風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
中國世紀
來自維基百科，自由百科全書
“中國世紀”是一個新詞，指21世紀可能在地緣經濟或地緣政治上由中華人民共和國主導，[1]類似於“美國世紀”指20世紀，“英國世紀”指19世紀。[2][3] 該詞組尤其用於指代中國經濟可能超越美國成為世界最大經濟體的觀點。[4][5] 與之類似的還有“中國崛起”（簡體中文：中國崛起；繁體中文：中國崛起；拚音：Zhōngguó juéqǐ）。[6][7]
中國發起了“一帶一路”倡議。據分析人士稱，這是一項地緣戰略努力，旨在在全球事務中發揮更大作用，並挑戰美國戰後的霸權。[8][9][10]也有觀點認為，中國共同創立亞洲基礎設施投資銀行和新開發銀行，是為了在發展融資方麵與世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織競爭。[11][12] 2015年，中國啟動了“中國製造2025”戰略規劃，以進一步發展製造業。關於這些規劃在提升中國全球地位方麵的有效性和實用性，一直存在爭議。
中國崛起為全球經濟強國與其龐大的勞動人口息息相關。[13] 然而，中國人口老齡化速度比曆史上幾乎任何其他國家都快。[13][14] 當前的人口趨勢可能會阻礙經濟增長，造成具有挑戰性的社會問題，並限製中國成為新的全球霸主的能力。[13][15][16][17] 中國主要依靠債務驅動的經濟增長也引發了人們對巨大信貸違約風險和潛在金融危機的擔憂。
據《經濟學人》報道，按購買力平價（PPP）計算，中國經濟在2013年已成為世界最大經濟體。[18] 以匯率計算，2020年和2021年初的一些預測認為，中國可能在2028年超過美國，[19] 如果人民幣進一步走強，則可能在2026年超過美國。[20] 截至2021年7月，彭博分析師估計，中國要麽在2030年代超過美國成為世界最大經濟體，要麽永遠無法實現這一目標。[21] 一些學者認為，中國的崛起已經達到頂峰，隨後可能出現停滯或衰退。[22][23][24]
爭論與因素
GDP（現價美元，未根據購買力平價調整）- 美國、中國（單位：萬億美元，1960-2019）
人均名義GDP（未根據購買力平價調整）- 美國、中國（1960-2019）
另請參閱：一帶一路倡議、中國製造2025和區域全麵經濟夥伴關係
據估計，中國經濟在16、17和18世紀初是世界最大經濟體。[25] 約瑟夫·斯蒂格利茨曾表示，“中國世紀”始於2014年。[26] 《經濟學人》援引中國自2013年以來的GDP數據（按購買力平價計算），認為“中國世紀正在順利開啟”。[27]
自 2013 年起，中國發起了“一帶一路”倡議，未來投資額接近 1 萬億美元[28]。分析人士認為，此舉是中國在全球事務中發揮更大作用的地緣戰略推動力。[8][9] 也有人認為，中國共同創立了亞洲基礎設施投資銀行和新開發銀行，是為了在發展融資方麵與世界銀行和國際貨幣基金組織競爭。[11][12] 2015 年，中國啟動了“中國製造 2025”戰略規劃，以進一步發展製造業，旨在提升中國工業的製造能力，從勞動密集型工廠發展成為技術密集型強國。
2020 年 11 月，中國簽署了區域全麵經濟夥伴關係協定，作為一項自由貿易協定[29][30][31]，以對抗跨太平洋夥伴關係協定[32][33][34]。一些評論人士認為該協議是中國的“巨大勝利”，[35][36]盡管事實證明，如果沒有印度的參與，該協議隻會使中國2030年的GDP增長0.08%。[37][38]
布魯金斯學會外交政策高級研究員瑞安·哈斯表示，中國“勢不可擋，即將超越步履蹣跚的美國”的論調，很大程度上是由中國官方媒體所宣傳的。他還補充道：“威權體製善於展示自身優勢，掩蓋自身劣勢。”[39] 政治學家馬修·克羅尼格表示：“‘一帶一路’倡議和‘中國製造2025’這兩個經常被引用為中國高瞻遠矚的計劃，實際上都是習近平分別在2013年和2015年才宣布的。這兩個計劃都太新了，不足以稱之為成功的長期戰略規劃的傑出典範。”[40]
據加州大學聖地亞哥分校教授兼中國問題專家巴裏·諾頓稱，2016年，中國城鎮家庭的平均收入為42,359元人民幣，城鎮居民平均收入為16,02元人民幣。
2019年，中國農村家庭人均收入排名第一。即使按購買力平價換算，中國城鎮居民平均收入也略高於1萬美元，農村居民平均收入略低於4000美元。諾頓質疑，像這樣一個中等收入國家，在開拓新技術方麵“投入如此不成比例的風險支出”是否合理。他評論說，雖然從純粹的經濟角度來看這沒有道理，但中國政策製定者在實施“中國製造2025”等產業政策時，還有“其他考慮”。[41]
