2024 失敗顧問 傑克.沙利文 美國壞盡 反被中國玩耍

2024 失敗顧問 傑克.沙利文 美國壞盡 反被中國玩耍

本文有感於美國國家安全顧問傑克.沙利文2024年1月30日的演講 Remarks and Q&A by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Future of U.S.-China Relations, 沙利文沮喪地說: 我們意識到，幾十年來塑造或改變中華人民共和國的努力，無論是暗地的還是公開，經濟的還是軍事的，手段用盡，都沒有成功。我們預計，在可預見的未來，中國將成為世界舞台上的主要參與者。這意味著即使我們競爭，我們也必須找到彼此共同生活的方法。

傑克.沙利文沒有意識到，他們推銷的玩意兒，已經玩完自己國家。

西方的富裕主要是來自軍事和經濟掠奪，如今，中國重新快速崛起，有強大軍事能力自保，掠奪成性的它們再也不敢造次來殺戮和掠奪，其它一直被西方國家欺淩和掠奪的弱小國家，也敢於大膽說不。西方發達國家已經無法以掠奪為生。在它們國內，其祖先善心好意杜撰的意識形態，一直在造孽。人權，自由，公民社會，馴化國民隻有向政府討社會正義不勞而獲的本能，沒有工作謀生的本能，法律支持的工會不斷組織罷工，要少勞還要多得 ，隨著二戰高素質一代離去，勞動生產率被永遠帶走。那些靠掠奪發家的富裕民主國家，已經失去生存根基，啟動無法遏製的衰落自殺程序。

荒謬意識形態摧毀美利堅合眾國

2018年，美國哈佛大學肯尼迪政府學院教授格雷厄姆·艾利森在Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap一書中證明，美國已經失去了活力，社會生產力喪失。華盛頓地鐵銀線項目，1968年開始規劃，2000年正式通過，但是，直到2009年才開始建設。一期工程於2014年竣工，距離開始規劃已經46年了，但是，隻完成了計劃的34個站點的5個。教授感歎，很難知道連接杜勒斯機場的第二階段何時完成。

教授介紹了另一個項目，那就是從他辦公室的窗戶可以看到的橫跨查爾斯河、連接肯尼迪學院和哈佛商學院的小橋。2012年，馬薩諸塞州表示將翻新這座橋，大概需要兩年時間。但是，直到2017年才完工。工人怠工，直到追加超出三倍的原預算。與此形成鮮明對比的是，教授介紹了中國北京的一個項目；一座更大的三元橋，在43小時之內完成了修複。鮮明對比，令艾利森教授，失望地歎息，現在中國人用幾小時完成的項目，比美國人要用幾年時間完成的項目還要多。

可怕在於，荒謬意識形綁架社會治理。現在，美國招工要問族裔，必須把崗位留給那些沒有人願意雇用的人，避免被起訴種族歧視。波音客機曾經是美國製造業的驕傲，是世界各國人民信賴的旅行工具，如今，事故頻發，已經被低俗質勞工玩完。看看印度人，建橋橋塌，建壩壩跨，修飛機自由落體，就是因為沒有責任心，我與他們共過事兒，隻要無人監督，立刻偷奸取巧。如今，他們玩完印度，又占領歐美的製造業崗位，軟件硬件一起下手，玩完歐美國家的製造業。

荒謬意識形態摧毀法蘭西共和國

2013年2月21日，文章French minister hits back at 'three hour day' attack 《法國部長回擊“每天三小時”的攻擊》說：在法國政客呼籲美國輪胎製造商為一家陷入困境的法國分廠提供財政支持之後；法國工業複興部長阿爾諾·蒙特堡受到美國輪胎製造商首席執行官莫裏斯·泰勒的書麵侮辱。泰勒先生斥責法國工人每天隻工作“三個小時”，並表示，如果他的公司投資法國的虧損輪胎廠，是“愚蠢的”。泰勒先生寫道，我當著法國工會工人的麵說：法國勞動力的工資很高，但是，每天隻工作三個小時。他們用一個小時午餐和休息，三個小時閑聊和三個小時工作。他們告訴我，這就是法國方式。

鑒於此，法國綜合日報《費加羅報》進行了網上調查，有81%的法國人表示支持美國老板的觀點。這清楚地表明，法國人是清醒的，理性的，對某些法國人糟糕的職業道德的現狀感到不滿。隻是自己的祖先杜撰的荒謬意識形態-普世價值、自由和人權被低素質的人利用，綁架社會治理。理性的法國人，身不由己走邪路，毀滅自己的家園。

荒謬意識形態摧毀大不列顛王國

英國是最早發起工業革命，誘發資本結合成公司打造資本家，資本家又利用資本進行血腥掠奪，打造所謂的資本主義。後來馬克思和恩格斯發起共產主義，推行各盡所能，各取所需，治療資本主義貪婪的社會病，幾乎消滅了資本主義。英國也曾經出現過有國有化，並建立從搖籃到墳墓的社會福利體係-實際上的共產主義。後來工會胡鬧，國有企業成為虧損無底洞，英國前首相撒切爾夫人，與美國總統裏根，遙相呼應，互相打氣壯膽，把工會組織當為流氓組織打擊，重新私有化。現在，工會組織又把私有經濟玩完了，又玩不轉了。

2016年2月12日，英國赫特福德郡大學教授Hulya Dagdeviren發表文章How did Britain fall out of love with privatisation《為何英國人再也不愛私有化了》說：一直以來，人們認為，私有化的競爭能帶來高效，減少納稅人的負擔，能夠為客戶提供高價值的最優服務。然而，在英國，長期以來，私營企業提供的服務與此逆向而行。文章說，35分鍾的火車旅程，在國營的意大利僅收費37英鎊，而在私營的英國收費258英鎊。英國私企承建的醫療設施，最初預算是110億英鎊，但是，到完工時，政府被迫實際支出800億英鎊。文章還說，英國工黨領袖（譯注：擅長國有化，支持工會）發誓，要再次把英國的私有經濟國有化，保證英國人過得舒舒服服。

重新國有化不是工黨首腦心甘情願，而是不得不；英國人在YouTube留言稱，在中國完成項目的花費，在英國通過項目預算都不夠。如果，英國重新國有化成功，將成為從私有化到國有化，又從國有化到私有化，再從私有化到國有化的國家。英國人運行國民經濟，如同中國人烙美味餡餅，耐心地翻來覆去兩麵烙，現在，又要翻回到已經烙糊的一麵，接著烙，必定烙得更糊，注定再玩完，英國已經被工會折騰死了。

英國人的好兒子，斯密斯和凱恩斯探索的微觀經濟學和宏觀經濟學，一直在互補地指導世界經濟。可是，在自己的祖國，卻被自己祖宗好心好意肚撰的意識形態打敗，不能拯救自己的鄉親。

為什麽有人素質低，因為智力水平低，既不能掌握技能，又沒有責任心。

文章Optimal IQ's for Various Groups《各族裔的最佳智商》指出了各國人的平均智商：（原文鏈接已經失效）

中國北方沿海地區：115-118，中國南方沿海地區:112-116

普遍的日本和朝鮮：110-112

普遍的北歐：97-102，普遍的南歐：92-102

普遍的印度：92-96 (貧窮營養和教育不良)

撒哈拉以南國家：85 (貧窮營養和教育不良) 

文章Secular Rise in Black IQ and Head Size: Evidence For a Eugenic Effect說: “自從1850年，一直有研究者說，黑人幼時高智商，成長漸變低智商。”悲催，原本聰明黑人仔，成長返祖智力如猿。文章沒有說原因，在這裏，我告訴大家，父母不著調瞎胡鬧，家庭生活環境糟，造孽把孩子弄傻。我留言YouTube黑人不要恐嚇逗孩子驚恐。他回複我別瞎說，這是他們的傳統。

從IQ水平，聯想到世界各地人種的行為差異，可知，是人種的智商水平決定其行為方式：

中國人種，智商112-118,製定和平共處5項原則與他國共建繁榮生活，啟迪歐洲結束黑暗世紀和誕生微觀經濟學和宏觀經濟學。奠定現代文明的基礎。

有的人種，智商92-102, 有史以來掠殺的血腥生活，鑄就人種獸性基因，玩民主把國家行政權賞給智障，到處挑起戰爭，依然在世界各地激烈進行中。

神牛人種，智商92-96，數次外來文明的衝刷，積累文明垃圾劇毒的意識形態和宗教，敬牛為祖，人與畜同，感覺丁丁好，想當老大，卻隻能當阿三。

有的人種，智商低於85，幼時聰明，長大返祖如猿。缺乏認知和行為控製能力，做事不計後果，魯莽犯罪率最高，用絲襪套頭蓋臉，就開門掙錢去了。

看看西方人描繪的人種平均智商分布地圖Global IQ Scores。

圖片來源：https://www.quora.com/Why-is-Chinas-average-IQ-so-much-higher-than-the-USA 

儒家文明和平生活促進人高智商 美國混亂環境導致人低智商

曆史上，中華文明影響了鄰國的文明進程，譬如，韓國和日本，形成西方人所說的亞洲價值觀 Asian Values 或儒家亞洲 Confucian Asia。我稱其為中國為基的東方集體主義文明。

儒家文明友好和諧的生活環境，促進人的大腦發育良好，高智商。

2022年5月7日,文章Psychologists found a“striking”difference in intelligence after examining twins raised apart in South Korea and the United States介紹，1974年出生韓國的同卵雙胞胎姐妹，兩歲時，姐姐走失被美國家庭收養，2020年團聚，測試，在感知推理和處理速度相關的智力IQ得分，妹妹比姐姐高16分。文章說，研究人員曾經研究過許多分開撫養的同卵雙胞胎，發現基因確實影響人類的身體和心智的發育，同卵雙胞胎的外型、思維和行為的方式相似，智商也有差異，限於6分之內。

針對南韓姐妹的智力IQ得分的巨大差異，研究者進行了針對性研究，發現與她們經曆的成長環境有關。留在韓國的妹妹，是在家庭成員之間和睦友愛和互相幫助的氛圍中長大。相比之下，美國的姐姐是在嚴格的宗教虔誠和衝突程度較高的家庭氛圍中長大。與之對應，在韓國養育的妹妹具有更多的集體主義價值觀，而在美國養育的姐姐具有更強的個人主義價值觀。

文章指出，妹妹將自己視為集體的一部分，並願意接受集體中的等級製度和不平等，這與她生活的韓國文化是一致的。姐姐認為是自我做主，並且相信集體成員的地位是平等的。這表明她已經很好地適應了美國文化。總而言之，韓國主要是集體主義文化，而美國主要是個人主義文化。這對雙胞胎姐妹的評測結果，反映了文化在各自價值體係形成的重要性。

曆史上，與戰亂不休的西方國家相比較，中國一直是世界領先的經濟體，在2000多年前，就開拓絲綢之路為西方人提供生活用品，促進了東西方文化交流，中國人民也獲益良多。是西方列強和日本的百年殺戮掠奪，把中國掃蕩得一貧如洗。是毛澤東運用中國共產黨組織的政治工具，把一盤散沙的中國人凝聚成鐵拳，韓戰打敗美國為首的16國聯軍，讓列強不敢小視中國，開創了長期和平局麵。新加坡華人的驕傲李光耀說，中國在韓戰擊敗美國糾集的16國聯軍之後，歐洲人頓消蔑視，開始對他畢恭畢敬。

歐盟主席馮德萊恩監軍訪問中國的法國總統馬克龍回國後，增加幾分人性，2023年4月18日發表演講Von der Leyen at EP plenary session on EU-China relations：“本月的中國之行，我很幸運能在清明節這一天來到北京 - 這是中國最傳統的節日之一。這是一個緬懷並向先輩們致敬的日子。它是中國豐富曆史和文化的一部分，無疑吸引並激發了世界各地人們的想象力。再次親眼目睹這個國家，更加加深了我對中國人民的深深欽佩和尊重。幾個世紀以來，他們幫助塑造了世界文明。”

