加中關係簡史
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/canadian-views-china/thumbnail-history-canada-china-relations
加拿大對中國的看法 2020 年 7 月 22 日
從矛盾心理到不信任
研究論文 2020 年 7 月 22 日 ISBN: 978 1 78413 405 1
自2018年底兩國陷入外交爭端以來，加拿大對中國的態度發生了巨大轉變——從矛盾到不信任。本文認為，這些強硬的情緒不太可能消散，加中關係似乎已經進入了僵局。 新的、更謹慎的階段。
概括
對中國的強硬看法可能會持續下去
對中國采取協調一致的態度？
加拿大總理皮埃爾·埃利奧特·特魯多（Pierre Elliott Trudeau）是現任總理的父親，他是 1970 年首批與中華人民共和國建立外交關係的西方領導人之一，比美國建立外交關係早九年。 此後，加拿大對華政策或多或少地追隨了美國的政策。 與華盛頓一樣，渥太華也奉行接觸政策，這一政策的基礎是對兩國關係的商業潛力的希望，以及中國將逐步開放其內政並成為國際社會負責任的成員的期望。 即使在 1989 年因天安門廣場示威活動而肆意殺害抗議者之後，這種做法仍然持續存在。事件發生後，加拿大譴責了中國領導層，並暫停了多個領域的合作，但時任外交國務卿喬·克拉克 (Joe Clark) 表示， ”，他說：“我們沒有、也不會成為反華的對象……我們必須盡量避免采取可能將中國推向孤立的措施。”3加拿大迅速恢複了與中國的合作，再次與美國的立場保持一致 。
2006年，斯蒂芬·哈珀總理上台後短暫放棄了這一政策，指責之前的自由黨和保守黨政府未能捍衛中國的人權和民主。 在表明加拿大態度轉變的其他姿態中，哈珀承諾他不會“以萬能的美元”出賣加拿大的重要價值觀；4在他渥太華的辦公室會見了達賴喇嘛（他的辦公桌上掛著一麵西藏國旗）； 並尖銳地宣布他不會參加2008年北京夏季奧運會。 然而，到 2009 年，哈珀前往中國並促進雙邊合作和貿易，促使一位評論員寫到他“對亞洲重要性的大馬士革轉變”。5 這種轉變似乎在 2012 年完成，當時哈珀稱讚兩國“” 戰略夥伴關係”，並與中國外長溫家寶共同宣布，雙邊外國投資促進和保護協定的談判已成功。6兩國領導人還啟動了一項聯合研究，以審查“自由貿易協定的可行性和一些潛力”。 貿易協定”(FTA).7
2017 年底，加拿大和中國似乎準備宣布正式啟動自由貿易協定談判。 然而，兩國最終未能就談判的基本規則達成一致，進一步的討論陷入僵局。
2015年接替哈珀擔任總理的賈斯汀·特魯多也有興趣擴大加拿大與中國的貿易。 習近平主席和其他中國官員宣布雙邊關係進入“黃金時代”，以迎接特魯多的當選，但加拿大領導人則更為謹慎。 在授權就可能的中加自由貿易協定進行探索性討論之前，他敦促中國取消對某些加拿大農產品的進口限製，並釋放自 1984 年以來一直居住在中國的加拿大人凱文·加勒特 (Kevin Garratt)，他於 2014 年被中國當局拘留，並被誣陷 軍事間諜活動。 加勒特於 2016 年 9 月獲釋並返回加拿大後，探索性討論繼續進行，到 2017 年底，加拿大和中國似乎準備宣布正式開始自由貿易協定談判。 然而，兩國最終未能就談判的基本規則達成一致，進一步的討論陷入僵局。 與此同時，美國總統特朗普威脅擾亂與加拿大的貿易也成為加拿大政府關注的焦點。
這就是當年加中關係的現狀
2018年底，美國司法部正式要求加拿大當局拘留在溫哥華機場轉機的孟晚舟，等待指控孟晚舟犯有銀行欺詐和電匯欺詐聯邦罪的引渡請求。 孟晚舟除了是中國最重要的電信公司華為的首席財務官之外，還是該公司創始人任正非的女兒，任正非曾是中國人民解放軍成員，據報道與中國共產黨有著密切的聯係。 據《環球郵報》報道，特魯多堅稱加拿大逮捕孟晚舟的決定沒有政治參與。 8 事實上，此類決定由加拿大司法部的職業執法官員做出，並最終由加拿大法官做出，他們會審查孟晚舟的決定。 引渡請求。 從技術上講，司法部長有權暫停此類訴訟，但通常隻在最後階段發揮作用：決定是否向提出請求的國家移交嫌疑人。9 盡管如此，中國政府指責加拿大出於政治動機進行逮捕。
孟晚舟被捕幾天後，中國當局拘留了加拿大企業高管邁克爾·斯帕弗(Michael Spavor)和擔任國際危機組織智囊團政策顧問的前加拿大外交官邁克爾·科夫裏格(Michael Kovrig)，逮捕了兩人，理由是“涉嫌從事危害國家安全的活動”。 10 據報道，他們被關押在條件惡劣的中國拘留設施中，11 而孟晚舟已獲得正當程序，並在引渡聽證會期間住在她在溫哥華的兩處豪宅中的一處，她的代表是一名律師。 律師團隊。 這並不是中國第一次拘留加拿大人，顯然是為了向加拿大施壓。 12
