Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness
https://portal.ieu-monitoring.com/editorial/munich-security-report-2022-turning-the-tide-unlearning-helplessness
Feb 17, 2022 Munich Security Conference 2022, Munich Security Index 2022, Munich Security Report 2022
A mounting tide of crises that reinforce each other threatens to overwhelm our societies and political systems. The Munich Security Report 2022 explores the emergence of a sense of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of global challenges and stimulates the debate on how it can best be overcome.
越來越多的危機相互加強，威脅著我們的社會和政治製度。 《2022 年慕尼黑安全報告》探討了麵對大量全球挑戰時出現的“集體無助感”，並引發了關於如何最好地克服它的辯論。
2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Whether it was the seemingly endless coronavirus pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or rising geopolitical tensions, all these challenges added up to a feeling of a loss of control.
2021 年顯然不是地緣政治樂觀的一年。 無論是看似無休止的冠狀病毒大流行、氣候變化日益明顯的威脅、相互關聯的世界令人煩惱的脆弱性，還是不斷加劇的地緣政治緊張局勢，所有這些挑戰都加劇了失控感。
As data from the Munich Security Index 2022 shows, since the last wave of research on risk perceptions in February and March 2021, concern about risk has not only grown among societies in the G7 and BRICS countries. There is also a widespread sense of helplessness in the face of present and looming threats among the twelve countries surveyed. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed. The new Munich Security Report (MSR) argues that just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. This belief, the report warns, may turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy, and prevent the world from addressing the most important crises before it is too late.
正如 2022 年慕尼黑安全指數的數據顯示，自 2021 年 2 月和 2021 年 3 月的上一波風險認知研究以來，對風險的擔憂不僅在 G7 和金磚國家的社會中有所增長。 在接受調查的 12 個國家中，麵對當前和迫在眉睫的威脅也普遍存在無助感。 自由民主國家似乎感到特別不知所措。 新的慕尼黑安全報告 (MSR) 認為，就像人們會遭受“習得性無助”——一個描述任何人所做的任何事情都無法產生積極變化的感覺的心理學術語——社會也可能會開始相信他們無法獲得 抓住他們麵臨的挑戰。 報告警告說，這種信念可能會變成一種自我實現的預言，並阻止世界在為時已晚之前解決最重要的危機。
The 2022 edition of the Munich Security Report covers security challenges in Afghanistan, the Sahel region, the Horn of Africa, and Eastern Europe, as well as risks posed by dependencies in the supply chains of critical technologies and by growing inequality. While the challenges are real, the report argues, the tools and resources needed to address them are, in fact, available. Transatlantic leaders need to revive the optimism and momentum palpable in the early days of the Biden administration. If they can “unlearn helplessness” and demonstrate that democracies can still deliver, they have a chance to turn the tide.
2022 年版慕尼黑安全報告涵蓋了阿富汗、薩赫勒地區、非洲之角和東歐的安全挑戰，以及關鍵技術供應鏈中的依賴性和不平等加劇帶來的風險。 報告認為，雖然挑戰是真實存在的，但應對這些挑戰所需的工具和資源實際上是可用的。 跨大西洋領導人需要重振拜登政府初期的樂觀情緒和勢頭。 如果他們能夠“忘記無助”並證明民主仍然可以實現，他們就有機會扭轉局勢。
Bibliographic data: Tobias Bunde, Sophie Eisentraut, Natalie Knapp, Randolf Carr, Julia Hammelehle, Isabell Kump, Luca Miehe, and Amadée Mudie-Mantz, “Munich Security Report 2022: Turning the Tide – Unlearning Helplessness,” Munich: Munich Security Conference, February 2022, https://doi.org/10.47342/QAWU4724.
Source – MSC 2022
Executive Summary
2021 was clearly not a year for geopolitical optimism. Almost every month, a new crisis dominated the news, contributing to a sense that this mounting tide of crises threatens to overwhelm us.
