民主原教旨主義者：對內森·J·羅賓遜的“社會主義作為一套原則的回應
奧利弗·沃特斯 · 2018 年 5 月 22 日
在《時事》雜誌上，其編輯內森·J·羅賓遜（Nathan J. Robinson）對現代社會主義者的常見批評做出了回應，即他們的後資本主義製度究竟會是什麽樣子。 羅賓遜本人是一名堅定的社會主義者，他承認，雖然許多當代社會主義者會拒絕在整個20 世紀以他們的名義實施的特定模式，但很少能找到一個完全清晰的願景來替代嚐試。
但他認為這不一定是問題。 社會主義作為一套原則或理想，對於一個公正的經濟和政治體係來說，仍然是有意義的，而不是一張闡明社會主義社會機製如何運作的詳細藍圖。 因此，社會主義可以被認為是一個框架，在這個框架內我們可以嚐試許多不同類型的政策，而不必教條地堅持某一特定政策。
羅賓遜最初提出的一些定義社會主義的核心價值觀確實在直覺上很有吸引力，並且可能受到各種政治派別的人們的普遍接受：
與其他人的聯係和同情心。
個人自主權——塑造自己命運的能力。
每個人都盡可能享受最充實的生活。
為社會主義歡呼三聲！ 有什麽不喜歡的？
當他開始充實第二個原則——個人自主權時，事情就變得有點複雜了。 以“塑造我們自己的命運”的概念為例。 對於羅賓遜來說，這一原則的政治體現無非是“將民主應用於社會生活的各個方麵”。
羅賓遜認為，民主不應僅僅局限於公民投票選舉政治代表，這是大多數現代自由民主國家的常態。 相反，他堅持認為，我們都應該對影響我們的任何事情擁有民主決策權。 從表麵上看，這個原則聽起來很有吸引力。 畢竟，誰不想在自己的生活環境中擁有更多的政治權力呢？
然而，這一原則與經濟學家布萊恩·卡普蘭（Bryan Caplan）所說的“民主原教旨主義”有著驚人的相似之處，並且經過仔細檢查發現存在很大問題。 每天，我們的生活都受到遠近各色各樣的人做出的數千個決定的深刻影響。 我們應該對每項決定擁有政治權力的想法往好裏說是行不通的，往壞了說是具有刑事壓迫性的。
首先舉一個無聊的例子，最近我對亞曆克斯·加蘭 (Alex Garland) 改編自傑夫·範德米爾 (Jeff VanderMeer) 小說《湮滅》 (Annihilation) 的電影深感失望。 我是否應該與這本書的數千名其他粉絲一起對最終剪輯發表意見？ 很明顯不是。 如果我這麽做的話，結果可能會更糟。 顯然我無權幹涉加蘭的創作願景。
如果單純的審美影響看起來微不足道，那麽讓我們考慮一個更黑暗的情況。 離婚可能是我們生活中對情感和經濟最具破壞性的事件之一。 羅賓遜激進的民主方法似乎要求，由於一個男人的妻子離開他的決定對他影響很大，他應該在這個決定中擁有平等的發言權。 這大概相當於否決權，因為他控製著直接利益相關方 50% 的選票。
事實上，不久前，這還曾是常態。 丈夫必須征得妻子的同意才能離開他。 那麽為何不？ 婚姻的破裂不僅會嚴重影響他的生活，還會影響他的孩子和社區其他人的生活。
我猜想，羅賓遜的進步本能會讓他一想到退回到如此壓抑、厭惡女性的狀態就會感到畏縮。 但尚不清楚為什麽這不是他的民主概念的直接應用。
羅賓遜希望根據他的原則得到什麽具體結果，這一點已經很清楚了。 他舉了兩個直觀的例子：長期租房者沒有出售房產的權利，工廠汽車工人沒有是否搬遷的決定權。 羅賓遜認為，這兩種情況都存在不公正現象，因為受經濟決策影響最嚴重的人沒有法律參與該決策的製定。
當然，現在租房者或汽車工人希望有更多的權力來指導影響他們的決策。 但如果財產倒塌或公司破產，他們是否也想分擔法律和財務責任？
這就涉及到關鍵問題：“民主原教旨主義”賦予人們自動參與決策的權利，隻要他們僅僅受到決策的影響。 這一原則的倡導者需要小心一個古老的問題，即如何準確地得到他們想要的東西。
權利和責任是同一枚硬幣的兩麵，如果你擁有決定權，你也要對該決定的結果負責。
自由民主國家的一個關鍵原則是，我們在所有非政府組織內的個人決策與我們自願承擔的責任水平成正比。 至關重要的是，為了在組織中擁有任何決策權，您必須自願與該組織簽訂協議。 這一原則恰恰可以保護您免受未經您同意而強加於您的義務。