康明凱和斯帕沃爾於 2019 年 1 月被拘留兩周後，加拿大人羅伯特·謝倫伯格 (Robert Schellenberg) 於 2018 年 11 月因販毒罪被中國法院判處 15 年有期徒刑，在短時間內接受重審。 第二次聽證會的法官們審議了不到一個小時，就裁定謝倫伯格先前的量刑過輕，判處他死刑——審理速度之快、非同尋常，連中國的法律專家都公開表示驚訝。 今年三月，中國還限製了某些加拿大農產品的進口——首先是油菜籽，隨後是牛肉和豬肉。 事實證明，新的限製措施給農業部門帶來了痛苦：2018 年，僅加拿大向中國出口的油菜籽就達 27 億加元。13 總而言之，中國的行動似乎旨在迫使加拿大政府暫停對孟晚舟的引渡程序並釋放她。
A thumbnail history of Canada–China relations
https://www.chathamhouse.org/2020/07/canadian-views-china/thumbnail-history-canada-china-relations
Canadian Views on China
a session on women’s workforce participation, future of work and aging societies at the
G20 Summit on 29 June 2019 in Osaka, Japan.
Photo credit: Copyright © Kazuhiro NOGI/Pool/Getty
Associate Fellow, US and the Americas Programme (based in Canada)
Canadian attitudes towards China have undergone a dramatic shift – from ambivalence to distrust – since the two countries became locked in a diplomatic dispute in late 2018. This paper argues that these hardened sentiments are unlikely to dissipate and Canada–China relations seem to have entered a new, warier phase.
A thumbnail history of Canada–China relations
Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau, the father of the current prime minister, was one of the first Western leaders to establish diplomatic relations with the People’s Republic of China in 1970, nine years before the US did the same. Canada’s policy towards China has more or less tracked that of the US since then. Like Washington, Ottawa pursued a policy of engagement that rested on hopes for the commercial potential of the relationship, and on the expectation that China would gradually liberalize its domestic affairs and become a responsible member of the international community. This approach persisted even after the indiscriminate killing of protesters in response to the Tiananmen Square demonstrations in 1989. In the aftermath of that event, Canada condemned the Chinese leadership and suspended cooperation in several areas, but as Joe Clark, then secretary of state for foreign affairs, put it: ‘We have not become, and will not become, anti-China […] We must try to avoid measures that would push China towards isolation.’3 Canada quickly resumed cooperation with China, again aligning with the US stance.