“在過去的幾十年裏，中國政府改變了自己國家的經濟，使8億多人擺脫困境，消除了貧窮。並且，使自己的國家轉變為現代化經濟強國、全球事務的重要參與者以及許多尖端技術的領導者，這些技術將重塑未來的全球人類文明和進步。如今，作為經濟強國；中國正在減少對世界的依賴，同時，在增加世界對自己的依賴。”

這一切，都是在被西方禽獸及其馴化的日本禽獸百年殺戮和掠奪一窮二白的基礎上發展起來的。

1982年《大趨勢》的作者約翰.奈斯比特：我曾提到過，中國會迅速崛起，日本會緩慢衰落，但是，中國的崛起速度依然令我驚詫。實際上，中國就是抓住了大趨勢的國家。現在，中國擁有優勢，掌握大趨勢相對容易，美國和歐洲就沒有那麽輕鬆，歐美掌握大趨勢的前提是要認清現實。

讓智商低下的歐美人認清現實掌握大趨勢，是絕不可能的，他們的本性使然，隻能使用街頭小混混的蠻力，逞強鬥勝。

葛兆光教授心地不壞，希望同胞們改變思維方式，融入世界，享受西方發達國家一樣的富裕生活。事實是，他們不讓中國人享受富裕生活，必須做它們的奴隸。2010年4月15日，美國飯桶奧巴那匹馬在接受澳大利亞電視台專訪說：“如果中國居民也像澳大利亞人、美國人現在這樣生活，那麽我們所有人都將陷入十分悲慘的境地。”

2023年11月3日，華爾街日報中文網發文《全球經濟日益割裂，美中兩大對立陣營逐漸成形》，說，貿易和投資流正圍繞美國和中國這兩個相互競爭的權力中心形成新格局，重大風險隨之而至。去年秋中國跨越了一道重要的裏程碑：其與發展中國家的貿易額自40多年前改革開放以來，首次超過與美、歐和日本的貿易額之和。

文章說，在數十年間，美國等西方國家曾尋求讓中國在這些最富裕國家所引領的單一全球經濟中充當合作夥伴和消費者。華盛頓方麵持續以投資限製和出口禁令向中國施壓，中國則為本國經濟的一些大的組成部分調整方向，從西方轉向發展中世界。

我注意到，該文是譯自英文文章，其兩位作者分別是華爾街日報駐新加坡記者Jason Douglas，和華爾街日報駐法蘭克福記者Tom Fairless。文章所說的“重大風險隨之而至”，應該是中國將貿易重點成功地從西方轉向發展中世界，擺脫了西方國家製定的單一全球經濟體係讓中國充當他們合作夥伴和消費者企圖的控製，讓他們感到重大風險，美夢落空。

國家安全顧問傑克沙利文關於美中關係未來的講話和問答

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/01/30/remarks-and-qa-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-future-of- 中美關係/

2024年1月30日

外交關係委員會

華盛頓特區。

先生，沙利文：至少我有勇氣在布魯金斯學會而不是在 CFR 發表演講，所以——（笑聲）——

邁克，我想說謝謝你讓我回到 CFR。 感謝蘇珊、庫爾特、夏琳和史蒂夫，感謝你們讓我回到加州大學聖地亞哥分校中國論壇，自該論壇開幕以來，我有幸實際參加了該論壇。 我想說一月份的聖地亞哥比一月份的華盛頓要好一點，但我們就在這裏湊合吧。 

我今天的目的不是試圖公布新的中國戰略，而是更簡單的事情：在幕後與大家分享過去三年我們如何努力實施我們的戰略，以及我們在 2024 年的預期。 在此過程中，在不直接回答邁克提出的問題的情況下，也許可以為工廠提供一點幫助，在接下來的幾天裏，當您解決這些非常困難的問題時，它們可以有所幫助。

我想先退後一步。

在為拜登政府服務之前，我們許多現在在政府任職的人——包括我自己、庫爾特和其他人——都在以書麵形式和在這樣的會議上重新審視我們長期對華政策背後的假設。 一旦進入政府，我們就沉浸在最新的情報、專業知識和分析中。

 我們認為，中華人民共和國是唯一一個既有意願重塑國際秩序，又有經濟、外交、軍事和技術實力來實現這一目標的國家。 我們看到中國試圖在高科技領域“趕上並超越”美國； 它正在進行曆史上最大規模的和平時期軍事集結； 中國在國內更加高壓，而在國外則更加強勢，包括在南海、東海以及台灣海峽。 我們看到中華人民共和國努力讓世界更加依賴中國，同時減少自己對世界的依賴。 我們看到它正在采取措施調整國際體係以適應其自身的體係和偏好。

我們還看到了一些真正引人注目的事情，那就是中華人民共和國認為美國正處於最終衰落之中——我們的工業基礎已經被掏空，我們對盟友和夥伴的承諾被削弱，美國正在苦苦掙紮 為了應對百年一遇的大流行，北京的許多人公開宣稱“東方正在崛起，西方正在衰落”。

當我們上任時，我們繼承了上屆政府的做法，更新了對中國挑戰的範圍和性質的診斷，但沒有充分製定應對這一挑戰的戰略和工具。 這種做法有時更具對抗性，而不是競爭性，而且往往低估了對維持有效的中國戰略至關重要的盟友和夥伴的價值。

 但我們不想回到早先與中國的做法，這種做法基於對其發展軌跡更加樂觀的假設，有時優先考慮避免摩擦而不是追求美國的國家利益。 因此，我們製定了自己的方法，布林肯部長在幾年前的一次演講中提出了這一方法——投資、協調、競爭——力求加強我們的競爭地位，確保我們的利益和價值觀，同時謹慎管理這一重要關係。

在過去的三年裏，我們已經實施了這種方法。 我們通過在基礎設施、芯片和科學以及清潔能源方麵的曆史性立法，對美國國內實力的基礎進行了影響深遠的投資，同時解決了中國的非市場行為，並采取措施確保美國的領導地位 技術和經濟增長的源泉。

 我們相信我們的方法已經產生了成果。 自 2019 年以來，美國對半導體和清潔能源生產的大規模投資增長了 20 倍。新製造項目的建設支出已經翻了一番。 展望未來十年，我們估計新的公共和私人投資將達到 3.5 萬億美元，這些投資將由我剛才提到的曆史性立法中的投資釋放。

 在國外，我們試圖以幾年前不太可能、甚至不可想象的方式加強與印太盟友和夥伴的關係。 我們推出了 AUKUS。 我們升高了四邊形。 與越南、菲律賓、印度、印尼等關係升級。

 我們與日本和韓國發起了曆史性的三邊會談，最終在拜登總統在戴維營主持的曆史性峰會上達到了頂峰。

 我們與太平洋島嶼領導人舉行了多次峰會就像東盟一樣。

 我們的地區盟友和合作夥伴則押注於美國的經濟活力。 自本屆政府上台以來，他們已宣布向美國投資近 2000 億美元。

 我們還努力連接我們的歐洲和印度-太平洋聯盟。 我們與七國集團合作夥伴一起采取集體措施，降低經濟風險，實現多元化，擺脫戰略依賴，而不是脫鉤。 我們與我們的盟友和夥伴一起強調了維護台海和平與穩定的重要性。

 我們還努力確保我們公司正在開發的先進敏感技術不會成為漏洞的來源。 我們對關鍵技術實施了精心設計的出口限製； 專注於先進的半導體製造工具——順便說一句，當我第一次真正沉浸在半導體製造設備的問題時，這個主題是早期加州大學聖地亞哥分校論壇的核心主題； 超級計算能力； 以及對軍事現代化至關重要的最先進芯片。

 我們還采取措施規範技術領域的對外投資，並加強美國外國投資委員會對關鍵技術的關注，以確保入境投資真正解決不斷變化的國家安全挑戰——入境投資的篩選製度。

 這些步驟不是為了保護主義，也不是為了阻止任何人。 從長遠來看，它們對我們的國家安全至關重要。

 現在，這些行動的背景是大流行後最強勁的複蘇，也是世界主要經濟體中通脹最低的國家之一。 多年來，經濟學家一直預測中國的國內生產總值將在本十年或未來十年內超過美國。 現在這些預測正變得越來越遙遠。 由於中國麵臨著一係列挑戰，一些人表示這一時刻可能永遠不會到來。

 這讓我想到了一個關鍵點：此時此刻，美國再次展示了其恢複力和重塑的能力。

 但這還不是故事的全部。 這就是我今天要發表的言論的真正關鍵之處。

 當我們采取這些步驟來提高我們的競爭地位時，我們的目標是以一種為世界上最重要的關係之一（也許是世界上最重要的關係）建立穩定性的方式。 事實上，我們相信，我們在國內的投資以及我們深化與國外盟友和夥伴關係的工作實際上為與中國進行更有效的外交創造了條件。

 可持續的中國政策就是要同時牢記多種真理，並反複努力調和它們。 我們對與中國關係中的競爭結構動態有著清醒的認識。 但我們也敏銳地意識到，美國和中國在經濟上相互依存，在解決跨國問題和減少衝突風險方麵擁有共同利益。

 我們意識到，幾十年來塑造或改變中華人民共和國的努力，無論是暗示的還是明確的，都沒有成功。 我們預計，在可預見的未來，中國將成為世界舞台上的主要參與者。 這意味著即使我們競爭，我們也必須找到彼此共同生活的方法。

 與中華人民共和國的競爭不一定會導致衝突、對抗或新的冷戰。 美國可以一方麵采取措施推進其及其盟友和夥伴的利益和價值觀，另一方麵負責任地管理競爭。 能夠做到這兩件事是我們方法的核心。 事實上，美國擁有數十年在我們的利益需要時與我們的競爭對手交談甚至合作的經驗。

 去年，我們一直在借鑒這種經驗。 雖然“管理競爭”感覺像是一個抽象的口號，但理解它如何轉化為行動的最佳方法是“放大”2023 年。

 今年伊始，兩國關係就處於曆史低點。 一年前的這個星期，一個中國間諜氣球飛越美國。 我們過去和現在都對中國在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭時向其提供致命援助深感擔憂。 2022 年 8 月，中華人民共和國舉行了曆史性且史無前例（但從積極意義上來說並非曆史性）的軍事演習，之後一係列的兩岸危機似乎迫在眉睫。

 所有這些都阻礙了拜登總統和習主席巴厘島峰會的進展。 高層溝通停止，更不用說軍事關係或禁毒或氣候合作了——所有這些都被中華人民共和國凍結了。

 我們著手穩定兩國關係，同時不犧牲我們加強聯盟、積極競爭和捍衛我們利益的能力。

 去年5月開始，我們開啟了密集外交時期。 這是全員齊心協力的努力整個內閣的工作涵蓋了我們與中華人民共和國關係的各個方麵。 我們的目標不是掩蓋我們的分歧。 相反，我們的目標是解決誤解和溝通不暢，避免重大意外，重新開放已失效的渠道，並更清楚地向彼此傳達我們各自的立場和利益。 我們不僅尋求增加溝通的數量，而且尋求提高溝通的質量。

 5月份，我與王毅主任在維也納呆了兩天，幫助兩國關係恢複了一些正常狀態。 在維也納，我們就高層接觸的粗略路線圖達成共識，以執行拜登總統和習主席在巴厘島提出的議程——雙方當時都希望最終能在聖保羅舉行領導人級別會議。 弗朗西斯科將於今年晚些時候出席亞太經合組織會議。

 在接下來的幾個月裏，我們舉行了一係列重要會議。

 六月，布林肯國務卿前往北京會見了習近平主席和高級外交政策官員，努力在一段緊張時期後穩定局勢。

 7 月，國務卿耶倫前往北京，與中國新的經濟領導層建立關係。 同月，氣候特使約翰?克裏前往重新開放停滯數月之久的氣候渠道。

 隨後，雷蒙多部長於 8 月訪問了中國，以推進我們的商業關係，並強調我們致力於在不切斷中美經濟關係的情況下保護對國家安全有影響的關鍵技術。

當時批評人士稱，這次旅行是單方麵的，但我們的策略是利用這些會議開啟雙向交流，而事實也正是如此。

 這種密集的外交是為了解決棘手問題，而不是修補關係。 我們直接表達了我們的分歧，包括中國對俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭和海峽兩岸問題的支持。

