全球美元麵臨風險, 下一步如何 布達佩斯全球對話2025

The Global Dollar at Risk—What Comes Next? | Budapest Global Dialogue 2025

Observer Research Foundation 2025年7月7日 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnkYHiTWwsE

全球美元麵臨風險——下一步如何？| 布達佩斯全球對話2025

觀察家研究基金會 2025年7月7日

重塑布雷頓森林體係

曾經以布雷頓森林體係為堅實後盾的全球秩序，如今正處於十字路口。隨著新興經濟力量的崛起和全球挑戰的增多，這些基礎機構必須從根本上為新時代注入新的活力，否則就有可能走向衰落。

現有架構能否適應多極化，還是我們正在見證西方主導的全球經濟治理的終結？

下一個全球秩序將建立在包容性合作的基礎上，還是建立在新舊大國之間根深蒂固的競爭之上？

世界是否正處於全球美元儲備貨幣重置的邊緣？這將對國際金融和美國實力產生何種影響？

演講嘉賓

菲利普·皮爾金頓，匈牙利國際事務研究所高級研究員，匈牙利

約翰·龐，亞太“一帶一路”倡議核心小組高級研究員，馬來西亞

主持人

維多利亞·帕諾娃，金磚國家專家委員會主席；高等經濟大學副校長；W20 Sherpa項目，俄羅斯
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

大家好，我叫維多利亞·帕諾娃，是今天關於重塑Maritan Boots的會議主持人。今天我們邀請到幾位非常有意思的演講嘉賓，他們知識淵博，可以就以下問題發表一些見解：我們的發展方向；美元的作用；以及布雷頓森林體係中的機構在多大程度上能夠適應當前的挑戰並實現預期目標。事實上，迄今為止，它們一直未能實現這些目標，我們看到了持續不斷的危機。
回溯到20年前，30年前。嗯，所以我們需要一些新的東西。
有一些“磚塊”提案。比如，建立一個新的開發銀行，建立應急儲備安排。還有人談論可以引入新的金融支付係統來對衝風險，並為世界提供更多替代方案。嗯，但如果能聽到我們傑出的演講嘉賓，談談他們對未來發展的願景，那就太好了。今天，我們邀請到了匈牙利國際事務研究所高級研究員菲利普·皮爾金頓，以及馬來西亞亞太地區“一帶一路”倡議核心小組高級研究員約翰·龐。歡迎菲利普，第一個問題是你的。那麽，你的想法是什麽？布雷頓森林體係有多重要？嗯，我們能否繼續將美元作為儲備貨幣，作為一個可行的選擇？

菲利普·皮爾金頓

我認為現在有相當有力的證據表明，美元作為儲備貨幣的地位不會維持太久。嗯，
我認為現在來看，美元作為儲備貨幣的地位可能很短。美元作為儲備貨幣的地位可能在2030年就終結。嗯，這聽起來可能很奇怪，甚至有點極端，但我們已經收到越來越多的信號，尤其是自從特朗普的“解放日”政策，比如關稅政策以來。當然，美元作為儲備貨幣地位的下降可以追溯到俄羅斯儲備資產被沒收。嗯，我想現在每個人都知道這一點，但我認為市場一度處於不確定狀態，而“解放日”政策在某種程度上把市場推到了崩潰的邊緣。所以，我們看到很多技術指標表明，美元正在失去其儲備貨幣地位。我隻說一兩個，以便大家有個大概的了解。金價如此之高的原因是各國央行正在大量購買黃金，而這又是因為他們不再購買美元了。另一個指標是，通常情況下，當股市下跌時，美元就會上漲，美國借貸利率也會下降，這被稱為金融市場的避險情緒。現在，這種情況已經消失了。已經消失了。嗯，另一個指標，通常情況下，當美國利率高企時，美元就會走強。現在這種情況已經不複存在了。所以，所有這些從金融市場背景來看——我自己也有金融市場背景——都表明，美元市場出現了一些重大問題，或者說，出現了問題。美元市場現在不像以前那樣運作了。嗯，有很多傳言說，美元的儲備貨幣地位已經終結了。嗯，我的意思是大西洋理事會
就此發表了一些看法。嗯，史蒂文·莫蘭，總統經濟顧問委員會主席，對儲備貨幣地位的作用提出了質疑。你現在可以在白宮網站上找到相關信息。所以，所有
力量似乎都在推動美元不再成為儲備貨幣。昨天我在彭博社看到一篇報道，稱出口商現在正在尋求美元以外的其他貨幣。所以，這真的越來越成為現實了。嗯，所以我認為這個問題主要出在美國方麵。
美國人想如何處理這個問題？嗯，他們已經忽略這個問題一段時間了。我不認為他們完全忽略了這個問題。我認為特朗普政府中的一些人

