風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
Victor Hanson 屠殺與文化 西方強國崛起中的裏程碑式戰役
屠殺與文化：西方強國崛起中的裏程碑式戰役
作者：維克多·戴維斯·漢森（Victor Davis Hanson），2002年8月27日
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
by Victor Davis Hanson (Author) Aug. 27 2002
維克多·戴維斯·漢森考察了從古至今的九場裏程碑式戰役——從寡不敵眾的希臘人徹底擊敗薛西斯奴隸軍隊的薩拉米斯戰役，到科爾特斯征服墨西哥，再到春節攻勢——解釋了西方軍隊為何是世界上最具殺傷力和作戰效率的軍隊。
漢森拋開地理或先進技術等流行解釋，認為正是西方的文化和價值觀——持不同政見的傳統、對創造力和適應力的重視以及公民意識——才使得西方始終擁有更強大的武器和士兵。 《屠殺與文化》以引人入勝的戰爭敘事和平衡的視角，避免了簡單的必勝主義，展現了軍隊與孕育它們的文化密不可分，並解釋了自由文化孕育的軍隊為何始終占據優勢。
人工智能概覽
+4
維克多·戴維斯·漢森的《屠殺與文化》是一部引人入勝的曆史分析著作，探討了西方軍隊為何在曆史上如此高效。據亞馬遜加拿大站介紹，該書認為西方的軍事優勢源於文化因素，而非僅僅源於技術進步。漢森探討了從古代到春節攻勢的九場裏程碑式戰役，以闡明自由、個人主義和理性主義等西方價值觀如何造就了卓越的軍事實力。
本書論點和主題的主要方麵：
文化影響：
漢森認為，強調個人主動性、自由探索和民主理想的西方文化，是西方軍事成功的關鍵驅動力。
裏程碑式戰役：
本書分析了曆史上的關鍵戰役，展現了西方軍隊如何始終戰勝對手，尤其是在勝算渺茫的情況下。
超越科技：
漢森在承認科技作用的同時，也強調西方軍隊的戰鬥力也植根於其文化價值觀以及他們組織和激勵士兵的方式。
西方持久的優勢：
漢森認為，西方軍事主導地位源於其獨特的文化和製度框架，這種框架促成了其卓越軍事能力的發展。
總而言之，《屠殺與文化》一書以細致入微、發人深省的視角審視了西方軍事力量的崛起，指出西方價值觀在塑造軍事曆史進程中發揮了至關重要的作用。
產品描述
書評
“生動……雄心勃勃……挑戰讀者拓寬視野，審視自己的假設……[漢森] 的論述遠勝於論證本身。”——《紐約時報書評》
“沒有人能比他更引人入勝地展現戰爭如何反映和影響發動戰爭的社會，包括我們自己的社會。”——《國家評論》
“漢森……正在成為美國最知名的曆史學家之一……[《大屠殺與文化》] 隻會提升他的聲譽。”——約翰·基根，《每日電訊報》（倫敦）
“維克多·戴維斯·漢森憑借另一部通俗易懂、淺顯易懂的作品再次引發爭議。他與約翰·基根並列為最引人入勝的戰爭史學家。” ——《婦女與戰爭》作者 Jean Bethke Elshtain
封底
維克多·戴維斯·漢森 (Victor Davis Hanson) 考察了從古至今九場具有裏程碑意義的戰役——從寡不敵眾的希臘人徹底擊敗薛西斯奴隸軍隊的薩拉米斯戰役，到科爾特斯征服墨西哥，再到春節攻勢——解釋了西方軍隊為何是世界上最具殺傷力和戰鬥力的軍隊。
漢森拋開地理或先進技術等流行解釋，認為正是西方文化和價值觀——持不同政見的傳統、對創造力和適應力的重視以及公民意識——才持續造就了更優秀的武器和士兵。《屠殺與文化》以引人入勝的戰役敘事和平衡的視角，避免了簡單的必勝信念，展現了軍隊與孕育它們的文化密不可分，並解釋了為什麽自由文化孕育的軍隊始終占據優勢。
關於作者
維克多·戴維斯·漢森是斯坦福大學胡佛研究所馬丁和伊利·安德森古典文學和軍事史高級駐留研究員、加州州立大學弗雷斯諾分校古典文學名譽教授，以及《論壇媒體服務》的全國專欄作家。他也是希爾斯代爾學院韋恩和瑪西婭·布斯克傑出曆史研究員，每年秋季學期在該學院教授軍事史和古典文化課程。他著有《戰爭之魂》、《戰爭之秋》和《戰爭之漣漪》，均由Anchor Books出版。他的最新著作是《救世主將軍》（Bloomsbury出版社，2013年）。漢森曾榮獲