我們沒有撤回以國家安全為重點的措施，例如限製對外投資和更新出口管製。 相反，我們利用這些會議作為機會來解釋這些措施是什麽，但幾乎同樣重要的是，它們不是什麽，這是企圖破壞中華人民共和國的繁榮和發展。 這些措施並非如此，我們在這些會議上向我們的同行明確解釋了這一點。

我們還利用這些會議尋找空間來協調我們利益重疊的問題。

9月，我和王毅主任在馬耳他再次會麵。 我們為在舊金山舉行的領導人會議製定了路線，並闡述了我們希望在禁毒和軍用渠道等問題上實現的目標。

在接下來的幾周裏，多數黨領袖舒默率領兩黨代表團訪問了中國，中國也派出了一批官員前往美國，其中包括副總統、副總理和王毅主任，他們參加了為期兩天的會議 與布林肯國務卿和我本人一起。

正如你從邁克那裏聽到的，所有這一切都在拜登總統和習主席在加利福尼亞州伍德賽德舉行的峰會上達到了頂峰，這次會議在三個主要問題上取得了進展。

一是拜登總統和習主席重啟禁毒合作。 從那時起，我們看到北京采取了初步措施，阻止用於製造芬太尼的前體化學品的流動，我們希望並需要看到這一進展繼續下去。 美國和中華人民共和國之間的第一個跨部門禁毒工作組今天在北京舉行會議，我們的目標是就打擊這種可怕的毒品開展執法合作。

其次，拜登總統和習主席宣布恢複凍結一年多的兩軍溝通。 我們的參謀長聯席會議主席現已與他的同行進行了交談，我們已經恢複了一些關鍵的操作員級別機製。 現在的問題是，即使麵對未來的動蕩，這種情況是否還會持續下去。 就我們而言，我們將繼續證明軍隊之間的溝通在任何時候都至關重要，尤其是在緊張時期。

第三，在伍德賽德峰會上，我們的領導人宣布了一項旨在管理人工智能風險的新對話，該對話將於春季開始。

正如邁克提到的，上周末我在曼穀會見了王毅主任，以跟進伍德賽德峰會並推進這三個領域的努力。

細致而頑強的外交對於管理兩個大國之間戰略競爭中普遍存在的摩擦是必要的。 這項工作的一些風險可能是不可預見的，也可能是令人意外的。 其他風險更為明顯，包括南海和東海的摩擦以及經濟和技術的動向和反製措施。

最重大的風險將是台灣海峽的危機，特別是考慮到北京在台灣和台灣海峽的軍事活動增加。周圍的空氣和水域。 在這方麵，密集的外交也很重要。

就在幾周前，台灣舉行了曆史性的選舉，沒有發生任何重大的兩岸事件，部分原因是華盛頓、北京和台北等各方都在努力減少對各自意圖的誤解和誤解。 這是很少有人在 2022 年 8 月預見到的結果，當時大多數人預計兩岸局勢會變得更加緊張，而不是減弱。 但這並不能保證未來的趨勢，而且風險仍然存在。 因此，我們必須繼續努力，加強外交和威懾。

明年，就像過去三年一樣，我們將繼續對侵犯人權、強迫勞動和防擴散采取行動。 我們將對中國支持俄羅斯對烏克蘭戰爭以及幫助俄羅斯重建國防工業基礎的努力保持警惕，並采取必要措施予以應對。

如果中國繼續在南海、東海以及台灣海峽進行挑釁，我們將與盟友和夥伴密切合作，反擊世界上最重要水道的和平與穩定麵臨的風險，並大聲疾呼。 我們將繼續在國際法允許的範圍內通過飛行、航行和行動來維護該地區的航行自由。 我們將繼續采取旨在保護我們國家安全的量身定製的國家安全措施。

即使我們這樣做，我們仍將致力於繼續與中國密切互動，這有助於雙方管理分歧領域並在我們利益一致的領域展開合作。

我們不打算重建早期雙邊關係中現已過時的結構和機製。 我們絕對不會為了對話而對話。 但我們確實認為，在精心挑選的離散領域發起和引導一定數量的工作層麵磋商是有價值的，以促進我們的利益並取得成果。 這就是我們今天在禁毒方麵使用的方法——這種方法植根於此時此地，而不是懷念過去。

未來一段時期，我們希望能夠與中國合作，深化危機溝通機製，減少衝突風險。 我們已準備好在氣候、健康安全、全球宏觀經濟穩定以及人工智能帶來的風險等新挑戰方麵進行協調。 我們還將與北京討論從紅海到朝鮮半島等具有挑戰性的地區和全球問題。 我們還將努力推動一係列雙邊問題的進展，包括民間關係。

最後我要指出的是，這一切都不會容易，並且會有緊張的時候。 在這樣的競爭中這是不可避免的，而且根本不會以幹淨利落和決定性的最終狀態解決。 正如我所指出的，有一件事是肯定的：一路上將會有驚喜。

我們將像去年一樣繼續努力管理比賽。 我們將繼續投資於我們在國內的實力，並在國外深化我們的全球聯盟和夥伴關係網絡。

我向您描述的方法並不是什麽重大的戰略轉變。 這是我們從上任之日起就開始做出的努力。 對於美國的治國之道來說，這也不是什麽新鮮事。 離得很遠。 這種做法本身就是美國獨有的，植根於數十年的曆史、外交和來之不易的經驗。 它也植根於兩黨合作，因為當美國在兩黨強有力支持的立場上進行戰略競爭時，在所有人齊心協力為國家服務時，我們總是會變得更強大。

所以我們打算堅持這一策略。 我們打算采取必要措施來保護我們的利益和盟友，同時有效管理與中國的競爭，這不僅有利於美國，也有利於全球穩定。 這是我們的承諾。 這就是我們試圖做的。

今天，我的目標隻是向您介紹我們如何在實踐中嚐試執行這一目標，以便我們能夠超越寬泛的口號，並落實到由來自世界各地的令人難以置信的團隊組成的實際日常辛勤工作。 整個美國政府，無論是職業政府還是任命的政府，都在努力工作。 我必須說，環顧這個房間，在來自兩黨、私營部門和公共部門以及各行各業的眾多人士的支持和建議下，我們已經做到了這一點。 這是我們在前進過程中繼續取得成功的唯一途徑。

 感謝您今天給我發言的機會，我期待著這次談話。 （掌聲。）

先生。 哈德利：傑克，謝謝你和我們在一起。 謝謝您的評論。 我認為我們都更了解您在中國政策方麵所製定的內容以及您所取得的成功。

 我們要去做什麽我要做的是向這裏的傑克問三四個問題。 然後我們將轉向觀眾回答你們的問題。 這一切都記錄在案。 我們會盡量在 7:45 準時結束。 我將繼續當晚剩下的活動。

首先讓我問你，如果有的話，你是否願意告訴我們你最近在泰國與中國外交部長王毅會麵的情況。 今晚有什麽重大突破要報告嗎？ （笑聲）你想在聚集的群眾麵前發布什麽消息嗎？

先生。 蘇利文：嗯，首先，我們吃了一頓非常美味的飯。 所以那很好。 （笑聲。）

你知道，這是我與王毅的第三輪長談——第一次是在維也納，第二次是在馬耳他，然後是在曼穀。 在接下來的每一輪談判中，我認為我們已經逐漸達到了擱置談話要點並真正進行戰略對話的地步。

就下一步而言，會議的主要內容實際上是確定啟動人工智能對話，美國和中國將共同努力管理風險。 這將在今年春天開始。 所以我們討論了其中的要素。

第二，我們有機會深入探討兩岸問題，分享各自立場。 我會保持謹慎。 眾所周知，這裏布滿了可供公開談論的地雷。 而且，我想尊重頻道的自由裁量權。 但我認為這是關於該主題的一次非常有用、直接和坦誠的對話。

然後，我們顯然也有機會談論時事——紅海時事、朝鮮半島時事，以及我們對這兩個地方不穩定的擔憂。 我想說的是，這些對話的質量和特點，以及關於烏克蘭戰爭的相當直接、在某種程度上密集的對話，我認為幫助我們雙方留下了我們不同意或意見不一致的感覺。 一切方麵，但還有很多工作需要推進。

我要說的最後一點是：我們同意拜登總統和習主席應該講話，並且應該盡快通過電話講話。 我認為伍德賽德承認，領導者之間的對話確實是無可替代的——我的意思是，在伍德賽德的那次會議過程中，這一要素對於有效管理領導者的重要性變得如此明顯。 美中政策。 因此，我們都同意我們會向我們的領導匯報，並且我們會盡快給他們打電話。

先生。 哈德利：太好了。 我想問你關於台灣問題的問題。 當然，他們最近在台灣舉行了選舉。 在座的一些人對這些選舉的重要性發表了很多評論。 你怎麽看他們？ 您認為這個結果可能會對我們處理兩岸關係的能力產生什麽影響？

先生。 沙利文：嗯，你知道，我們在公開和私下場合都明確、直接地向所有利益相關者表示，我們在這些選舉中沒有表明立場； 我們自始至終都刻意保持中立。 我們祝賀獲勝者。 我們祝賀蔡英文，你知道，這是一次有效的民主選舉。 現在，你知道，我們已經明確表示希望看到平穩過渡。

否則，從美國的角度來看，台灣表現出這種充滿活力的民主性格是一件積極的事情。 我們的政策在此期間保持不變。 和以前一樣，它將會向前發展——一個中國政策、《與台灣關係法》、六項保證，以及在座的人們都非常了解的所有問題。

拜登總統已經明確表示，我們仍然致力於一個中國政策。 我對王毅也說得很清楚。

我還明確表示，我們仍然對海峽周圍侵略性軍事活動的加劇感到擔憂。 我們認為這無助於和平與穩定。 正如我認為世界其他國家所做的那樣，我們普遍希望看到台灣海峽的和平與穩定。 我們致力於盡一切努力來支持這一目標。

先生。 哈德利：謝謝。 我想問一些關於中國經濟的問題。 關於經濟結構性問題的文章有很多，很多人猜測北京政府既沒有能力也沒有意願解決這些根本性的結構性問題。 對中國經濟前景的看法相當悲觀。

我想知道這種敘述是否消極。 我想問你如何看待經濟前景以及習近平和他的團隊解決我們都知道的一些結構性問題的能力和意願，這些問題涉及房地產行業、債務和所有其他領域。休息。

先生。 沙利文：你知道，在過去的幾次裏，我參加了加州大學聖地亞哥分校中國論壇——那是在我進入政府之前——我養成了一個習慣，就是去接觸我所認識的關於中國和經濟的最聰明的人，並扣扣他們和他們的觀點。 說：“請告訴我有關中國經濟的情況。” 我會聽到一個人的籠統回答，我會想：“好吧，這就是答案。” 然後我會和其他人交談，他們會有完全不同的答案。

對於中國經濟走向何方，知識淵博、思想正確的人們的看法相當廣泛。 因此，我很謙虛，無法真正描述該經濟未來可能的軌跡，因為我認為如果你在兩年前問人們這個問題，他們可能會得到與今天不同的答案。 坦率地說，如果你問人們一年前的美國經濟與今天的情況，人們會有不同的答案。

因此，我們從根本上關注的是思考我們可以做些什麽來投資美國自己的力量來源。 我在演講中談到了這一點。 我們有點拒絕我認為的一種普遍觀點，即不知何故，你知道，這是一個一方麵不可阻擋地崛起，另一方麵不可阻擋地衰落的故事。 選擇對北京和華盛頓都很重要。 我們正在努力做出正確的選擇。 當然，這取決於北京如何選擇站在自己一邊。

沒有真正回答你的問題怎麽辦？ （笑聲。）

先生。 哈德利： 很好。 很好。 你知道 -

先生。 沙利文：我正在向托尼?布林肯學習如何成為一名外交官。 （笑聲。）

先生。 哈德利：我將暫時脫離劇本，問一個關於您如何製定政策的問題，因為您明確表示我們的目標不是阻礙或破壞中國經濟。 這不是我們正在做的事情的目標。 我們正在做一些事情來保護我們自己的國家安全利益。

