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報告：中美之間的“戰略不信任”?
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/04/150011703/report-strategic-distrust-between-u-s-and-china
2012 年 4 月 4 日
Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
肯尼斯·李伯索 (Kenneth Lieberthal) 與人合著了一本名為“解決美中戰略不信任”的新專著。 他還是布魯金斯學會約翰·桑頓中國中心的主任。 羅伯特·西格爾 (Robert Siegel) 與李博索 (Lieberthal) 談論了兩國之間不信任背後的原因以及可以采取的措施。
羅伯特·西格爾，主持人：
美中關係充滿了不對稱。 我們認為他們的經濟和軍事實力正在迅速增長。 他們認為我們是一個正在衰落的國家。 我們認為美國的對華政策試圖讓北京在既定的國際規則和體係中發揮更具建設性的作用。 他們認為我們試圖遏製或挫敗對全球權力的假設。 舉出一個重大的全球問題——朝鮮、伊朗、敘利亞、貨幣政策——兩國很可能會就此爭論不休。
布魯金斯學會的一份新報告將這些差異歸結為一個詞：戰略不信任。 該報告名為“解決美中戰略不信任”。 它是由一個中國人和一個美國人合著的，他們都是各自國家與對方打交道的專家。 美國的合著者、布魯金斯學會約翰·L·桑頓中國中心主任肯尼斯·李伯索現在也加入了我們的行列。
很高興和你在一起。
衡量我們和中國差距的一個指標是，每個國家的領導層是否都將戰略不信任視為一個問題。 我想，有，我們沒有。
我認為兩國都將長期不信任問題視為一個嚴重的問題。 我認為不同之處在於他們的不信任更多地基於過去的曆史。 我們的不信任更多是基於對中國未來將如何行動的不確定性。
那種認為美國正在走出去、正在衰落的觀點在中國廣泛存在，還是存在一些爭論？ 你會如何描述它？
我認為人們普遍持有的觀點是，美國要麽開始衰落，要麽在未來十年左右的時間裏看到其實力達到頂峰並開始衰落。 不過，讓我再補充一點，每個人都認為美國仍然是迄今為止世界上最強大的國家。 所以這並不是說美國現在很弱。 但是當你展望未來時，他們認為美國已經達到頂峰，現在唯一的問題是它什麽時候真正開始下降，然後下降的速度有多快。
這裏一個明顯的不信任點是美國促進民主、人權和公民權利的政策。 中國人不認為這是某種良性的美國世界觀。 他們認為這是一種阻撓他們的嚐試，我想。
對於那些中國精英來說，美國的民主議程被視為試圖改變中國政治製度並讓他們下台的議程。 所以，當然，他們認為這並不受歡迎。 他們將我們在世界各地所做的很多事情解釋為有效地試圖為中國政權更迭創造機會。
我想讓你描述一下另一個非常令人擔憂的不信任領域，那就是軍事問題。 中國人認為，他們在其公認領海以外的海域擁有真正的戰略利益，即他們的海岸線。 美國認為它在同一水域擁有正當的安全利益。
這是潛在危險的觀點差異。 你認為兩軍實際上有辦法解決這些問題，也許可以更好地理解彼此。
我認為客觀上我們將在這個問題上有很大的緊張關係。 中國確實有非常合法的安全利益可以超越他們的領海。 我們對這些水域有著長期的、嚴肅的利益。 我們與韓國和日本結盟。 我們與台灣等地有著牢固的關係。 這些都是非常重要的航道。
我認為存在真正的利益衝突。 所以這不僅僅是一個感知問題。 它們可以通過明智的談判和加強相互理解來減少。 他們無法被淘汰。 但是，即使在冷戰最激烈的時候，我們也可以進行核武器談判，達成協議，在某些領域相互克製，這樣我們雙方都不會做一些會破壞穩定的事情。
所以我認為外交確實可以在幫助調和真正的利益衝突方麵產生重大影響。 無法完全解決它們，但它可以創造一個成本更低、更安全的未來。
Kenneth Lieberthal，感謝您接受我們的采訪。
我的榮幸，很高興和你交談。
布魯金斯學會的肯尼斯·李博索 (Kenneth Lieberthal) 是新報告“評估美中戰略不信任”的合著者。
主持人 AUDIE CORNISH：
這是 NPR 新聞。
Report: 'Strategic Distrust' Between U.S. And China
https://www.npr.org/2012/04/04/150011703/report-strategic-distrust-between-u-s-and-china
Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
ROBERT SIEGEL, HOST:
The relationship between the U.S. and China is full of asymmetries. We see them as growing rapidly in economic and military power. They see us as a country on the decline. We see U.S. China policy as trying to get Beijing to play a more constructive role within established international rules and systems. They see us as trying to contain or frustrate assumption of global power. Name a big global issue - North Korea, Iran, Syria, monetary policy - and the two countries are likely arguing about it.