2021 年顯然不是地緣政治樂觀的一年。 幾乎每個月，一場新的危機都會占據新聞頭條，讓人感覺這種不斷升級的危機浪潮有可能淹沒我們。
Against this backdrop, it is not surprising that in Europe and beyond, concern about a growing loss of control is prevalent (Chapter 1). In fact, findings from the Munich Security Index 2022 not only reflect the high level of risk perceived by respondents in the G7 and BRICS countries; they also suggest the emergence of “collective helplessness” in the face of a plethora of crises that reinforce each other. Just like people can suffer from “learned helplessness” – a psychological term describing the feeling that nothing one does can effect positive change – societies, too, may come to believe that they are unable to get a grip on the challenges they are facing. Whether it is the seemingly endless pandemic, the increasingly tangible threat of climate change, the vexing vulnerabilities of an interconnected world, or increasing geopolitical tensions, all these challenges contribute to a feeling of a loss of control. Liberal democracies appear to feel particularly overwhelmed.
在這種背景下，在歐洲及其他地區普遍存在對日益失控的擔憂（第 1 章）也就不足為奇了。 事實上，2022 年慕尼黑安全指數的調查結果不僅反映了七國集團和金磚國家受訪者認為的高風險水平； 它們還表明，麵對大量相互強化的危機，會出現“集體無助”。 就像人們可能會遭受“習得性無助”——一個描述任何人所做的任何事情都無法帶來積極改變的感覺的心理學術語——社會也可能會開始相信他們無法應對所麵臨的挑戰。 無論是看似無休止的流行病、氣候變化日益明顯的威脅、相互關聯的世界令人煩惱的脆弱性，還是日益加劇的地緣政治緊張局勢，所有這些挑戰都會讓人感到失控。 自由民主國家似乎感到特別不知所措。
This perception is highly dangerous because it can turn into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Societies that have concluded that they cannot solve humankind’s most challenging problems might no longer even try to turn the tide. Will our stressed and overburdened societies end up accepting what they see as their fate, although they have the tools and resources to change it?
這種看法非常危險，因為它可能會變成一種自我實現的預言。 斷定他們無法解決人類最具挑戰性的問題的社會甚至可能不再試圖扭轉局勢。 盡管我們擁有改變命運的工具和資源，但我們壓力重重、負擔過重的社會最終會接受他們所認為的命運嗎？
Unfortunately, 2021 overall did not alleviate these concerns. With the chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, for instance, the past year has also reinvigorated a debate about what international interventions are able to realistically accomplish. In light of the limited achievements of the United States and its partners in Afghanistan (Chapter 2), hard questions arise about the West’s ability to build capable, legitimate state structures and promote stability elsewhere in the world. As Afghanistan now finds itself on the brink of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, with civil liberties being severely restricted under Taliban rule, the investments of two decades of external intervention are at risk. While the West has ended an “endless war,” people in Afghanistan are looking toward an uncertain future.
不幸的是，2021 年總體上並未緩解這些擔憂。 例如，隨著從阿富汗的混亂撤軍，過去一年也重新引發了一場關於國際幹預能夠實際實現什麽的辯論。 鑒於美國及其合作夥伴在阿富汗取得的有限成就（第 2 章），西方在世界其他地方建立有能力、合法的國家結構和促進穩定的能力出現了尖銳的問題。 由於阿富汗現在正處於世界上最嚴重的人道主義危機的邊緣，公民自由在塔利班統治下受到嚴格限製，二十年來外部幹預的投資麵臨風險。 雖然西方已經結束了一場“無休止的戰爭”，但阿富汗人民正在展望一個不確定的未來。
The developments in Afghanistan have also spurred a debate on European engagement in Mali and the Sahel region (Chapter 3). Even though this region has seen a massive increase in peacebuilding activities since 2013, the security situation has continuously deteriorated. The Malian government has been an exceedingly difficult partner for the international community – even before it entered talks with a Russian mercenary group. And increasing levels of violence in Mali and neighboring states have made it difficult for external actors to address the root causes of the problems afflicting the region – among these are poor development, human rights abuses, and rampant corruption.