他於2007年獲得美國國家人文獎章，於2008年獲得布拉德利獎，並於2015年獲得威廉·F·巴克利獎，於2006年獲得克萊蒙特研究所政治家風度獎，以及於2002年獲得埃裏克·布雷德爾觀點新聞獎。他平時生活在加州塞爾瑪的農場（他於1953年出生）和斯坦福校園之間。
摘錄。© 經許可轉載。保留所有權利。
第一
西方為何獲勝
號角吹響，士兵們拿起武器衝鋒陷陣。他們衝鋒越發迅猛，發出一聲大喊，然後各自向營地奔去。但野蠻人的大軍卻被巨大的恐懼所籠罩；西裏西亞女王駕著馬車倉皇而逃，市場上的人們也扔下貨物，倉皇逃竄。就在這時，希臘人放聲大笑，逼近了營地。西裏西亞女王對方陣的輝煌壯麗和井然有序讚歎不已；居魯士則欣喜地看到蠻族人看到希臘人時所展現出的驚恐之色。
——色諾芬，《遠征記》（1.2.16-18）
開明的暴徒
即使是那些積極進取的殺手的困境也能說明一些問題。公元前401年夏天，小居魯士雇傭了10700名希臘重裝步兵——這些步兵全副武裝，手持長矛、盾牌和盔甲——來幫助他鞏固波斯王位。這些新兵大多是之前27年伯羅奔尼撒戰爭（公元前431-404年）中久經沙場的老兵。作為雇傭兵，他們來自整個希臘語世界。其中許多人是嗜殺成性的叛徒和流亡者。無論是接近青春期的少年，還是依然健壯的中年人，都應征入伍領取報酬。在幾乎摧毀希臘世界的內戰餘波中，希臘人精疲力竭，許多人失業，不惜一切代價尋找殺手這份高薪工作。然而，隊伍中也有一些享有特權的哲學和演說家，他們與這些窮困潦倒的雇傭兵並肩作戰，向亞洲進軍——其中既有像蘇格拉底的學生色諾芬和波奧蒂亞將軍普羅克塞努斯這樣的貴族，也有醫生、職業軍官、未來的殖民者，以及居魯士王子富有的希臘朋友。
在成功向東行進1500多英裏，擊潰所有敵軍後，希臘人在巴比倫北部的庫納克薩戰役中突破了波斯皇家防線。摧毀波斯軍隊一翼的代價，是一名希臘重裝步兵被箭射傷。然而，在波斯王位爭奪戰的巔峰之戰中，萬裏長征的勝利卻付諸東流。他們的雇主居魯士魯莽地追擊其弟阿塔薛西斯，越過戰線，被波斯禁衛軍斬首。
突然麵對大批敵人和充滿敵意的前盟友，他們遠離家鄉，既沒有金錢、向導、糧食，也沒有未來的國王，也沒有足夠的騎兵或遠程部隊，這些孤兒寡母的希臘遠征步兵最終投票拒絕向波斯君主投降。相反，他們準備一路殺回希臘世界。這段穿越亞洲向北，最終抵達黑海沿岸的殘酷旅程，構成了色諾芬《遠征記》（《向內陸進軍》）的核心內容，作者本人正是撤退萬裏長征的領導者之一。
盡管被成千上萬的敵人包圍，原有的將軍被俘斬首，被迫穿越二十多個不同民族的爭奪之地，困於雪堆、險峻的山口和缺水的草原，飽受凍傷、營養不良和頻繁生病之苦，還要與各種野蠻的部落作戰，希臘人最終安全抵達了黑海——這距離他們離開家園不到一年半。他們擊潰了途中所有亞洲敵對勢力。六人中有五人活著出來，大多數陣亡者並非死於戰鬥，而是葬身亞美尼亞的冰雪之中。
在嚴酷的考驗中，一萬人被陶奇人驚呆了，他們的婦女和兒童從村子高聳的懸崖上跳下，舉行集體自殺的儀式。他們也同樣對野蠻的白皮膚莫西諾伊奇人感到困惑，他們竟然在公共場合公開進行性交。卡利比亞人帶著被殺對手的首級行軍。就連波斯皇家軍隊也顯得有些奇怪；追擊的步兵，有時被軍官鞭笞，在希臘方陣的第一次猛攻下就潰不成軍。《遠征記》最終震撼讀者的，不僅僅是希臘軍隊的勇氣、技巧和殘暴——畢竟，他們在亞洲除了殺戮和金錢之外，別無他求——而是這支“萬人騎兵”與他們所對抗的勇敢部落之間巨大的文化鴻溝。
在地中海，還有哪裏能讓哲學家和修辭學學者列隊行進，與殺戮者並肩作戰，一頭紮進敵人的血肉？還有哪裏能讓每個士兵都感到與軍隊中的其他人平等——或者至少認為自己是自由的，能夠掌控一切？
自己的命運？古代世界上還有哪支軍隊選舉自己的領袖？如此小規模的軍隊，如何通過選舉委員會，在成千上萬的敵軍中，跋涉數千英裏，返回故鄉？
這支既是“行軍民主”又是雇傭軍的萬民軍，離開庫納克薩戰場後，士兵們例行舉行集會，就其選舉領袖的提議進行投票。在危機時刻，他們會組建臨時委員會，以確保有足夠的弓箭手、騎兵和醫務兵。當麵臨各種突如其來的自然和人為挑戰——無法通行的河流、糧食匱乏以及陌生的部落敵人——時，他們會召開會議，討論新戰術、製造新武器，並調整組織架構。民選將軍與士兵並肩作戰，並仔細地提供財政支出報告。