根據不同的情景假設，據估計，中國要麽在2030年代超越美國成為世界最大經濟體，要麽永遠無法做到這一點。[21]
國際關係
2023年軍費開支排名前五的國家[42]
2011年，時任哈佛大學肯尼迪學院研究員的邁克爾·貝克利發表了其著作《中國的世紀？為何美國的優勢將持續》。該書駁斥了美國相對於中國正在衰落的觀點，也否認了美國為維持全球化體係而承擔的霸權負擔導致了其衰落。貝克利認為，美國的實力是持久的，“單極”和全球化是主要原因。他指出：“美國從其優勢地位中獲得了競爭優勢，而全球化使其能夠利用這些優勢，吸引經濟活動，並操縱國際體係使其受益。”[43]
貝克利認為，如果美國陷入終極衰落，它就會采取新重商主義的經濟政策，並放棄在亞洲的軍事承諾。 “然而，如果美國並未衰落，而全球化和霸權是主要原因，那麽美國就應該反其道而行之：通過維持自由的國際經濟政策來遏製中國的增長，並通過在亞洲維持強大的政治和軍事存在來抑製中國的野心。”[43] 貝克利認為，美國受益於現存的霸權地位——1990年，美國並沒有為了自身利益而顛覆國際秩序，而是現有秩序在其周圍崩潰了。
對美國能否保持領先地位持懷疑態度的學者包括羅伯特·佩普，他計算得出，“現代曆史上最大的相對衰落之一”源於“技術向世界其他地區的傳播”。[44]同樣，費雷德·紮卡裏亞寫道：“過去二十年的單極秩序正在衰落，並非因為伊拉克戰爭，而是因為全球權力的廣泛擴散。”[45] 保羅·基普楚姆巴在《21世紀的中國與非洲：戰略探索》一書中預測，21世紀中美之間將爆發一場致命的冷戰；如果這場冷戰不發生，他預測中國將在全球霸權的各個方麵取代美國。[46]
學者羅斯瑪麗·富特寫道，中國的崛起引發了美國在亞太地區霸權的一些重新談判，但中國公開宣稱的雄心與政策行動之間的不一致引發了各種形式的抵製，使得美國的霸權僅受到部分挑戰。[47]與此同時，C·拉賈·莫漢觀察到，“中國的許多鄰國正穩步走向要麽在北京和華盛頓之間保持中立，要麽幹脆接受被其龐大鄰國主導”。然而，他也指出，澳大利亞、印度和日本已準備好挑戰北京。[48] 理查德·海德裏安認為，“美國相對於中國的優勢在於其廣泛且出人意料地持久的區域聯盟網絡，尤其是與中等強國日本、澳大利亞以及日益壯大的印度的聯盟。這些國家對中國日益增強的自信有著共同的擔憂，盡管這種擔憂並非完全相同。”[49]
在全球擔憂中國的經濟影響力包含政治影響力之際，中國領導人習近平表示：“中國無論發展到什麽程度，都永遠不稱霸”。[50] 在多次國際峰會上，其中包括2021年1月的世界經濟論壇，中國領導人習近平表示傾向於多邊主義和國際合作。[51] 然而，政治學家斯蒂芬·沃爾特將這一公開信息與中國對鄰國的恐嚇進行了對比。斯蒂芬·沃爾特建議，美國“應該采納習近平提出的多邊合作傾向，並利用美國龐大的盟友和夥伴，在各種多邊論壇中尋求有利結果”。盡管他鼓勵互利合作的可能性，但他也認為，“兩個最大強國之間的競爭在很大程度上根植於新興的國際體係結構中”。[51] 新加坡前總理李光耀認為，中國“最初”希望與美國平等共存本世紀，但“有意成為”
最終成為世界上最強大的國家”。[49]
餘雷和隋菲婭在《亞歐期刊》上撰文指出，中俄戰略夥伴關係“表明了中國增強‘硬’實力以提升其在係統（全球）層麵地位的戰略意圖”。[52]
2018年，陳向明撰文指出，中國可能正在創造一場新的大博弈，與最初的大博弈相比，這場博弈轉向了地緣經濟競爭。陳向明指出，中國將扮演大英帝國的角色（俄羅斯將扮演19世紀俄羅斯帝國的角色），就像“主導力量對抗較弱的獨立中亞國家”。此外，他還指出，“一帶一路”倡議最終可能將“中國與中亞的關係轉變為一種附庸關係，其特點是中國為維護邊境安全和政治穩定而進行跨境投資”。[53]
快速老齡化和人口挑戰
曆史人口估計值與預測人口根據聯合國針對當前人口最多的三個國家（印度、中國和美國）的中等變量情景，預測中國到2100年將達到的人口老齡化水平。
世界銀行對中國2050年勞動年齡人口的預測
另見：中國老齡化
中國崛起為全球經濟強國，與其龐大的勞動人口息息相關。[13] 然而，中國人口老齡化的速度幾乎超過了曆史上任何其他國家。[13][14] 根據預測，到2050年，中國超過退休年齡的人口比例將達到總人口的39%。中國在發展早期就迅速老齡化，其速度比其他國家都要快。[13] 當前的人口趨勢可能會阻礙經濟增長，引發具有挑戰性的社會問題，並限製中國成為新的全球霸權的能力。[13][15][16][17]