阿富汗的事態發展也引發了一場關於歐洲參與馬裏和薩赫勒地區的辯論（第 3 章）。 盡管該地區自 2013 年以來建設和平活動大幅增加，但安全局勢卻持續惡化。 對於國際社會來說，馬裏政府一直是一個極其棘手的夥伴——甚至在它與俄羅斯雇傭軍組織進行談判之前也是如此。 馬裏和鄰國日益嚴重的暴力事件使得外部行為者難以解決困擾該地區的問題的根源——其中包括發展不暢、侵犯人權和猖獗的腐敗。
The Sahel is not the only conflict region where the headwinds for international stabilization efforts are growing stronger. After a period of democratization and hope for regional reconciliation in the Horn of Africa and the Arabian Gulf, a profound destabilization is now evident (Chapter 4). Since November 2020, civil war engulfs Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region, causing a large-scale humanitarian emergency. Because the Red Sea region is a crucial choke point of international trade, an important security link between the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Indo-Pacific, plus a major hub for extremists, the ripple effects of escalating conflicts will likely be felt far beyond the region. In that regard, the situation in the Horn of Africa demonstrates that conflicts around the world are not waiting for the West to draw its lessons from Afghanistan.
薩赫勒地區並不是國際穩定努力的阻力越來越大的唯一衝突地區。 在非洲之角和阿拉伯灣經曆了一段時間的民主化和區域和解希望之後，現在明顯出現了嚴重的不穩定（第 4 章）。 2020年11月以來，內戰席卷埃塞俄比亞北部提格雷地區，引發大規模人道主義緊急情況。 由於紅海地區是國際貿易的重要咽喉要道，是連接地中海、中東和印太地區的重要安全紐帶，也是極端分子的主要集散地，衝突升級的連鎖反應可能會影響到很遠的地方 超出區域。 在這方麵，非洲之角的局勢表明，世界各地的衝突不會等待西方從阿富汗汲取教訓。
At the same time, rising tensions in the Indo-Pacific and Eastern Europe have also raised another type of fear among the transatlantic partners: that of actual war. Nothing illustrates the renewed focus on territorial defense in the West better than the increasingly tense security situation on NATO’s eastern flank (Chapter 5). In recent months, Moscow has made it abundantly clear that it is looking for a revision of the European security order. As the Russian draft proposals for new security treaties demonstrate, Russia insists on a “sphere of influence” in its neighborhood, effectively limiting the sovereignty of countries like Ukraine. Russia’s rhetorical escalation and military buildup have raised profound security concerns across Europe.
與此同時，印太和東歐地區日益緊張的局勢也引發了跨大西洋合作夥伴的另一種恐懼：對實戰的恐懼。 沒有什麽比北約東翼日益緊張的安全局勢更能說明西方對領土防禦的重新關注（第 5 章）。 近幾個月來，莫斯科非常明確地表示，它正在尋求修訂歐洲安全秩序。 正如俄羅斯新安全條約提案草案所表明的那樣，俄羅斯堅持在其周邊地區建立“勢力範圍”，有效地限製了烏克蘭等國家的主權。 俄羅斯的言辭升級和軍事集結在整個歐洲引發了深刻的安全擔憂。
While analysts disagree on what President Vladimir Putin’s specific goals are, the debate about the basic principles of European security – and how to defend them – will only intensify in the coming months, posing difficult political and military questions to European leaders who are forced to take a stand and reconsider their strategic posture.
盡管分析人士對弗拉基米爾·普京總統的具體目標是什麽意見不一，但關於歐洲安全基本原則以及如何捍衛這些原則的辯論隻會在未來幾個月內愈演愈烈，向被迫采取行動的歐洲領導人提出棘手的政治和軍事問題 站出來重新考慮他們的戰略態勢。
In addition to the return of very traditional security concerns, the coronavirus pandemic has relentlessly highlighted societies’ vulnerabilities in various policy areas. Among other things, it has unmasked strong dependencies in the supply chains of critical technologies, as well as gaping inequalities and their detrimental effects on global crisis resilience.
