Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
Kenneth Lieberthal is co-author of a new monograph called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." He's also director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution. Robert Siegel speaks with Lieberthal about what is behind the distrust between the two countries and what can be done about it.
ROBERT SIEGEL, HOST:
The relationship between the U.S. and China is full of asymmetries. We see them as growing rapidly in economic and military power. They see us as a country on the decline. We see U.S. China policy as trying to get Beijing to play a more constructive role within established international rules and systems. They see us as trying to contain or frustrate assumption of global power. Name a big global issue - North Korea, Iran, Syria, monetary policy - and the two countries are likely arguing about it.
A new report from the Brookings Institution has boiled these differences down to a phrase: Strategic Distrust. The report is called "Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust." It was co-authored by a Chinese and an American, each an expert on his country's dealings with the other. And the American co-author, Kenneth Lieberthal, director of the John L. Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution, joins us now.
Welcome to the program.
It's a pleasure to be with you.
One point that's a measure how apart, we and the Chinese are, is whether each country's leadership regards strategic mistrust as a problem. And I gather, there is does and ours doesn't.
I think both countries regard the issue of long-term distrust as a serious problem. I think the difference is that their distrust is based much more on past history. Our distrust is based much more on uncertainty about how China will act in the future.
That notion that the U.S. is on the way out, that it's in decline, widely held in China or a matter of some debate? How would you describe it?
I think what's very widely held as the notion the U.S. is either starting to decline or, within the coming decade or so, will have seen its power peak and will be in decline. Let me add one more point on that though, everyone thinks America is still by far the most powerful country in the world. So it isn't that America is now weak. But as you look to the future they see America as having peaked, and now the only question is when it will actually begin to decline and then how rapidly.
One obvious point of distrust here is the dimension of U.S. policy that fosters democracy and human rights and civil rights. The Chinese don't see that as some benign American worldview. They see it as an attempt to thwart them, I gather.
For those of the Chinese elite, America's democracy agenda is seen as an agenda of trying to change the Chinese political system and get them out of power. So, of course, they regard that as not all welcomed. And they interpret a lot of things we do around the world as effectively trying to tee-up the chances for regime change in China.
There's one other pretty worrying area of distrust that I want you to describe a bit, which is military issues. And the Chinese feel that they have a real strategic interest in seas that are beyond their recognized territorial waters, around their coast. And the U.S. believes that it has valid security interests in the very same waters.
That's potentially dangerous difference of views. And you think that there actually are ways in which the two militaries could address them, and perhaps understand each other a bit better.
I think it is objectively the case that we're going to have a lot of tension over this issue. The Chinese do have very legitimate security interests to go beyond their territorial waters. We have very long-standing, serious interests in those same waters. We have alliances with South Korea and Japan. We have a strong relationship with Taiwan and so forth. And these are very important shipping lanes.
I think there are real conflicts of interests. So this is not all a matter of perception. They can be reduced by intelligent negotiation and enhanced and mutual understanding. They can't be eliminated. But look, even at the height of the Cold War we could have nuclear arms negotiations that produced agreements, that involve mutual restraint in some areas so that neither of us did some things that would have been destabilizing.
So I think diplomacy can really have a significant impact in helping to reconcile real conflicts of interest. Can't fully resolve them but it can create a less costly, more secure future.
Kenneth Lieberthal, thanks for talking with us.
My pleasure, nice to talk to you.
Kenneth Lieberthal, of the Brookings Institution, is the co-author of the new report "Assessing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust."
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19 April 2012
"Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust"–A Must-Read!
Center for China and Globalization
Mandatory reading for all concerned observers of Sino-American relations!
Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi, Addressing U.S.-China Strategic Distrust, John L. Thornton China Center Monograph 4 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, March 2012).
The coauthors of this path-breaking study—one of America’s leading China specialists and one of China’s leading America specialists—lay out both the underlying concerns each leadership harbors about the other side and the reasons for those concerns. Each coauthor has written the narrative of his government’s views without any changes made by the other coauthor. Their purpose is to enable both leaderships to better fathom how the other thinks. The coauthors have together written the follow-on analysis and recommendations designed to improve the potential for a long-term normal major power U.S.-China relationship, rather than the adversarial relationship that might otherwise develop.
The issue of mutual distrust of long-term intentions—termed here “strategic distrust”—has become a central concern in US-China relations. Vice President Xi Jinping recognized this reality in giving this issue first place in his review of key problems in U.S.-China relations during his major policy address in Washington, DC on February 15, 2012.