地緣政治情報服務局客座專家布倫丹·奧萊利寫道：“人口下降引發經濟危機、政治不穩定、移民和生育率進一步下降的負反饋循環的黑暗情景對中國??來說是非常現實的”。[54][55]美國企業研究所的經濟學家和人口專家尼古拉斯·埃伯施塔特表示，當前的人口趨勢將壓倒中國的經濟和地緣政治，使其崛起更加不確定。他說：“經濟英雄式增長的時代已經結束。”[56]
布魯金斯學會的瑞安·哈斯表示，中國的“勞動年齡人口已在減少；到2050年，中國每8名勞動者對應1名退休人員，將減少到2名勞動者對應1名退休人員。此外，隨著人口受教育程度提高、城鎮化程度提高以及采用技術提高製造業效率，中國已經擠占了大部分生產力的大幅增長。”[39]
美國經濟學家斯科特·羅澤爾和研究員娜塔莉·赫爾認為：“中國看起來更像20世紀80年代的墨西哥或土耳其，而不是20世紀80年代的台灣或韓國。沒有哪個國家在高中教育普及率低於50%的情況下能夠躋身高收入國家。鑒於中國高中教育普及率僅為30%，該國可能麵臨嚴重困境。”他們警告稱，由於城鄉教育差距和結構性失業，中國有可能陷入中等收入陷阱。[57][58]彼得森國際經濟研究所的經濟學家馬丁·喬澤姆帕和黃天雷對此表示讚同，並補充道：“中國長期以來忽視了農村發展”，必須投資於農村社區的教育和衛生資源，以解決持續的人力資本危機。[58]
經濟增長與債務
中國在全球出口中的份額（1990-2019）
在2020年新冠疫情期間，中華人民共和國是唯一一個實現增長的主要經濟體。[59] 中國經濟增長了2.3%，而美國經濟和歐元區預計分別萎縮3.6%和7.4%。2020年，中國在全球GDP中的份額上升至16.8%，而美國經濟占全球GDP的22.2%。[60]然而，根據國際貨幣基金組織2021年全球經濟展望報告，到2024年底，中國經濟規模預計將低於此前預測，而美國經濟規模預計將高於此前預測。[61]
中國增加貸款的主要動力來自其希望盡快提高經濟增長率。幾十年來，地方政府官員的政績幾乎完全取決於其促進經濟增長的能力。Amanda Lee在《南華早報》上報道稱：“隨著中國經濟增長放緩，人們越來越擔心其中許多債務麵臨違約風險，這可能引發中國國家主導的金融體係的係統性危機。”[62]
Enodo Economics的Diana Choyleva預測，中國的債務比率將很快超過日本危機高峰時期的水平。[63] Choyleva認為：“有證據表明，北京意識到自己正深陷債務泥潭，
需要救生圈，隻要看看政府自己的行動就知道了。它終於在公司債券市場注入了一定程度的定價紀律，並積極鼓勵外國投資者為減少巨額壞賬提供資金。”[63]
中國的債務占GDP的比率從2010年第一季度的178%上升到2020年第一季度的275%。[63] 2020年第二季度和第三季度，中國的債務占GDP的比率接近335%。[62] 布魯金斯學會的瑞安·哈斯表示：“中國在基礎設施投資方麵的生產性空間正在耗盡，不斷上升的債務水平將進一步使其增長路徑複雜化。”[39]
中國政府定期修訂其GDP數據，通常是在年底。由於地方政府麵臨著實現預設增長目標的政治壓力，許多人對統計數據的準確性表示懷疑。[64] 據芝加哥大學布斯商學院經濟學家謝長泰稱，中國大學經濟學教授宋正香港及其合著者認為，2008年至2016年間，中國經濟增長率可能每年被高估1.7%，這意味著政府可能在2016年高估了中國經濟規模12%至16%。[65][66]
美國戰略家兼曆史學家愛德華·勒特韋克認為，中國不會麵臨巨大的經濟或人口問題，但會在戰略上失敗，因為“皇帝做所有的決定，卻沒有人可以糾正他”。他表示，從地緣政治角度來看，中國在2020年憑借極權政府的措施“贏得了一年的競爭優勢”，但這也使“中國威脅”凸顯出來，迫使其他國家政府做出回應。[67]
社會學家孔誥烽指出，盡管中國在新冠疫情期間的大量放貸使經濟在最初的封鎖後迅速反彈，但也加劇了許多國家本已深厚的債務負擔。中國企業，到2021年經濟增長將放緩，並抑製長期表現。洪教授還指出，盡管2008年主要在宣傳中聲稱人民幣可能取代美元成為儲備貨幣，但十年後，人民幣在國際使用中卻停滯不前，甚至下降，排名低於英鎊，更不用說美元了。[68]
中國衰落
一些學者認為，中國的崛起將在2020年代結束。外交政策專家邁克爾·貝克利和哈爾·布蘭茲認為，由於“嚴重的資源匱乏”、“人口崩潰”以及“失去了使其發展壯大的歡迎世界”，中國作為一個修正主義大國，幾乎沒有時間改變世界現狀，使其對自身有利，並補充說，“中國巔峰”已經到來。[22]
美國海軍戰爭學院的安德魯·埃裏克森和貝克研究所的加布裏埃爾·柯林斯認為，中國的實力正達到頂峰，“這個體係越來越意識到，它隻有很短的時間來實現一些最關鍵、長期堅持的目標，這將帶來十年的危險”。[23]《華盛頓郵報》專欄作家戴維·馮·德雷爾寫道，西方應對中國的衰落將比應對中國的崛起更困難。[69]
