John Mearsheimer 將烏克蘭危機歸咎於美國

為什麽約翰·米爾斯海默將烏克蘭危機歸咎於美國

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

多年來，這位政治學家一直聲稱普京對烏克蘭的侵略是西方幹預造成的。 最近發生的事情改變了他的想法嗎？

作者：艾薩克·喬蒂納 (Isaac Chotiner)，《紐約客》特約撰稿人 2022 年 3 月 1 日

“他不會征服整個烏克蘭”米爾斯海默談到普京時說道。"試圖這樣做將是一個巨大的錯誤。"

政治學家約翰·米爾斯海默是冷戰結束以來美國外交政策最著名的批評者之一。 米爾斯海默最著名的作品可能是他與斯蒂芬·沃爾特合著的《以色列遊說集團和美國外交政策》，他是大國政治的支持者，這是一個現實主義國際關係學派，它認為，出於自利的目的，要保護以色列的利益。為了國家安全，各國將針對對手的預期采取先發製人的行動。多年來，米爾斯海默一直認為，美國推動北約東擴並與烏克蘭建立友好關係，增加了核武國家之間發生戰爭的可能性，並為弗拉基米爾·普京對烏克蘭的侵略立場奠定了基礎。事實上，2014年俄羅斯吞並克裏米亞後，米爾斯海默寫道，"美國及其歐洲盟友對這場危機負有大部分責任。”

目前對烏克蘭的入侵重新引發了有關美俄關係的一些長期爭論。 盡管普京的許多批評者認為，無論西方是否參與，他都會在前蘇聯共和國奉行侵略性外交政策，但米爾斯海默堅持自己的立場，認為美國對挑釁他有過錯。我最近通過電話與米爾斯海默進行了交談。 在我們的談話中，我們討論了當前的戰爭是否可以避免，將俄羅斯視為帝國強國是否有意義，以及普京對烏克蘭的最終計劃。談話內容經過了長度和清晰度的編輯。

看看現在俄羅斯和烏克蘭的局勢，你認為世界現在怎麽樣了？

我認為這起事件的所有麻煩真正開始於2008年4月在布加勒斯特舉行的北約峰會，隨後北約發表聲明稱烏克蘭和格魯吉亞將成為北約的一部分。俄羅斯人當時明確表示，他們認為這是一種生存威脅，並劃清了界限。然而，隨著時間的推移，我們已經將烏克蘭納入西方，使烏克蘭成為俄羅斯邊境上的西方堡壘。當然，這不僅僅包括北約的擴張。北約擴張是該戰略的核心，但它包括歐盟。擴張也是如此，其中包括將烏克蘭轉變為親美的自由民主國家，從俄羅斯的角度來看，這是一個生存威脅。

你說這是為了“把烏克蘭變成一個親美的自由民主國家”。我對美國將地方"轉變”為自由民主國家並沒有太多的信任或信心。如果烏克蘭、烏克蘭人民想要生活在親美的自由民主國家怎麽辦？

如果烏克蘭成為親美的自由民主國家、北約成員和歐盟成員，俄羅斯人將認為這是絕對不可接受的。 如果沒有北約擴張和歐盟 擴張，而烏克蘭剛剛成為一個自由民主國家，並且與美國和西方國家更友好，它可能會逃脫懲罰。 您想了解這裏有一個三管齊下的策略在發揮作用：歐盟、擴張、北約擴張以及將烏克蘭轉變為親美的自由民主國家。

你一直在說“把烏克蘭變成一個自由民主國家”，這似乎是烏克蘭人需要決定的問題。 北約可以決定接納誰，但我們在2014年看到，許多烏克蘭人似乎希望被視為歐洲的一部分。告訴他們他們不能成為自由民主國家，這似乎幾乎是某種帝國主義。

這不是帝國主義，而是帝國主義。 這就是大國政治。 當你是像烏克蘭這樣的國家，並且住在像俄羅斯這樣的大國的隔壁時，你必須仔細注意俄羅斯人的想法，因為如果你拿棍子戳他們的眼睛，他們就會 進行報複。 西半球國家對美國非常了解這一點。

本質上是門羅主義。

當然。 我們不會允許西半球任何國家邀請遙遠的大國向該國派遣軍事力量。

是啊，但是說美國不允許西半球的國家，大部分是民主國家，自己決定什麽樣的外交政策，你可以說好，也可以說壞，但這就是帝國主義，對嗎？ 我們本質上是說，我們對民主如何運作有某種發言權。

untries 經營他們的生意。

我們確實有這個發言權，事實上，我們在冷戰期間推翻了西半球民主選舉的領導人，因為我們對他們的政策不滿意。 這就是大國的行事方式。

我們當然這樣做了，但我想知道我們是否應該這樣做。 當我們考慮外交政策時，我們是否應該考慮努力創造一個美國和俄羅斯都不會這樣做的世界？

世界不是這樣運作的。 當你試圖創造一個這樣的世界時，你最終會得到美國在單極時期奉行的災難性政策。 我們走遍世界，試圖建立自由民主國家。 當然，我們的主要關注點是大中東地區，你知道效果如何。 不是很好。

