美國和中國可以成為利益相關者嗎？

美國和中國可以成為利益相關者嗎？

Can America and China be Stakeholders?

https://www.brunswickgroup.com/bob-zoellick-can-america-and-china-be-stakeholders-i14750/ 

世界銀行前行長、佐利克在美中貿易全國委員會成立40周年晚宴上致辭。

羅伯特·佐利克 (Robert Zoellick) 高級顧問，華盛頓特區，2019 年 12 月 11 日

12月4日，世界銀行前行長、美國貿易代表、美國國務院副國務卿、現任布倫瑞克集團地緣政治負責人羅伯特·佐利克大使榮幸地在美中貿易全國委員會成立40周年晚宴上致辭。

十四年前，我在美中關係全國委員會發表了題為《中國向何處去：從成員身份到責任？》的演講。 該標題包含一個問號。

我當時解釋說，在基本實現了整合中國的目標之後，美國麵臨的問題是北京的行為：“中國將如何利用其影響力？”

我敦促中國的目光超越國際體係的成員資格——“成為該體係中負責任的利益相關者”。
講話強調國際一體化的“規範”，而不僅僅是“形式”。

現在，為了使這項政策發揮作用，美國官員需要在盟友和商界人士的幫助下，與中國和更廣泛地區的事態發展保持密切聯係。 美國的政策需要處理細節並討論戰略。

我們過去稱之為外交。
今天與中國不斷對抗的邏輯拒絕了我概述的方法。
它拒絕接受中國可以在美國構建的體係中發揮建設性作用的觀點。
它拒絕接受中國可以做出貢獻的想法。
它甚至拒絕承認中國可以、甚至願意以補充美國利益的方式行事。

請注意：如果美國政策認為中國不能在美國設計的體係內做任何這些事情，那麽美國實際上將敦促中國支持一個平行的、獨立的體係，其規則截然不同。

我理解今天的許多抱怨，但我們麵臨著忽視美國目標以及如何最好地實現這些目標的嚴重風險。直到 20 世紀 80 年代末，中國一直是世界上核武器和導彈的主要擴散國……它在 90 年代停止了核試驗，並簽署了《全麵禁止核試驗條約》——同時等待美國采取行動後再批準。

• 盡管中國曾經是伊朗的合作夥伴，但它與美國合作製裁和製止了伊朗的核計劃。
• 盡管中國在朝鮮戰爭中與美國作戰，但它仍與華盛頓合作，迫使朝鮮凍結並扭轉平壤的核武器計劃。
• 2000年至2018年間，在美國的大力推動下，中國支持了聯合國安理會190項製裁違反國際規則國家的決議中的182項。
• 中國是聯合國和聯合國維和行動的第二大資助國……
• 中國是全球增長的最大貢獻者。 中國將其全球經常賬戶盈餘從占 GDP 的 10% 左右削減至零左右，這意味著其需求推動了全球擴張。
• 過去15年來，中國一直是美國出口增長最快的目的地——直到特朗普政府奉行保護主義並引發全球報複。
• 中國不再低估其匯率。 它減少了約1萬億美元的儲備。
• 在全球金融危機期間，中國采取了最大規模、最快的刺激措施來應對可能出現的另一場大蕭條。
• 中國作為最大的溫室氣體排放國，現在承認必須共同努力限製氣候變化……

但那些樂觀地認為美國與中國的合作沒有產生符合美國利益的結果的人是完全錯誤的。
那些認為中國沒有在美國主導的體係內采取建設性行動的人——那些認為中國隻是破壞者的人——正在誤導自己，自欺欺人在外交上是危險的。

我們需要清醒地認識到中國帶來的真正戰略挑戰，並嚴守紀律，不要用全麵的攻擊分散注意力，這可能會導致誤判和錯誤。

卡內基國際和平基金會的埃文·費根鮑姆最近指出，中國實際上正在采取雙軌製應對不斷變化的國際秩序。

作為國際組織的成員，中國尋求推動這些政權向中國的偏好和規範靠攏。

然而，正如費根鮑姆所解釋的那樣，中國也在尋求第二條替代道路：中國的“一帶一路”提出了另一種國際模式，是中國長期以來對朝貢關係偏好的現代適應。 這一努力為那些加入中國的國家帶來了經濟利益，同時也對那些未能遷就北京的國家提出了警告。