士兵們尋求與敵人進行麵對麵的衝擊性戰鬥。所有人都認同嚴格紀律的必要性，並盡可能並肩作戰。盡管他們自身騎兵嚴重短缺，但他們對大王的騎兵卻唯唯諾諾。“在戰鬥中，沒有人死於馬的咬傷或踢傷，”色諾芬提醒他那些被圍困的步兵（《遠征記》3.2.19）。抵達黑海沿岸後，這支萬人軍對其領導層在過去一年中的表現進行了司法調查和審計，而心懷不滿的個人則自由投票決定分頭返回家園。一位卑微的阿卡迪亞牧羊人與蘇格拉底的學生、即將成為從道德哲學到古雅典收入潛力等各領域著作的貴族色諾芬擁有同樣的投票權。
想象一個相當於波斯萬人軍的組織是不可能的。想象一下，波斯國王的精銳重步兵——所謂的“不朽者”或“阿姆塔卡”，同樣有 10,000 人——在數量上以十比一處於劣勢，被切斷並丟棄在希臘，從伯羅奔尼撒半島行軍到色薩利，在到達安全的赫勒斯滂海峽時，擊敗了他們入侵的每個希臘城邦數量上占優勢的方陣。曆史提供了一個更悲慘的真實案例：公元前 479 年，波斯將軍馬多尼烏斯的龐大入侵軍隊在普拉提亞戰役中被數量上處於劣勢的希臘人擊敗，隨後被迫撤退到北部 300 英裏處，穿過色薩利和色雷斯。盡管軍隊規模龐大，而且沒有任何有組織的追擊，但很少有波斯人返回家園。他們顯然沒有一萬人。他們的國王很久以前就拋棄了他們；在薩拉米斯戰役戰敗後，薛西斯於前一年秋天撤回了安全的宮廷。
技術優勢本身並不能解釋希臘人取得的奇跡般的成就，盡管色諾芬曾在多處指出，這支萬人大軍沉重的青銅、木材和鐵質盔甲是亞洲任何武器都無法比擬的。也沒有證據表明希臘人本質上與阿塔薛西斯國王的士兵“不同”。後來，歐洲人種族優越於波斯人的偽科學觀點在當時的希臘人中並不普遍。盡管這支萬人大軍是經驗豐富的雇傭兵，熱衷於掠奪和偷竊，但他們並不比當時其他劫掠者更野蠻或好戰；更不用說他們比在亞洲遇到的部落更仁慈或更有道德了。希臘宗教並不推崇以德報怨，也不認為戰爭本身是不正常的或不道德的。氣候、地理和自然資源對我們並無多大幫助。事實上，色諾芬的士兵們隻能羨慕小亞細亞的居民，因為他們擁有的可耕地和豐富的自然資源與希臘貧瘠的土地形成了鮮明對比。他們甚至警告士兵，任何向東遷移的希臘人，在如此富饒的自然景觀中，都可能變成遲鈍的“食蓮者”。
然而，《遠征記》明確指出，希臘人的作戰方式與他們的對手截然不同，而這些獨特的希臘式戰鬥特征——個人自由意識、卓越的紀律、無與倫比的武器、平等的友愛精神、個人主動性、持續的戰術適應和靈活性、對重裝步兵突擊戰的偏愛——本身就是整個希臘文化的殺戮紅利。希臘人獨特的殺戮方式源於協商一致的政府、中產階級的平等、對軍事事務的民事審計、與宗教無關的政治、自由和個人主義以及理性主義。萬人行的嚴酷考驗，在陷入困境、瀕臨滅絕之際，喚醒了所有希臘士兵與生俱來的城邦精神，他們在戰場上如同各自城邦的平民一般行事。
在萬人行之後，同樣殘酷的歐洲將以某種形式重現。
入侵者：阿格西勞斯和他的斯巴達人、雇傭兵隊長查理斯、亞曆山大大帝、尤利烏斯·凱撒及其數個世紀的軍團統治地位、十字軍、埃爾南·科爾特斯、亞洲海域的葡萄牙探險家、印度和非洲的英國紅衣軍，以及其他眾多盜賊、海盜、殖民者、雇傭兵、帝國主義者和探險家。隨後的大多數西方遠征軍寡不敵眾，而且往往部署在遠離家鄉的地方。盡管如此，他們還是戰勝了數量上占優勢的敵人，並在不同程度上借鑒了西方文化的元素，無情地屠殺對手。
在歐洲悠久的軍事實踐史上，過去2500年來，西方軍隊的主要軍事擔憂幾乎是另一支西方軍隊。在馬拉鬆戰役（公元前490年）中，幾乎沒有希臘人陣亡。後來在尼米亞和科羅尼亞（公元前394年）的希臘戰爭中，數千人喪生。後期的希波戰爭（公元前480-479年）中，希臘人的死亡人數相對較少。希臘城邦之間的伯羅奔尼撒戰爭（公元前431-404年）是一場慘烈的血戰。亞曆山大本人在亞洲屠殺的歐洲人比大流士三世統治下的數十萬波斯人還要多。羅馬內戰幾乎摧毀了這個共和國，其程度甚至比漢尼拔都未曾有過。滑鐵盧戰役、索姆河戰役和奧馬哈海灘戰役，都進一步印證了西方人與西方人相遇時必然發生的浩劫。