但我們是否必須坦白地告訴中國，我們為保護自己的國家安全利益所做的一些事情實際上正在對中國經濟產生不利影響，並將產生不利影響？ 它會對我們的經濟增長等方麵產生不利影響。

我們是否足夠坦誠地向中國人說明我們正在做什麽、為什麽這樣做以及這將對中國產生什麽影響？

先生。 沙利文：我的意思是，我們真正嚐試著手做的一件事 - 我在一年前的演講中提到了這一點 - 是更加直接和透明地說明我們正在采取的措施的性質以及將要采取的措施 ，因為我們也在向他們發電報，“這就是我們進行對外投資或更新半導體出口管製的地方。 這就是我們這樣做的原因。 這就是我們定製的方式。 這是我們製定的嚴格流程。 這就是理由。” 然後聽到他們對此的回應。

我和王毅有機會在曼穀討論了中國和美國如何看待經濟與國家安全之間的界限。 顯然，我們對這個問題的看法並沒有完全一致。 但我認為重要的是要認識到，長期以來，中華人民共和國以國家安全為明確理由采取了對美國工人、美國企業和美國經濟產生不利影響的措施。 因此，這不可能是一場單向的對話。

你知道，中國將在談判桌上表達對美國所作所為的擔憂。 美國有義務代表其公民坐到談判桌前，表達我們對中國長期以來所作所為的擔憂。 當我們在曼穀時，我當然已經做好了這樣做的準備。

先生。 哈德利：對你有好處。

我將再給你一次發布新聞的機會。 （笑聲。）

我們是否應該——特別是在這個技術問題上——期待拜登政府采取進一步措施來降低美國經濟對中國過度依賴的風險？ 我們可能會在哪些領域看到進一步的行動？

先生。 沙利文：首先，為了回答你的問題，我可能不會製造新聞。

我隻想花一點時間談談去風險的含義。 事實上，我已經直接向我的中國同行說了這一點。 它基本上具有三個要素。

首先，投資美國的工業和創新能力。 降低風險的一個重要方法是讓我們自己擁有更多的能力，以便能夠在技術創新的邊緣運作。

 第二是使供應鏈多樣化，這樣我們就不會依賴於任何單點故障。 這還不是中國的全部。 這是我們從新冠疫情中吸取的教訓。 但中華人民共和國是其中的一部分。

三是有一係列量身定製的措施，讓美國技術科學不能用來破壞美國及其盟友的安全。 在這一類別中，我們一直透明地表示，我們已經采取了一係列步驟，並且我們將在前進過程中采取進一步的步驟，所有這些都根據我們將量身定製並以某種方式針對它們的基本原則 它們確實是針對我們的國家安全問題，而不是為了使我們的技術生態係統或經濟脫鉤而做出的更廣泛的努力。 但額外措施的具體性質和時間表我將在稍後討論。

我還要說的是：2022年10月，我們對先進半導體和半導體製造設備進行了第一輪出口管製。 2023 年 10 月，我們更新了它們。 我認為世界可以期待這將成為未來進程的一部分，因為隨著技術的發展，我們的控製也必須發展。 這並不意味著我們控製所依據的標準會不斷發展——這些標準保持不變——但它們必須隨著技術的進步而應用於技術。 這將需要更新現有的控製措施，即使我們也在其他領域添加有針對性的、定製的控製措施。

先生。 哈德利：如果我是一個從火星上下來的人，我會說，聽你講話並觀察兩國關係，這兩個國家正在努力保持關係的一定穩定性，並做出了一些戰術轉變，但從戰略上講，中國正在繼續 他們已經推行了一段時間的一係列政策。 正如你剛才所建議的，拜登政府將繼續執行已完成的政策。 似乎有很多向心力在拉動這種關係——這是在你進入美國國會之前。 你真的能把它拚湊在一起嗎？ 有什麽方法可以保留它（聽不清）？

先生。 沙利文：聽著，這是一個公平的問題。 顯然，即使在拜登總統任期內，我們也經曆了相當緊張的時期。 但他決心將這兩件事同時記在心裏。 正如我之前所說，是的，兩國關係中存在結構性、競爭性的動態，我們應該對此保持清醒的認識，我們應該審視這一點——盯著臉上的方格。 另一方麵，為了我們自己的國家利益，我們有義務確保競爭不會演變成衝突，我們將其管理到穩定的程度，並且我們也有義務在我們的利益符合的地方找到我們可以合作的領域。 對齊。

現在，我認為這個秘訣相對容易用文字來概括。 付諸行動就更難了。 這需要一定程度的激烈外交，就像我在演講和關懷中真正嚐試過的那樣——你知道，基本上是不斷的園藝。 即便如此，無論是可預見的還是不可預見的，風險和緊張局勢都可能爆發。 我們不能——你不能否認這一點。 但這是——你知道，我們也不必對此抱有宿命論。

我們的工作是試圖以清晰的方式理解這些風險和固有的緊張局勢，並盡最大努力來管理它們，同時不損害我們的基本價值觀，也不放棄對美國國家利益和利益的捍衛。 我們的盟友和夥伴的利益。

我試圖以“讓我們實際上隻談談 2023 年以及我們這一年所做的事情”之類的方式發表這些言論的部分原因是，美中關係中有很多格言—— “管理競爭”，以及“投資、協調、競爭”。 歸根結底，這實際上取決於我們在國內采取的一係列行動，我們對盟友和合作夥伴進行的一係列投資，然後與中國進行直接、頑強的外交，其基礎是，是的， ，我們將競爭，但我們也將居住在同一個星球上，我們必須共同努力，以確保我們最終不會陷入衝突。

這就是這個的目的。 它並沒有真正簡化為保險杠貼紙。 但我認為這是一種常識性戰略，可以確保兩黨的支持，如果你看看美國人對中國的態度，我認為這基本上就是美國人民的立場。 他們希望我們表現強硬，維護我們的利益，反擊侵略或傷害美國人的行為，但他們也不尋求戰爭。 這就是我們正在努力的方向。

 先生。 哈德利：我最後一個簡短的問題。 明天我們將在中國論壇上舉行一次會議，討論中國的內部政治局勢，包括其政治體係的韌性和脆弱性。 對此你有什麽想說的——

先生。 沙利文：不。（笑聲）

先生。 哈德利：——就你如何——

先生。 沙利文：我建議你去北京發表評論。

先生。 哈德利：所以我們都必須收聽明天的會議。

先生。 沙利文：沒錯。

先生。 哈德利：我猜傑克會聽從這一點如果可以的話，讓我們走向觀眾。 我想提醒大家，這是一次記錄在案的會議，我想邀請觀眾參與這次對話。 所以請舉手，我會叫你。

讓我們從這位先生開始吧。

觀眾：非常感謝。 我叫馬克?羅滕伯格。 我在人工智能和數字政策中心工作。

您在講話中談到了人工智能。 我首先想說的是，我認為中國參加英國人工智能峰會非常好。 這是最初沒有預料到的。 但顯然，正如您所說，保持有關人工智能在戰爭中的風險的討論很重要。

但與此同時，也明顯存在兩種不同形式的政府。 人工智能可以支持開放和多元化的政府，或者人工智能可以支持更加封閉、受限的政府形式。

在我看來，目前正在展開一場關於人工智能治理的政策辯論，坦率地說，還有對美國立場的一些擔憂。 因此，目前歐洲委員會正在談判一項人工智能條約。 歐洲委員會的使命是促進基本權利、民主製度和法治。 我們的許多民主盟友正在尋求一項強有力的條約，以保障這個人工智能時代的基本權利。

人們對美國的立場表示擔憂。 我的問題是：美國政府會支持一項強有力的人工智能條約來保障基本權利嗎？

先生。 沙利文：因此，我們一直非常積極地參與歐洲委員會有關該條約的談判，因為我們對人工智能治理的基本願景植根於保護基本權利和賦予人們權力的理念，而不是提升這些權利。 而不是壓製他們。

我們對人工智能治理的願景確實與中國截然不同，這就是為什麽我們與他們的對話將真正聚焦於我們作為重要國家和主要人工智能參與者的責任，以管理人工智能的風險。 向前。

我們還提出了自願性標準，世界上一些最大的人工智能公司已經簽署了這些標準。 我們發布了一項行政命令，反映了您問題核心的許多核心價值觀和原則。

歐洲委員會對該條約的最終裁決並不在於美國是否支持或反對該條約，該條約在基本權利方麵具有強有力的影響力。 它將涉及更具體的條款，可能會涉及我們的特定利益。

因此，我無法預測條約談判的結果如何，但我可以告訴你們，無論結果如何，它都會——美國對這一更廣泛願景的基本承諾，我們已經闡明了這一願景，現在已經開始將其融入其中。 國際機構，包括聯合國大會努力製定一項關於人工智能的決議，這項工作將是積極的，美國將在其中發揮領導作用。

觀眾：謝謝。

先生。 哈德利：是的，女士。

觀眾：嗨。 非常感謝您今天和我們在一起。 我是瓦法?本?哈辛。 我在奧米迪亞網絡。 我也是加州大學聖地亞哥分校政治學係的校友。 因此，感謝 CFR 將聖地亞哥帶到我們這裏，即使您無法到場。

我的問題實際上把我們帶到了一個不同的地理環境。 在非洲，我們看到中國正在超越“一帶一路”倡議和“數字絲綢之路”。 我們看到他們在試圖影響政策方麵進行了相對細致的幹預，例如向各種非營利組織、獨立媒體集團和媒體供應華為手機。

我很好奇你是否能稍微說明一下美國在非洲的定位，以及我們可能希望如何確保我們的國家安全並促進非洲的人權以應對此類幹預措施。 謝謝。

先生。 沙利文：所以，首先，我姐姐實際上也是加州大學聖地亞哥分校的校友； 她去了加州大學聖地亞哥分校醫學院。 所以我必須和她一起出去玩。 這是一個美麗的校園，一個上學的好地方。

庫爾特和我在 2019 年的《外交事務》文章中寫到的一件事是，我們不能像我認為的美國和其他國家那樣，將世界其他國家視為代理戰場，這對我們在這方麵保持紀律非常重要。 冷戰期間蘇聯經常這樣做。

因此，看看非洲，我們的問題不應該是我們如何在這個國家獲得相對於中國的相對優勢，因為這成為一個扭曲和扭曲的因素，坦率地說，在某種程度上，也可能損害我們的整體地位。 因此，我們提出的問題是：我們如何提供更好的價值主張？

坦率地說，我想說，我們現在正在積極努力填補的空白領域之一是動員資本投資於非洲國家正在尋求的領域。他們的發展——基礎設施、清潔能源、數字化。 這就是錢的問題。 這是關於公共部門的資金通過購買政治風險和貨幣風險來利用私營部門的美元。

我們與世界銀行新任行長阿賈伊?班加（Ajay Banga）密切合作，拜登總統在幫助他就職方麵發揮了積極作用。 我們正在努力擴大世界銀行的能力來做到這一點。 為此，我們通過 PGI（全球基礎設施和投資項目[原文如此]）與七國集團合作。

我們越來越希望與國會在兩黨合作的基礎上合作，爭取獲得必要的資源來釋放此類投資。 因為你無法憑空打敗某物。 中國帶來了大量資本，正如你所說，還有其他可以發揮作用的工具。

對於美國來說，我們的觀點不應該是，你知道，在任何特定國家，你知道，我們獲得一勝一負的方式是什麽。 應該是：我們如何實際出現並提供一些能夠滿足該國合法發展需求的東西。

我想我會認為我們在這方麵是不完整的。 我們在本屆政府中已經開始相當積極地開展這項工作，而且我們還有很多工作要做。 這將需要國會與我們合作釋放其中一些資源，進而釋放私營部門更大份額的資源，以實現我們想要實現的價值主張。

