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美國對太平洋島國投入大量關注
https://www.economist.com/asia/2023/05/25/america-is-lavishing-attention-on-pacific-island-states?utm_source=flipboard&utm_content=user%2FTheEconomist
安東尼·布林肯是自道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟將軍以來訪問巴布亞新幾內亞的最重要的美國官員
2023 年 5 月 25 日
有兩種方式看待美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯 (Antony Blinken) 於 5 月 22 日與巴布亞新幾內亞 (png) 總理詹姆斯·馬拉佩 (James Marape) 簽署的安全協議。 最明顯的一個是美國和中國之間的大國競爭的進一步證據，這種競爭正在太平洋上不斷擴大的漣漪中展開。 在這場競爭中，美國根據自己的估計，之前忽視了太平洋島國的作用，而擁有 1000 萬人口的多元化國家巴布亞新幾內亞是迄今為止最大的。
美國現在正在做出彌補。 它在所羅門群島和湯加設立了大使館，並計劃在基裏巴斯和瓦努阿圖設立大使館。 在巴布亞新幾內亞首都莫爾茲比港期間，布林肯還與密克羅尼西亞和帕勞這兩個位於巴布亞新幾內亞和美國屬地關島之間的島國簽署了新的“自由聯合協定”。 隨後將與馬紹爾群島簽訂新的協議。 這些國家將國防完全交給美國，以換取援助保證和其他好處。
然而，與巴布亞新幾內亞簽署的協議是美國重新參與該地區事務的最顯著證據，也為其島國帶來了重大的新機遇。 總統喬·拜登原定前往巴布亞新幾內亞簽署該協議。 美國充滿爭議的內部債務上限談判否定了這一點。 即便如此，布林肯現在無疑是自道格拉斯·麥克阿瑟將軍以來訪問巴布亞新幾內亞最有影響力的美國官員。
其戰略思路是這樣的：如果美國要阻止中國入侵台灣（或者如果美國要在中國入侵時保衛台灣），關島將是美國至關重要的軍事基地。 它超出了許多中國導彈的射程。 但關島的恢複力有賴於其周圍安全的海洋和天空。 因此，這些其他島國也很重要。 此外，如果中國控製了巴布亞新幾內亞周圍的水域，美國的重要盟友澳大利亞可能會陷入困境。 第二次世界大戰中一些最慘烈的戰鬥發生在巴布亞新幾內亞，麥克阿瑟在那裏擔任盟軍最高指揮官，正是因為它的戰略重要性。
美國對一場規模宏大的超級大國競爭的看法遭到了中國的正式譴責，但也得到了中國的認同。 中國駐太平洋特使錢波指責美國抱有“冷戰思維”，試圖破壞中國關係，並被“意識形態偏見”蒙蔽了雙眼。 也許。 但中國也有冷戰思維。 它不屈不撓地與台灣爭奪對太平洋小國的影響力。 2019年，其金融誘惑（其中一些是秘密的）說服所羅門群島和基裏巴斯改變了外交忠誠。 中國去年與所羅門群島簽署的一項安全協議讓驚慌失措的美國意識到自己在該地區失去了多少領土。
一些島民對兩個大國之間不受限製的競爭感到不祥（莫爾茲比港出現了針對新協議的抗議活動）。 太平洋島嶼作為不幸受害者的曆史已深深烙印在集體記憶中。 它們是殖民剝削的對象，然後是血腥的戰場，最後是戰後的核試驗場所。 但對於那些希望看到太平洋國家在其新的地緣政治相關性中的好處和風險的人來說，有很多機會可以指出。
島國不再是受害者。 堪培拉澳大利亞國立大學的約翰·布拉克斯蘭 (John Blaxland) 表示，他們已經有很多年沒有享受過來自外部勢力的如此優惠了，包括高層訪問、提供投資和其他承諾（布林肯先生承諾的 4500 萬美元將幫助貧困的巴布亞新幾內亞）。 它打擊跨國犯罪和氣候變化）。
大國競爭意味著更多的選擇。 巴布亞新幾內亞協議強調了太平洋國家與與他們有共同點的英語、基督教和曆史的外來者之間的舒適度。 去年，他們斷然拒絕了中國建立新地緣政治集團的企圖。 但他們很樂意接受中國投資。 馬拉佩先生表示巴布亞新幾內亞不會停止與中國的合作； 事實上，它正在與之談判一項自由貿易協定。 悉尼智庫洛伊研究所的米哈伊·索拉（Mihai Sora）表示，他“非常擅長劃分關係”——與美國的安全和發展，與中國的貿易和投資。
其他太平洋國家也是如此。 從當地角度來看，島國正日益將美國和中國納入太平洋義務之網。 它可以使該地區變得更加強大——而且，通過抑製兩國的冒險主義，也許會變得更加安全。 ■
America is lavishing attention on Pacific island states
Anthony Blinken is the most significant American official to visit Papua New Guinea since General Douglas MacArthur
There are two ways of looking at the security pact that Antony Blinken, America’s secretary of state, signed with the prime minister of Papua New Guinea (png), James Marape, on May 22nd. The obvious one is as further evidence of the great-power contest between America and China that is playing out in ever-expanding ripples across the Pacific Ocean. In that contest, America had, by its own reckoning, previously neglected the role of Pacific island states, of which png, a diverse land with 10m people, is by far the biggest.