我認為，很難說美國在二戰結束後七十五年，或者冷戰結束後三十年的中東政策是創造自由主義。 中東的民主國家。

我認為這就是單極時期布什主義的含義。

在伊拉克。 但不是在巴勒斯坦領土、沙特阿拉伯、埃及或其他任何地方，對嗎？

不——嗯，不是在沙特阿拉伯，也不是在埃及。 首先，布什主義基本上說，如果我們能夠在伊拉克建立一個自由民主國家，就會產生多米諾骨牌效應，敘利亞、伊朗等國家，最終沙特阿拉伯和埃及將變成民主國家。 這就是布什主義背後的基本理念。 布什主義的目的不僅僅是將伊拉克變成一個民主國家。 我們心裏有一個更宏偉的計劃。

我們可以討論布什政府的掌權者到底有多想把中東變成一堆民主國家，並且真的認為這將會發生。 我的感覺是，對於將沙特阿拉伯變成民主國家並沒有太多的實際熱情。

嗯，我認為從你的角度來看，關注沙特阿拉伯是最簡單的情況。 從美國的角度來看，這是最困難的情況，因為沙特阿拉伯因為石油而對我們有很大的影響力，而且它當然不是一個民主國家。 但是，如果你看看我們當時所說的話，布什主義的基礎是我們可以使大中東民主化。 這可能不會在一夜之間發生，但最終會發生。

我想我的觀點是行動勝於雄辯，而且，無論布什的華麗演講怎麽說，我不認為美國在其近代曆史上的任何時候的政策都是試圖確保世界各地的自由民主 。

美國在單極時刻的表現與其在曆史進程中的表現存在很大差異。 當你在更廣泛的曆史進程中談論美國外交政策時，我同意你的觀點，但單極時刻是一個非常特殊的時刻。 我相信，在單極時期，我們堅定地致力於傳播民主。

對於烏克蘭，了解這一點非常重要：直到 2014 年，我們都沒有設想過北約擴張和歐盟擴張。 擴張是一項旨在遏製俄羅斯的政策。 2014 年 2 月 22 日之前，沒有人認真認為俄羅斯是威脅。北約擴張、歐盟。 擴張，以及將烏克蘭和格魯吉亞以及其他國家轉變為自由民主國家，都是為了建立一個遍布整個歐洲（包括東歐和西歐）的巨大和平區。 其目的並不是為了遏製俄羅斯。 發生的事情是，這場重大危機爆發了，我們必須歸咎於我們，當然我們永遠不會責怪我們自己。 我們本來打算責怪俄羅斯人。 所以我們編造了俄羅斯一心要侵略東歐的故事。 普京有興趣創建一個更大的俄羅斯，甚至可能重建蘇聯。

讓我們回顧一下當時和克裏米亞的吞並。 我讀過一篇舊文章，你寫道：“根據西方普遍的看法，烏克蘭危機幾乎完全可以歸咎於俄羅斯的侵略。 有人認為，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京出於複興蘇聯帝國的長期願望而吞並了克裏米亞，他最終可能會針對烏克蘭其他地區以及東歐其他國家。 然後你說：“但是這個說法是錯誤的。” 過去幾周發生的事情是否讓您認為該報道比您想象的更接近事實？

哦，我想我是對的。 我認為證據很清楚，我們在 2014 年 2 月 22 日之前並不認為他是侵略者。這是我們編造的故事，以便我們可以責怪他。 我的觀點是，西方，特別是美國，應對這場災難負主要責任。 但沒有一個美國政策製定者，而且在美國外交政策機構中幾乎沒有任何一個人願意這樣做。

如果他們想要承認這一論點，他們就會說俄羅斯人應對此負責。

你的意思是因為俄羅斯人進行了吞並和入侵？

是的。

我對那篇文章感興趣，因為你說普京最終可能會攻擊烏克蘭其他地區以及東歐其他國家的想法是錯誤的。 考慮到他現在似乎正在追擊烏克蘭其他地區，事後看來，你是否認為這個論點可能更正確，即使我們當時並不知道？

很難說他是否會去攻擊烏克蘭的其他地區，因為——我並不是想在這裏吹毛求疵——但這意味著他想征服整個烏克蘭，然後他將轉向波羅的海國家，而他的目標 是創造一個更大的俄羅斯或者蘇聯的轉世。 目前我還沒有看到證據證明這是真的。 看看當前衝突的地圖，很難判斷他究竟在做什麽。 在我看來，很明顯他將占領頓巴斯，頓巴斯要麽成為兩個獨立國家，要麽成為一個大的獨立國家，但除此之外，還不清楚他會做什麽。 我的意思是，很明顯他沒有觸及烏克蘭西部。