如果您希望建立一個係統，讓個人自動獲得在組織內行使決策權的權利，那麽您就要求一個係統，讓人們自動承擔相應的責任。 這是個人自主和自由的對立麵。 這是對封建時代的回歸，人們發現自己生來就陷入了一係列不可避免的法律糾葛，這些法律糾葛是由一個人在社會中任意的起始地位所決定的。 這就是萊謝克·科瓦科夫斯基（Leszek Ko?akowski）的短語“強迫下的博愛”的含義，羅賓遜在他的文章中引用了這句話，作為對過去社會主義政權的恰當描述。
要麽羅賓遜沒有考慮到這些後果，要麽他認為在自由主義、主要是資本主義的體係下，更糟糕的結果是合理的。 他表示擔心，如果不從根本上擴大民主的範圍，個人自願交易（即自由市場）必然會導致最富有的人決定其他人的命運。 但他在這裏投射了實際上是政府特征的自由市場屬性。
在政治進程中，那些擁有最大權力的人確實常常最終獨家決定如何分配大量資源。 但在市場中，最終決定公司生產什麽以及生產多少的是消費者。 他們的日常小決定單獨來看似乎無能為力，但總的來說卻是決定性的。
企業尋求滿足消費者的需求和欲望，這意味著較不富裕的人最終仍能得到服務，因為企業可以通過向更多人銷售更便宜但有效的產品來賺取巨額利潤。 蘇丹電氣工程師穆罕默德·易卜拉欣通過在貧困的非洲國家銷售手機賺了數十億美元，並被譽為“改變了非洲大陸”。 另一方麵，政客有動機將其政策“推銷”給社會中最響亮、最有影響力的利益集團。 這就是我們最終得到浪費和不公正的玉米、糖和煤炭補貼的原因，更不用說全麵的國際貿易戰了。
在自由資本主義體係中，群眾還可以通過直接的社會活動向公司施加壓力。 現在正是譴責公司不道德行為並號召相關公民抵製或撤資的最佳時機。 隨著社交媒體的出現，個人影響公司聲譽和利潤的力量呈指數級增長。
因此，羅賓遜擔心自由市場民主不會對公民的選擇做出反應，這種擔心是多餘的。 然而，這並不是要低估市場中出現的需要民主政治行動來解決的經典協調問題，例如市場失靈和外部性。
羅賓遜的民主原教旨主義的明智替代方案是古典自由主義的民主概念。 在這種思想傳統中，民主是一種相當生硬的機製，旨在確保社會中的少數群體不能奴役大多數人。 它是許多壓迫性政府形式的強大溶劑，例如君主製、寡頭政治、種姓製度、神權政治等。
正如哲學家卡爾·波普爾所說，民主的主要功能是使社會能夠在不流血的情況下罷免壞領導人。 因此，它絕對必要，但還遠遠不足以保證開放和繁榮社會的許多要素，例如自由和理性的話語、少數群體的權利以及對個人自治的保護。 這種較薄弱的民主概念與資本主義生產體係完全兼容，並且不會產生像羅賓遜那樣的荒謬。
它在實踐中也有效。 盡管羅賓遜真正關心資本主義下經濟權力的集中，但他似乎忽視了這樣一個曆史事實：最強大的現代民主國家出現在以資本主義為主的社會中。 英國、美國、加拿大、澳大利亞等國家對普通勞動者私有財產權的保護相對較強，使得勞動者的勞動權利相對廣泛。
The Democratic Fundamentalist: A Response to Nathan J. Robinson's "Socialism as a Set of Principles:
Oliver Waters· May 22, 2018Over at Current Affairs, its editor Nathan J. Robinson has laid out his response to a common critique of modern socialists, namely what exactly their post-capitalist system will look like. A committed socialist himself, Robinson concedes that while many contemporary socialists would reject the specific models implemented in their name throughout the 20th century, it’s rare to find a fully articulated vision of what to try instead.