我們需要在國際機構和國別內與中國競爭。 因為一無所有是很難打敗的。

我們需要通過推廣更好的想法和實踐以及有吸引力的夥伴關係來與中國競爭，而不是通過退縮和欺淩。

我們還需要問，為什麽中美關係會陷入不斷的對抗？

我認為有六個發展趨同：

1. 首先，美國企業在市場準入方麵的挫敗感激增：缺乏互惠貿易和投資開放； 強製技術轉讓； 侵犯知識產權； 監管障礙和任意行為； 以及稀土礦產等出口限製。

2. 其次，美國人質疑中國的國家資本主義是否允許公平競爭。

3. 第三，美國人擔心中國將主宰未來的技術。 這種批評針對的是“中國製造2025”計劃，盡管黨的領導人淡化了該計劃的影響力。 我們已經處於分裂網絡時代。 我預計電信、互聯網和ICT服務以及5G係統將實現脫鉤。

4. 第四，我去年在中國指出，沒有人解釋“一帶一路”的動機：這是地緣政治舉措嗎？ 計劃利用中國過剩產能建設基礎設施？ 一個開發項目？ 我的猜測就是以上所有。 中國可以通過中國式的運輸走廊建設歐亞大陸的想法很可能會增加債務，而不是可持續發展。
5. 第五，中國的外交和安全政策顯然已經超越了鄧小平所說的“韜光養晦”。 這些目標雖然令人不安，但並不令人意外。 他們應該得到戰略性的、資源充足的、一致的回應。

海軍上校阿爾弗雷德·塞耶·馬漢 (Alfred Thayer Mahan) 在撰寫有關 20 世紀之初美國在亞太地區戰略的文章時，預計該地區的實力仍將“充滿爭議”。換句話說，美國需要與其他國家競爭、機動和平衡力量。 我們可以從馬漢的 21 世紀曆史和地緣政治視角中受益。 馬漢還希望促進美國與亞洲的貿易。 他寫道，關稅就像“一艘現代鐵甲艦，裝甲厚重，但發動機和火炮較差； 防守強，進攻弱。” 為什麽我們要采取鐵定的貿易政策？

6. 最後，我的第六點是習近平的領導優先考慮共產黨並限製中國的開放和辯論。 中國為侵入性技術和再教育營的反烏托邦社會樹立了榜樣，這傷害了自己。 香港“一國兩製”模式賴以存在的法治和開放可能會被推翻或踐踏。 如果中國壓製香港，中國將在經濟和心理上長期傷害自己。

美國吸引力的基礎是我們自己的故事。 我們需要為世界想象和渴望的美國而努力。
當我們的領導人未能認識到美國的做法應該成為榜樣和典範時，我感到很難過，這是一項可以追溯到美國革命一代和亞伯拉罕·林肯的基本原則。

美國不會通過變得更像中國來贏得競爭。

這讓我回到了 2005 年“負責任的利益相關者”演講的起點。

我在結束講話時解釋說，“自由是美國的核心……”，這是我們對“不可協商的尊嚴要求”的呼籲的指導。

我指出，我們倡導思想和理想的目的不是“削弱中國”。 正如喬治·W·布什總統當時所說，我們的目標是“幫助他人找到自己的聲音，獲得自己的自由，開辟自己的道路”。
中國的未來篇章仍有待書寫。

正如我今晚所概述的那樣，美中關係麵臨的挑戰與誇誇其談和關稅攻勢格格不入。

如果與目標無關，僅靠“強硬”作為政策是失敗的。

隨著時間的推移，美國失去了世界各地的朋友和信任。 中國與美國進行戰術演習，並可能帶著苦澀的滿足感看著美國消散幾十年來積累的國際實力。

問問自己：美國真的能期望剝奪中國在國際體係中的地位以及對規則製定的影響力嗎？
如果我們承認中國在談判桌上的大國角色，難道我們不應該敦促中國承擔起係統性利益相關者的責任嗎？