他的炸彈正在觸碰它，對嗎？

但這不是關鍵問題。 關鍵問題是：你要征服什麽領土，你要守住什麽領土？ 前幾天我正在和某人談論這些從克裏米亞出來的部隊將會發生什麽，那個人告訴我，他認為他們會轉向西方並占領敖德薩。 我最近和其他人交談過，他說這不會發生。 我知道會發生什麽嗎？ 不，我們誰都不知道會發生什麽。

你不認為他對基輔有企圖嗎？

不，我不認為他對基輔有什麽企圖。 我認為他有興趣至少占領頓巴斯，或許還有更多領土和烏克蘭東部，第二，他想在基輔建立一個親俄羅斯政府，一個符合莫斯科利益的政府。

我以為你說過他對占領基輔不感興趣。

不，他有興趣占領基輔以實現政權更迭。 好的。？

相對於什麽？

而不是永久征服基輔。

這將是一個對俄羅斯友好的政府，他想必對此有一定的發言權，對嗎？

對，就是這樣。 但重要的是要明白，這與征服並堅守基輔有著根本的不同。 你明白我所說的嗎？

我們都可以想到帝國的財產，即使祖國實際上控製著那裏發生的事情，但某種名義上的領袖被推上王位，對嗎？ 我們仍然會說那些地方已經被征服了，對嗎？

我對你使用“帝國”這個詞有疑問。 我不知道有誰會從帝國主義的角度談論整個問題。 這是大國政治，俄羅斯人想要的是一個符合俄羅斯利益的基輔政權。 最終，俄羅斯人可能會願意與中立的烏克蘭共存，而莫斯科則沒有必要對基輔政府進行任何有意義的控製。 也許他們隻是想要一個中立而不是親美的政權。

當你說沒有人將其視為帝國主義時，普京在講話中特別提到了“前俄羅斯帝國的領土”，他對失去它感到遺憾。 所以看起來他正在談論這件事。

我認為這是錯誤的，因為我認為你引用了前半句話，就像大多數西方人所做的那樣。 他說：“誰不懷念蘇聯，誰就沒有心”。 然後他說：“誰想拿回來，誰就沒有腦子。”

他還說烏克蘭本質上是一個虛構的國家，而他似乎正在入侵它，不是嗎？

好吧，但是把這兩件事放在一起並告訴我這意味著什麽。 我隻是不太確定。 他確實相信這是一個虛構的國家。 我要向他指出，所有國家都是組成的。 任何研究民族主義的學生都可以告訴你這一點。 我們發明了這些國家認同的概念。 它們充滿了各種各樣的神話。 所以他對烏克蘭的看法是正確的，就像他對美國或德國的看法是正確的一樣。 更重要的一點是：他明白他無法征服烏克蘭並將其納入更大的俄羅斯或前蘇聯的轉世。 他不能那樣做。 他在烏克蘭所做的事情完全不同。 他顯然正在砍掉一些領土。 除了 2014 年克裏米亞事件之外，他還將從烏克蘭奪走一些領土。此外，他肯定對政權更迭感興趣。 除此之外，很難確切地說這一切會導致什麽，除了他不會征服整個烏克蘭這一事實。 試圖這樣做將是一個巨大的錯誤。

我假設你認為如果他嚐試這樣做，那將會改變你對我們所目睹的事情的分析。

絕對地。 我的觀點是，他不會重建蘇聯或試圖建立一個更大的俄羅斯，他對征服烏克蘭並將其納入俄羅斯不感興趣。 重要的是要明白，我們編造了這樣一個故事：普京極具攻擊性，他對烏克蘭的這場危機負有主要責任。 美國以及更廣泛的西方外交政策機構所發明的論點圍繞著他有興趣創建一個更大的俄羅斯或前蘇聯的轉世。 有人認為，當他征服烏克蘭後，他將轉向波羅的海國家。 他不會轉向波羅的海國家。 首先，波羅的海國家是北約成員國，並且——

那是件好事兒嗎？

不。

你說他不會入侵他們，部分原因是他們是北約的一部分，但他們不應該成為北約的一部分。

是的，但這是兩個截然不同的問題。 我不確定你為什麽要連接它們。 我是否認為他們應該成為北約的一部分與他們是否是北約的一部分無關。 他們是北約的一部分。 他們有第 5 條的保證——這才是最重要的。 此外，他從未表現出任何證據表明他有興趣征服波羅的海國家。 事實上，他從未表現出任何證據表明他有興趣征服烏克蘭。