經濟團隊明白這一點。史蒂文·莫蘭確實明白這一點。我認為斯科特·貝桑特也明白這個問題，而且我認為國務院裏也有一些人明白這個問題，但他們還沒有決定如何解決這個問題。在我看來，除非很快出現重大變化，否則他們有兩個選擇：要麽讓美元根據市場情況調整，這實際上可能會非常劇烈，並且可能對美國經濟產生重大影響；要麽采取更謹慎的管理方式。我認為這就是某種新型布拉頓木材係統的問題所在。但這或許隻是提出了問題，而不是暫時解決問題。

主持人

好的。謝謝你，菲利普。約翰，現在輪到你了。嗯，菲利普提到，迄今為止，其中一個關鍵影響是關於他們對俄羅斯的製裁，以及它是如何運作的，以及允許使用美元。但我們知道，事實上，這給世界許多國家敲響了警鍾，因為他們明白，這很容易被用在他們身上。所以，這不是共同利益。它可能被用作武器，這是一個問題。但嗯，我們從曆史中知道，一係列問題逐漸引發了他們對美元使用本身的擔憂，菲利普提到，特朗普政府的某些部門對此表示理解。所以，我們可能正處於他們的接受階段，但美國政府會對此做出多大反應呢？嗯，我們知道特朗普對此非常嚴格，但背後的曆史是什麽？因為這是一個長期存在的問題，而且不僅僅是最近發生的事件，才導致了美元問題的出現。

約翰·龐

非常感謝，這當然不是一個突然出現的現象。我們現在的美元體係建立在國際秩序體係之上，它幾乎是該國際秩序的基礎，而隨著該秩序的瓦解，美元體係也在瓦解。嗯，例如在亞洲，人們非常熟悉1997年、1998年金融危機，當時的危機就是由於對美元的依賴而爆發的。它終結了一係列國家的非凡增長期，事實上，這些國家至今仍未從中恢複過來。你知道，這些危機有著長期的影響。呃，我說的是像印度尼西亞、馬來西亞、泰國這樣的國家。所以，那場危機在那裏被銘記，以至於外界並沒有低估它。所以，我認為，人們非常強烈地意識到美元體係的局限性，以及這種情況不可能永遠持續下去。我認為，真正出乎意料的是，該體係幾乎是自我毀滅，訴諸扣押俄羅斯的儲備，以及將Swift貨幣係統武器化。由此可見，這不僅僅是美元所依賴的國際秩序（單極秩序）結構終結的問題，更是一場管理能力和信譽的危機。
所以，這確實令人震驚，我認為這加速了美元的下跌。我不確定我們當中是否有人預料到，此刻坐在這裏，談論美元體係和美元儲備貨幣地位的終結，還有10到20年的時間。但我們現在處於這種奇怪的、不確定的狀態，因為人們在美元體係中投入了太多，並且非常依賴美元周邊資本市場的深度，對吧？全球貿易就是建立在這個基礎上的，而美元擁有無與倫比的深度和流動性。
所以，你知道人們喜歡說，別無選擇，但事實並非如此。盡管你知道，具體的和平談判舉措，以及我們尚未建立的實體，都很重要，但你知道人們看不到前進的道路。我認為菲利普當然會和我們討論一項提案，這項提案確實有著深厚的智識淵博，東盟人士確實會談論馬來西亞、中國、馬來西亞、印度尼西亞等國的貨幣貿易。所以，這正在發生，但係統性的解決方案還有很長的路要走。所以我們對下一步該怎麽做感到左右為難。是的，非常正確。