本書試圖解釋這一切為何如此，為何西方人如此善於利用其文明去殺戮他人——如此殘酷地交戰，卻往往毫發無損。過去、現在和未來，世界軍事活力的故事最終是對西方武器威力的探究。戰爭學者或許會對如此廣泛的概括感到不滿。大學裏的學者會認為這種論斷帶有沙文主義色彩，甚至更糟——因此他們會列舉從溫泉關到小巨角戰役的每一個例外來反駁。公眾本身大多並未意識到其文化自身在武器方麵獨特而持續的殺傷力。然而，在過去的2500年裏——即使在“軍事革命”之前的黑暗時代，——這並非僅僅是文藝複興、歐洲人發現美洲或工業革命的結果——西方戰爭中就存在著一種獨特的實踐，一種共同的基礎和持續的作戰方式，這使得歐洲人成為文明史上最致命的士兵。
戰爭的首要地位
戰爭作為文化
我在此並不關心歐洲軍事文化在道德上是否優於非西方文化，或者是否比非西方文化更加糟糕。征服者們在墨西哥城的大金字塔上終結了活人祭祀和酷刑，他們離開的是一個飽受宗教裁判所和殘酷的收複失地運動摧殘的社會，身後留下了一個病態殘破、幾近毀滅的新大陸。我也不太關心特定戰爭的正義性——秘魯的皮薩羅（他平靜地宣布“印加時代結束了”）是否比他那些殺戮成性的印加敵人更好或更壞，印度是否從英國殖民統治中遭受了巨大的苦難或獲得了些許的利益，日本人轟炸珍珠港或美國人焚毀東京是否有正當理由。我好奇的並非西方人內心的黑暗，而是他們的戰鬥能力——特別是他們的軍事實力如何反映出更廣泛的社會、經濟、政治和文化實踐，而這些實踐本身似乎與戰爭無關。
價值觀與戰爭之間的聯係並非原創，而是源遠流長。希臘曆史學家的敘事以戰爭為中心，幾乎總是試圖從文化中汲取教訓。在修昔底德所著的伯羅奔尼撒戰爭史中，大約2500年前，斯巴達將軍布拉西達斯對伊利裏亞和馬其頓部落的軍事實力不屑一顧，因為他們與他的斯巴達重裝步兵交鋒。布拉西達斯在談到這些野蠻的對手時說，這些人缺乏紀律，因此無法承受衝擊性戰鬥。“就像所有暴民一樣”，當他們麵對紀律嚴明的士兵冷酷的鐵甲時，他們一改以往令人畏懼的姿態，發出驚恐的叫喊。為什麽會這樣？因為正如布拉西達斯繼續告訴他的士兵們的那樣，這樣的部落是“多數人統治少數人，而是少數人統治多數人”的文化的產物（《修昔底德》4.126）。
與這些由喊叫著“野蠻人”組成的龐大軍隊形成對比的是，他們沒有協商一致的政府，也沒有成文的憲法——“體型龐大，令人難以忍受的大聲叫喊，以及揮舞武器的可怕景象”——布拉西達斯向他的士兵們保證：“像你們這樣的國家的公民，堅守陣地。”請注意，布拉西達斯對膚色、種族或宗教隻字未提。相反，他簡單地將軍事紀律、列隊作戰和對突擊戰的偏好與民意一致的政府的存在聯係起來，這種政府賦予了方陣中的普通步兵一種平等感和優於敵人的精神。
米斯。無論我們是否想將布拉西達斯自私自利地描繪的狂熱部落成員視為西方沙文主義的“建構”或“虛構”，也無論我們是否想爭論他筆下的斯巴達寡頭政治是否是一個基礎廣泛的政府，亦或批評歐洲步兵經常遭到更敏捷的遊擊隊伏擊和伏擊，毋庸置疑的是，在實行憲政統治的希臘城邦中，存在著訓練有素的重裝步兵的傳統，而北方的部落民族中卻沒有這種傳統。
在分析文化與衝突時，我們為什麽要專注於幾個小時的戰鬥和普通士兵的戰鬥經驗，而不是史詩般的戰爭，以及它們蘊含的宏偉戰略、戰術機動和廣闊的戰場行動，而這些更適合進行細致的社會和文化闡釋？軍事史絕不能偏離殺戮的悲劇故事，而殺戮最終隻能在戰鬥中發生。軍隊作戰的文化決定了成千上萬幾乎無辜的年輕人在預定的戰鬥時間後是生是死。資本主義或公民軍國主義之類的抽象概念在戰爭麵前幾乎不再抽象，而是具體的現實，最終決定了勒班陀戰役中二十多歲的土耳其農民是幸存下來，還是成千上萬地被魚叉刺死，決定了雅典的鞋匠和製革工人在薩拉米斯屠殺之後是安全返回家園，還是被衝到阿提卡海岸，成為一塊塊的肉塊。
Carnage and Culture: Landmark Battles in the Rise to Western Power
Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values–the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship–which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage.
- Hanson argues that Western culture, with its emphasis on individual initiative, free inquiry, and democratic ideals, has been a key driver of Western military success.