卡托研究所的約翰·穆勒認為，中國“可能會出現衰退，或至少是長期的停滯，而不是持續崛起”。他列舉了環境、腐敗、民族和宗教緊張局勢、中國對外資企業的敵意等因素，這些都是導致中國即將衰落的因素。[24]
威斯康星大學麥迪遜分校人口與健康研究員易福賢認為，“中國世紀”已經“結束”。
The Chinese Century
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
The Chinese Century is a neologism suggesting that the 21st century may be geoeconomically or geopolitically dominated by the People's Republic of China,[1] similar to how the "American Century" refers to the 20th century and the "British Century" to the 19th.[2][3] The phrase is used particularly in association with the idea that the economy of China may overtake the economy of the United States to be the largest in the world.[4][5] A similar term is China's rise or rise of China (simplified Chinese: 中國崛起; traditional Chinese: 中國崛起; pinyin: Zhōngguó juéqǐ).[6][7]
China created the Belt and Road Initiative, which according to analysts has been a geostrategic effort to take a larger role in global affairs and challenges American postwar hegemony.[8][9][10] It has also been argued that China co-founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank to compete with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in development finance.[11][12] In 2015, China launched the Made in China 2025 strategic plan to further develop its manufacturing sector. There have been debates on the effectiveness and practicality of these programs in promoting China's global status.
China's emergence as a global economic power is tied to its large working population.[13] However, the population in China is aging faster than almost any other country in history.[13][14] Current demographic trends could hinder economic growth, create challenging social problems, and limit China's capabilities to act as a new global hegemon.[13][15][16][17] China's primarily debt-driven economic growth also creates concerns for substantial credit default risks and a potential financial crisis.