主持人：例如，在休息時間，各國貨幣的使用率已經達到了90%，這很有意思。您還提到了國際貨幣基金組織、世界銀行等國際組織領導層的勝任能力。我還記得，在2008年、2009年金融危機期間，人們又一次提出了“我們該如何繼續前進？為什麽領導層隻能由一部分國家承擔，而其他國家卻無法承擔？”的想法。當時人們對此抱怨不已。您十年前就告訴我們，其他國家不能被視為領導層的候選人，因為我們自己也遇到了問題，而你們更了解情況，所以你們可以指導我們。而如今，或者說在2008年，他們卻說我們

問題主要在於我們，所以隻有我們才能決定，領導力問題仍然存在，因此，
整個機構的問題在於，因為它們是這個問題的根本原因。那麽，它們可以改變嗎？我們是否需要新的機構？或者這些機構如何適應？這僅僅是領導力的問題，還是更係統性的問題？我知道你有一些
有趣的建議，也許你也可以為我們闡述一下。

菲利普·皮爾金頓
是的，我認為這兩件事是相關的。嗯，所以我們需要在這裏稍微回顧一下曆史。布雷頓森林體係建立於1944年，二戰結束時。當時，英國和美國代表約翰·凱恩斯和哈裏·德克斯特·懷特在新罕布什爾州的布雷頓森林進行了談判。凱恩斯希望建立一個多邊體係。事實上，有趣的是，這個多邊體係最終可能會包括蘇聯，但事實並非如此。英國也希望建立一個多邊體係，因為他們因為戰爭而負債累累。美國人想要一個以美元為基礎的體係，而我們最終也建立了這個體係。凱恩斯當時警告他們，這是一個錯誤，一旦美國經濟停止貿易順差，他們就會後悔當初沒有把美元作為儲備貨幣。事實證明，凱恩斯是對的。到了70年代，他們不得不放棄金本位。嗯，我們進入了一個奇怪的法定貨幣時代，這導致了美國的去工業化和經濟空心化。嗯，基本上這就是史蒂文·莫蘭在那場備受爭議的演講中所說的內容。嗯，這就是這些機構的曆史。國際貨幣基金組織和世界銀行實際上是按照凱恩斯的計劃設計的。嗯，但在最後一刻，他們把多邊安排換成了美元安排。所以理論上，這些機構可以圍繞某種多邊體係進行改革。凱恩斯也指出，我讀過44號文件，卡尼斯也指出，如果想要建立區域合作夥伴，就像磚塊一樣，那完全沒問題。他實際上,設想過類似的方案，我認為當時歐洲人, 甚至可能擁有自己的銀行機構，與國際貨幣基金組織（IMF）掛鉤，或者作為IMF的合作夥伴，諸如此類。所以，存在著無數種不同的關係，嗯，你可以說說，但目前有兩個問題，一個是製度問題，一個是政治問題。所以，我認為你提出的製度問題是，這些機構
現在還值得信賴嗎？IMF 還值得信賴嗎？或者世界銀行還值得信賴嗎？他們已經失去了對世界的信任。嗯，我認為過去幾年IMF的表現其實還不錯。我認為，它一直在喊冤，實際上，相當客觀。我通常不維護IMF的政策，但我認為，在過去幾年裏，盡管經濟一片混亂，但它一直相當清醒，沒有試圖操縱數據或類似的事情。這或許可以緩解我們麵臨的一些緊張局勢。所以，我想說，這反映了一些事實，正如他們所說的，這些機構不得不承認一些錯誤。嗯，但最終，如果他們想這樣做，他們能否獲得足夠的信任？或者對IMF。你可以建立一個完全不同的機構。但無論如何，我建議首先嚐試利用IMF。這個銀行或多邊銀行的提案實際上利用了IMF已有的某種機製，例如特別提款權。所以，把它融入到架構中並不難。我個人認為，應該重新利用這些機構，但如果它們對發展中國家失去了足夠多的信任，那麽就必須進行談判。但政治問題才是真正的問題，為了做出這個決定，我認為，實際上必須在中美兩國之間進行雙邊談判，因為兩國是造成巨大貿易失衡的經濟體，也是必須進行主要調整的兩個經濟體。其他國家可以順勢而為。所以，這是一個重要的政治問題。你能說服特朗普政府或未來的政府嗎？你能說服中國接受這個想法嗎？因為這些經濟體必須進行調整。呃，

