論互相同情的快樂 《道德情操論》（2）

《道德情操論》

Chap. II

Of the Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy

第二章 論互相同情的快樂

1．

But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may
be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men
a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are
we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.
Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain
refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account,
according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and
this pain. Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of
the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices
whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he
is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he
observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their
opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so
instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it
seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such
self-interested consideration. A man is mortified when, after
having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees
that nobody laughs at his jests but himself. On the contrary, the
mirth of the company is highly agreeable to him, and he regards
this correspondence of their sentiments with his own as the
greatest applause.

無論產生同情的原因是什麽，也無論同情是如何產生的，最令我們快樂的莫過於看到我們發自內心的情感在別人身上產生共鳴；打擊我們最甚的莫過於看到與此相反的情形。有些人喜歡根據自愛之心的某些細膩的表現來推斷我們全部的情感。這些人自認為根據自己的原則已經把這種快樂和痛苦的原因說得一清二楚。他們說，人都能意識到自己的軟弱，也能意識到需要他人的幫助。看到別人受到自己激情的感染，他就心花怒放，因為他確信能獲得別人的幫助；不過看到相反的情況，他就會鬱悶悲傷。然而，無論是快樂，還是痛苦的感覺，都會轉瞬即逝，而且這種情況經常是在一些無關痛癢的場合發生。於是似乎很明顯，快樂與痛苦這兩種情感都無法從這種自我感興趣的考慮中產生。一個人竭盡全力想通過逗趣博得同伴一樂，但環顧四周，發現除他本人之外，再沒有別人對他的笑話捧腹時，他就感到很難為情。而相反，同伴的歡樂和他高度合拍的時候，他就把這種情感的合拍看作是最牛的喝彩。


2．

Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the
additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy
with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with
when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other,
no doubt, do in some measure. When we have read a book or poem so
often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by
ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a
companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into
the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him,
but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider
all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they
appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves,
and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus
enlivens our own. On the contrary, we should be vexed if he did not
seem to been entertained with it, and we could no longer take
any pleasure in reading it to him. It is the same case here. The
mirth of the company, no doubt, enlivens our own mirth, and their
silence, no doubt, disappoints us. But though this may contribute
both to the pleasure which we derive from the one, and to the
pain which we feel from the other, it is by no means the sole
cause of either; and this correspondence of the sentiments of
others with our own appears to be a cause of pleasure, and the
want of it a cause of pain, which cannot be accounted for in this
manner. The sympathy, which my friends express with my joy,
might, indeed, give me pleasure by enlivening that joy: but that
which they express with my grief could give me none, if it served
only to enliven that grief. Sympathy, however, enlivens joy and
alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of
satisfaction; and it alleviates grief by insinuating into the
heart almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at that
time capable of receiving.


歡樂與痛苦生成的軌跡大致如此，但仔細想來，他之所以歡樂，似乎並非全然因為從同伴那裏博得一樂而感到喜悅倍增，他之所以痛苦，亦非因為未能博得同伴共鳴而感到失望。我們翻來覆去閱讀一本書或一首詩，就不再能從獨自閱讀中發現樂趣，但如果讀給同伴聽，我們依然可以感到情趣盎然。對於同伴來講，此書或此詩堪稱新穎之至，樂趣充盈。於是我們就會發現對方驚喜莫名，讚不絕口，之所以如此，自然是此書或此詩使然。但是此時此刻，書也好，詩也罷，早已不能再在我們心中泛起任何激情的漣漪。由是觀之，在考慮詩書所描述的所有思想時，我們的著眼點與其說集中於我們自己，毋寧說是集中於那位夥伴。我們因為自己對他的愉悅之情感同身受而開心不已。相反，如果同伴看上去並不欣賞這本書或這首詩，我們就會很鬱悶，於是就再也不能從對他閱讀詩書中獲得任何樂趣。這裏的情況也相同。同伴的歡樂，毫無疑問，使我們倍加歡樂；同伴的沉默，疑問毫無，使我們失望倍加。不過，雖然這能使我們在一種情況下獲得歡樂，而在另一種情況下產生痛苦，但這絕然不是二者產生的唯一原因；他人與我們的情感吻合，看來就是產生快樂的一個原因，而缺乏這種吻合，看來便是產生痛苦的一個原因，雖然如此，但這也不能完全用以解讀快樂與痛苦產生的根源。如果朋友對我的快樂產生同情，而這種同情反過來又能使我的快樂加倍，那我就感到很開心；但是如果朋友對我的悲傷產生同情，而這種同情反過來卻隻能使我的悲傷加劇，我就不能感到開心。然而，同情既能增加快樂，也能緩解悲傷。它為產生滿意的情緒提供另一個溫床，因而增加快樂；它使彼時彼刻能夠接受的愉悅情緒潛入心靈，從而緩解悲傷。

3．

It is to be observed accordingly, that we are still more
anxious to communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our
agreeable passions, that we derive still more satisfaction from
their sympathy with the former than from that with the latter,
and that we are still more shocked by the want of it.

因此可以說：我們更急於向朋友表達不快之情，而不是愉悅之情；我們從他們對前者，而不是對後者的同情中獲得更多的滿足；我們由於他們缺乏同情之心而受創更重。

4.