According to The Economist, on a purchasing-power-parity (PPP) basis, the Chinese economy became the world's largest in 2013.[18] On a foreign exchange rate basis, some estimates in 2020 and early 2021 have determined that China could overtake the U.S. in 2028,[19] or 2026 if the Chinese currency further strengthened.[20] As of July 2021, Bloomberg L.P. analysts estimated that China may either overtake the U.S. to become the world's biggest economy in the 2030s or never be able to reach such a goal.[21] Some scholars believe that China's rise has peaked and that an impending stagnation or decline may follow.[22][23][24]
Debates and factors
[edit]
China's economy was estimated to be the largest in the 16th, 17th and early 18th century.[25] Joseph Stiglitz said the "Chinese Century" had begun in 2014.[26] The Economist has argued that "the Chinese Century is well under way", citing China's GDP since 2013, if calculated on a purchasing-power-parity basis.[27]
From 2013, China created the Belt and Road Initiative, with future investments of almost $1 trillion[28] which according to analysts has been a geostrategic push for taking a larger role in global affairs.[8][9] It has also been argued that China co-founded the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and New Development Bank to compete with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in development finance.[11][12] In 2015, China launched the Made in China 2025 strategic plan to further develop the manufacturing sector, with the aim of upgrading the manufacturing capabilities of Chinese industries and growing from labor-intensive workshops into a more technology-intensive powerhouse.
In November 2020, China signed the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership as a free trade agreement[29][30][31] in counter to the Trans-Pacific Partnership.[32][33][34] The deal has been considered by some commentators as a "huge victory" for China,[35][36] although it has been shown that it would add just 0.08% to China's 2030 GDP without India's participation.[37][38]
Ryan Hass, a senior fellow in foreign policy at the Brookings Institution, said that much of the narrative of China "inexorably rising and on the verge of overtaking a faltering United States" was promoted by China's state-affiliated media outlets, adding, "Authoritarian systems excel at showcasing their strengths and concealing their weaknesses."[39] Political scientist Matthew Kroenig said, "the plans often cited as evidence of China's farsighted vision, the Belt and Road Initiative and Made in China 2025, were announced by Xi only in 2013 and 2015, respectively. Both are way too recent to be celebrated as brilliant examples of successful, long-term strategic planning."[40]
According to Barry Naughton, a professor and China expert at the University of California, San Diego, the average income in China was CN¥42,359 for urban households and CN¥16,021 for rural households in 2019. Even at the purchasing power parity conversion rate, the average urban income was just over US$10,000 and the average rural income was just under US$4,000 in China. Naughton questioned whether it is sensible for a middle income country of this kind to be taking "such a disproportionate part of the risky expenditure involved in pioneering new technologies". He commented that while it does not make sense from a purely economic perspective, Chinese policymakers have "other considerations" when implementing their industrial policy such as Made in China 2025.[41]
Depending on different assumptions of scenarios, it has been estimated that China would either overtake the U.S. to become the world's biggest economy in the 2030s or never be able to do so.[21]
International relations
[edit]  |
| Top five countries by military expenditure in 2023.[42] |
In 2011, Michael Beckley, then a research fellow at the Harvard Kennedy School, released his journal China's Century? Why America's Edge Will Endure which rejects that the U.S. is in decline relative to China or that the hegemonic burdens the U.S. bears to sustain a globalized system contributes to its decline. Beckley argues the U.S. power is durable, and "unipolarity" and globalization are the main reasons. He says, "The United States derives competitive advantages from its preponderant position, and globalization allows it to exploit these advantages, attracting economic activity and manipulating the international system to its benefit."[43]
Beckley believes that if the United States was in terminal decline, it would adopt neomercantilist economic policies and disengage from military commitments in Asia. "If however, the United States is not in decline, and if globalization and hegemony are the main reasons why, then the United States should do the opposite: it should contain China’s growth by maintaining a liberal international economic policy, and it should subdue China’s ambitions by sustaining a robust political and military presence in Asia."[43] Beckley believes that the United States benefits from being an extant hegemon—the U.S. did not overturn the international order to its benefit in 1990, but rather, the existing order collapsed around it.