主持人：那麽，您設想的改革後的機構新體係是什麽樣的？

菲利普·皮爾金頓：

我隻是在重新討論凱恩斯關於多邊貨幣體係的舊觀點，這實際上可以追溯到最初的布雷頓森林體係，每個人從1945年起就經曆過。

1971年。中國人喜歡固定匯率製度，實際上，我稍微跟中國人提了一下。他們喜歡這個想法。固定匯率製度，管理固定。所以，如果出現貿易失衡，貨幣實際上會被迫調整。這種情況一直持續到1971年。我們以前也經曆過。它非常有效。嗯，而且基本上，它會有很多補充措施。你不會再依賴美元了。所以，國家之間會有某種談判程序。舉個例子，現在美國和中國。美國對中國存在巨額貿易逆差。嗯，有兩種方法可以消除這種逆差，但最明顯的一種是允許美元貶值，或者通過談判讓美元貶值。這已經在發生了。美元正在貶值。所以市場無論如何都在調整。但銀行體係會通過引入內向投資（例如，對美國的外國直接投資）來補充。所以，它就像胡蘿卜加大棒的政策一樣。銀行體係既鼓勵對逆差國的投資，也強製實施調整，但其根本目的是消除任何顯著規模的貿易失衡。約翰，你如何看待這個想法？你認為作為東盟成員國，馬來西亞，它會走多遠？我認為，你知道，世界上大多數其他國家，尤其是發展中國家，隻要有一個解決方案，就對它持懷疑態度。所以，很明顯，現有的體係是不可持續的。它正在自身重壓下崩潰。如果不采取任何措施，我們實際上將任由崩潰來決定接下來會發生什麽，情況可能會變得非常糟糕。嗯，即使在最好的 情況下，我認為有些人認為某種多貨幣體係即將出現，但肯定是某種國際貨幣聯盟，
如果我們能就此達成一致，我認為會得到強有力的支持。隻是你知道，從務實的角度看，我們需要看到很多事情， 美國的情況會變得更糟，才會有政治意願來達成這一目標，而現實情況可能會給我們提供這樣的機會。非常感謝，我們參加了菲利普·皮林頓和約翰·龐的這次關於重新構想布雷頓森林體係的會議，希望它不會崩潰，我們能夠提出他們的新想法，也希望我們能更多地聽取專家的意見。非常感謝。

The Global Dollar at Risk—What Comes Next? | Budapest Global Dialogue 2025

Observer Research Foundation 2025年7月7日 

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bnkYHiTWwsE

Reimagining Bretton Woods

The global order, once firmly anchored by the Bretton Woods framework, is now at a crossroads. As new economic powers rise and global challenges multiply, these foundational institutions must be fundamentally revitalised for a new era, or risk sliding into obsolescence.

Can the existing architecture adapt to multipolarity, or are we witnessing the end of Western-led global economic governance?

Will the next global order be built on inclusive cooperation or entrenched competition between old and new powers?

Is the world on the cusp of a global dollar reserve-currency reset? What are the implications on international finance and American power?

Speakers

Philip Pilkington, Senior Research Fellow, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Hungary

John Pang,  Senior Fellow, Belt and Road Initiative Caucus for Asia Pacific,Malaysia

Moderator

Victoria Panova, Head, BRICS Expert Council; Vice Rector, HSE University; W20 Sherpa, Russia
<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

Hello, my name is Victoria Panova and uh
I'm the moderator for today's session on
reimagining maritan boots. Uh we're
hosting today a very interesting set of
speakers who are very knowledgeable and
also could shed some light on uh where
we are going, what is the role of the
dollar, how much the current
Brettonwoods institutions
would be able to adapt to current
challenges and live up to the
expectations which they failed
consistently in fact so far and we saw
it with a numerous crisis uh ongoing.
going take it 20 years back, 30 years
back. Um, so we need something new.
There are some bricks proposals. There
is a uh bricks created new development
bank uh contingent reserve arrangements.
there are talks of their uh new
financial payment system that could be
introduced in order to hedge some risks
and um offer more alternatives to to the
world. Uh but it would be really good to
hear from our prominent speakers on what
is their vision of where do we go. So
today with us we have uh Philip
Pilkington, senior research fellow at
the Hungarian Institute of International
Affairs and John Pang, senior fellow of the Bel
and Road Initiative Caucus of Forasia
Pacific Malaysia. Welcome and Philillip
the question first question is yours. So
what's your idea? How relevant is Breton
Woods? Uh, can we continue just with the
dollar as a reserve currency as a viable
option?

