but waves of strikes.
• A party that came to power as a movement of peasants now confronts violent rural protests, especially against corruption.
• A government with massive police powers cannot control spreading crime.

  Some in China believe they can secure the Communist Party’s monopoly on power through emphasizing economic growth and heightened nationalism. This is risky and mistaken.

  China needs a peaceful political transition to make its government responsible and accountable to its people. Village and grassroots elections are a start. They might be expanded – perhaps to counties and provinces – as a next step. China needs to reform its judiciary. It should open government processes to the involvement of civil society and stop harassing journalists who point out problems. China should also expand religious freedom and make real the guarantees of rights that exist on paper – but not in practice.

  Ladies and Gentlemen: How we deal with China’s rising power is a central question in American foreign policy.

  In China and the United States, Mr. Zheng’s idea of a "peaceful rise" will spur vibrant debate. The world will look to the evidence of actions.

  Tonight I have suggested that the U.S. response should be to help foster constructive action by transforming our thirty-year policy of integration: We now need to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. As a responsible stakeholder, China would be more than just a member – it would work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.

  Cooperation as stakeholders will not mean the absence of differences – we will have disputes that we need to manage. But that management can take place within a larger framework where the parties recognize a shared interest in sustaining political, economic, and security systems that provide common benefits.

  To achieve this transformation of the Sino-American relationship, this Administration – and those that follow it – will need to build the foundation of support at home. That’s particularly why I wanted to join you tonight. You hear the voices that perceive China solely through the lens of fear. But America succeeds when we look to the future as an opportunity, not when we fear what the future might bring. To succeed now, we will need all of you to press both the Chinese and your fellow citizens.

  When President Nixon visited Beijing in 1972, our relationship with China was defined by what we were both against. Now we have the opportunity to define our relationship by what are both for.

  We have many common interests with China. But relationships built only on a coincidence of interests have shallow roots. Relationships built on shared interests and shared values are deep and lasting. We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.

  Released on September 21, 2005