在我看來，如果他想帶回什麽，那就是早於蘇聯的俄羅斯帝國。 他似乎對蘇聯很批評，對嗎？

好吧，我不知道他是否批評。

他在去年寫的長篇文章中說了這一點，並在最近的一次演講中表示，他本質上指責蘇聯的政策允許烏克蘭等蘇維埃共和國享有一定程度的自治權。

但他也說過，正如我之前讀給你們聽的那樣，“誰不懷念蘇聯，誰就沒有心。” 這和你剛才說的有些矛盾。 我的意思是，他實際上是在說他想念蘇聯，對吧？ 這就是他所說的。 我們在這裏談論的是他的外交政策。 你要問自己的問題是你是否認為這是一個有能力做到這一點的國家。 你意識到這是一個擁有國民生產總值的國家。 比德克薩斯州還小。

各國總是試圖做一些他們沒有能力做的事情。 你可以對我說：“誰認為美國能讓伊拉克電力係統快速運轉？ 我們在美國麵臨所有這些問題。” 你是對的。 但我們仍然認為我們能做到，我們仍然嚐試去做，但我們失敗了，對嗎？ 美國在越南期間無法做它想做的事，我相信你會說這是不打這些不同戰爭的一個理由——我同意——但這並不意味著我們對我們的能力是正確或理性的。

我說的是俄羅斯的原始實力潛力——它擁有的經濟實力。 軍事實力是建立在經濟實力之上的。 你需要經濟基礎來建立一支真正強大的軍隊。 出去征服烏克蘭、波羅的海國家等國家，重建前蘇聯，或者在東歐重建前蘇聯帝國，需要一支龐大的軍隊，而這需要一個當代俄羅斯所不具備的經濟基礎。 接近擁有。 沒有理由擔心俄羅斯將成為歐洲的地區霸主。 俄羅斯對美國來說並不是嚴重威脅。 我們確實麵臨國際體係中的嚴重威脅。 我們麵臨著一個同行的競爭對手。 那就是中國。 我們在東歐的政策正在削弱我們應對當今麵臨的最危險威脅的能力。

您認為我們現在對烏克蘭的政策應該是什麽？您擔心我們正在做的哪些事情會破壞我們的對華政策？

第一，我們應該把重心從歐洲轉移出去，以激光般的方式與中國打交道。 第二，我們應該加班加點地與俄羅斯建立友好關係。 俄羅斯是我們對抗中國的平衡聯盟的一部分。 如果你生活在一個有三個大國——中國、俄羅斯和美國——的世界，而其中一個大國中國是一個同等的競爭對手，那麽如果你是美國，你想做的就是 俄羅斯站在你這一邊。 相反，我們在東歐的愚蠢政策所做的隻是將俄羅斯人推入中國人的懷抱。 這違反了權力政治平衡101。

我回去重讀了你2006年在《倫敦書評》上發表的關於以色列遊說團體的文章。你在談論巴勒斯坦問題，你說了一些我非常同意的話，那就是：“存在道德層麵 這裏也一樣。 由於美國的遊說，它已成為以色列占領被占領土的事實上的推動者，使其成為對巴勒斯坦人犯下的罪行的同謀。” 我很高興

讀這篇文章是因為我知道你認為自己是一個堅強、脾氣暴躁的老家夥，不談論道德，但在我看來，你似乎在暗示這裏存在道德維度。 我很好奇你對烏克蘭目前正在發生的事情的道德層麵有何看法（如果有的話）。

我認為國際政治中的幾乎每個問題都涉及戰略和道德層麵。 我認為有時這些道德和戰略維度是相互一致的。 換句話說，如果你在 1941 年至 1945 年間與納粹德國作戰，你就會知道接下來的故事。 在其他情況下，這些箭頭指向相反的方向，做戰略上正確的事情在道德上是錯誤的。 我認為如果與蘇聯結盟來對抗納粹德國，這是一個戰略上明智的政策，但在道義上卻是一個錯誤的政策。 但你這樣做是因為出於戰略原因你別無選擇。 換句話說，艾薩克，我要對你說的是，當緊要關頭，戰略考慮壓倒了道德考慮。 在理想的世界中，如果烏克蘭人能夠自由選擇自己的政治製度和外交政策，那就太好了。

但在現實世界中，這是不可行的。 認真關注俄羅斯人對他們的要求符合烏克蘭人的既得利益。 如果從根本上疏遠俄羅斯人，他們將麵臨嚴重風險。 如果俄羅斯認為烏克蘭因為與美國及其西歐盟友結盟而對俄羅斯構成生存威脅，那麽這將對烏克蘭造成巨大損害。 這當然正是現在正在發生的事情。 所以我的觀點是：對烏克蘭來說，明智的策略是斷絕與西方特別是美國的密切關係，並盡力遷就俄羅斯。 如果沒有決定將北約東移包括烏克蘭，克裏米亞和頓巴斯今天將成為烏克蘭的一部分，烏克蘭也不會有戰爭。