- The book analyzes key battles across history to demonstrate how Western armies have consistently triumphed over opponents, often against long odds.
- While acknowledging the role of technology, Hanson emphasizes that Western armies' effectiveness is also rooted in their cultural values and the way they organize and motivate soldiers.
- Hanson argues that Western military dominance is a result of a unique cultural and institutional framework that has allowed for the development of superior military capabilities.
“No one offers a more compelling picture of how wars reflect and affect the societies, including our own, that wage them.” —National Review
“Hanson . . . is becoming one of the best-known historians in America . . . [Carnage and Culture] can only enhance his reputation.” —John Keegan, Daily Telegraph (London)
“Victor Davis Hanson is courting controversy again with another highly readable, lucid work. Together with John Keegan, he is our most interesting historian of war.” —Jean Bethke Elshtain, author of Women and War
From the Back Cover
Looking beyond popular explanations such as geography or superior technology, Hanson argues that it is in fact Western culture and values-the tradition of dissent, the value placed on inventiveness and adaptation, the concept of citizenship-which have consistently produced superior arms and soldiers. Offering riveting battle narratives and a balanced perspective that avoids simple triumphalism, Carnage and Culture demonstrates how armies cannot be separated from the cultures that produce them and explains why an army produced by a free culture will always have the advantage.
About the Author
Excerpt. © Reprinted by permission. All rights reserved.