A new report from the Brookings Institution has boiled these differences down to a phrase: Strategic Distrust. The report is called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." It was co-authored by a Chinese and an American, each an expert on his country's dealings with the other. And the American co-author, Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, joins us now.
Welcome to the program.
It's a pleasure to be with you.
One point that's a measure how apart, we and the Chinese are, is whether each country's leadership regards strategic mistrust as a problem. And I gather, there is does and ours doesn't.
I think both countries regard the issue of long-term distrust as a serious problem. I think the difference is that their distrust is based much more on past history. Our distrust is based much more on uncertainty about how China will act in the future.
That notion that the U.S. is on the way out, that it's in decline, widely held in China or a matter of some debate? How would you describe it?
I think what's very widely held as the notion the U.S. is either starting to decline or, within the coming decade or so, will have seen its power peak and will be in decline. Let me add one more point on that though, everyone thinks America is still by far the most powerful country in the world. So it isn't that America is now weak. But as you look to the future they see America as having peaked, and now the only question is when it will actually begin to decline and then how rapidly.
One obvious point of distrust here is the dimension of U.S. policy that fosters democracy and human rights and civil rights. The Chinese don't see that as some benign American worldview. They see it as an attempt to thwart them, I gather.
For those of the Chinese elite, America's democracy agenda is seen as an agenda of trying to change the Chinese political system and get them out of power. So, of course, they regard that as not all welcomed. And they interpret a lot of things we do around the world as effectively trying to tee-up the chances for regime change in China.
There's one other pretty worrying area of distrust that I want you to describe a bit, which is military issues. And the Chinese feel that they have a real strategic interest in seas that are beyond their recognized territorial waters, around their coast. And the U.S. believes that it has valid security interests in the very same waters.
That's potentially dangerous difference of views. And you think that there actually are ways in which the two militaries could address them, and perhaps understand each other a bit better.
I think it is objectively the case that we're going to have a lot of tension over this issue. The Chinese do have very legitimate security interests to go beyond their territorial waters. We have very long-standing, serious interests in those same waters. We have alliances with South Korea and Japan. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan and so forth. And these are very important shipping lanes.
I think there are real conflicts of interests. So this is not all a matter of perception. They can be reduced by intelligent negotiation and enhanced and mutual understanding. They can't be eliminated. But look, even at the height of the Cold War we could have nuclear arms negotiations that produced agreements, that involve mutual restraint in some areas so that neither of us did some things that would have been destabilizing.
So I think diplomacy can really have a significant impact in helping to reconcile real conflicts of interest. Can't fully resolve them but it can create a less costly, more secure future.
Kenneth Lieberthal, thanks for talking with us.
My pleasure, nice to talk to you.
Kenneth Lieberthal, of the Brookings Institution, is the co-author of the new report "Assessing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust."
AUDIE CORNISH, HOST: This is NPR News.
19 April 2012
"Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust"–A Must-Read!
Center for China and Globalization
https://www.andrewerickson.com/2012/04/addressing-u-s-china-strategic-distrust-a-must-read/
Blog Posts Chinese Language 中文
Mandatory reading for all concerned observers of Sino-American relations!
Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012).
Click here for Podcast and both Chinese and English versions of the paper.
The issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions—termed here “strategic distrust”—has become a central concern in US-China relations. Vice President Xi Jinping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place in his review of key problems in U.S.-China relations during his major policy address in Washington, DC on February 15, 2012.
Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are, moreover, mature. The two sides understand well each others’ position on all major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
This history and these extensive activities have not, however, produced trust regarding long-term intentions on either side, and arguably the problem of lack of such trust is becoming more serious. Distrust is itself corrosive, producing attitudes and actions that themselves contribute to greater distrust. Distrust itself makes it difficult for leaders on each side to be confident they understand the deep thinking among leaders on the other side regarding the future U.S.-China relationship.
The coauthors of this paper explicate both the underlying concerns each leadership harbors about the other side and the reasons for those concerns. Each coauthor has written the narrative of his government’s views without any changes made by the other coauthor. The coauthors have together written the follow-on analysis and recommendations. The focus is not on day-to-day willingness to cooperate on various issues but rather on the factors on each side that create underlying distrust of the long-term intentions of the other.