這個建議現在看來有點難以置信。 盡管我們從實地看到的情況如此，烏克蘭還有時間以某種方式安撫俄羅斯嗎？

我認為烏克蘭很有可能與俄羅斯達成某種臨時解決辦法。 原因是俄羅斯人現在發現占領烏克蘭並試圖操縱烏克蘭政治會帶來大麻煩。

所以你是說占領烏克蘭將是一個艱難的過程？

絕對的，這就是為什麽我對你說，我不認為俄羅斯人會長期占領烏克蘭。 但是，要非常明確的是，我確實說過他們將至少占領頓巴斯，希望不會更多地占領烏克蘭最東部地區。 我認為俄羅斯人太聰明了，不會參與對烏克蘭的占領。

Why John Mearsheimer Blames the U.S. for the Crisis in Ukraine

 

https://www.newyorker.com/news/q-and-a/why-john-mearsheimer-blames-the-us-for-the-crisis-in-ukraine

For years, the political scientist has claimed that Putin’s aggression toward Ukraine is caused by Western intervention. Have recent events changed his mind?

 

By Isaac Chotiner is a staff writer at The New Yorker  March 1, 2022

“He is not going to conquer all of Ukraine,” Mearsheimer says, of Putin. “It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.”

The political scientist John Mearsheimer has been one of the most famous critics of American foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. Perhaps best known for the book he wrote with Stephen Walt, “The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy,” Mearsheimer is a proponent of great-power politics—a school of realist international relations that assumes that, in a self-interested attempt to preserve national security, states will preëmptively act in anticipation of adversaries. For years, Mearsheimer has argued that the U.S., in pushing to expand nato eastward and establishing friendly relations with Ukraine, has increased the likelihood of war between nuclear-armed powers and laid the groundwork for Vladimir Putin’s aggressive position toward Ukraine. Indeed, in 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea, Mearsheimer wrote that “the United States and its European allies share most of the responsibility for this crisis.”

The current invasion of Ukraine has renewed several long-standing debates about the relationship between the U.S. and Russia. Although many critics of Putin have argued that he would pursue an aggressive foreign policy in former Soviet Republics regardless of Western involvement, Mearsheimer maintains his position that the U.S. is at fault for provoking him. I recently spoke with Mearsheimer by phone. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed whether the current war could have been prevented, whether it makes sense to think of Russia as an imperial power, and Putin’s ultimate plans for Ukraine.

Looking at the situation now with Russia and Ukraine, how do you think the world got here?

I think all the trouble in this case really started in April, 2008, at the nato Summit in Bucharest, where afterward nato issued a statement that said Ukraine and Georgia would become part of nato. The Russians made it unequivocally clear at the time that they viewed this as an existential threat, and they drew a line in the sand. Nevertheless, what has happened with the passage of time is that we have moved forward to include Ukraine in the West to make Ukraine a Western bulwark on Russia’s border. Of course, this includes more than just nato expansion. nato expansion is the heart of the strategy, but it includes E.U. expansion as well, and it includes turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy, and, from a Russian perspective, this is an existential threat.

You said that it’s about “turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.” I don’t put much trust or much faith in America “turning” places into liberal democracies. What if Ukraine, the people of Ukraine, want to live in a pro-American liberal democracy?

If Ukraine becomes a pro-American liberal democracy, and a member of nato, and a member of the E.U., the Russians will consider that categorically unacceptable. If there were no nato expansion and no E.U. expansion, and Ukraine just became a liberal democracy and was friendly with the United States and the West more generally, it could probably get away with that. You want to understand that there is a three-prong strategy at play here: E.U. expansion, nato expansion, and turning Ukraine into a pro-American liberal democracy.

You keep saying “turning Ukraine into a liberal democracy,” and it seems like that’s an issue for the Ukrainians to decide. nato can decide whom it admits, but we saw in 2014 that it appeared as if many Ukrainians wanted to be considered part of Europe. It would seem like almost some sort of imperialism to tell them that they can’t be a liberal democracy.

It’s not imperialism; this is great-power politics. When you’re a country like Ukraine and you live next door to a great power like Russia, you have to pay careful attention to what the Russians think, because if you take a stick and you poke them in the eye, they’re going to retaliate. States in the Western hemisphere understand this full well with regard to the United States.

The Monroe Doctrine, essentially.

Of course. There’s no country in the Western hemisphere that we will allow to invite a distant, great power to bring military forces into that country.

Right, but saying that America will not allow countries in the Western hemisphere, most of them democracies, to decide what kind of foreign policy they have—you can say that’s good or bad, but that is imperialism, right? We’re essentially saying that we have some sort of say over how democratic countries run their business.