Scholars that are skeptical of the U.S.'s ability to maintain a leading position include Robert Pape, who has calculated that "one of the largest relative declines in modern history" stems from "the spread of technology to the rest of the world".[44] Similarly, Fareed Zakaria writes, "The unipolar order of the last two decades is waning not because of Iraq but because of the broader diffusion of power across the world."[45] Paul Kipchumba in Africa in China's 21st Century: In Search of a Strategy predicts a deadly cold war between the U.S. and China in the 21st century, and, if that cold war does not occur, he predicts China will supplant the U.S. in all aspects of global hegemony.[46]
Academic Rosemary Foot writes that the rise of China has led to some renegotiations of the U.S. hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region, but inconsistency between China's stated ambitions and policy actions has prompted various forms of resistance which leaves U.S. hegemony only partially challenged.[47] Meanwhile, C. Raja Mohan observes that "many of China’s neighbors are steadily drifting toward either neutrality between Beijing and Washington or simply acceptance of being dominated by their giant neighbor." However, he also notes that Australia, India, and Japan have readily challenged Beijing.[48] Richard Heyderian proposes that "America’s edge over China is its broad and surprisingly durable network of regional alliances, particularly with middle powers Japan, Australia and, increasingly, India, which share common, though not identical, concerns over China’s rising assertiveness."[49]
In the midst of global concerns that China's economic influence included political leverage, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated "No matter how far China develops, it will never seek hegemony".[50] At several international summits, one being the World Economic Forum in January 2021, Chinese leader Xi Jinping stated a preference for multilateralism and international cooperation.[51] However, political scientist Stephen Walt contrasts the public message with China's intimidation of neighboring countries. Stephen Walt suggests that the U.S. "should take Xi up on his stated preference for multilateral engagement and use America’s vastly larger array of allies and partners to pursue favorable outcomes within various multilateral forums." Though encouraging the possibility of mutually beneficial cooperation, he argues that "competition between the two largest powers is to a considerable extent hardwired into the emerging structure of the international system."[51] According to former Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew, China will "[initially] want to share this century as co-equals with the U.S.", but have "the intention to be the greatest power in the world" eventually.[49]
Writing in the Asia Europe Journal, Lei Yu and Sophia Sui suggest that the China-Russia strategic partnership "shows China’s strategic intention of enhancing its 'hard' power in order to elevate its status at the systemic (global) level."[52]
In 2018, Xiangming Chen wrote that China was potentially creating a New Great Game, shifted to geoeconomic competition compared with the original Great Game. Chen stated that China would play the role of the British Empire (and Russia the role of the 19th century Russian Empire) in the analogy as the "dominant power players vs. the weaker independent Central Asian states". Additionally, he suggested that ultimately the Belt and Road Initiative could turn the "China-Central Asia nexus into a vassal relationship characterized by cross-border investment by China for border security and political stability."[53]
Rapid aging and demographic challenges
[edit]
China's emergence as a global economic power is tied to its large, working population.[13] However, the population in China is aging faster than almost any other country in history.[13][14] In 2050, the proportion of Chinese over retirement age will become 39 percent of the total population according to projections. China is rapidly aging at an earlier stage of its development than other countries.[13] Current demographic trends could hinder economic growth, create challenging social problems, and limit China's capabilities to act as a new global hegemony.[13][15][16][17]
Brendan O'Reilly, a guest expert at Geopolitical Intelligence Services, wrote, "A dark scenario of demographic decline sparking a negative feedback loop of economic crisis, political instability, emigration and further decreased fertility is very real for China".[54][55] Nicholas Eberstadt, an economist and demographic expert at the American Enterprise Institute, said that current demographic trends will overwhelm China's economy and geopolitics, making its rise much more uncertain. He said, "The age of heroic economic growth is over."[56]
Ryan Hass at the Brookings said that China's "working-age population is already shrinking; by 2050, China will go from having eight workers per retiree now to two workers per retiree. Moreover, it has already squeezed out most of the large productivity gains that come with a population becoming more educated and urban and adopting technologies to make manufacturing more efficient."[39]