Both Beijing and Washington seek to build a constructive partnership for the long run. U.S.-China relations are, moreover, mature. The two sides understand well each others’ position on all major issues and deal with each other extensively. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
This history and these extensive activities have not, however, produced trust regarding long-term intentions on either side, and arguably the problem of lack of such trust is becoming more serious. Distrust is itself corrosive, producing attitudes and actions that themselves contribute to greater distrust. Distrust itself makes it difficult for leaders on each side to be confident they understand the deep thinking among leaders on the other side regarding the future U.S.-China relationship.
The coauthors of this paper explicate both the underlying concerns each leadership harbors about the other side and the reasons for those concerns. Each coauthor has written the narrative of his government’s views without any changes made by the other coauthor. The coauthors have together written the follow-on analysis and recommendations. The focus is not on day-to-day willingness to cooperate on various issues but rather on the factors on each side that create underlying distrust of the long-term intentions of the other.
The purpose of these narratives of distrust is to enable each leadership to better fathom how the other thinks—and therefore to devise more effective ways to build strategic trust. The coauthors hope this paper will improve the potential for a long-term normal major power relationship between the United States and China, rather than an adversarial relationship that might otherwise develop. …
For further ideas about how Washington and Beijing might reduce strategic distrust, see:
US Senate confirmation hearings for President Obama's foreign policy and security team will focus on Middle East issues, not on the "main game" of China, unfortunately.
US President Barack Obama has nominated John Kerry to be the new Secretary of State, Chuck Hagel to be the next Secretary of Defense, and John Brennan to take over the directorship of the CIA.
These nominations must be approved by the US Senate, and a bruising Senate confirmation process is now certain for the latter two. Issues at the top of the agenda will be support for Israel, toughness on Iran, and the US's national and military strength.
Without diminishing the importance of any of these issues, they are not the main game in the 21st century. The greatest foreign policy and security challenges facing the US over the coming four years and beyond will be managing the US/China relationship and addressing the strategic distrust (mutual distrust of long term intentions) between the two countries, an issue very well analysed by Kenneth Lieberthal and Wang Jisi in a recent Brookings Publication.
The US and China are the world's biggest two economies, with China's total GDP set to overtake America's in a matter of years. They have known each other for more than 40 years since President Nixon first visited China. Their economies are intimately linked through trade, investment, finance and migration. The highest level leaders meet relatively frequently, and there are more than sixty regular government-to-government dialogues between agencies in the two governments each year.
And yet, their strategic distrust, deeply rooted in history, is only getting worse -- even though the US claims that it is prepared to accommodate China's rise as a responsible superpower, while China is not seeking to replace America's global leadership. Name a global issue -- North Korea, Iran Syria, or monetary policy -- and the two countries are likely to be arguing about it.
In short, China's rise is changing the economic and political structure of the world, and the US/China relationship will define the shape of the 21st century.
In Beijing's view, it is US policies, attitude and misconceptions that cause the lack of mutual trust between the two countries. Chinese political elites believe that the US is seeking to maintain global hegemony and constrain or even upset China's rise. Their strategic distrust of the US derive from four sentiments: China's feeling that since 2008 it has become and should be treated as a first-class global power; the assessment that the US is heading for decline; the observation that the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are challenging Western dominance; and the notion that China's development model of strong political leadership that effectively manages social and economic affairs ("Beijing consensus") provides an alternative from Western models for other developing countries.
For their part, American leaders are deeply concerned that China is seeking to dominate the Asian region at significant cost to US influence and interests -- that is, a zero sum relationship, not win-win. In the economics and trade area, the US is concerned about intellectual property theft, China's currency policy, restrictions on foreign direct investment in China, and China's use as a foreign policy tool of export restrictions on rare earths.
There are three fundamental sources of the growing strategic distrust: different political traditions, value systems and cultures; insufficient comprehension and appreciation of each other's policy-making process; and the perceived narrowing power gap between the two countries.
It is essential that the two countries work ever more closely together to improve mutual understanding in areas like economics and trade, military affairs, cyber security, and trilateral relations (like China/Japan/US and China/India/US).
But the two countries' fundamentally and irreconcilable different political traditions, value systems and cultures pose great relationship challenges. Americans don't trust authoritarian political systems run by parties that call themselves communist. Authoritarian political systems are inherently less stable, more prone to blaming others for their domestic discontent, and less transparent. But from China's point of view, the US democratic system poses an existential threat to its system of governance.
In short, the US/China relationship will require very careful management. In the context of growing strategic distrust, an "accident" could trigger a devastating political or military crisis between the US and China. And this must be avoided at all costs.
In this context, it is most regrettable that the US Congress has not yet shown any interest for its confirmation process in the biggest foreign policy and security challenge facing America, and indeed the world, in the 21st century.
Author
John West
Executive Director
Asian Century Institute
www.asiancenturyinstitute.com