美國也是利益攸關方。 20 世紀約有 25 萬美國人死於亞洲。 用拿破侖的話來說，一個國家影響力的邊界是以該國士兵的墳墓為標誌的。

我們不應該因為不穩定的短期貿易公告而放棄我們的利益，也不應該將聯盟降格為基於軍隊、貢品和貿易的不正當核算的便利關係。

最後，我將向你們所有人——美國商界的領袖們提出一個直接的觀察：你們腳下的土地正在發生變化。

你們對中國的擔憂導致你們中的許多人退縮了，這也許是可以理解的。

然後你小心翼翼地采取行動，以避免特朗普總統的憤怒——更不用說中國的憤怒了。
現在的賭注更高了。 警惕誤判和意外後果的更大風險。

澳大利亞前總理、美國的好朋友、中國的親密學生陸克文最近警告說：“一個完全‘脫鉤的世界’將是一個極度不穩定的地方，它會破壞過去 40 年的全球增長假設，預示著東西方之間鐵幕的回歸，以及新的常規軍備競賽和核軍備競賽的開始，以及隨之而來的戰略不穩定和風險。”

你準備好了嗎？

你需要決定你是否認為美國仍然可以與中國合作以實現互利共贏，同時管控分歧——如果可以，如何合作。

您需要決定是否可以通過與盟友和合作夥伴的長期夥伴關係來增強美國的影響力。
你們需要決定我們是否應該保存、更新、甚至擴大開放、有規則、公平解決爭端的國際貿易體係。

你需要決定是否希望在國外代表美國作為原則和商業的傳播者，以尊嚴和尊重的方式對待來自其他國家的人民。

然後你需要闡述你的觀點——不僅是向政府，而且是向國會、州長和市長； 與您的員工、客戶和供應商； 與媒體和意見領袖。

當我在2005年選擇“利益相關者”這個詞時，我想到的是利益相關者在共享企業中擁有利益。 這種興趣值得付出努力，甚至堅持不懈，才能保持、適應和發展。 隻有愚蠢或膽怯的人才會屈服或放棄企業。

作為利益相關者的合作並不意味著沒有分歧。 利益相關者也參與競爭。 管理它們之間的差異應該在一個提供共同利益的更大框架內進行。

這是可以做到的。但前提是有您的支持和積極行動。

在這裏閱讀完整的演講。

Can America and China be Stakeholders?

https://www.brunswickgroup.com/bob-zoellick-can-america-and-china-be-stakeholders-i14750/ 

Ambassador Robert Zoellick was honored to address the 40th Anniversary Gala dinner of the US-China Business Council.

Robert Zoellick  Senior Counselor, Washington, D.C.   Dec.11, 2019

On December 4th, Ambassador Robert Zoellick, former President of the World Bank, US Trade Representative and Deputy Secretary at the US Department of State and current Geopolitical Principal at Brunswick Group, was honored to address the 40th Anniversary Gala dinner of the US-China Business Council.

Fourteen years ago, I gave a speech to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations titled: “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility?” That title included a question mark.
Having largely accomplished the aim of integrating China, the question for the United States, I explained back then, concerned Beijing’s conduct: “How will China use its influence?”
I urged China to look beyond membership in the international system— “to become a responsible stakeholder in that system.”
The speech stressed the “norms,” not just the “forms,” of international integration.
Now to make such a policy effective, U.S. officials needed to remain in close touch with developments in China and the wider region—with the help of allies and all of you in the business community. American policy needed to work the details as well as discuss strategy.
We used to call this diplomacy.
Today’s logic of constant confrontation with China rejects the approach I had outlined.
It rejects the idea that China can play a constructive role within the system that America constructed.
It rejects the idea that China can make contributions.
It even rejects the idea that China can, or even would, act in ways that complement U.S. interests.
Be aware: If U.S. policy assumes China cannot do any of those things within the system America designed, then the United States will, in effect, be prodding China into championing a parallel, separate system, with very different rules.
I understand many of today’s complaints, but we are at serious risk of losing sight of American aims and how best to achieve them.Until the late 1980’s, China was the world’s leading proliferator of nuclear weapons and missiles… It ceased nuclear tests in the 1990s and signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—while waiting for U.S. action before ratifying.