Why the West Has Won
When the trumpet sounded, the soldiers took up their arms and went out. As they charged faster and faster, they gave a loud cry, and on their own broke into a run toward the camp. But a great fear took hold of the barbarian hosts; the Cilician queen fled outright in her carriage, and those in the market threw down their wares and also took to flight. At that point, the Greeks in great laughter approached the camp. And the Cilician queen was filled with admiration at the brilliant spectacle and order of the phalanx; and Cyrus was delighted to see the abject terror of the barbarians when they saw the Greeks.
--Xenophon, Anabasis (1.2.16-18)
ENLIGHTENED THUGS
EVEN THE PLIGHT of enterprising killers can tell us something. In the summer of 401 b.c., 10,700 Greek hoplite soldiers--infantrymen heavily armed with spear, shield, and body armor--were hired by Cyrus the Younger to help press his claim to the Persian throne. The recruits were in large part battle-hardened veterans of the prior twenty-seven-year Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.). As mercenaries, they were mustered from throughout the Greek-speaking world. Many were murderous renegades and exiles. Both near adolescents and the still hale in late middle age enlisted for pay. Large numbers were unemployed and desperate at any cost for lucrative work as killers in the exhausted aftermath of the internecine war that had nearly ruined the Greek world. Yet there were also a few privileged students of philosophy and oratory in the ranks, who would march into Asia side by side these destitute mercenaries--aristocrats like Xenophon, student of Socrates, and Proxenus, the Boeotian general, as well as physicians, professional officers, would-be colonists, and wealthy Greek friends of Prince Cyrus.
After a successful eastward march of more than 1,500 miles that scattered all opposition, the Greeks smashed through the royal Persian line at the battle of Cunaxa, north of Babylon. The price for destroying an entire wing of the Persian army was a single Greek hoplite wounded by an arrow. The victory of the Ten Thousand in the climactic showdown for the Persian throne, however, was wasted when their employer, Cyrus, rashly pursued his brother, Artaxerxes, across the battle line and was cut down by the Persian imperial guard.
Suddenly confronted by a host of enemies and hostile former allies, stranded far from home without money, guides, provisions, or the would-be king, and without ample cavalry or missile troops, the orphaned Greek expeditionary infantrymen nevertheless voted not to surrender to the Persian monarchy. Instead, they prepared to fight their way back to the Greek world. That brutal trek northward through Asia to the shores of the Black Sea forms the centerpiece of Xenophon's Anabasis ("The March Up-Country"), the author himself one of the leaders of the retreating Ten Thousand.
Though surrounded by thousands of enemies, their original generals captured and beheaded, forced to traverse through the contested lands of more than twenty different peoples, caught in snowdrifts, high mountain passes, and waterless steppes, suffering frostbite, malnutrition, and frequent sickness, as well as fighting various savage tribesmen, the Greeks reached the safety of the Black Sea largely intact--less than a year and a half after leaving home. They had routed every hostile Asian force in their way. Five out of six made it out alive, the majority of the dead lost not in battle, but in the high snows of Armenia.
During their ordeal, the Ten Thousand were dumbfounded by the Taochians, whose women and children jumped off the high cliffs of their village in a ritual mass suicide. They found the barbaric white-skinned Mossynoecians, who engaged in sexual intercourse openly in public, equally baffling. The Chalybians traveled with the heads of their slain opponents. Even the royal army of Persia appeared strange; its pursuing infantry, sometimes whipped on by their officers, fled at the first onslaught of the Greek phalanx. What ultimately strikes the reader of the Anabasis is not merely the courage, skill, and brutality of the Greek army--which after all had no business in Asia other than killing and money--but the vast cultural divide between the Ten Thousand and the brave tribes they fought.
Where else in the Mediterranean would philosophers and students of rhetoric march in file alongside cutthroats to crash headlong into enemy flesh? Where else would every man under arms feel equal to anyone else in the army--or at least see himself as free and in control of his own destiny? What other army of the ancient world elected its own leaders? And how could such a small force by elected committee navigate its way thousands of miles home amid thousands of hostile enemies?
Once the Ten Thousand, as much a "marching democracy" as a hired army, left the battlefield of Cunaxa, the soldiers routinely held assemblies in which they voted on the proposals of their elected leaders. In times of crises, they formed ad hoc boards to ensure that there were sufficient archers, cavalry, and medical corpsmen. When faced with a variety of unexpected challenges both natural and human--impassable rivers, a dearth of food, and unfamiliar tribal enemies--councils were held to debate and discuss new tactics, craft new weapons, and adopt modifications in organization. The elected generals marched and fought alongside their men--and were careful to provide a fiscal account of their expenditures.