We do have that say, and, in fact, we overthrew democratically elected leaders in the Western hemisphere during the Cold War because we were unhappy with their policies. This is the way great powers behave.

Of course we did, but I’m wondering if we should be behaving that way. When we’re thinking about foreign policies, should we be thinking about trying to create a world where neither the U.S. nor Russia is behaving that way?

That’s not the way the world works. When you try to create a world that looks like that, you end up with the disastrous policies that the United States pursued during the unipolar moment. We went around the world trying to create liberal democracies. Our main focus, of course, was in the greater Middle East, and you know how well that worked out. Not very well.

I think it would be difficult to say that America’s policy in the Middle East in the past seventy-five years since the end of the Second World War, or in the past thirty years since the end of the Cold War, has been to create liberal democracies in the Middle East.

I think that’s what the Bush Doctrine was about during the unipolar moment.

In Iraq. But not in the Palestinian territories, or Saudi Arabia, or Egypt, or anywhere else, right?

No—well, not in Saudi Arabia and not in Egypt. To start with, the Bush Doctrine basically said that if we could create a liberal democracy in Iraq, it would have a domino effect, and countries such as Syria, Iran, and eventually Saudi Arabia and Egypt would turn into democracies. That was the basic philosophy behind the Bush Doctrine. The Bush Doctrine was not just designed to turn Iraq into a democracy. We had a much grander scheme in mind.

We can debate how much the people who were in charge in the Bush Administration really wanted to turn the Middle East into a bunch of democracies, and really thought that was going to happen. My sense was that there was not a lot of actual enthusiasm about turning Saudi Arabia into a democracy.

Well, I think focussing on Saudi Arabia is taking the easy case from your perspective. That was the most difficult case from America’s perspective, because Saudi Arabia has so much leverage over us because of oil, and it’s certainly not a democracy. But the Bush Doctrine, if you go look at what we said at the time, was predicated on the belief that we could democratize the greater Middle East. It might not happen overnight, but it would eventually happen.

I guess my point would be actions speak louder than words, and, whatever Bush’s flowery speeches said, I don’t feel like the policy of the United States at any point in its recent history has been to try and insure liberal democracies around the world.

There’s a big difference between how the United States behaved during the unipolar moment and how it’s behaved in the course of its history. I agree with you when you talk about American foreign policy in the course of its broader history, but the unipolar moment was a very special time. I believe that during the unipolar moment, we were deeply committed to spreading democracy.

With Ukraine, it’s very important to understand that, up until 2014, we did not envision nato expansion and E.U. expansion as a policy that was aimed at containing Russia. Nobody seriously thought that Russia was a threat before February 22, 2014. nato expansion, E.U. expansion, and turning Ukraine and Georgia and other countries into liberal democracies were all about creating a giant zone of peace that spread all over Europe and included Eastern Europe and Western Europe. It was not aimed at containing Russia. What happened is that this major crisis broke out, and we had to assign blame, and of course we were never going to blame ourselves. We were going to blame the Russians. So we invented this story that Russia was bent on aggression in Eastern Europe. Putin is interested in creating a greater Russia, or maybe even re-creating the Soviet Union.

Let’s turn to that time and the annexation of Crimea. I was reading an old article where you wrote, “According to the prevailing wisdom in the West, the Ukraine Crisis can be blamed almost entirely on Russian aggression. Russian president Vladimir Putin, the argument goes, annexed Crimea out of a longstanding desire to resuscitate the Soviet Empire, and he may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine as well as other countries in Eastern Europe.” And then you say, “But this account is wrong.” Does anything that’s happened in the last couple weeks make you think that account was closer to the truth than you might have thought?

Oh, I think I was right. I think the evidence is clear that we did not think he was an aggressor before February 22, 2014. This is a story that we invented so that we could blame him. My argument is that the West, especially the United States, is principally responsible for this disaster. But no American policymaker, and hardly anywhere in the American foreign-policy establishment, is going to want to acknowledge that line of argument, and they will say that the Russians are responsible.

You mean because the Russians did the annexation and the invasion?

Yes.

I was interested in that article because you say the idea that Putin may eventually go after the rest of Ukraine, as well as other countries in Eastern Europe, is wrong. Given that he seems to be going after the rest of Ukraine now, do you think in hindsight that that argument is perhaps more true, even if we didn’t know it at the time?

It’s hard to say whether he’s going to go after the rest of Ukraine because—I don’t mean to nitpick here but—that implies that he wants to conquer all of Ukraine, and then he will turn to the Baltic states, and his aim is to create a greater Russia or the reincarnation of the Soviet Union. I don’t see evidence at this point that that is true. It’s difficult to tell, looking at the maps of the ongoing conflict, exactly what he’s up to. It seems quite clear to me that he is going to take the Donbass and that the Donbass is going to be either two independent states or one big independent state, but beyond that it’s not clear what he’s going to do. I mean, it does seem apparent that he’s not touching western Ukraine.