先生。 哈德利：丹?羅森。

先生。 沙利文：丹可以談談中國經濟。 （笑聲。）

觀眾：但是人們已經聽夠我談論這件事了，傑克。 這就是我想回到你身邊的地方。

所以當你參加會議時，一位經濟學家會想到一件事。 另一個，另一個。 但政治科學家和安全專家不也是這樣嗎，你將擁有一個完整的範圍？

 為了進行一場係統性的競爭，你是否必須從某種角度來看待他們的經濟體係的表現，才能弄清楚我們在這場競爭中的表現如何？

 盡管觀眾可能存在多樣性，但我希望美國政府內部的你們能夠對中國經濟體係的表現做出淨評估。

 先生。 沙利文：所以，首先，你剛剛完全推翻了我對史蒂夫問題的巧妙回避。 （笑聲）所以，我很欣賞這一點。

 其次，事實上，丹——據丹所知，我們把一批深入研究中國經濟的專家帶到了白宮。 也許那是一年前的事了。 你知道，這個群體中存在著各種各樣的意見，並且存在非常非常尖銳的分歧。

 首先，我想說有一點區別。 我發現對於基本的戰略診斷並沒有不同的意見。 關於我們應該在政治和安全方麵采取什麽措施，存在很多爭論。 盡管有一些，但關於我們正在處理什麽、我們正在關注什麽的頻譜較少。

 其次，是的，我們確實需要有一個操作假設。 但我想我想說的是，經營假設必須是謙虛的，因為它必須適應我們所看到的新經濟數據的現實或我們所看到的各種趨勢 一直在觀察自己的表現。

 因此，我們是根據一組特定的假設進行操作的。 現在，我將第二次嚐試回避闡述它們到底是什麽，因為我隻是不認為美國國家安全顧問以紙上談兵的中國經濟分析師的身份提出巨大的好處。 （笑聲。）

 但我想說，如果我們的假設被證明是錯誤的，我們還需要一個可以應用的多向策略。 我還要說，準確地說，這是一個特別困難的時期，因為新冠肺炎 (COVID-19) 疫情、所有因素如何協調到位。

 但總的來說，我在講話中所說的話以及在回答史蒂夫問題時所說的話我隻是想強調一下，那就是我們上任後並不接受我認為的關於美國相對軌跡的一種基礎廣泛的傳統智慧。 和中華人民共和國。 總統不接受這一點。 我不接受這一點。 我們的團隊沒有。 我們繼續反對這種認為不可阻擋的崛起、最終的衰退才是核心的觀點——這是兩國關係的核心特征。

我想我現在應該停止說話了，否則我會給自己惹上麻煩。 （笑聲）所以我就這麽做。

 先生。 哈德利：是的，女士。 請。

 觀眾：嘿，傑克。 Kim Dozier，CNN 分析師和 CFR 成員。

 我想問一下，關於中國繼續支持美國的對手，特別是俄羅斯，包括北京幫助莫斯科避免一些技術製裁，以及提供的不是武器，而是基本設備，你的信息是什麽？俄羅斯為烏克蘭戰爭提供重型卡車等裝備，以及中國通過增加石油采購來支持伊朗，而你最近指責伊朗支持上周末導致美軍喪生的致命襲擊。 謝謝。

 先生。 沙利文：正如我在演講中提到的，烏克蘭戰爭一直是我與中國同行對話的主線，可以追溯到王毅和楊潔篪之前的最初幾個月，你知道，我們 發出了明確的信息，表明我們擔心中國可能會提供針對烏克蘭平民的致命援助。 我們還沒有看到提供致命援助。

 但正如我在發言中所說，也正如你在問題中指出的那樣，我們看到了中國企業的支持，幫助俄羅斯重建國防工業基礎。 我們已經明確、直接地表達了我們的擔憂。 我在講話中指出，當我們看到這種情況發生時，我們準備采取措施應對此類活動，因為我們相信俄羅斯的國防工業基礎基本上正在建立，以繼續支持帝國的征服戰爭。 歐洲。 這是美國的根本國家安全利益。 在與我的同行的談話中，我毫不掩飾這一點。

 總統最近簽署了一項行政命令，賦予他額外的工具和權力來應對這一挑戰。 它不針對中華人民共和國。 這對於支持俄羅斯國防工業基礎的國家來說是普遍的，但它為我們提供了這方麵的工具。

 就伊朗而言，討論的重點領域之一是胡塞武裝在紅海的持續襲擊以及對海上商業重要動脈的破壞，破壞了全球經濟的供應鏈安全，坦率地說，破壞 對於中歐貿易而言，紅海顯然對中歐貿易至關重要。 並證明中國是一個負責任的參與者； 作為聯合國安理會成員，美國有義務利用其在德黑蘭的影響力，促使德黑蘭境內的人利用其對胡塞武裝的影響力來反擊這種行為。

 你知道，我不會描述回應的特征，因為我會把這個問題留給王毅自己來做，但我隻會說這是一次詳細而實質性的對話，因為這是一個我們相信各國、 特別是聯合國安理會常任理事國，擁有獨特的責任，應該承擔起這些責任。

 先生。 哈德利：我再回答一兩個問題。 這裏是這位紳士，然後是那邊的這位女士。

 先生。

 觀眾：謝謝你，傑克。 阿特?柯林斯與 the GROUP。

 跟我們談談韓國和日本的三邊關係吧。 據了解，你剛才提到，日本首相將於春季對日本進行國事訪問。 日本顯然正在增加——事實上，可能是增加一倍——其軍事預算。 但在這方麵，我們對韓國和日本的合作夥伴還有什麽期望呢？ 除了我們已經做的事情之外，我們還準備對這種關鍵關係做什麽？

 先生。 沙利文：嗯，你知道，首先，我認為重要的是要認識到三邊關係的安全層麵至關重要。 它一直是三個國家團結在一起的動力源泉。 它體現在更密切的情報協調、更密切的防務合作、演習、聯合威懾上，特別是在朝鮮半島問題上。 我們希望看到這種情況繼續發展。

 但我還要指出，三邊夥伴關係的範圍遠遠不止於此。 首先，它擴展到區域之外。 如果你看看對烏克蘭的支持，就會發現日本和韓國都大力支持歐洲民主國家。 日本首相特別明確地解釋說，烏克蘭發生的事情對印度-太平洋地區至關重要。 尹總統也強調了這一點。

 最後，這種關係延伸到經濟脅迫、技術與國家安全、創新、經濟投資和活力的交叉領域——這三個國家在所有領域都擁有巨大的互補能力來支持和提升彼此。

 當你把所有這些放在一起時，這就是具有共同價值觀的三個國家之間的強大夥伴關係。 經濟、技術、國家安全方麵的巨大能力； 和全球影響力。

 所以，你知道，我們對迄今為止所做的工作感到非常自豪，但這在很大程度上是一項正在進行的工作，在我們前進的過程中必須不斷加強。

 我最近剛剛在首爾參加了一次國家安全顧問三方會議，將其轉化為我們如何在導彈防禦預警等方麵合作的細節，並思考我們可以合作的領域以太——例如，回答之前提出的問題：我們如何在擁有來自我們三個國家的三筆巨額官方發展援助預算的發展中國家共同提出價值主張？

 所以，你知道，三邊夥伴關係不涉及任何國家。 這與中國無關。 這與朝鮮無關。 這是為了某種目標——對世界、對地區、更重要的是對世界的願景。 我們認為它有助於在共同優先事項背後創造巨大的動力，我們希望繼續發展這一勢頭。

 先生。 哈德利：最後一個問題。 我向那些我沒有聯係到的人表示歉意。

 女士，回來了。 就在這兒。 是的。 你能把麥克風遞給她嗎？ 太感謝了。

 觀眾：嗨。 瑪吉?多爾蒂與參議院外交關係委員會。

 你簡單地提到了人權，所以我想聽聽你對中國侵犯維吾爾族、藏族、基督教少數群體人權的策略。 我們將如何麵對這一挑戰？

 先生。 沙利文：首先，正如總統公開表示的那樣，他在兩次峰會的談話中非常明確和直接地闡述了美國總統就這些問題發表講話的基本責任和義務。 問題，因為這是我們的核心。 這並不是要試圖將問題武器化；而是要試圖將問題武器化。 這是為了踐行我們的價值觀。 這就是他在我們處理這個問題時試圖向美國政府灌輸的精神。

 因此，這意味著我們不僅要就這些問題大聲疾呼，還要采取行動。 過去三年來，我們在你提到的每個領域都采取了一係列行動。 在很大程度上，我們是在兩黨合作的基礎上與國會合作做到這一點的，包括我們政府通過的、我們現在正在實施的關於強迫勞動等問題的法律，《維吾爾族強迫勞動預防法》。

 因此，正如曆屆政府所做的那樣，這仍將是美中關係的一個重要優先事項和特征。 從我們的角度來看，直接外交和對關係的強化管理與在與保護人權有關的問題上站出來發言並采取實質性行動並不矛盾。

 先生。 哈德利：所以我們已經到了最後的時刻了。 如果可以的話，讓我告訴你我們接下來要做什麽。

 我要感謝大家參加這次混合會議。 傑克，謝謝你和我們在一起。

 結尾

Remarks and Q&A by National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan on the Future of U.S.-China Relations

https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2024/01/30/remarks-and-qa-by-national-security-advisor-jake-sullivan-on-the-future-of-u-s-china-relations/

JANUARY 30, 2024

Council on Foreign Relations

Washington, D.C.

MR. SULLIVAN:  At least I had the bravery to give that speech at Brookings rather than at CFR.  So — (laughter) —

Mike, I want to say thank you for having me back at CFR.  And to Susan and Kurt and Charlene and Steve, thank you for having me back at the UCSD China Forum, which I’ve had the privilege of actually attending since its inauguration.  I would say San Diego in January is a little nicer than D.C. in January, but we’ll make do here.

My aim today is not to try to unveil a new China strategy, but something more straightforward: to share with you behind the curtain how we’ve tried to implement our strategy over the last three years and then what we might expect here in 2024.  And in the course of that, without directly answering the questions Mike has posed, perhaps provide a little grist for the mill that can help over the next couple of days as you grapple with these very difficult questions.

I want to start by taking a step back.

Before serving in the Biden administration, many of us who are now in government — including myself and Kurt and others — were revisiting the assumptions behind our longstanding China policy in writing and in conferences like this one.  And once in government, we immersed ourselves in the latest intelligence, expertise, and analysis.

We determined that the PRC was the only state with both the intent to reshape the international order and the economic, diplomatic, military, and technological power to do it.  We saw that the PRC sought to “catch up and surpass” the United States in high technology; that it was pursuing the largest peacetime military buildup in history; and that it was more repressive at home and more assertive abroad, including in the South and East China Seas as well as the Taiwan Strait.  We saw the PRC working to make the world more dependent on China while reducing its own dependence on the world.  And we saw it taking steps to adapt the international system to accommodate its own system and preferences.

We also saw something that really stood out, which is that the PRC believed the United States was in terminal decline — that our industrial base had been hollowed out, that our commitment to our allies and partners had been undercut, that the United States was struggling to manage a once-in-a-century pandemic, and that many in Beijing were openly proclaiming that “the East was rising and the West was falling.”

When we came into office, we inherited an approach from the previous administration that had updated the diagnosis of the scope and nature of the China challenge but had not adequately developed the strategy and tools to address it.  That approach was at times more confrontational than competitive, and too often undervalued the allies and partners critical to sustaining an effective China strategy.

But we did not want to return to an earlier approach with the PRC, one based on more optimistic assumptions about its trajectory and that sometimes prioritized avoiding friction over pursuing the American national interest.  So we developed our own approach, which Secretary Blinken laid out in a speech a couple of years ago — invest, align, compete — that sought to strengthen our competitive position and secure our interests and values while carefully managing this vital relationship.

And over the past three years, we’ve implemented that approach.  We’ve made far-reaching investments in the foundation of American strength at home with historic legislation on infrastructure, chips and science, and clean energy, all while addressing the PRC’s non-market practices and taking steps to ensure that the United States would lead in the sources of technological and economic growth.  

We believe our approach has generated results.  Large-scale investments in semiconductor and clean-energy production in the United States are up 20-fold since 2019.  Construction spending on new manufacturing projects has already doubled.  And looking out over the next decade, we’re estimating $3.5 trillion in new public and private investment, unlocked by the investments made in the historic legislation I just referenced.  