The soldiers in the ranks sought face-to-face shock battle with their enemies. All accepted the need for strict discipline and fought shoulder-to-shoulder whenever practicable. Despite their own critical shortage of mounted troops, they nevertheless felt only disdain for the cavalry of the Great King. "No one ever died in battle from the bite or kick of a horse," Xenophon reminded his beleaguered foot soldiers (Anabasis 3.2.19). Upon reaching the coast of the Black Sea, the Ten Thousand conducted judicial inquiries and audits of its leadership's performance during the past year, while disgruntled individuals freely voted to split apart and make their own way back home. A lowly Arcadian shepherd had the same vote as the aristocratic Xenophon, student of Socrates, soon-to-be author of treatises ranging from moral philosophy to the income potential of ancient Athens.
To envision the equivalent of a Persian Ten Thousand is impossible. Imagine the likelihood of the Persian king's elite force of heavy infantry--the so-called Immortals, or Amrtaka, who likewise numbered 10,000--outnumbered ten to one, cut off and abandoned in Greece, marching from the Peloponnese to Thessaly, defeating the numerically superior phalanxes of every Greek city-state they invaded, as they reached the safety of the Hellespont. History offers a more tragic and real-life parallel: the Persian general Mardonius's huge invasion army of 479 b.c. that was defeated by the numerically inferior Greeks at the battle of Plataea and then forced to retire home three hundred miles northward through Thessaly and Thrace. Despite the army's enormous size and the absence of any organized pursuit, few of the Persians ever returned home. They were clearly no Ten Thousand. Their king had long ago abandoned them; after his defeat at Salamis, Xerxes had marched back to the safety of his court the prior autumn.
Technological superiority does not in itself explain the miraculous Greek achievement, although Xenophon at various places suggests that the Ten Thousand's heavy bronze, wood, and iron panoply was unmatched by anything found in Asia. There is no evidence either that the Greeks were by nature "different" from King Artaxerxes' men. The later pseudoscientific notion that the Europeans were racially superior to the Persians was entertained by no Greeks of the time. Although they were mercenary veterans and bent on booty and theft, the Ten Thousand were no more savage or warlike than other raiders and plunderers of the time; much less were they kinder or more moral people than the tribes they met in Asia. Greek religion did not put a high premium on turning the other cheek or on a belief that war per se was either abnormal or amoral. Climate, geography, and natural resources tell us as little. In fact, Xenophon's men could only envy the inhabitants of Asia Minor, whose arable land and natural wealth were in dire contrast to their poor soil back in Greece. Indeed, they warned their men that any Greeks who migrated eastward might become lethargic "Lotus-Eaters" in such a far wealthier natural landscape.
The Anabasis makes it clear, however, that the Greeks fought much differently than their adversaries and that such unique Hellenic characteristics of battle--a sense of personal freedom, superior discipline, matchless weapons, egalitarian camaraderie, individual initiative, constant tactical adaptation and flexibility, preference for shock battle of heavy infantry--were themselves the murderous dividends of Hellenic culture at large. The peculiar way Greeks killed grew out of consensual government, equality among the middling classes, civilian audit of military affairs, and politics apart from religion, freedom and individualism, and rationalism. The ordeal of the Ten Thousand, when stranded and near extinction, brought out the polis that was innate in all Greek soldiers, who then conducted themselves on campaign precisely as civilians in their respective city-states.
In some form or another, the Ten Thousand would be followed by equally brutal European intruders: Agesilaus and his Spartans, Chares the mercenary captain, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar and centuries of legionary dominance, the Crusaders, Hernan Cortes, Portuguese explorers in Asiatic seas, British redcoats in India and Africa, and scores of other thieves, buccaneers, colonists, mercenaries, imperialists, and explorers. Most subsequent Western expeditionary forces were outnumbered and often deployed far from home. Nevertheless, they outfought their numerically superior enemies and in varying degrees drew on elements of Western culture to slaughter mercilessly their opponents.
In the long history of European military practice, it is almost a truism that the chief military worry of a Western army for the past 2,500 years was another Western army. Few Greeks were killed at Marathon (490 b.c.). Thousands died at the later collisions at Nemea and Coronea (394 b.c.), where Greek fought Greek. The latter Persian Wars (480-479 b.c.) saw relatively few Greek deaths. The Peloponnesian War (431-404 b.c.) between Greek states was an abject bloodbath. Alexander himself killed more Europeans in Asia than did the hundreds of thousands of Persians under Darius III. The Roman Civil Wars nearly ruined the republic in a way that even Hannibal had not. Waterloo, the Somme, and Omaha Beach only confirm the holocaust that occurs when Westerner meets Westerner.