His bombs are touching it, right?

But that’s not the key issue. The key issue is: What territory do you conquer, and what territory do you hold onto? I was talking to somebody the other day about what’s going to happen with these forces that are coming out of Crimea, and the person told me that he thought they would turn west and take Odessa. I was talking to somebody else more recently who said that that’s not going to happen. Do I know what’s going to happen? No, none of us know what’s going to happen.

You don’t think he has designs on Kyiv?

No, I don’t think he has designs on Kyiv. I think he’s interested in taking at least the Donbass, and maybe some more territory and eastern Ukraine, and, number two, he wants to install in Kyiv a pro-Russian government, a government that is attuned to Moscow’s interests.

I thought you said that he was not interested in taking Kyiv.

No, he’s interested in taking Kyiv for the purpose of regime change. O.K.?

As opposed to what?

As opposed to permanently conquering Kyiv.

It would be a Russian-friendly government that he would presumably have some say over, right?

Yes, exactly. But it’s important to understand that it is fundamentally different from conquering and holding onto Kyiv. Do you understand what I’m saying?

We could all think of imperial possessions whereby a sort of figurehead was put on the throne, even if the homeland was actually controlling what was going on there, right? We’d still say that those places had been conquered, right?

I have problems with your use of the word “imperial.” I don’t know anybody who talks about this whole problem in terms of imperialism. This is great-power politics, and what the Russians want is a regime in Kyiv that is attuned to Russian interests. It may be ultimately that the Russians would be willing to live with a neutral Ukraine, and that it won’t be necessary for Moscow to have any meaningful control over the government in Kyiv. It may be that they just want a regime that is neutral and not pro-American.

When you said that no one’s talking about this as imperialism, in Putin’s speeches he specifically refers to the “territory of the former Russian Empire,” which he laments losing. So it seems like he’s talking about it.

I think that’s wrong, because I think you’re quoting the first half of the sentence, as most people in the West do. He said, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” And then he said, “Whoever wants it back has no brain.”

He’s also saying that Ukraine is essentially a made-up nation, while he seems to be invading it, no?

O.K., but put those two things together and tell me what that means. I’m just not too sure. He does believe it’s a made-up nation. I would note to him, all nations are made up. Any student of nationalism can tell you that. We invent these concepts of national identity. They’re filled with all sorts of myths. So he’s correct about Ukraine, just like he’s correct about the United States or Germany. The much more important point is: he understands that he cannot conquer Ukraine and integrate it into a greater Russia or into a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. He can’t do that. What he’s doing in Ukraine is fundamentally different. He is obviously lopping off some territory. He’s going to take some territory away from Ukraine, in addition to what happened with Crimea, in 2014. Furthermore, he is definitely interested in regime change. Beyond that, it’s hard to say exactly what this will all lead to, except for the fact that he is not going to conquer all of Ukraine. It would be a blunder of colossal proportions to try to do that.

I assume that you think if he were to try to do that, that would change your analysis of what we’ve witnessed.

Absolutely. My argument is that he’s not going to re-create the Soviet Union or try to build a greater Russia, that he’s not interested in conquering and integrating Ukraine into Russia. It’s very important to understand that we invented this story that Putin is highly aggressive and he’s principally responsible for this crisis in Ukraine. The argument that the foreign-policy establishment in the United States, and in the West more generally, has invented revolves around the claim that he is interested in creating a greater Russia or a reincarnation of the former Soviet Union. There are people who believe that when he is finished conquering Ukraine, he will turn to the Baltic states. He’s not going to turn to the Baltic states. First of all, the Baltic states are members of nato and—

Is that a good thing?

No.

You’re saying that he’s not going to invade them in part because they’re part of nato, but they shouldn’t be part of nato.

Yes, but those are two very different issues. I’m not sure why you’re connecting them. Whether I think they should be part of nato is independent of whether they are part of nato. They are part of nato. They have an Article 5 guarantee—that’s all that matters. Furthermore, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering the Baltic states. Indeed, he’s never shown any evidence that he’s interested in conquering Ukraine.

It seems to me that if he wants to bring back anything, it’s the Russian Empire that predates the Soviet Union. He seems very critical of the Soviet Union, correct?

Well, I don’t know if he’s critical.

He said it in his big essay that he wrote last year, and he said in a recent speech that he essentially blames Soviet policies for allowing a degree of autonomy for Soviet Republics, such as Ukraine.

But he also said, as I read to you before, “Whoever does not miss the Soviet Union has no heart.” That’s somewhat at odds with what you just said. I mean, he’s in effect saying that he misses the Soviet Union, right? That’s what he’s saying. What we’re talking about here is his foreign policy. The question you have to ask yourself is whether or not you think that this is a country that has the capability to do that. You realize that this is a country that has a G.N.P. that’s smaller than Texas.

