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‘The bottom line is that Wars of Plunder represents a near-exhaustive study of the relationship between resources and conflict. In light of its command of a vast literature and its wealth of descriptive details it should be given a prominent place on the bookshelf of any researcher in related fields and should be the first book read by any new student of the field.’ — H-War, H-Net reviews
Focusing on key resources — oil, diamonds, and timber — he argues that resources and wars are linked in three main ways. First, resource revenues finance belligerents, a trend that has become all the more conspicuous since the withdrawal of Cold War foreign sponsorship in the late 1980s. Second, resource exploitation generates conflict. As global demand for raw materials has sharply increased, competition over critical resources such as oil has resulted in a flurry of ‘resource conflicts’, from local community struggles against mining multinationals to regional and international tensions. Third, economic shocks and poor governance sharply increase the risk of war (the ‘resource curse’).
專注於關鍵資源——石油、鑽石和木材——他認為資源和戰爭主要以三種方式聯係在一起。 首先，資源收入為交戰方提供資金，這一趨勢自 1980 年代末冷戰時期外國讚助退出以來變得更加明顯。 其次，資源開發產生衝突。 隨著全球對原材料的需求急劇增加，對石油等關鍵資源的競爭導致了一係列“資源衝突”，從當地社區與礦業跨國公司的鬥爭到地區和國際緊張局勢。 第三，經濟衝擊和治理不善會急劇增加戰爭風險（“資源詛咒”）。
While today’s resource boom is a major economic opportunity for resource rich but otherwise poor countries, reliance on resource exports often leads to sharp and unexpected economic downturns. Not all resources are the same, however, and effective responses are at hand. Sanctions, military interventions and wealth sharing have helped bring an end to conflicts, yet only deeper domestic and international reforms in resource governance can stop the plunder of Africa and Asia.
雖然今天的資源繁榮對資源豐富但資源匱乏的國家來說是一個重要的經濟機會，但對資源出口的依賴往往會導致急劇和意想不到的經濟衰退。 然而，並非所有資源都是相同的，有效的應對措施就在眼前。 製裁、軍事幹預和財富分享有助於結束衝突，但隻有更深入的國內和國際資源治理改革才能阻止對非洲和亞洲的掠奪。
Reviews
‘For anyone interested in war economies and what to do about them, this book is a real ‘must-read’. From Angola to Cambodia, from oil to timber, the author draws on two decades of scholarly research and field experience to paint a remarkable picture of the complex resource-conflict nexus: concise, and yet nuanced and comprehensive.’ — Gilles Carbonnier, professor of development economics at the Graduate Institute / Geneva and editor-in-chief of International Development Policy
‘Le Billon has written a deep, nuanced, analytically rich exploration of the many ways that oil, diamonds, and timber are intertwined with violent conflict. This is an important book for both scholars and activists.’ — Michael L. Ross, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles, and author of The Oil Curse: How Petroleum Shapes the Development of Nations
‘The complexity of contemporary resource wars is elegantly unpacked in this lucid investigation of geography and violence. It shows how resources are entangled in complicated geopolitical economies which require careful policy initiatives rather than simple moral certainties. This simply is the “must read” volume for anyone concerned to understand these issues in depth.’ — Simon Dalby, Carleton University
‘Le Billon’s uncovering of the complexities involved in resource conflict makes this book a valuable contribution to the discussion of intrastate violence … Highly recommended.’ — M. Olson Lounsbery, Choice
“對於任何對戰爭經濟以及如何應對它們感興趣的人來說，這本書都是真正的‘必讀’。 從安哥拉到柬埔 日內瓦研究生院發展經濟學和國際發展政策主編
“Le Billon 對石油、鑽石和木材與暴力衝突交織在一起的多種方式進行了深刻、細致入微、分析豐富的探索。 對於學者和活動家來說，這都是一本重要的書。’——邁克爾·羅斯 (Michael L. Ross)，加州大學洛杉磯分校政治學教授，《石油詛咒：石油如何塑造國家發展》一書的作者
“當代資源戰爭的複雜性在這部對地理和暴力的清晰調查中得到了優雅的詮釋。 它展示了資源如何與複雜的地緣政治經濟糾纏在一起，這需要謹慎的政策舉措，而不是簡單的道德確定性。 這簡直是任何相關人士深入了解這些問題的“必讀”書籍。’——卡爾頓大學西蒙·達爾比 (Simon Dalby)
“Le Billon 揭示了資源衝突中的複雜性，使這本書成為對國內暴力討論的寶貴貢獻……強烈推薦。”——M. Olson Lounsbery，Choice
About author(s)
Philippe Le Billon is a specialist on the links between resource extraction and armed conflict. With an MBA and PhD in geography, he worked for the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and in UN peacekeeping, advised governments, and collaborated with NGOs and research institutes, such as Global Witness and the International Institute for Strategic Studies. He is Associate Professor at the Liu Institute for Global Issues and the Department of Geography, University of British Columbia.