Philip Pilkington

I think there's pretty strong evidence
now that the dollar is not going to be
the reserve currency for very long. Um,
I think the time horizon on it is
actually probably quite short now.
Potentially the end of the reserve
currency by maybe 2030. Um that might
sound quite strange, maybe quite
extreme, but we've got we've got
increasing signals of this, especially
since um Trump's liberation day policies
as tariff policies. Of course, the um
fall of the dollar as the reserve
currency goes back to the seizure of the
Russian reserve assets. Um I think
everyone knows that now, but the uh I
think the markets were in limbo for a
little bit and liberation day kind of
pushed the markets over the edge. And so
we're seeing a lot of technical tech
technical indicators um that the dollar
is losing its status as a reserve
currency. I'll just say one or two just
so people have a sense. The reason the
gold price is so high is because central
banks are buying up gold and that's
because they're not buying dollars
anymore. Another indicator is that um
usually when equity markets go down, US
dollar goes up and US borrowing rates go
down and that's called the flight to
safety in financial markets. That's
gone. That's gone. Um, another indicator
that's gone is usually when interest
rates are high in the US, the dollar
strengthens. Not anymore. So, all these
things from a financial markets
background, I have a financial markets
background myself, um, indicate that
something
has gone significantly uh, wrong or it's
uh, in in US dollar markets. They're
just not operating as they used to. Um,
there's plenty of murmurss that the US
dollar reserve currency status is
finished. both um I mean the Atlantic
Council put out something on it. Uh
Steven Moran who was the chief of um the
head of the chair uh chairperson of
economic adviserss to the president uh
has question the role of the reserve uh
status. You can find it on the white
house website now. So all the all the
forces seem to be militating that um
that the US dollar is not going to be
the reserve status. There's one more I
saw on Bloomberg yesterday, a report
that exporters were asking for
alternative currencies rather than the
dollar now. So, it's really getting it's
getting real. Um, and so the question I
think is mainly on the American side.
What do the Americans want to do with
this? Um, they've ignored it now for
some time. I wouldn't say they've
completely ignored it. I think some
people on the Trump economic team
understand it. Steven Moran does
understand it. I think Scott Bessant
understands the problem as well and I
think there's some people at the state
department as well who understand the
problem but um they haven't made a
decision on what to do about it and to
my mind unless something significant
changes soon uh they have two choices
they can either let the US dollar adjust
by the market which will be could be
quite uh violent actually and it could
have major ramifications for the United
States economy or they can take a more
ma managed approach and I think That's
where um that's where the question of
some sort of new Bratton wood system
comes in. But perhaps that kind of
raises the the issue rather than
tackling it for the moment. 

Moderator

Okay. Thank you, Philillip. John, now to you. Uh
Philip has mentioned that one of the key
ramifications so far was about their you
know sanctions against Russia and how it
swift was used and uh the allowance to
use dollar. But we know and in fact this
was a wakeup call for many countries
around the world because they understood
this could be applied to them easily. So
it's not a common good. It could be used
as a weapon and it's a problem. But uh
we know from history that
there was a gradual um set of problems
that were bringing up their issue of the
use of dollar as such and uh Philip
mentioned that there is understanding in
their in in some part of administration
of Trump. So we are living in their of
age of acceptance probably but how much
uh US administration would be uh
reacting to that and uh we know Trump
was quite rigorous about that but so
what's the history behind that because
it's a long-term prog uh problem and
it's not just about the recent events
that brought the problem of dollar on
site it it certainly 