Abroad, we’ve tried to strengthen our ties with Indo-Pacific allies and partners in ways that would have been unlikely, even inconceivable, a few years ago.  We launched AUKUS.  We elevated the Quad.  We upgraded our relationship with Vietnam, the Philippines, India, Indonesia, and others.

We launched a historic trilateral with Japan and the Republic of Korea that culminated in a historic summit that President Biden hosted at Camp David.  

We held summits — multiple summits — with the leaders of the Pacific Islands as well as with ASEAN.

Our regional allies and partners, for their part, are betting on American economic vitality.  They’ve announced almost $200 billion of investments into the United States since the start of the administration.

We’ve also worked to connect our European and Indo-Pacific alliances.  And together with our G7 partners, we’ve aligned on collective steps to de-risk our economies and diversify away from strategic dependencies rather than decoupling.  And alongside our allies and partners, we’ve stressed the importance of maintaining peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.

We’ve also worked hard to ensure that advanced and sensitive technologies our companies are developing do not become a source of vulnerability.  We implemented carefully tailored export restrictions on key technologies; focused on advanced semiconductor manufacturing tools — a topic, by the way, that was central to one of the earlier UCSD forums when I first really got immersed in this question of semiconductor manufacturing equipment; supercomputing capabilities; and the most advanced chips critical to military modernization.

We also took steps to regulate outbound investments of concern in technology and to strengthen CFIUS’s focus on critical technologies to make sure inbound investment actually addresses evolving national security challenges — the screening regime for inbound investment.

These steps are not about protectionism, and they’re not about holding anybody back.  They’re critical for our national security over the long run.

Now, the backdrop to these actions was the strongest post-pandemic recovery and among the lowest inflation of any leading economy in the world.  For years, economists were predicting that the PRC would overtake the United States in GDP either in this decade or the next.  Now those projections are moving further and further out.  And with the PRC facing its own set of challenges, some say that moment may never come.

And this brings me to a critical point: America, in this moment, is once more showing its capacity for resilience and reinvention.

 But this is not the whole story.  And that’s what’s really critical about the remarks I want to give today.

As we took these steps to improve our competitive position, we aimed to do so in a way that built stability into one of the world’s most consequential relationships — perhaps the world’s most consequential relationship.  And, in fact, we believe our investments at home and our work to deepen ties with allies and partners abroad actually created the conditions for more effective diplomacy with the PRC.

A sustainable China policy is about holding in one’s head multiple truths at the same time and working iteratively to reconcile them.  We are clear-eyed about the competitive structural dynamics in our relationship with the PRC.  But we’re also keenly aware that the United States and the PRC are economically interdependent and share interests in addressing transnational problems and reducing the risk of conflict.

We realize that efforts, implied or explicit, to shape or change the PRC over several decades did not succeed.  We expect that the PRC will be a major player on the world stage for the foreseeable future.  That means that even as we compete, we have to find ways to live alongside one another.

Competition with the PRC does not have to lead to conflict, confrontation, or a new Cold War.  The United States can take steps to advance its interests and values and those of its allies and partners on the one hand, while responsibly managing competition on the other.  Being able to do both of those things is at the heart of our approach.  And in fact, the United States has decades of experience talking to and even working with our competitors when our interests call for it.  

Over the last year, we’ve called on that experience.  And while “managing competition” can feel like an abstract slogan, the best way to understand how it translates into action is to “zoom in” on 2023.

The year began with the relationship at a historic low point.  A year ago this week, a Chinese spy balloon traveled across the United States.  We were, and remain, deeply concerned about the PRC providing Russia with lethal aid in its invasion of Ukraine.  And after historic and unprecedented — and not historic in a positive sense — PRC military exercises in August of 2022, it seemed a series of cross-Strait crises loomed over the horizon.

All of this set back the progress from the Bali summit between President Biden and President Xi.  High-level communication halted, to say nothing of military-to-military ties or cooperation on counternarcotics or climate — all of which the PRC had frozen.

We set out to stabilize the relationship without sacrificing our capacity to strengthen our alliances, compete vigorously, and defend our interests.

Beginning in May of last year, we launched a period of intensive diplomacy.  It was an all-hands-on-deck effort across the Cabinet spanning the full range of our relationship with the PRC.  The goal was not to paper over our differences.  Our aim instead was to address misperceptions and miscommunication, to avoid major surprises, to reopen defunct channels, and to more clearly signal to each other about our respective positions and interests.  And we sought to increase not just the quantity but the quality of our communication.

 In May, I spent two days with Director Wang Yi in Vienna to help restore some normalcy to the relationship.  In Vienna, we reached consensus on a rough roadmap for high-level engagement to carry out the agenda that President Biden and President Xi had set forward in Bali — one both sides hoped at that time would ultimately culminate in a leader-level meeting in San Francisco at APEC later in the year.

 In the months that followed, we held a series of critical meetings.

 In June, Secretary Blinken traveled to Beijing and met with President Xi and senior foreign policy officials, working to stabilize after a period of tension.

In July, Secretary Yellen traveled to Beijing to build relationships with the PRC’s new economic leadership.  In that same month, Special Envoy for Climate John Kerry traveled to reopen climate channels that had stalled for months.

Then, in August, Secretary Raimondo visited the PRC to advance our commercial ties and underscore our commitment to protect critical technologies with national security implications without severing the economic relationship between the U.S. and China.

Critics said at the time that this travel was one-sided, but our strategy was to use those meetings to open up a two-way flow of exchanges, and that’s exactly what happened.

This intensive diplomacy was about managing tough issues rather than patching up the relationship.  We were direct about our differences, including PRC support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and cross-Strait issues.   

We did not pull back from national security-focused measures, like restrictions on outbound investment and updates to our export controls.  Instead, we used these meetings as opportunities to explain what these measures were, but almost as importantly, what they were not, which was an attempt to undermine the PRC’s prosperity and development.  That is not what those measures were, and we explained that clearly to our counterparts in these sessions.  

We also used these meetings to find space to coordinate on issues where our interests overlapped.

In September, Director Wang Yi and I met in Malta for another round of meetings.  We charted the course for a leader meeting in San Francisco and laid out what we hoped to accomplish on issues like counternarcotics and mil-mil channels.  

Over the following weeks, Majority Leader Schumer led a bipartisan delegation to the PRC, and the PRC sent a stream of officials to the United States, including the Vice President, the Vice Premier, and Director Wang Yi, who came for two days of meetings with Secretary Blinken and myself.

And all of this culminated, as you heard from Mike, in the meeting — the summit — between President Biden and President Xi in Woodside, California, which saw progress on three major issues.

First, President Biden and President Xi restarted counternarcotics cooperation.  Since then, we’ve seen Beijing take initial steps to stem the flow of precursor chemicals used to make fentanyl, progress that we hope and need to see continue.  The first interagency counternarcotics working group between the U.S. and the PRC met today in Beijing, and our aim is to open up law enforcement cooperation on fighting this terrible drug.

Second, President Biden and President Xi announced the resumption of military-to-military communication that had been frozen for more than a year.  The Chairman of our Joint Chiefs of Staff has now spoken with his counterpart, and we’ve restored a number of critical operator-level mechanisms.  The question now is whether that will continue even in the face of future turbulence.  We, for our part, will continue to make the case that military-to-military communication is critical at all times but especially in times of tension. 

And third, the Woodside summit saw our leaders announce a new dialogue aimed at managing the risks of artificial intelligence, which will start in the spring. 

As Mike mentioned, this past weekend I met with Director Wang Yi in Bangkok to follow up on the Woodside summit and to advance efforts in each of these three areas. 

Detailed, dogged diplomacy is necessary to manage the friction that is endemic to a strategic competition between two major powers.  Some risks to that effort may be unforeseeable, may be surprises.  Other risks are more recognizable, including friction in the South and East China Sea and economic and technology moves and countermoves. 

The most significant risk would be a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, especially given Beijing’s increased military activity in and around its air and waters.  Here, too, intensive diplomacy matters. 

Just a few weeks ago, Taiwan held historic elections without any major cross-Strait incident, in part because all sides — Washington, Beijing, and Taipei — worked to reduce miscommunication and misperception about their respective intentions.  That is an outcome few may have foreseen in August of 2022, when most expected the cross-Strait situation to grow more tense, not less.  But it’s no guarantee of future trends, and the risk remains real.  So we have to keep working at this by intensifying both diplomacy and deterrence. 

Over the next year, as we have for the last three, we’ll continue to take action on human rights abuses, forced labor, and nonproliferation.  We’ll be vigilant about the PRC’s support for Russia’s war against Ukraine and its efforts to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base, and we’ll take necessary measures to respond. 

If PRC provocations continue in the South and East China Seas and the Taiwan Strait, we’ll work closely with allies and partners to push back and speak out about the risks to peace and stability in the world’s most important waterways.  We’ll continue to uphold freedom of navigation in the region by flying, sailing, and operating wherever international law allows.  And we’ll continue to pursue tailored national security measures designed to protect our national security. 

And even as we do so, we’ll aim to continue the pace of intensive interaction with the PRC that has helped both sides manage areas of difference and unlock cooperation on areas where our interests align. 

We’re not planning to recreate the now outdated structures and mechanisms from an earlier period in the bilateral relationship.  And we’re definitely not interested in dialogue just for dialogue’s sake.  But we do see value in launching and shepherding a select number of working-level consultations in discrete, carefully chosen areas to advance our interests and achieve results.  That’s the approach we use today on counternarcotics — an approach rooted in the here and now rather than in the nostalgia of the past. 

In the period ahead, we hope we can work with the PRC to deepen crisis communication mechanisms to reduce the risk of conflict.  We’re ready to coordinate on climate, health security, global macroeconomic stability, and new challenges like the risks posed by artificial intelligence.  We’ll also talk to Beijing about challenging regional and global issues, from the Red Sea to the Korean Peninsula.  And we’ll work to advance progress on a range of bilateral issues too, including people-to-people ties. 

Let me conclude by noting that none of this will be easy, and there will be times of tension.  That’s inevitable in a competition like this that is simply not going to resolve in a neat and decisive end state.  And as I noted, one thing is certain: There will be surprises along the way. 

We’ll keep working to manage the competition as we have over the last year.  We’ll continue to invest in our strength at home and to deepen our global networks of alliances and partnerships abroad. 

The approach I’m describing to you is not some big strategic shift.  It’s an effort we began building from the day we came into office.  It’s also not something new to American statecraft.  Far from it.  It’s an approach that is itself uniquely American and rooted in decades of history, diplomacy, and hard-won experience.  It’s also rooted in bipartisanship, because when the United States deals in a strategic competition from a position of strong bipartisan support, of all pulling together in service of the country, we always come out stronger for it. 

So we intend to stick with this strategy.  We intend to do what we need to do to protect our interests and defend our allies, while at the same time effectively managing competition with China to the good not just of the United States, but to the good of global stability as well.  That is our commitment.  That’s what we’ve tried to do. 

And today my goal was simply to walk you through how we’ve tried to execute that in practice so we can get beyond the kind of broad slogans and down to the actual day-to-day hard work that an incredible team of people across the entire U.S. government, both career and appointed, have been working.  And we’ve done so, I must say, looking around this room, with the support and advice of a huge number of people here from both parties, from the private sector and the public sector, and across a range of walks of life.  And that is the only way we’re going to continue to succeed in this effort as we go forward. 

So thank you for giving me the opportunity to speak today, and I look forward to the conversation.  (Applause.) 

MR. HADLEY:  Jake, thank you for being with us.  Thank you for your remarks.  I think we’re all much better informed about what you’ve been building in terms of China policy and the successes that you’ve had. 

What we’re going to do is I’m going to ask three or four questions to Jake, up here.  And then we’re going to turn to the audience to take questions from you.  This is all on the record.  And we will try to end promptly at 7:45.  And I will proceed with the rest of the activities of the evening. 

Let me begin by asking you if — what, if anything, you would feel comfortable telling us about your recent meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi in Thailand.  Any great breakthroughs to report here tonight?  (Laughter.)  Any news you want to make before the assembled multitude? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, first, we had a very nice meal.  So that was good.  (Laughter.)