菲利普·勒比永 (Philippe Le Billon) 是研究資源開采與武裝衝突之間聯係的專家。 他擁有 MBA 和地理學博士學位，曾在法國外交部和聯合國維和行動中工作，為政府提供建議，並與全球見證和國際戰略研究所等非政府組織和研究機構合作。 他是劉全球問題研究所和不列顛哥倫比亞大學地理係的副教授。
Review – Wars of Plunder
Wars of Plunder
by Phillippe Le Billon
London: Hurst & Co., 2012
In Wars of Plunder: Conflicts, Profits, and The Politics of Resources, Philippe Le Billon embarks on an ambitious task of reframing the debating surrounding “resource wars.” Not satisfied with the simplistic geopolitical and socio-biological explanations of why conflicts over resources proliferated at the end of the twentieth century, Le Billon reframes the debate by stressing that resources “should not be considered as simply raw materials that come out from nature, but as complex objects produced by socio-natural processes” which are rightly understood as “subjects influencing social relations” (10). Drawing on his years of direct field experience, Le Billon broadens the scope of inquiry by asking whether the presence of resources is the problem or if the problem is the context of resource exploitation (9). This social view of resources sets Le Billon’s book apart from other literature on “resource wars” and is a welcomed addition to the scholarly debate.
Book Summary
Grappling with the sad reality that most conflict-related deaths following the Cold War have occurred in primary commodity export dependent economies, Le Billon’s central argument is that “resource sectors influence the likelihood and course of armed conflicts” (4). Le Billon is clear, however, to emphasize that the deterministic view of resources causing conflicts is incorrect, and that ignoring how resources shape and are expressive of social relations is a mistake. Therefore, a proper understanding of “resource wars” needs “thick historical and geographical contextualization” (57) of “resource dependence and the specificities of the resource sectors involved” (5).
Le Billon centers his argument around three dimensions: vulnerability, risk, and opportunity. The first dimension describes the “resource curse” argument, where economic dependence on a resource results in “economic underperformance and a weakening of governing institutions” thus making a country more vulnerable to conflict (13). The second dimension depicts the “resource conflict” argument, where some resource sectors are more prone to violence and conflicts because of their direct linkages to the “control and exploitation of resources” (13). The third dimension illustrates the “conflict resources” argument, which “focuses on the financial opportunities that sustain armed conflicts” (13), particularly how belligerents take advantage of resources to “finance their struggle” (73). When viewed together, these dimensions explain how resource endowments play a role in “shaping greater vulnerability to, risk of, and opportunities for armed conflicts” (14).
With numerous possible resources to analyze, Le Billon concentrates on three: oil, diamonds, and timber because these resources account for most resource related violence post Cold War. These resources also share an important characteristic: while produced by nature, they must be extracted from nature to be useful. Extraction is inherently a social endeavor requiring complex relationships between multiple parties throughout the commodity chain. The study of “resource wars” cannot be isolated to belligerents but must include the companies that purchase the resources, end consumers who demand the resources, and governments who are indirectly complicit with resource conflicts through indifference or a refusal to engage because they succumb to pressure from interest groups who have vested interests in resources.
Expanding the number of parties analyzed allows Le Billon to broaden the definition of violence considered. Whereas previous studies of conflict and resources “rest on narrow definitions of violence” (122), Le Billon considers structural, symbolic, and physical forms of violence for a richer analysis. For example, when discussing oil, Le Billon does not assign blame for violence solely to rebel groups. Instead, he faults governments and consumers for not reducing their oil demand, which “reinforces scarcity and an associated politics of tension around ‘strategic’ oil areas”, leading to “the geopolitics of fear and force” (83). In regards to diamonds, a narrow definition of violence would exclude De Beers from any blame even though they profited from conflict diamonds and resisted attempts to curtail the trade (85). A narrow definition of violence would also excuse foreign owners of timber companies from any wrongdoing, despite their role in influencing colonial policies and institutions that are still distortive today (130-131). Uneven development, environmental degradation, invasive regulatory interventions, armed conflict, etc. are all forms of violence that must be considered by policymakers looking to manage extractive resource sectors.
The three resources (oil, diamonds, and timber) Le Billon highlights provide varying degrees of evidence relating to the three dimensions of conflict (vulnerability, risk, and opportunity). The author finds strong evidence between oil and conflict (82). Oil booms and busts lead to institutional weakening, increasing vulnerability to conflict. The concentration of oil deposits and the need for capital intensive extraction techniques that limit local employment opportunities encourage armed conflicts aimed at controlling oil flows (71), increasing the risk of conflict. Onshore oil locations allow belligerents to extort oil companies for “protection” or kidnap oil staff for ransom payments, increasing opportunity to conflict. For diamonds and timber, the opportunity dimension is the strongest link to conflict. Secondary deposits of diamonds are “easily mined and highly valuable” as well as “easy to conceal, transport, store, and trade” (109), all attractive qualities for those looking to finance conflict. Insurgents and guerrillas can “opportunistically use” dense forests “as advantageous terrain” and “as a source of finance” (150).