But he argues that this isn’t necessarily a problem. Socialism can still be meaningful as a set of principles or ideals, for a just economic and political system, rather than a detailed blueprint spelling out how the mechanics of socialist society would work. Socialism can thus be thought of as a framework within which we can experiment with lots of different kinds of policies, without dogmatically clinging to one set in particular.
Robinson’s initial formulation of some core values defining socialism are indeed intuitively attractive and likely to be universally embraced by people of all political persuasions:
- Connectedness and compassion with other human beings.
- Personal autonomy — the ability to shape your own destiny.
- Everyone enjoying the most fulfilling life possible.
Three cheers for socialism! What’s not to like?
It’s when he starts to flesh out the second principle — personal autonomy — that things get a little more complicated. Take the notion of “shaping our own destinies.” For Robinson, the political manifestation of this principle is nothing short of “the application of democracy to all aspects of social life.”
Robinson argues that democracy should not just be constrained to citizens voting for political representatives, as is the norm in most modern liberal democracies. He maintains instead that we should all have democratic decision-making power over anything that affects us. On its surface, this principle sounds appealing. After all, who wouldn’t want more political power over their life circumstances?
This principle however bears a striking similarity to what the economist Bryan Caplan has termed “democratic fundamentalism,” and turns out to be highly problematic upon closer inspection. Every day, our lives are profoundly affected by thousands of decisions made by all kinds of people, near and far. The idea that we should have political power over each of those decisions is at best unworkable, and at worst, criminally oppressive.
To begin with a frivolous example, I was recently profoundly disappointed by Alex Garland’s film adaptation of Jeff VanderMeer’s novel Annihilation. Should I have had a say over the final cut, along with thousands of other fans of the book? Obviously not. It probably would have turned out to be far worse if I had. Clearly I had no right to interfere with Garland’s creative vision.
If mere aesthetic impact seems trivial, let’s consider a darker case. A divorce can be one of the most emotionally and economically damaging events of our lives. Robinson’s radically democratic approach seems to mandate that since the decision of a man’s wife to leave him affects him greatly, he ought to have an equal say in the decision. This presumably amounts to a right to veto it, since he controls 50% of the vote of directly interested parties.
Indeed not too long ago, this used to be the norm. A husband had to give his consent for his wife to leave him. And why not? Not only his life, but the lives of his children, and others in his community, would stand to be profoundly affected by the break-up of the marriage.
I’m assuming Robinson’s progressive instincts would make him cringe at the thought of regressing to such an oppressive, misogynistic state of affairs. But it’s unclear why it’s not a straightforward application of his conception of democracy.
It’s clear enough what specific outcomes Robinson desires as a consequence of his principle. He raises two intuition-pumping examples: long-term home renters having no rights regarding the sale of the property, and factory auto-workers having no decision-rights over whether it is relocated. Robinson’s view is that an injustice occurs in both of these cases, as those most severely affected by the economic decision have no legal involvement in the making of that decision.
Now of course the renters or auto-workers would like more power to direct the decision-making affecting them. But do they also want to share legal and financial liability if the property collapses or the company goes bankrupt?
This gets to the crucial issue: “democratic fundamentalism” grants people rights to be involved in decision-making automatically, so long as they are merely affected by a decision. Advocates of the principle need to be careful of the age-old problem of getting exactly what they wish for.
Rights and responsibilities are two sides of the same coin, and if you possess the right to decide, you are also responsible for the outcome of that decision.
A key principle in liberal democracies is that our individual decision-making within all non-governmental organisations is proportional to the level of responsibility we have voluntarily adopted. Crucially, in order to have any decision-making power in an organisation, you must have voluntarily entered into an agreement with that organisation. This principle is precisely what protects you from obligations forced upon you without your consent.