• Although China once had been a partner of Iran, it worked with the United States to sanction and halt Iran’s nuclear program.
• Although China fought against the United States in the Korean War, it has worked with Washington to press North Korea to freeze and reverse Pyongyang’s nuclear weapons program.
• Between 2000 and 2018, China supported 182 of 190 UN Security Council resolutions imposing sanctions on states violating international rules, prodded by vigorous U.S. efforts.
• China is the second largest funder of the UN and UN peacekeeping missions…
• China is the largest contributor to global growth. China cut its global current account surplus from about 10 percent of GDP to around zero—meaning that its demand has fueled worldwide expansion.
• For the past 15 years, China has been the fastest growing destination for U.S. exports—until the Trump Administration embraced protectionism and sparked worldwide retaliation.
• China no longer undervalues its exchange rate. It reduced reserves by about $1 trillion.
• During the global financial crisis, China had the largest and quickest stimulus to counteract what could have been another Depression.
• China, the largest emitter of greenhouse gases, now accepts that it must join in efforts to limit climate change…

But those who blithely assume that U.S. cooperation with China didn’t produce results in America’s interest are flat wrong.
Those who assume that China has not acted constructively within the U.S.-guided system—who assume that China is only a disrupter—are misleading themselves, and self-deception is dangerous in diplomacy.
We need to be clear-eyed about the real strategic challenges that China presents and disciplined not to distract with blanket blasts that will likely lead to misjudgments and mistakes.
Evan Feigenbaum of the Carnegie Endowment has pointed out recently that China is in fact pursuing a two-track approach toward the changing international order.
As a member of international organizations, China seeks to nudge those regimes toward Chinese preferences and norms.
As Feigenbaum has explained, however, China is pursuing a second, alternative track as well: China’s Belt and Road presents another international model, a modern adaptation of China’s long-standing preference for tributary ties. This effort offers economic benefits to those who join China, combined with warnings for states that fail to accommodate Beijing.
We need to compete with China within international institutions and country-by-country. Because it’s hard to beat something with nothing.
We need to compete with China by promoting better ideas and practices and through attractive partnerships, instead of by retreating and bullying.
We also need to ask why Sino- American relations have tumbled into constant confrontation.
I believe six developments have converged:

1. First, frustrations boiled over for U.S. businesses on market access: a lack of reciprocal trade and investment openings; forced technology transfers; IPR violations; regulatory hurdles and arbitrary actions; and restrictions on exports, such as rare earth minerals.
2. Second, Americans question whether China’s state capitalism permits fair competition.
3. Third, Americans fear that China will dominate the technologies of the future. This critique targets the “Made in China 2025” plan, although Party leaders have downplayed that plan’s influence. We are already in the age of the splinternet. I expect to see decoupling in telecom, internet and ICT services, and 5G systems.
4. Fourth, I pointed out in China last year that no one had explained the motivation for Belt and Road: Was it a geopolitical move? A plan to employ excess Chinese capacity to build infrastructure? A development project? My guess is all of the above. The idea that China could build out Eurasia with Chinese-style transport corridors may well be building debts, not sustainable development.
5. Fifth, China’s foreign and security policy has clearly moved beyond Deng Xiaoping’s adage of “Hide your strength, bide your time.” These goals, while disconcerting, should not be surprising. They merit a strategic, well-resourced, and consistent response. Navy Captain Alfred Thayer Mahan, writing about American strategy in the Asia-Pacific at the dawn of the 20th Century, expected power in the region to remain “debated and debatable.” In other words, the United States would need to compete, maneuver, and balance power with others. We could benefit from Mahan’s historical and geopolitical perspective in the 21st Century. Mahan also wanted to boost U.S. trade with Asia. Tariffs, he wrote, were like “a modern ironclad that has heavy armor, but inferior engines and guns; mighty for defense, weak for offense.” Why have we adopted an ironclad trade policy?
6. Finally, my sixth point is that Xi Jinping’s leadership has prioritized the Communist Party and restricted openness and debate in China. China hurts itself by forging a role model for dystopian societies of intrusive technologies and reeducation camps. The rule of law and openness upon which Hong Kong’s “One Country, Two Systems” model rests may topple or be trampled. If China crushes Hong Kong, China will wound itself—economically and psychologically—for a long time.