You know, this is my third extended round of conversations with Wang Yi — the first in Vienna, the second in Malta, and then this one in Bangkok.  And with each successive round, I think we have increasingly gotten to the point of setting aside the talking points and really having strategic conversations. 

In terms of next steps, the main things coming out of the meeting were actually to, you know, kind of fix the launch of this AI dialogue, where the U.S. and China will work together to manage risk.  And that will get going this spring.  So we talked through what the elements of that would look like. 

Second, we had the opportunity to go deep on cross-Strait issues and to share our respective positions.  And I’ll be cautious.  As you know very well, this is littered with landmines to speak about publicly.  And also, I want to respect the discretion of the channel.  But I think it was a very useful, direct, and candid set of conversations on that topic. 

And then, we obviously also had the opportunity to talk about current events — current events in the Red Sea, current events on the Korean Peninsula, concerns that we have about instability in both places.  And I would say the quality and character of those conversations and a rather direct and, in some ways, intensive conversation about the war in Ukraine, I think helped both of us leave feeling that we didn’t agree or see eye-to-eye on everything but that there was a lot of work to carry forward. 

Last point I would make: We agreed that President Biden and President Xi should speak and should speak by telephone relatively soon.  And I think the acknowledgment coming out of Woodside that there really is no substitute for leader-to-leader conversation — I mean, it became so apparent over the course of that meeting at Woodside how central that ingredient has to be to an effective stewardship of U.S.-China policy.  And so, both of us agreed that we would report back to our leaders and we would get them on the phone sooner rather than later.

 MR. HADLEY:  Great.  Let me ask you on the Taiwan question.  They recently, of course, had elections in Taiwan.  A lot of commentary by some of the people in this room about the significance of those elections.  How do you see them?  And what impact do you think the results might have on our ability to manage the cross-Strait relationship? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, you know, we were explicit and direct, publicly and privately, with all stakeholders that we were not taking a position in those elections; we remained studiously neutral throughout.  We congratulated the winner.  We congratulated the — Tsai Ing-wen on, you know, an effective democratic election.  And now, you know, we’ve made clear we would like to see a smooth transition. 

And otherwise, from the United States’ perspective, Taiwan exhibiting this vibrant, democratic character is a positive thing.  And our policy remains constant through it.  As it was before, it will be going forward — the One China policy, the Taiwan Relations Act, the Six Assurances, and all of the issues that people in this room know so well. 

And President Biden has been clear that, you know, we remain committed to the One China policy.  And I was clear on that with Wang Yi as well. 

I was also clear that we continue to have concerns about elevated levels of aggressive military activity around the Strait.  We don’t regard that as conducive to peace and stability.  And we generally want to see, as I think the rest of the world does, peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait.  And we are committed to doing everything we can to support that. 

MR. HADLEY:  Thank you.  I want to ask a little bit about the Chinese economy.  There’s a lot that has been written about the structural problems of the economy, a lot of speculation that the administration in Beijing has neither the ability nor the willingness to address those underlying structural problems.  A fairly gloomy view about the prospects for the Chinese economy. 

And I wonder whether that negative — whether that narrative is too negative.  And I’d ask you how you see the prospects of the economy and the ability and willingness of Xi and his team to address some of the structural problems that we all know about in terms of the real estate sector, indebtedness, and all the rest. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  You know, in the last couple of times I went to the UCSD China Forum — it was before I came into government — I made a habit of going up to the smartest people I know on China and on economics, and buttonholing them and saying, “Tell me about the economy in China.”  And I would hear a, kind of, general answer from one and I would think, “Okay, that’s the answer.”  And then I would talk to someone else, and they would have quite a different answer. 

And the spectrum of opinion on whither China’s economy among incredibly informed, like, right-thinking people is quite broad.  And so, I’m humble enough to not really be able to characterize the likely future trajectory of that economy because I think if you would have asked people that question two years ago, they might have a different answer than they have today.  Frankly, if you asked people about the U.S. economy one year ago versus where they are today, people would have a different answer. 

So what we’re focused on fundamentally is thinking about what we can do to invest in the sources of our own strength here in the United States.  And I talked about that some in my speech.  And we kind of reject what I believe was a kind of common view that somehow, you know, it was a story of inexorable rise on the one side and inexorable decline on the other side.  Choices matter in both Beijing and Washington.  We’re trying to make the right choices.  And of course, it’s up to Beijing how they choose to make choices on their side. 

How’s that for not really answering your question?  (Laughter.) 

MR. HADLEY:  It’s good.  It’s good.  You know — 

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’m learning from Tony Blinken how to be a diplomat.  (Laughter.) 

MR. HADLEY:  I’m going to go off script for a minute and ask one question about how you frame the policy, because you made clear that our goal is not to hold back or undermine the Chinese economy.  That’s not the objective of what we’re doing.  We’re doing things to protect our own national security interests. 

But don’t we have to be candid with China that some of the things we are doing to protect our own national security interests are actually having an adverse and will have an adverse effect on the Chinese economy?  It’ll have an adverse effect on our economy in terms of economic growth and the like. 

Have we been candid enough with the Chinese about what it is we’re doing, why we’re doing it, and what impact it’s going to have on China? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  I mean, one thing that we really tried to embark on — and I alluded to this in my speech a year ago — was to be much more direct and transparent about what the nature of the measures we were undertaking both were and would be, because we were telegraphing to them, as well, “This is where we are going on outbound investment or on updates to semiconductor export controls.  This is why we’re doing it.  This is how we’ve tailored it.  This is the rigorous process we put in place.  And this is the rationale.”  And then heard their response to that. 

And Wang Yi and I had an opportunity in Bangkok to talk about how each of us, China and the United States, see the boundary between economics and national security.  And obviously, we don’t have completely converging perspectives on that question.  But I think it’s really important to recognize that, for a very long time, the PRC has taken measures on explicit grounds of national security that have had an adverse impact on American workers, American businesses, the American economy.  And so, this cannot be a one-way street of a conversation. 

You know, China will come to the table with its concerns about what the United States is doing.  And the United States has an obligation on behalf of its citizens to come to the table with our concerns about what China has been doing for quite a long time.  And I certainly came to the table prepared to do that when we were in Bangkok. 

MR. HADLEY:  Good for you. 

I’m going to give you one more chance to make some news.  (Laughter.) 

Should we — on this issue of technology in particular, should we expect further steps by the Biden administration to de-risk the U.S. economy from its overdependence on China?  And in what areas are we likely to see further action? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So first, to answer your question, I probably won’t make news. 

I just want to take a minute on what we mean by de-risking.  And, in fact, I’ve said this directly to my Chinese counterparts.  It basically has three elements. 

First, investing in America’s industrial and innovation capacity.  A big way to de-risk is to have more capacity ourselves to be able to, you know, operate at the technological innovation edge. 

The second is to diversify supply chains so that we’re not dependent on any single point of failure.  And that’s not all about China.  That’s a lesson we learned from COVID.  But the PRC is a part of that. 

And the third is to have a series of tailored measures so that American technology cannot be used to undermine the security of the United States and our allies.  And in this category, we have been transparent that we’ve taken a series of steps already, and we will take further steps as we go forward, all according to the basic principle that we are going to tailor them and target them in a way that they really are aimed at our national security concerns and not at a broader effort to decouple our technological ecosystems or our economies.  But I will leave for a later day what exactly the nature and timetable of additional measures will be. 

One more thing I will say is: In October of 2022, we did a first round of export controls on advanced semiconductors and semiconductor manufacturing equipment.  In October of 2023, we updated them.  I think the world can expect that will be part of the process going forward, because as the technology evolves, our controls have to evolve.  It doesn’t mean the standards underlying our controls evolve — those remain constant — but they have to be applied to technology as it advances.  And that will require updates to existing controls, even as we add, you know, targeted, tailored controls in other areas as well. 

MR. HADLEY:  If I were a man from Mars coming down, I would say, listening to you and observing the relationship, that these two countries are trying to maintain some stability in the relationship and have made some tactical shifts, but strategically, China is continuing with a series of policies they’ve been pursuing for some time.  And the Biden administration is going to continue, as you just suggested, with the policies done.  There seem to be a lot of centripetal forces pulling at this relationship — and that’s before you get to the United States Congress.  Can you really keep it kludged together?  What’s the way to keep it (inaudible)? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Look, it’s a fair question.  And obviously, we’ve gone through periods of considerable tension, even during President Biden’s tenure.  But he is determined to hold these two things in his head at the same time.  As I said before, that, yes, there are structural, competitive dynamics in the relationship, and we should be clear-eyed about that, and we should look at that — stare at that square in the face.  And on the other hand, we have an obligation for our own national interest to ensure that that competition does not veer into conflict, that we manage it to a point of stability, and that we also find areas where we can work together where our interests align. 

Now, that recipe is, I think, relatively easily distilled in words.  It is harder to put into action.  And it requires a level of intense diplomacy of the kind I really tried to walk through in my speech and care — you know, basically constant gardening.  And even then, whether foreseen or unforeseen, risks and tensions could boil over.  We cannot — you cannot deny that.  But it is — you know, we don’t have to be fatalistic about it, either. 

Our job is to try to understand, in a clear-eyed way, what those risks and inherent tensions are, and do our very best to manage them without compromising on our fundamental values and without walking away from the defense of the American national interest and the interest of our allies and partners. 

And part of the reason that I tried to give these remarks in more of a way of, like, “let’s actually just talk about 2023 and what we did through the year” is it’s there’s a lot of aphorisms in the U.S.-China relationship — “manage competition,” and, you know, “invest, align, compete.”  At the end of the day, it really comes down to a set of actions that we take here domestically, a set of investments we make in our allies and partners, and then just direct, dogged diplomacy with China built on the proposition that, yes, we’re going to compete but we also are going to inhabit the same planet, and we have to work together to ensure that we don’t end up tipping over into conflict. 

That’s what this is about.  It doesn’t really reduce to a bumper sticker.  But I think it’s a kind of common-sense strategy that can secure bipartisan support and that people — if you kind of look at American attitudes on the PRC, I think that’s basically where the American people are.  They want us to be tough and stand up for our interests and push back against aggression or actions that harm Americans, but they also are not looking for war.  And so that’s what we’re trying to work towards. 

MR. HADLEY:  Last quick question from me.  We have a session tomorrow on the China forum about the internal political situation in China, both its resilience and its fragility in its political system.  Anything you want to say about that — 

MR. SULLIVAN:  No.  (Laughter.) 

MR. HADLEY:  — in terms of how you — 

MR. SULLIVAN:  I’ll refer you to Beijing to comment on it. 

MR. HADLEY:  So we’ll all have to tune into the session tomorrow. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Exactly. 

MR. HADLEY:  I guess Jake is deferring to that. 

Let’s go to the audience if we can.  I want to remind everybody this is an on-the-record session, and I’d like to invite folks from the audience to engage in this conversation.  So please raise your hand and I will call on you. 

Let’s start with this gentleman here. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you very much.  My name is Marc Rotenberg.  I’m with the Center for AI and Digital Policy. 

And you talked about artificial intelligence in your remarks.  I wanted to begin by saying I think it was very good that China participated in the UK AI Summit.  That was not originally anticipated.  But clearly, as you’ve said, it’s important to maintain discussion about the risk of AI in warfare. 

But at the same time, there are also clearly two different forms of government.  And AI can support an open and pluralist government or AI can support a more closed, constrained form of government. 

And it seems to me that there is a policy debate playing out right now regarding the governance of AI and, frankly, some concerns about the U.S. position.  So, presently, at the Council of Europe, a treaty on AI is being negotiated.  The mandate of the Council of Europe is to promote fundamental rights, democratic institutions, and the rule of law.  And many of our democratic allies are looking for a robust treaty that safeguards fundamental rights in this era of AI. 

Concerns have been expressed about the U.S. position.  And my question is: Will the U.S. government support a robust treaty on AI that safeguards fundamental rights? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, we have been very actively engaged in the negotiations over the treaty at the Council of Europe because our basic vision for the governance of AI is rooted in the idea of the protection of fundamental rights and the empowerment of people lifting them up rather than holding them down. 