Countries try to do things that they don’t have the capabilities for all the time. You could have said to me, “Who thinks that America could get the Iraqi power system working quickly? We have all these problems in America.” And you would’ve been correct. But we still thought we could do it, and we still tried to do it, and we failed, right? America couldn’t do what it wanted during Vietnam, which I’m sure you would say is a reason not to fight these various wars—and I would agree—but that doesn’t mean that we were correct or rational about our capabilities.

I’m talking about the raw-power potential of Russia—the amount of economic might it has. Military might is built on economic might. You need an economic foundation to build a really powerful military. To go out and conquer countries like Ukraine and the Baltic states and to re-create the former Soviet Union or re-create the former Soviet Empire in Eastern Europe would require a massive army, and that would require an economic foundation that contemporary Russia does not come close to having. There is no reason to fear that Russia is going to be a regional hegemony in Europe. Russia is not a serious threat to the United States. We do face a serious threat in the international system. We face a peer competitor. And that’s China. Our policy in Eastern Europe is undermining our ability to deal with the most dangerous threat that we face today.

What do you think our policy should be in Ukraine right now, and what do you worry that we’re doing that’s going to undermine our China policy?

We should be pivoting out of Europe to deal with China in a laser-like fashion, number one. And, number two, we should be working overtime to create friendly relations with the Russians. The Russians are part of our balancing coalition against China. If you live in a world where there are three great powers—China, Russia, and the United States—and one of those great powers, China, is a peer competitor, what you want to do if you’re the United States is have Russia on your side of the ledger. Instead, what we have done with our foolish policies in Eastern Europe is drive the Russians into the arms of the Chinese. This is a violation of Balance of Power Politics 101.

I went back and I reread your article about the Israel lobby in the London Review of Books, from 2006. You were talking about the Palestinian issue, and you said something that I very much agree with, which is: “There is a moral dimension here as well. Thanks to the lobby of the United States it has become the de facto enabler of Israeli occupation in the occupied territories, making it complicit in the crimes perpetrated against the Palestinians.” I was cheered to read that because I know you think of yourself as a tough, crusty old guy who doesn’t talk about morality, but it seemed to me you were suggesting that there was a moral dimension here. I’m curious what you think, if any, of the moral dimension to what’s going on in Ukraine right now.

I think there is a strategic and a moral dimension involved with almost every issue in international politics. I think that sometimes those moral and strategic dimensions line up with each other. In other words, if you’re fighting against Nazi Germany from 1941 to 1945, you know the rest of the story. There are other occasions where those arrows point in opposite directions, where doing what is strategically right is morally wrong. I think if you join an alliance with the Soviet Union to fight against Nazi Germany, it is a strategically wise policy, but it is a morally wrong policy. But you do it because you have no choice for strategic reasons. In other words, what I’m saying to you, Isaac, is that when push comes to shove, strategic considerations overwhelm moral considerations. In an ideal world, it would be wonderful if the Ukrainians were free to choose their own political system and to choose their own foreign policy.

But in the real world, that is not feasible. The Ukrainians have a vested interest in paying serious attention to what the Russians want from them. They run a grave risk if they alienate the Russians in a fundamental way. If Russia thinks that Ukraine presents an existential threat to Russia because it is aligning with the United States and its West European allies, this is going to cause an enormous amount of damage to Ukraine. That of course is exactly what’s happening now. So my argument is: the strategically wise strategy for Ukraine is to break off its close relations with the West, especially with the United States, and try to accommodate the Russians. If there had been no decision to move nato eastward to include Ukraine, Crimea and the Donbass would be part of Ukraine today, and there would be no war in Ukraine.

That advice seems a bit implausible now. Is there still time, despite what we’re seeing from the ground, for Ukraine to appease Russia somehow?

I think there’s a serious possibility that the Ukrainians can work out some sort of modus vivendi with the Russians. And the reason is that the Russians are now discovering that occupying Ukraine and trying to run Ukraine’s politics is asking for big trouble.

So you are saying occupying Ukraine is going to be a tough slog?

Absolutely, and that’s why I said to you that I did not think the Russians would occupy Ukraine in the long term. But, just to be very clear, I did say they’re going to take at least the Donbass, and hopefully not more of the easternmost part of Ukraine. I think the Russians are too smart to get involved in an occupation of Ukraine.

More on the War in Ukraine

• How Ukrainians saved their capital.

• A historian envisions a settlement among Russia, Ukraine, and the West.

• How Russia’s latest commander in Ukraine could change the war.

• The profound defiance of daily life in Kyiv.

• The Ukraine crackup in the G.O.P.

• A filmmaker’s journey to the heart of the war.