Prime Minister Stephen Harper briefly abandoned this policy when he gained power in 2006, accusing previous Liberal and Conservative governments of failing to defend human rights and democracy in China. Among other gestures indicating a shift in the Canadian approach, Harper pledged that he would not sell out important Canadian values ‘to the almighty dollar’;4 met the Dalai Lama in his Ottawa office (with a Tibetan flag displayed upon his desk); and announced pointedly that he would not attend the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing. By 2009, however, Harper was travelling to China and promoting bilateral cooperation and trade, prompting one commentator to write of his ‘Damascene conversion to the importance of Asia’.5 The conversion seemed complete in 2012, when Harper praised the two countries’ ‘strategic partnership’ and announced, jointly with his Chinese counterpart Wen Jiabao, the successful negotiation of a bilateral foreign investment promotion and protection agreement.6 The two leaders also launched a joint study to examine ‘the feasibility and some of the potentials of a free-trade agreement’ (FTA).7
By late 2017 Canada and China appeared poised to announce the formal start of negotiations towards an FTA. However, the two countries were ultimately unable to agree on the ground rules for the negotiations, leaving further discussions in limbo.
Justin Trudeau, who replaced Harper as prime minister in 2015, was also interested in expanding Canadian trade with China. President Xi Jinping and other Chinese officials greeted Trudeau’s election by proclaiming a ‘golden era’ in bilateral relations, but the Canadian leader was more circumspect. Before authorizing exploratory discussions on a possible Canada–China FTA, he pressed China to remove import restrictions on certain Canadian agricultural products and to release Kevin Garratt, a Canadian resident in China since 1984 who had been detained by Chinese authorities in 2014 and falsely accused of military espionage. Following Garratt’s release and return to Canada in September 2016, exploratory discussions proceeded, and by late 2017 Canada and China appeared poised to announce the formal start of negotiations towards an FTA. However, the two countries were ultimately unable to agree on the ground rules for the negotiations, leaving further discussions in limbo. Meanwhile, US President Trump’s threats to disrupt trade with Canada had become the focus of the Canadian government’s attention.
Such was the status of Canada–China relations in late 2018, when the US Department of Justice formally requested that the Canadian authorities detain Meng Wanzhou as she was changing planes at Vancouver airport, pending an extradition request that accused Meng of the federal crimes of bank fraud and wire fraud. In addition to being the chief financial officer of Huawei, China’s foremost telecommunications company, Meng is the daughter of its founder Ren Zhengfei, a former member of the People’s Liberation Army who reportedly has strong connections to the Communist Party of China. As reported in The Globe and Mail, Trudeau insisted that there was no political involvement in the Canadian decision to arrest Meng.8 Indeed, such decisions fall to career law-enforcement officials in Canada’s Department of Justice, and ultimately to Canadian judges, who review extradition requests. The justice minister technically has the power to suspend such proceedings, but typically plays a role only at the final stage: deciding whether to surrender the suspect to the requesting state.9 Nevertheless, the Chinese government accused Canada of making a politically motivated arrest.
Days after Meng’s arrest, Chinese authorities detained Michael Spavor, a Canadian business executive, and Michael Kovrig, a former Canadian diplomat working as a policy adviser for the International Crisis Group think-tank, arresting both men on ‘suspicion of engaging in activities that endanger national security’.10 They have reportedly been held under harsh conditions in Chinese detention facilities,11 whereas Meng has been afforded due process and is living in one of her two Vancouver mansions for the duration of her extradition hearing, where she is represented by a team of lawyers. It was not the first occasion on which China had detained Canadians in an apparent bid to pressure Canada.12
Two weeks after the detention of Kovrig and Spavor, in January 2019, Canadian Robert Schellenberg, who in November 2018 had been sentenced by Chinese courts to a 15-year jail term for drug-trafficking, was retried at short notice. Judges at the second hearing deliberated for barely an hour before ruling that Schellenberg’s previous sentence was too light and sentencing him to death – proceedings so extraordinary and rapid that even Chinese legal experts openly expressed surprise. In March, China also restricted imports of certain Canadian agricultural goods – firstly canola, and subsequently beef and pork. The new restrictions proved painful to the agricultural sector: Canada’s exports to China of canola seeds, alone, amounted to C$2.7 billion in 2018.13 Taken together, China’s actions seemed intended to coerce the Canadian government into suspending the extradition proceedings against Meng and releasing her.