If you wish for a system where individuals are automatically granted rights to exercise decision-making within an organisation, you’re asking for a system in which people are automatically burdened with corresponding responsibilities. This is the antithesis of individual autonomy and freedom. It is a reversion to feudal times, where one found oneself born into a set of inescapable legal entanglements, defined by one’s arbitrary starting position in society. It is the meaning of Leszek Ko?akowski’s phrase “fraternity under compulsion,” which Robinson cites in his article as an apt description of past socialist regimes.
Either Robinson hasn’t thought through these consequences, or he thinks they are justified by worse outcomes under a liberal, largely capitalist system. He expresses the fear that without radically expanding democracy’s scope, individual voluntary transactions (i.e. a free market) necessarily lead to the wealthiest deciding what happens for everyone else. But here is he projecting onto the free market attributes that in fact characterize government.
In political processes, those who have the most power do indeed often end up exclusively deciding how vast amounts of resources are allocated. But in a market, it is consumers who ultimately decide what companies produce, and how much. Their small daily decisions may seem powerless in isolation, but are definitive in aggregate.
Businesses seek to satisfy consumer needs and desires, which means the less wealthy still end up being serviced because businesses stand to make a huge amount of money selling cheaper but effective products to larger numbers of people. The Sudanese electrical engineer Mohammed Ibrahim made billions selling mobile phones in impoverished African countries, and has been credited with “transforming a continent.” A politician, on the other hand, has an incentive to “sel” his policies to the loudest, most influential interest groups in a society. This is how we end up with wasteful and unjust corn, sugar and coal subsidies, not to mention full-blown international trade wars.
The masses can also pressure companies via direct social activism in a liberal capitalist system. There’s never been a better time to call out companies for unethical behaviour and rally your fellow concerned citizens to boycott or divest. The power of an individual to affect a company’s reputation and bottom-line has grown exponentially with the advent of social media.
Robinson’s fear that a liberal market democracy is not responsive to citizens’ choices is therefore overblown. This is not to discount however the classic coordination problems that emerge in markets that require democratic political action to resolve, such as market failures and externalities.
The sensible alternative to Robinson’s democratic fundamentalism is the classical liberal conception of democracy. In this tradition of thought, democracy is a rather blunt mechanism for ensuring that a minority group in a society cannot enslave the majority. It serves as a powerful solvent for many oppressive forms of government, such as monarchies, oligarchies, caste systems, theocracies and so on.
As the philosopher Karl Popper put it, democracy’s primary function is to enable a society to remove bad leaders without bloodshed. It is thus absolutely necessary, but far from sufficient to guarantee many of the elements of an open and prosperous society, such as free and rational discourse, rights for minorities, and protection of individual autonomy. This thinner concept of democracy is fully compatible with a capitalist system of production, and doesn’t produce the same absurdities that Robinson’s does.
It also works in practice. For all of Robinson’s genuine concern with the concentration of economic power under capitalism, he seems ignorant of the historical fact that the most robust modern democracies arose in predominantly capitalist societies. The relatively strong protections of private property rights for ordinary workers in countries like the UK, US, Canada and Australia helped to enable a relatively wide dispersal of property ownership. With ordinary citizens having genuine control over their parcel of resources, they were able to command greater political representation, and put up strong resistance to would-be dictators appropriating all their hard-earned wealth. Indeed, this general historical trajectory from capitalist economies to universal political enfranchisement undermines the central socialist claim that capitalism is fundamentally in tension with democracy.
To be fair, Robinson’s call for a rational, sensible alternative to the nightmares of 20thcentury socialism should be welcomed. But as always, the devil is in the details. His clarification of what he means by “experimenting” with socialist economic models doesn’t exactly reassure:
“Experimentation doesn’t mean that you shouldn’t be bold. It just means constantly checking to make sure you’re upholding the principles.”
Note that Robinson doesn’t say “constantly check to make sure your predictions are coming true,” or that “the empirical evidence supports your principles.” He advocates pursuing socialist principles. Period. Regardless of their consequences.
The problem is that his principles are mistaken. It’s just a question of how many more “broken eggs” will convince him to abandon that ever-elusive omelette.
Written by Oliver Waters