The foundation of America’s appeal is our own story. We need to work on the America of the world’s imagination and aspiration.
I am saddened when our leaders fail to appreciate that America’s practices should be examples and models, a founding principle dating back to America’s Revolutionary generation and then Abraham Lincoln.
The United States will not win a competition by becoming more like China.
Which brings me back to where I began, with the “Responsible Stakeholder” speech of 2005.
I closed those remarks by explaining that, “Freedom lies at the heart of what America is…” guided by our call for the “non-negotiable demands of dignity.”
I pointed out that our purpose in championing ideas and ideals was not “to weaken China.” Our goal, as President George W. Bush then stated it, has been “to help others find their own voice, attain their own freedom, make their own way.”
China’s future chapters are still to be written.
The challenges of U.S.-China relations, as I’ve outlined them tonight, fit poorly with bombast and tariff barrages.
“Toughness” alone fails as policy if unconnected to objectives.
As time passes, the United States loses friends and trust around the world. China maneuvers tactically with America and watches, probably with wry satisfaction, as the United States dissipates the international strengths built up over many decades.
Ask yourself: Can the United States really expect to deny China a place in the international system, with influence over rule-making?
If we acknowledge China’s role as a power at the table, shouldn’t we urge China to assume responsibilities as a systemic stakeholder?
The United States is a stakeholder with interests, too. Some 250,000 Americans died in Asia in the 20th Century. To paraphrase Napoleon, the borders of a nation’s influence are marked by the graves of its soldiers.
We should not abandon our stake for shaky, short-term trade announcements or by degrading alliances into ties of convenience based upon shady accountings of troops, tribute, and trade.

I'll conclude with a direct observation for all of you, leaders in America’s business community: The ground is shifting under your feet.
Your own concerns with China led many of you, perhaps understandably, to pull back.
You then stepped cautiously to avoid President Trump’s wrath—not to mention China’s.
The stakes are higher now. Be alert to greater risks of miscalculations and unintended consequences.
Kevin Rudd—former Prime Minister of Australia, a good friend of the United States, and a close student of China—recently warned: “A fully ‘decoupled world’ would be a deeply destabilizing place, undermining the global growth assumptions of the last 40 years, heralding the return of an iron curtain between East and West and the beginning of a new conventional and nuclear arms race with all its attendant strategic instability and risk.”
Are you ready for this?
You need to decide whether you think the United States can still cooperate with China to mutual benefit while managing differences-- and if so, how.
You need to decide whether U.S. influence can be enhanced through long-term partnerships with allies and partners.
You need to decide whether we should save, update, and even expand the international trading system of openness, rules, and fair settlements of disputes.
You need to decide whether you wish to represent America abroad as purveyors of principles, as well as commerce, treating people from other lands with dignity and respect.
Then you need to make your case—not just with the Administration, but with Congress, Governors, and Mayors; with your employees, customers, and suppliers; with the media and opinion leaders.
When I selected the word “stakeholder” in 2005, I had in mind that stakeholders have interests in a shared enterprise. That interest is worth work, even perseverance, to preserve, adapt, and grow. Only the foolish or faint-hearted just yield or abandon the enterprise.
Cooperation as stakeholders does not mean the absence of differences. Stakeholders compete, too. The management of their differences should take place within a larger framework that offers common benefits.
This can be done.But only with your support and activism. 

Read the full speech here.