This book attempts to explain why that is all so, why Westerners have been so adept at using their civilization to kill others--at warring so brutally, so often without being killed. Past, present, and future, the story of military dynamism in the world is ultimately an investigation into the prowess of Western arms. Scholars of war may resent such a broad generalization. Academics in the university will find that assertion chauvinistic or worse--and thus cite every exception from Thermopylae to Little Big Horn in refutation. The general public itself is mostly unaware of their culture's own singular and continuous lethality in arms. Yet for the past 2,500 years--even in the Dark Ages, well before the "Military Revolution," and not simply as a result of the Renaissance, the European discovery of the Americas, or the Industrial Revolution--there has been a peculiar practice of Western warfare, a common foundation and continual way of fighting, that has made Europeans the most deadly soldiers in the history of civilization.
THE PRIMACY OF BATTLE
War as Culture
I am not interested here in whether European military culture is morally superior to, or far more wretched than, that of the non-West. The conquistadors, who put an end to human sacrifice and torture on the Great Pyramid in Mexico City, sailed from a society reeling from the Grand Inquisition and the ferocious Reconquista, and left a diseased and nearly ruined New World in their wake. I am also less concerned in ascertaining the righteousness of particular wars--whether a murderous Pizarro in Peru (who calmly announced, "The time of the Inca is over") was better or worse than his murdering Inca enemies, whether India suffered enormously or benefited modestly from English colonization, or whether the Japanese had good cause to bomb Pearl Harbor or the Americans to incinerate Tokyo. My curiosity is not with Western man's heart of darkness, but with his ability to fight--specifically how his military prowess reflects larger social, economic, political, and cultural practices that themselves seemingly have little to do with war.
That connection between values and battle is not original, but has an ancient pedigree. The Greek historians, whose narratives are centered on war, nearly always sought to draw cultural lessons. In Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War, nearly 2,500 years ago the Spartan general Brasidas dismissed the military prowess of the tribes of Illyria and Macedonia, who confronted his Spartan hoplites. These men, Brasidas says of his savage opponents, have no discipline and so cannot endure shock battle. "As all mobs do," they changed their fearsome demeanor to cries of fright when they faced the cold iron of disciplined men in rank. Why so? Because, as Brasidas goes on to tell his soldiers, such tribes are the product of cultures "in which the many do not rule the few, but rather the few the many" (Thucydides 4.126).
In contrast to these enormous armies of screaming "barbarians" without consensual governments and written constitutions--"formidable in outward bulk, with unbearable loud yelling and the frightful appearance of weapons brandished in the air"--"citizens of states like yours," Brasidas assures his men, "stand their ground." Notice that Brasidas says nothing about skin color, race, or religion. Instead, he simplistically connects military discipline, fighting in rank, and the preference for shock battle with the existence of popular and consensual government, which gave the average infantryman in the phalanx a sense of equality and a superior spirit to his enemies. Whether or not we wish to dismiss Brasidas's self-serving portrait of frenzied tribesmen as a chauvinistic Western "construct" or "fiction," or debate whether his own Spartan oligarchy was a broad-based government, or carp that European infantrymen were often ambushed and bushwhacked by more nimble guerrillas, it is indisputable that there was a tradition of disciplined heavy infantrymen among the constitutionally governed Greek city-states, and not such a thing among tribal peoples to the north.
In an analysis of culture and conflict why should we concentrate on a few hours of battle and the fighting experience of the average soldier--and not the epic sweep of wars, with their cargo of grand strategy, tactical maneuver, and vast theater operations that so much better lend themselves to careful social and cultural exegesis? Military history must never stray from the tragic story of killing, which is ultimately found only in battle. The culture in which militaries fight determines whether thousands of mostly innocent young men are alive or rotting after their appointed hour of battle. Abstractions like capitalism or civic militarism are hardly abstract at all when it comes to battle, but rather concrete realities that ultimately determined whether at Lepanto twenty-year-old Turkish peasants survived or were harpooned in the thousands, whether Athenian cobblers and tanners could return home in safety after doing their butchery at Salamis or were to wash up in chunks on the shores of Attica.