According to American economist Scott Rozelle and researcher Natalie Hell, "China looks a lot more like 1980s Mexico or Turkey than 1980s Taiwan or South Korea. No country has ever made it to high-income status with high school attainment rates below 50 percent. With China's high school attainment rate of 30 percent, the country could be in grave trouble." They warn that China risks falling into the middle income trap due to the rural urban divide in education and structural unemployment.[57][58] Economists Martin Chorzempa and Tianlei Huang of the Peterson Institute agree with this assessment, adding that "China has overlooked rural development much too long", and must invest in the educational and health resources of its rural communities to solve an ongoing human capital crisis.[58]
Economic growth and debt
[edit]
The People's Republic of China was the only major economy that reported growth in 2020, during the COVID-19 pandemic.[59] The economy of China expanded by 2.3% while the U.S. economy and the eurozone are expected to have shrunk by 3.6% and 7.4% respectively. China's share of the global GDP rose to 16.8%, while the U.S. economy accounted for 22.2% of global GDP in 2020.[60] By the end of 2024, however, the Chinese economy is expected to be smaller than what was previously projected, while the U.S. economy is expected to be larger, according to the International Monetary Fund's 2021 report on the global economic outlook.[61]
China's increased lending has been primarily driven by its desire to increase economic growth as fast as possible. The performance of local government officials has for decades been evaluated almost entirely on their ability to produce economic growth. Amanda Lee reports in the South China Morning Post that "as China’s growth has slowed, there are growing concerns that many of these debts are at risk of default, which could trigger a systemic crisis in China’s state-dominated financial system".[62]
Diana Choyleva of Enodo Economics predicts that China's debt ratio will soon surpass that of Japan at the peak of its crisis.[63] Choyleva argues "For evidence that Beijing realizes it is drowning in debt and needs a lifebuoy, look no further than the government's own actions. It is finally injecting a degree of pricing discipline into the corporate bond market and it is actively encouraging foreign investors to help finance the reduction of a huge pile of bad debt."[63]
China's debt-to-GDP ratio increased from 178% in the first quarter of 2010 to 275% in the first quarter of 2020.[63] China's debt-to-GDP ratio approached 335% in the second and third quarters of 2020.[62] Ryan Hass at the Brookings said, "China is running out of productive places to invest in infrastructure, and rising debt levels will further complicate its growth path."[39]
The PRC government regularly revises its GDP figures, often toward the end of the year. Because local governments face political pressure to meet pre-set growth targets, many doubt the accuracy of the statistics.[64] According to Chang-Tai Hsieh, an economist at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business, Michael Zheng Song, an economics professor at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, and coauthors, China's economic growth may have been overstated by 1.7 percent each year between 2008 and 2016, meaning that the government may have been overstating the size of the Chinese economy by 12-16 percent in 2016.[65][66]
According to American strategist and historian Edward Luttwak, China will not be burdened by huge economic or population problems, but will fail strategically because "the emperor makes all the decisions and he doesn't have anybody to correct him." He said that geopolitically, China "gained one year in the race" in 2020 by using the measures of a totalitarian government, but this has brought the "China threat" to the fore, pushing other governments to respond.[67]
Sociologist Ho-Fung Hung stated that, although China's extensive lending during the COVID-19 pandemic allowed a quick rebound after the initial lockdown, it contributed to the already deep indebtedness of many of China's corporations, slowing the economy by 2021 and depressing long-term performance. Hung also pointed out that in 2008, although it was claimed mainly in propaganda that the Chinese yuan could overtake the US dollar as a reserve currency, after a decade the yuan has since stalled and decreased in international usage, ranking below the British pound sterling, let alone the dollar.[68]
Chinese decline
[edit]Some scholars argue that China's rise will be over by the 2020s. According to foreign policy experts Michael Beckley and Hal Brands, China, as a revisionist power, has little time to change the status quo of the world in its favor due to "severe resource scarcity", "demographic collapse", and "losing access to the welcoming world that enabled its advance", adding that "peak China" has already come.[22]
According to Andrew Erickson of the U.S. Naval War College and Gabriel Collins of the Baker Institute, China's power is peaking, creating "a decade of danger from a system that increasingly realizes it only has a short time to fulfill some of its most critical, long-held goals".[23] David Von Drehle, a columnist for The Washington Post, wrote that it would be more difficult for the West to manage China's decline than its rise.[69]
According to John Mueller at the Cato Institute, a "descent or at least prolonged stagnation might come about, rather than a continued rise" for China. He listed the environment, corruption, ethnic and religious tensions, Chinese hostility toward foreign businesses, among others, as contributing factors to China's impending decline.[24]
According to Yi Fuxian, a demography and health researcher at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Chinese Century is "already over".[70]