The last section of the book evaluates “conflict termination strategies” and “conflict prevention and peace-building more broadly” (151). Three conflict termination strategies are considered: military intervention, economic sanctions, and using resource revenues to “buy” peace with belligerents. Each of these interventions has varying degrees of success in preventing conflict. Military intervention can be successful in targeting belligerents but can also “fuel nationalist mobilization, thereby escalating the conflict” (184) and fail to “usher in a stable peace” (185). Well targeted sanctions can deprive belligerents of revenue, reducing their ability to wage conflict, but are notoriously difficult to enforce and can invite corruption (i.e. the UN Oil-for-Food Program for Iraq). Using resource revenue to attain peace is “possible insofar as resources constitute divisible goods, especially in terms of revenue and to a lesser degree in terms of ownership” (171), but is controversial because it “may be perceived as rewarding violence” (174). Le Billon cautions against generalizing conflicts and applying cookie cutter solutions since the effectiveness of intervention are influenced by “the type of resources and type of conflicts involved” (179).
Le Billon presents three sets of proposals for conflict prevention and peace-building. The first set focuses on resource exploitation management, such as renegotiating “odious” contracts signed by former governments. The second set highlights resource revenue management, such as recovering previously “looted” resource revenue. The final set describes international initiatives dedicated to resource governance, such as international standards for extractive industries. Le Billon acknowledges building peace in areas with a history of resource conflict is “promising because much of the context for resource exploitation can be improved, but also challenging because of the incentives and limits of existing institutions” (221). With these challenges in mind, Le Billon stresses the important role international agencies play in “reforming extractive resource sectors” (222) and that the proposals he advances “are not equally applicable for all cases of post-conflict extractive resource management” (223). Therefore, “the sectors involved, the capacity of institutions, and broader political and economic aspects of post-conflict recover play a major part in deciding which options are most appropriate to pursue” (223).
Strengths and Weaknesses
Throughout the book, Le Billon does an admirable job of summarizing the voluminous, complex, and sometimes contradictory body of “resource war” literature. The analysis is well sourced and the examples referenced are numerous, but not too numerous as to distract the reader with needless anecdotes. Along with his careful insistence not to oversimplify conflicts surrounding resources to greed or geography, Le Billon is intellectually honest enough to not try to fool his audience into believing that resource conflicts can be solved with easy steps. Even though there are similarities between resource conflicts, each conflict is unique and the solutions to these conflicts should reflect the conflict’s uniqueness. In addition, the author’s broader definition of violence should become the new standard through which studies on “resource wars” should be analyzed. Resource extraction is not a solitary endeavor and linking the differing roles each party along the commodity chain has in the process is an important inclusion, particularly if the goal of activists and researchers is to find ways to reduce resource violence.
Despite Le Billon’s impressive contribution, two weaknesses permeate the manuscript. The most glaring is how the author treats the relationship between institutions and resources. While the author convincingly defends the resource curse hypothesis, where resource wealth weakens institutions, thus leading to poor economic and social outcomes, he does not consider the alternative explanation that poor outcomes exist because of weak institutions already established before resource discovery. This is particularly glaring because the author spends much of the book reminding readers that history matters, and yet never grapples with the possibility that weak institutions are the cause, not the effect, of the resource curse. Le Billon treats resource discovery as exogenous, when it is possible that resource discovery is endogenous to established institutions. While the author could disagree with this line of thought, his omission of this point is a major red flag since he builds his vulnerability argument around it.
The second weakness, related to the first, is the assumption that the players involved, not the institutions, are the reason conflict exists. This is particularly clear when Le Billon discusses ways to reduce conflict and promote peace. The solutions rely on “decent” people applying the “appropriate” policies. On this point, Le Billon would have been wise to borrow from public choice theory which stresses that poor outcomes can still exist if the rules of the game are providing the wrong incentives, even if the actors have good motivations. This may help explain why the author is so eager to embrace “prudent” regulations rather than the market forces of supply and demand anchored by solid institutions.
Conclusion
Wars of Plunder is a well sourced and informative read that stretches the reader to consider more complex reasons for why conflict is so prevalent in resource abundant areas. This book would be a welcome addition to the library of a scholar interested in the links between conflict and resources. However, if the reader is looking for a study on how institutions play a factor in the development of poorer countries, this book is not recommended.
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Jared A. Pincin is an Assistant Professor of Economics at The King’s College in New York City, where he teaches Economic Development.
Further Reading on E-International Relations
Jared A. Pincin is an Assistant Professor of Economics at The King’s College in New York City, where he teaches Economic Development. His email is jpincin@tkc.edu.