John Pang

thank you very much it certainly isn't n't a uh phenomenon
that just popped up. It's um the dollar
system as as we have it is based on
a system of international order and it's
almost the basis of that international
order and it's coming apart as that
order is coming apart. Um but um in Asia
for example uh in in uh people are very
familiar with what happened in the
1997, 98 uh crisis as a result of dependency on
the dollar. It put an end to an
extraordinary period of growth for a an
entire set of countries that in in fact
have not recovered from that. you know
these crises have long-term consequences. Uh I'm talking about
countries like Indonesia, Malaysia,
Thailand. So that crisis is remembered
there to an extent that it's not it's
underestimated outside. So there's I think very strong
awareness of the limitations of the
dollar system and that this can't go on
forever. I think what was what's been
quite unexpected is the almost the
self-sabotage of the of the system, the
resort to the seizure of uh Russian uh
reserves, the weaponization of Swift.
There you see that it's not just a
problem of the end of the structure the
international order the uniolar order
underlying the dollar but a crisis of
competence in the management and
credibility in the management of this.
So uh that has been quite quite shocking
and I think it's accelerated the
decline. I'm not sure any of us expected
to be sitting here right at this point
talking about 10 to 20 year to the end
of the dollar system the dollar's
reserve currency status but here we are in um ne nevertheless
we're in this strange we're in this
limbo state because people have invested
so to speak so much in the dollar system
and depend so much on the depth of the
capital markets around around the
dollar, right? Global trade is based on
this and the dollar has an unmatched uh
depth and uh and uh liquidity.
So there's no you know people like to
say there's no alternative to this where
is it uh despite you know particular
peacemeal moves um in in bricks and
these are important we haven't set up
that you know people don't see a path
forward and I think of course Philip is
going to talk to us about a a proposal
and indeed is a proposal with a great
intellectual pedigree um in ASEAN people
do talk about Malaysia China for
example, Malaysia, Indonesia about own
currency trade. So that's that's that's
on but a systemic solution is some way
um away. So we're in a kind of uh limbo
about where we go next. Yeah, very
right. 

Moderator

In breaks for example, national
currencies used reached 90% already and
this is uh quite interesting. You also
mentioned the competence of the
leadership of international
organizations like IMF, like World Bank
and I remember uh back in um uh 2008
2009 during the crisis when there was a
renewed wave of like how should we go
on? So why there should be leadership
just from one set of countries and it's
not open to the rest. uh the idea and
and people were complaining. You were
telling us 10 years before that other
countries cannot be seen as candidates
for leadership because we had problems
and you knew better so you could direct
us. Nowadays or 2008 they were saying we
have the problem primarily so only we
can decide on that and the leadership
problem still stays there and as such
the whole problem of institutions
because they are underlying for uh you
know for this problem. So could they be
altered at all? How uh or do we need new
institutions or could those adapt just
is it just question of leadership or
it's more systemic and I know you had
some interesting proposals maybe you
also could lay it down for us. 