And we do have a very different vision of AI governance than the PRC does, which is why our dialogue with them will really vector in on our, kind of, responsibility as significant countries and major AI players to manage the risks of AI as we go forward. 

And we’ve put forward voluntary standards that we’ve gotten some of the biggest AI players in the world to sign up to.  We’ve issued an executive order that reflects many of the core values and principles that are at the heart of your question. 

Where things ultimately land on the treaty in the Council of Europe is not going to be whether the U.S. is for or against the treaty that is strong on fundamental rights.  It’ll be on more specific provisions that may cut across particular interests we have. 

So I can’t predict how that treaty negotiation will turn out, but I can tell you that however it turns out, it will — the United States’ basic commitment to this broader vision, which we have articulated ourselves and have now begun infusing in international institutions including an effort at the U.N. General Assembly to have a resolution on AI, that work will be active and the United States will play a leadership role in it. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you. 

MR. HADLEY:  Yes, ma’am. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hi.  Thank you so much for being with us today.  I’m Wafa Ben-Hassine.  I’m at the Omidyar Network.  I’m also a UC-San Diego alum, political science.  So thank you to the CFR for bringing San Diego to us, even if you couldn’t be there. 

My question actually takes us to a different geography.  In Africa, we see China moving beyond the Belt and Road Initiative and the Digital Silk Road.  We see them have relatively nuanced interventions in how they attempt to influence policy, such as, by way of example, supplying Huawei phones to all sorts of nonprofits and independent media groups and outlets. 

I’m curious if you could illuminate a little bit about the U.S.’s positioning in Africa and how we would potentially like to secure our national security and also promote human rights in Africa in response to these types of interventions.  Thank you. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, my sister is actually a UCSD alum as well; she went to UCSD medical school.  So I got to hang out there with her.  It’s a beautiful campus, a wonderful place to go to school. 

One thing that Kurt and I wrote in our Foreign Affairs piece in 2019 that I have felt, like, really important to keep us disciplined in this is that we cannot treat the rest of the world as proxy battlegrounds the way that I think the U.S. and the Soviet Union too often did during the Cold War. 

So, looking at Africa, our question should not be how do we gain relative advantage over China in this country, because that becomes a warping and distorting factor that, frankly, in a way, can also undermine our overall position.  So the question we pose instead is: How do we offer a better value proposition? 

And I would say one of the areas that, frankly, is a gap that we are trying to fill now quite actively is mobilization of capital for investment in the things that African countries are looking for for their development — in infrastructure, in clean energy, in digital.  And that’s about money.  And it’s about public-sector money leveraging private-sector dollars by buying down political risk, currency risk. 

And we have worked very closely with the new head of the World Bank, who President Biden, you know, played an active role in helping get into the job, Ajay Banga.  We’re trying to expand the World Bank’s capacity to do this.  We’ve worked with the G7 through PGI, the Project [sic] on Global Infrastructure and Investment, to do this. 

And we’re increasingly looking to work on a bipartisan basis with the Congress to try to have the resources necessary to unlock these kinds of investments.  Because you can’t beat something with nothing.  China is coming with a substantial amount of capital and also, as you said, other tools to be able to bring to bear. 

And for the United States, our view should not be, you know, in any given country, you know, what’s just the way we get a one-up.  It should be: how do we actually show up and offer something that will respond to the legitimate development needs of that country. 

And I think I would grade us as incomplete on this.  It’s work that we have begun to do quite actively in this administration, and we have a lot more work to do.  That’s going to require Congress working with us to unlock some of these resources that in turn can unlock a much larger share of resources from the private sector to deliver the value proposition we want to deliver. 

MR. HADLEY:  Dan Rosen. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Dan can talk about the Chinese economy.  (Laughter.) 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  But people have heard enough of me talking about it, Jake.  So that’s where I want to circle back to you. 

So you come to the conference, and one economist thinks one thing.  Another, another.  But isn’t that true of political scientists and security experts out here too, that you’re going to have a whole spectrum? 

And to fight a — to wage a systemic competition, don’t you have to come down to a sort of point of view about how their economic system is doing in order to figure out how well we’re performing in that competition? 

And while there’s probably diversity here in the audience, I hope within USG you guys managed to come to a net assessment about how that Chinese economic system is performing. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, you’ve just completely exploded my artful dodge of Steve’s question.  (Laughter.)  So, I appreciate that. 

Second, in fact, Dan — as Dan knows, we brought in a group of experts, who have immersed themselves in the Chinese economy, to the White House.  Maybe it was a year ago or so.  And there was a diversity of opinions among that group, you know, with quite — quite sharp disagreements. 

First, I would say there is a bit of a difference.  I don’t find the diversity of opinion on just basic underlying strategic diagnosis.  There’s a lot of debate about what we should do about it on the political and security side.  Less spectrum on kind of what are we dealing with, what are we looking at, though there are some. 

Secondly, yes, we do need to have an operating assumption.  But I think the point I’d like to make is that operating assumption has to be humble, because — and it has to be adaptable to the reality of what we see as new economic data comes out or as various trends that we’ve all been watching manifest themselves. 

So we are operating according to a certain set of assumptions.  I will now for the second time try and dodge laying out exactly what they are because I just don’t see a huge amount of upside in the U.S. National Security Advisor kind of holding forth as an armchair analyst on China’s economy.  (Laughter.)

 

But I would say that we also need a multidirectional strategy that can apply if our assumptions turn out to be wrong.  And I would also say that this has been a uniquely difficult time, to be quite precise on this, because of COVID-19, the pandemic, how all the pieces fit into place.

 

But broadly speaking, what I said in my remarks and what I said in answer to Steve’s question I would just reinforce, which is we came into office not accepting what I think was a kind of broad-based conventional wisdom about relative trajectories of the U.S. and the PRC.  The President didn’t accept that.  I didn’t accept that.  Our team did not.  And we continue to push back against this idea about inexorable rise, terminal decline as being central — a central characteristic of the relationship. 

And I guess I should stop talking now because otherwise I’ll get myself into trouble.  (Laughter.)  So that’s what I’ll do. 

MR. HADLEY:  Yes, ma’am.  Please. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hey, Jake.  Kim Dozier, CNN analyst and CFR member. 

I wanted to ask what your message was regarding China’s continuing support for U.S. adversaries, specifically Russia, including Beijing helping Moscow avoid some of the technology sanctions and providing, while not weapons, but basic equipment like heavy-duty trucks for Russia’s war on Ukraine, and China’s support for Iran with rising petroleum purchases, whereas you’ve recently blamed Iran for supporting the deadly attacks that cost the lives of U.S. troops this past weekend.Thanks. 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, as I referred to in my speech, the war in Ukraine has been a through-line of my conversations with my Chinese counterparts going back to before Wang Yi, with Yang Jiechi, in the early months, you know, where we sent a clear message about our concern that China might provide lethal aid for use against civilians in Ukraine.  We have not seen the provision of lethal aid. 

But as I said in my remarks, and as you noted in your question, we have seen support from Chinese companies to help Russia reconstitute its defense industrial base.  And we have been clear and direct about our concerns.  And I noted in my remarks that as we watch this happen, we’re prepared to take steps to respond to that kind of activity, because we believe that Russia’s defense industrial base is basically building up to continue to support an imperial war of conquest in Europe.  And that’s a fundamental national security interest of the United States.  And I made no bones about that in my conversations with my counterpart. 

And the President has recently signed an executive order that gives him additional tools and authorities to deal with this challenge.  It’s not directed at the PRC.  It is general to countries that are supporting Russia’s defense industrial base, but it gives us tools in this regard. 

With respect to Iran, one of the areas of substantial focus in the discussion was about the continuing Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the disruption of a vital artery of maritime commerce, undermining of supply chain security in the global economy, and frankly, disruption to China-Europe trade, which the Red Sea is obviously, you know, critical to.  And made the case that, you know, China is a responsible player; as a U.N. Security Council member, has an obligation to use the influence it has in Tehran to get those in Tehran to use the influence they have with the Houthis to push back against this kind of behavior. 

And I won’t, you know, characterize the response because I’ll leave that to Wang Yi to do for himself, but I will just say that was a detailed and substantive conversation, because it is a matter where we believe that countries, particularly permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, have unique responsibilities and should step up to those responsibilities. 

MR. HADLEY:  I’ll take one or two more questions.  This gentleman here and then this woman back there. 

Sir. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Thank you, Jake.  Art Collins with theGROUP. 

Talk to us a little bit about the trilateral relationship with South Korea and Japan.  As we know, you mentioned it earlier, the Prime Minister of Japan will be here in the spring for a state visit.  Japan is obviously increasing — in fact, maybe doubling — its military budget.  But what else do we expect from our partners in that regard, in both South Korea and Japan?  And what are we prepared to do, beyond what we’ve already done, with that critical relationship? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  Well, you know, first, I think it’s important to recognize that the security dimension of that trilateral relationship is critical.  It has been a source of propulsion for pulling the three countries together.  And it manifests in closer intelligence coordination, closer defense cooperation, exercises, joint deterrence, particularly when it comes to the Korean Peninsula.  And we’d like to see that continue to evolve. 

But I would also point out that the trilateral partnership expands well beyond that.  First, it expands beyond the region.  If you look at support for Ukraine, Japan and Korea have both stepped up in significant ways to stand with a fellow democracy in Europe.  And the Japanese prime minister has been particularly articulate in explaining that what happens in Ukraine matters in the Indo-Pacific.  And President Yoon has reinforced that. 

And then finally, the relationship extends to economic coercion, the intersection of technology and national security, innovation, economic investment and vitality — all areas where the three countries have a huge amount of complementary capacity to support and lift one another up. 

When you put all that together, that is a formidable partnership of three countries with shared values; huge capacities across economics, technology, national security; and global reach. 

And so, you know, we’re very proud of the work that we’ve done so far, but it is very much a work in progress and has to be built on from strength to strength as we go forward. 

I was just recently in Seoul for a trilateral meeting of national security advisors to convert this into the details of how we work together on things like early warning for missile defense and also to think about areas where we can work together — for example, to answer the question that was posed earlier: How do we collectively have a value proposition in the developing world with three large ODA budgets from our three countries? 

So, you know, that is not — that trilateral partnership is not about any country.  It’s not about China.  It’s not about North Korea.  It’s about being for something — a vision for the world, for the region, but for the world writ large.  And we feel that it has helped create a huge amount of momentum behind shared priorities, and we want to continue to develop that. 

MR. HADLEY:  Last question.  And I apologize to those who I did not get to. 

Ma’am, back here.  Right here.  Yes.  Can you pass her the mic?  Thank you so much. 

AUDIENCE MEMBER:  Hi.  Maggie Dougherty with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

You briefly mentioned human rights, so I would like to hear your strategy towards Chinese abuse of human rights — Uyghurs, Tibetans, Christian minorities.  How are we going to face that challenge? 

MR. SULLIVAN:  So, first, the President, as he has said publicly, has been very clear and direct in his conversations, in the two summits that he’s had, about the kind of fundamental responsibility and obligation of an American president to speak out on these issues, because it’s core to who we are.  That’s not about trying to weaponize the issue; it’s about living out our values.  And that’s the ethos that he has tried to inculcate across the U.S. government as we deal with this issue. 

And so that means not just that we speak out on these issues but that we take actions.  And we have taken a series of actions over the course of the past three years in each of the areas you mentioned.  And to a considerable extent, we have done that in partnership with the Congress on a bipartisan basis, including laws that have been passed under our administration that we are now implementing, on issues like forced labor, the Uyghur Forced Labor Prevention Act. 

So this is something that will remain a critical priority and feature of the U.S.-China relationship, as it has through multiple administrations.  And from our perspective, having direct diplomacy and intensive management of the relationship is not inconsistent with standing up for speaking out on and taking material action on issues related to the protection of human rights. 

MR. HADLEY:  So we’re here at the end of our time.  Let me tell you where we’re going to proceed from here, if I can. 

I want to thank you all for joining this hybrid meeting.  Jake, thank you for being with us.

 END