The purpose of these narratives of distrust is to enable each leadership to better fathom how the other thinks—and therefore to devise more effective ways to build strategic trust. The coauthors hope this paper will improve the potential for a long-term normal major power relationship between the United States and China, rather than an adversarial relationship that might otherwise develop. …
For further ideas about how Washington and Beijing might reduce strategic distrust, see:
Andrew S. Erickson, “From Shanghai to Somalia: China’s Contributions to the Security of Seaborne Commerce in Asia and Beyond,” in 沈丁立, 張貴洪, 主編 [Shen Dingli and Zhang Guihong, eds], 亞洲國際關係的重構 [Restructuring of International Relations in Asia] (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People’s Press], 2011), 241-75.
Andrew S. Erickson, Lyle J. Goldstein, and Nan Li, eds., China, the United States, and 21st Century Sea Power: Defining a Maritime Security Partnership (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2010).
Andrew S. Erickson and Wei He, “U.S.-China Security Relations,” in Task Force Report—U.S.-China Relations: A Roadmap for the Future, Center for Strategic and International Studies Pacific Forum Issues & Insights 9.16 (August 20, 2009), 7-12, available in English and Chinese.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Maritime Security Cooperation in the South China Sea Region,” in Wu Shicun and Zou Keyuan, eds., Maritime Security in the South China Sea: Regional Implications and International Cooperation (London: Ashgate, 2009), 51-80.
Andrew S. Erickson, “The Container Security Initiative and Maritime Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific,” in 沈丁立, 任曉, 主編 [Shen Dingli and Ren Xiao, Chief Editors], 亞洲地緣經濟與政治 [Geoeconomics and Politics in Asia], (Shanghai: 上海人民出版社 [Shanghai People’s Press], 2008), 139-73.
Andrew S. Erickson, “Combating a Truly Collective Threat: Sino-American Military Cooperation Against Avian Influenza,” Global Health Governance: The Scholarly Journal for the New Health Security Paradigm, Vol. 1, Issue 1 (January 2007).
美中戰略不信任
https://asiancenturyinstitute.com/international/174-us-china-strategic-distrust
2014 年 3 月 22 日
不幸的是，美國參議院對奧巴馬總統外交政策和安全團隊的確認聽證會將重點放在中東問題上，而不是中國的“主要遊戲”。
美國總統奧巴馬已提名約翰克裏為新任國務卿，查克哈格爾為下一任國防部長，約翰布倫南接任中央情報局局長。
這些提名必須得到美國參議院的批準，而後兩者現在肯定會經過參議院的確認程序。 議程上的首要問題將是對以色列的支持、對伊朗的強硬態度以及美國的國家和軍事實力。
在不降低任何這些問題的重要性的情況下，它們不是 21 世紀的主要遊戲。 美國在未來四年及以後麵臨的最大外交政策和安全挑戰將是管理美中關係和解決兩國之間的戰略不信任（對長期意圖的相互不信任），肯尼斯對這個問題進行了很好的分析 Lieberthal 和 Wang Jisi 在最近的 Brookings Publication 中。
美國和中國是世界上最大的兩個經濟體，中國的GDP總量將在幾年內超過美國。 自尼克鬆總統首次訪華以來，他們相識已有40多年。 他們的經濟通過貿易、投資、金融和移民密切相關。 最高級別領導人會麵相對頻繁，兩國政府機構每年定期舉行60多次政府間對話。
然而，他們深深植根於曆史的戰略不信任隻會越來越嚴重——盡管美國聲稱它準備適應中國崛起為負責任的超級大國，而中國並不尋求取代美國的全球領導地位。 舉出一個全球性問題——朝鮮、伊朗、敘利亞或貨幣政策——兩國很可能會就此爭論不休。
總之，中國的崛起正在改變世界的經濟和政治格局，美中關係將決定21世紀的格局。
在北京看來，是美國的政策、態度和誤解導致兩國之間缺乏互信。 中國政治精英認為，美國謀求維護全球霸權，製約甚至攪局中國的崛起。 他們對美國的戰略不信任源於四種情緒：中國認為自 2008 年以來，它已經成為並且應該被視為一流的全球大國； 美國正走向衰落的評估； 觀察到金磚國家（巴西、俄羅斯、印度、中國和南非）正在挑戰西方的主導地位； 以及中國強有力的政治領導有效管理社會和經濟事務的發展模式（“北京共識”）為其他發展中國家提供了西方模式的替代方案。
就美國領導人而言，他們深感擔憂的是，中國正試圖以美國的影響力和利益付出巨大代價來主導亞洲地區——也就是說，這是一種零和關係，而不是雙贏關係。 在經貿領域，美國關注的是知識產權盜竊、中國的貨幣政策、對中國外國直接投資的限製以及中國將稀土出口限製作為外交政策工具。
日益增長的戰略不信任有三個基本來源：不同的政治傳統、價值體係和文化； 對彼此決策過程的理解和欣賞不足； 以及兩國之間明顯縮小的實力差距。
兩國必須更加緊密地合作，以增進在經貿、軍事、網絡安全和三邊關係（如中國/日本/美國和中國/印度/美國）等領域的相互了解。
但兩國政治傳統、價值體係和文化根本上不可調和，這給兩國關係帶來了巨大挑戰。 美國人不信任自稱為共產主義政黨的獨裁政治製度。 專製政治製度本質上不太穩定，更容易將國內不滿歸咎於他人，而且透明度較低。 但從中國的角度來看，美國的民主製度對其治理體係構成了生存威脅。
簡而言之，美中關係需要非常謹慎的管理。 在戰略互信日益加深的背景下，一個“意外”就可能引發美中之間毀滅性的政治或軍事危機。 必須不惜一切代價避免這種情況。
在此背景下，最令人遺憾的是，美國國會尚未對美國乃至世界在 21 世紀麵臨的最大外交政策和安全挑戰的確認程序表現出任何興趣。
These nominations must be approved by the US Senate, and a bruising Senate confirmation process is now certain for the latter two. Issues at the top of the agenda will be support for Israel, toughness on Iran, and the US's national and military strength.