除了非常傳統的安全問題回歸外，冠狀病毒大流行無情地凸顯了社會在各個政策領域的脆弱性。 除其他外，它揭示了關鍵技術供應鏈中的強烈依賴性，以及巨大的不平等及其對全球危機恢複力的不利影響。
Both the pandemic and recent geopolitical power moves have brought vulnerabilities in the technology sector into focus (Chapter 6). The ongoing global semiconductor supply bottleneck exemplifies what can happen when supply chains depend on “single points of failure” and geopolitically fraught supply sources. Due to the strategic importance of tech supply chains, the risk to them is only growing in an era of systemic competition. This realization has spurred a rethink on industrial policy in the US, Europe, and other high-tech economies. Meanwhile, China has had a head start as its comprehensive approach to economic planning has long focused on boosting its indigenous tech sector. However, approaches based on “onshoring,” the shifting of supply from foreign soil to within national borders, are clearly limited. Accordingly, the focus for policymakers has shifted to achieving supply chain cooperation between like-minded partners to collectively become more resilient.
大流行病和最近的地緣政治權力動向都使技術部門的脆弱性成為人們關注的焦點（第 6 章）。 持續的全球半導體供應瓶頸體現了當供應鏈依賴於“單點故障”和充滿地緣政治色彩的供應源時可能發生的情況。 由於技術供應鏈的戰略重要性，它們麵臨的風險隻會在係統性競爭時代增加。 這種認識促使美國、歐洲和其他高科技經濟體重新思考產業政策。 與此同時，中國已經取得了先機，因為其綜合經濟規劃方法長期以來一直專注於推動本土科技行業的發展。 然而，基於“在岸外包”（將供應從外國領土轉移到國內）的方法顯然是有限的。 因此，政策製定者的重點已轉移到實現誌同道合的合作夥伴之間的供應鏈合作，以共同提高彈性。
Covid-19 has brutally exposed inequalities that exist within and across states (Chapter 7). Pandemics are not the only grave threat facing humanity today that is inseparably tied to global divides. Climate change is, too. These threats to our health and habitats deepen existing disparities; and they will also defy successful containment if current levels of inequality persist. As long as the coronavirus rages on in other parts of the world, no country will be safe from the Covid-19 pandemic. And if less developed countries lack the resources to embark on low-carbon pathways, global warming cannot be effectively limited. It is becoming increasingly clear that improving global resilience in the face of present and future threats requires renewing social contracts, both within and between countries. Getting back on track to reach the UN Sustainable Development Goals would be the first important step.
Covid-19 殘酷地暴露了各州內部和各州之間存在的不平等現象（第 7 章）。 流行病並不是當今人類麵臨的唯一與全球鴻溝密不可分的嚴重威脅。 氣候變化也是如此。 這些對我們健康和棲息地的威脅加深了現有的差距； 如果當前的不平等程度持續存在，它們也將無法成功遏製。 隻要冠狀病毒在世界其他地區肆虐，就沒有哪個國家可以免受 Covid-19 大流行的影響。 如果欠發達國家缺乏走低碳道路的資源，全球變暖就無法得到有效限製。 越來越明顯的是，提高全球麵對當前和未來威脅的複原力需要更新國家內部和國家之間的社會契約。 重回正軌以實現聯合國可持續發展目標將是重要的第一步。
Despite these and the many other challenges on the agenda of this year’s Munich Security Conference, there is still good reason to believe that “unlearning helplessness” is possible. For this, transatlantic leaders need to revive the optimism and momentum palpable in the early days of the Biden administration and demonstrate that both democracy as a system and alliances based on liberal values can deliver for their states’ citizens and the world at large. Collectively, they have the chance to turn the tide.
Individually they risk being swept away.
盡管今年慕尼黑安全會議的議程上有這些以及許多其他挑戰，但仍有充分理由相信“忘掉無助感”是可能的。 為此，跨大西洋領導人需要重振拜登政府初期明顯的樂觀情緒和勢頭，並證明民主作為一種製度和基於自由價值觀的聯盟都能為他們所在州的公民和整個世界帶來好處。 總的來說，他們有機會扭轉局勢。
單獨地，他們冒著被卷走的風險。