Philip Pilkington
Yeah, I think the two things are related. Um so
there need we need to go into a tiny bit
of history here. when the when the
Bretonwoods systems were being set up in
1944 at the end of World War II um they
were negotiated at Bretonwoods in New
Hampshire um by John Mayor Kanes and
Harry Dexter White the British and the
American delegates respectively um John
Mayor Kanes wanted a multilateral system
and actually interestingly the
multilateral system probably would have
ended up including the Soviet Union but
it wasn't um Britain wanted a
multilateral system as well because they
were in debt heavily in debt because of
the war. The Americans wanted a dollar
backed system and that's what we ended
up with. Um Canes warned them at the
time that it was a mistake and once the
American economy stopped running trade
surpluses, it would um wish that they
hadn't uh taken on the the dollar as the
reserve currency. Turned out to be right
by the 70s they had to go off the gold
standard. And um we've been in a strange
period of fiat fiat currency since which
has led to the de-industrialization of
the United States and the hollowing out
of its economy. Um basically this is
what Steven Moran actually said in the
speech that was so controversial. Um so
that's the that's the history of those
institutions. The the IMF and the World
Bank were actually designed on Keynes's
plan. Um but then at the last minute
they kind of switched out the
multilateral arrangement for a US dollar
arrangement. So in theory those
institutions can be reformed um around
the uh around some sort of multilateral
system. Now Kanes also notes I read the
papers from 44 and Kanees also notes
that it would be absolutely fine if
there wanted to be regional uh partners
as well like bricks. he actually
envvisaged something like that for the
Europeans I think at the time and that
they might even have their own bank
institution that's tied at the you know
under the IMF or as a partner with the
IMF or something like that. So there's a
million different relationships um you
can you can come to the but the two
questions here are institutional and
political at the moment. So the
institutional question I think you kind
of raised it are these institutions
actually trustworthy anymore? Is the IMF
trustworthy anymore? or is the World
Bank trustworthy anymore? They've lost
an awful lot of trust in the world. Um,
I think the IMF in the past few years
has actually not been so bad. I think
it's been calling bulls and strikes
pretty uh pretty objectively actually.
I'm not usually a defender of IMF
policies, but I think actually in the
past couple of years with all the
economic chaos, it's it's been fairly
clearheaded and it hasn't tried to
manipulate data or anything like that.
It could have around some of the
tensions that we've had. So I would say
that there's some um I think I think
that reflects the fact that the the
institutions had to eat crow as they say
in America a little bit. Um but it's
ultimately can they can they get a
sufficient trust if they wanted to do it
or in the IMF. You could just set up a
completely alternative institution. But
I I I wouldn't I'd say try and use the
IMF first of all anyway. the the the
proposal the bank or the multilateral
proposal effectively uses kind of a a a
mechanism like special drawing rights
that the um IMF already has. So it
wouldn't be that hard to build it build
it into the architecture. So personally
I think reuse the institutions but if if
they've lost a sufficient amount of
trust in the developing world then that
would have to be negotiated. But the
political question is the real one and
that's that um in order to make this
decision I think the decision will
actually have to be made on a bilateral
basis between the Chinese and the
Americans effectively because they're
the ones that run the big trade
imbalances and they're the two economies
that that are going to have to do the
main adjustment. Everyone else can kind
of go along for the ride. So that's the
big political question. Can you sell the
Trump administration or a future
administration? And can you sell the
Chinese on this idea? Because those are
the economies that'll have to adjust.
And uh 

Moderator
so what's their what is envisioned by you as a possible new
system with the reformed institutions?
Philip Pilkington

So I'm just rehashing Keynes old idea of
the bankore um multilateral currency
system and that's effectively it goes
back to the original Breton Woods that
everybody experienced from 1945 up until
1971. Uh fixed exchange rate system uh
which the Chinese like actually um I
floated it a little bit to the Chinese.
They like that idea. fixed exchange rate
system, managed managed fixed. So, um,
currencies are effectively forced to
adjust if there's trade imbalances. This
was the case up until 1971. We've lived
through this before. It's pretty
functional. Um, and basically, it would
have a lot of supplements around that
though. You wouldn't be relying on the
dollar anymore. So, there'd be um
there'd be kind of negotiated processes
between uh countries. So just to take
one example, America and China at the
moment. Massive trade deficit America is
running with China. Um there's two ways
to allow well there's a couple of ways
to eliminate that but the most obvious
one is to allow the uh or to talk the US
dollar down. It's already happening. The
US dollar is falling. So the market is
adjusting anyway. But the bank the
bankor system would supplement that with
inward for example foreign direct
investment into America. So it has all
these it's a kind of carrot and sticks
approach. the the bankor system both
encourages investment in the deficit
country and it also kind of imposes
adjustments but the idea is basically to
eliminate trade imbalances of any
significant size. John what do you take
of this idea do you think it as ASEAN
members Malaysia uh how far it would go?
I think um you know most of the rest of
the world and especially developing u
countries uh are agnostic about you know
the the solution so long as there is
one. So what's clear is that the
existing one is not sustainable. It's
collapsing under its own weight.
um if nothing is done uh we will we're
going to effectively let the collapse
determine what what happens and it could
get really ugly. Um even on the best
sort of case scenario people I think
some people see a kind of multicurrency
system um coming to be but certainly a
kind of uh international currency union
where we could agree on this I think
would be very strongly um supported.
It's just that you know pragmatically
one would need to see a lot things would
have to get a lot worse for the US
before the political will is is is
mustered uh to come to this and it could
get you know reality could supply us
with with that with that circumstance.
Thank you so much and we were with you
for this session of reimagining Bretton
Woods with uh Philip Pilington and John
Pang and let's hope that it will not
collapse and it would not be too late
before we can come with their new ideas
and let's listen to our experts more.
Thank you so much.