Without diminishing the importance of any of these issues, they are not the main game in the 21st century. The greatest foreign policy and security challenges facing the US over the coming four years and beyond will be managing the US/China relationship and addressing the strategic distrust (mutual distrust of long term intentions) between the two countries, an issue very well analysed by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi in a recent Brookings Publication.
The US and China are the world's biggest two economies, with China's total GDP set to overtake America's in a matter of years. They have known each other for more than 40 years since President Nixon first visited China. Their economies are intimately linked through trade, investment, finance and migration. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
And yet, their strategic distrust, deeply rooted in history, is only getting worse -- even though the US claims that it is prepared to accommodate China's rise as a responsible superpower, while China is not seeking to replace America's global leadership. Name a global issue -- North Korea, Iran Syria, or monetary policy -- and the two countries are likely to be arguing about it.
In short, China's rise is changing the economic and political structure of the world, and the US/China relationship will define the shape of the 21st century.
In Beijing's view, it is US policies, attitude and misconceptions that cause the lack of mutual trust between the two countries. Chinese political elites believe that the US is seeking to maintain global hegemony and constrain or even upset China's rise. Their strategic distrust of the US derive from four sentiments: China's feeling that since 2008 it has become and should be treated as a first-class global power; the assessment that the US is heading for decline; the observation that the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are challenging Western dominance; and the notion that China's development model of strong political leadership that effectively manages social and economic affairs ("Beijing consensus") provides an alternative from Western models for other developing countries.
For their part, American leaders are deeply concerned that China is seeking to dominate the Asian region at significant cost to US influence and interests -- that is, a zero sum relationship, not win-win. In the economics and trade area, the US is concerned about intellectual property theft, China's currency policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment in China, and China's use as a foreign policy tool of export restrictions on rare earths.
There are three fundamental sources of the growing strategic distrust: different political traditions, value systems and cultures; insufficient comprehension and appreciation of each other's policy-making process; and the perceived narrowing power gap between the two countries.
It is essential that the two countries work ever more closely together to improve mutual understanding in areas like economics and trade, military affairs, cyber security, and trilateral relations (like China/Japan/US and China/India/US).
But the two countries' fundamentally and irreconcilable different political traditions, value systems and cultures pose great relationship challenges. Americans don't trust authoritarian political systems run by parties that call themselves communist. Authoritarian political systems are inherently less stable, more prone to blaming others for their domestic discontent, and less transparent. But from China's point of view, the US democratic system poses an existential threat to its system of governance.
In short, the US/China relationship will require very careful management. In the context of growing strategic distrust, an "accident" could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between the US and China. And this must be avoided at all costs.
In this context, it is most regrettable that the US Congress has not yet shown any interest for its confirmation process in the biggest foreign policy and security challenge facing America, and indeed the world, in the 21st century.
Author
John WestExecutive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com