How are the unfortunate relieved when they have found out a
person to whom they can communicate the cause of their sorrow?
Upon his sympathy they seem to disburthen themselves of a part of
their distress: he is not improperly said to share it with them.
He not only feels a sorrow of the same kind with that which they
feel, but as if he had derived a part of it to himself, what he
feels seems to alleviate the weight of what they feel. Yet by
relating their misfortunes they in some measure renew their
grief. They awaken in their memory the remembrance of those
circumstances which occasioned their affliction. Their tears
accordingly flow faster than before, and they are apt to abandon
themselves to all the weakness of sorrow. They take pleasure,
however, in all this, and, it is evident, are sensibly relieved
by it; because the sweetness of his sympathy more than
compensates the bitterness of that sorrow, which, in order to
excite this sympathy, they had thus enlivened and renewed. The
cruelest insult, on the contrary, which can be offered to the
unfortunate, is to appear to make light of their calamities. To
seem not to be affected with the joy of our companions is but
want of politeness; but not to wear a serious countenance when
they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity.

不幸者發現一個能與之傾訴悲傷原因的人，他們該是何等地如釋重負啊！有他的同情，他們就似乎能減輕自己的悲痛：說此人能與他們分擔痛苦未必欠妥。對於他們的悲傷，他不僅能夠感受到，而且還覺得似乎已經部分地加以分擔，他所能感受到的悲情，似乎能夠減輕他們所感受的重負。然而，傾訴不幸在某種程度上反而會使悲傷死灰複燃。他們會重新憶及已往使自己備受煎熬的環境。他們因此會加快從前淚水的流速，從而極易浸沉於哪怕是極度微弱的悲傷之中。不過他們會從所有這些當中獲得快樂，而且顯然會因此感到明顯的慰藉；因為獲得同情所產生的美好感覺，會對悲傷所引起的痛苦加以補償，至於這些悲傷，則是因為他們要去激發同情之心，而被重新賦予生機，進而卷土重來的。與之相反，不幸者大禍臨頭之際，卻遭他人熟視無睹，置若罔聞，這似乎就是對他們極度殘忍的戕害。麵對同伴的快樂而心如古井，無動於衷，這似乎隻是失禮而已；然而當他們傾訴衷腸，備述遭際時，我們卻依然故我，毫不動容，這實在是貨真價實的喪盡天良，毫無人性。

5.

Love is an agreeable; resentment, a disagreeable passion; and
accordingly we are not half so anxious that our friends should
adopt our friendships, as that they should enter into our
resentments. We can forgive them though they seem to be little
affected with the favours which we may have received, but lose
all patience if they seem indifferent about the injuries which
may have been done to us: nor are we half so angry with them for
not entering into our gratitude, as for not sympathizing with our
resentment. They can easily avoid being friends to our friends,
but can hardly avoid being enemies to those with whom we are at
variance. We seldom resent their being at enmity with the first,
though upon that account we may sometimes affect to make an
awkward quarrel with them; but we quarrel with them in good
earnest if they live in friendship with the last. The agreeable
passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart
without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions
of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing
consolation of sympathy.

愛是一種愉悅的激情，恨是一種鬱悶的激情。我們渴望朋友與自己共享友情，我們同樣也渴望朋友與自己同仇敵愾。我們春風得意，他們漠然處之，我們會原諒他們；我們水深火熱，他們若無其事，我們會忍無可忍。同樣，我們感恩戴德，他們置之不理，我們會怒火中燒；我們恨之入骨，他們置若罔聞，我們會五內俱焚。對於他們來講，避免成為我們朋友的朋友，簡直易如反掌；但避免成為我們敵人的敵人，則幾乎不可能。他們與朋友反目失和，我們很少抱怨，雖然有時我們也為此與他們小有口角。但如果他們與敵人和睦相處，我們就會與他們舌戰到底，難解難分。愛與歡樂的激情，無須添加額外的樂趣，就能使人由衷地感到心滿意足，受益匪淺。悲傷與怨恨引發的痛苦，亟需同情之心加以治愈。


6.

As the person who is principally interested in any event is
pleased with our sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we,
too, seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with him,
and to be hurt when we are unable to do so. We run not only to
congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted;
and the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in
all the passions of his heart we can entirely sympathize with,
seems to do more than compensate the painfulness of that sorrow
with which the view of his situation affects us. On the contrary,it is always disagreeable to feel that we cannot sympathize with him, and instead of being pleased with this exemption from sympathetic pain, it hurts us to find that we cannot share his uneasiness. If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness. It gives us the spleen, on the other hand, to see another too happy or too much elevated, as we call
it, with any little piece of good fortune. We are disobliged even
with his joy; and, because we cannot go along with it, call it
levity and folly. We are even put out of humour if our companion
laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it deserves; that
is, than we feel that we ourselves could laugh at it.

對什麽事都非常感興趣的人，會因為我們的同情而感到高興，會因為無人同情而感到傷心，因此當我們能夠同情他的時候，我們自己似乎也十分高興，而不能這樣做的時候，我們也會感到傷心。我們不僅樂於祝賀因成功而春風得意者，也樂於安慰因落敗而愁腸寸斷者，與一個激情滿懷而我們又完全能夠同情的人談話，就會感到快樂，而這種快樂似乎遠不止於能夠解除因目睹其情況而產生的悲傷與痛苦。相反，我們感到無法同情他時就總是鬱悶不已。我們不會因為免除同情心導致的痛苦而高興，隻會因為發現自己不能分擔他的不快而感到痛心。我們聽到一個人因為自己的不幸而嚎啕大哭時，如果我們認為這種不幸一旦落到我們頭上，並不會對我們產生如此巨大的作用，那我們就會因為他的悲傷而感到震驚；因為我們無法進入這個角色，因此就將這種行為稱之為膽怯與懦弱。另一方麵，看到別人因為交了點小運就十分高興，甚至心花怒放，我們就不屑一顧。我們甚至對他的快樂心生怨怒；因為我們對此無法苟同，便稱之為輕浮與愚笨。對於一個本不值得為之長時間哈哈大笑的笑話，如果我們感覺自己根本不會為之發笑，然而同伴卻笑得超過分寸， 我們甚至會怒火中燒。