America is now making amends. It opened an embassy in the Solomon Islands and Tonga, and has plans to do so in Kiribati and Vanuatu. While in Port Moresby, png’s capital, Mr Blinken also signed renewed “compacts of free association” with Micronesia and Palau, island states between png and America’s dependency of Guam. A renewed compact with the Marshall Islands will follow. These states hand over their defence exclusively to America in return for aid guarantees and other benefits.
Yet the pact with png, the most striking evidence of renewed American engagement with the region, also represents a significant new opportunity for its island states. President Joe Biden had been due to travel to png to sign the pact. America’s fraught internal debt-ceiling negotiations nixed that. Even so, Mr Blinken is surely now the most influential American official to have visited png since General Douglas MacArthur.
The strategic thinking is this: if America is to deter China from invading Taiwan (or if it is to defend Taiwan if China invades), Guam will be a crucial American military base. It is outside the range of many Chinese missiles. But Guam’s resilience rests on safe seas and skies around it. Hence the importance of these other island states. In addition, were China to control the waters around png, Australia, an important American ally, could be bottled up. Some of the bitterest fighting of the second world war took place in png, where MacArthur was supreme allied commander, precisely because of its strategic importance.
America’s view of a titanic, superpower contest is officially deplored by China—but shared by it. Its envoy to the Pacific, Qian Bo, accuses America of possessing a “cold-war mentality”, of trying to sabotage China’s relationships, and of being blinded by “ideological prejudice”. Perhaps. But China has a cold-war mentality, too. It vies unbendingly with Taiwan for influence with the Pacific’s smaller states. In 2019 its financial inducements, some of them underhand, persuaded the Solomon Islands and Kiribati to switch diplomatic allegiance. A security pact that China signed with the Solomons last year led a panicked America to realise how much ground in the region it had lost.
Untrammelled competition between the two big powers is met by some islanders with foreboding (Port Moresby saw protests against the new pact). The Pacific islands’ history as hapless victims is seared into the collective memory; they were objects of colonial exploitation, then bloody battlefields and finally post-war sites for nuclear tests. But for those minded to see the upside for the Pacific states, as well as the risks, in their renewed geopolitical relevance, there are many opportunities to point to.
The island states are no longer victims. It has been years, says John Blaxland of the Australian National University in Canberra, since they enjoyed such favours from outside powers, in terms of high-level visits, offers of investment and other commitments (the $45m Mr Blinken promised impoverished png will help it fight transnational crime and climate change).
Great-power competition can mean growing options. The png deal underscores a level of comfort among Pacific states with outsiders that have English, Christianity and history in common with them. Last year they flatly rejected China’s attempts to create a new geopolitical bloc. Yet they are happy to take Chinese investment. Mr Marape says png will not stop working with China; indeed it is negotiating a free-trade deal with it. png, says Mihai Sora of the Lowy Institute, a Sydney think-tank, is “very deft at compartmentalising relationships”—security and development with America, trade and investment with China.
Other Pacific states are, too. Seen from a local perspective, the island countries are increasingly binding America and China into a web of Pacific obligations. It could make the region stronger—and, by restraining the adventurism of both powers, perhaps even safer. ■
Read more from Banyan, our columnist on Asia:
Myanmar’s conflict is dividing South-East Asia (May 18th)
A winner has emerged in the old rivalry between Singapore and Hong Kong (May 11th)
America’s closest Indo-Pacific allies are cosying up (May 4th)
Also: How the Banyan column got its name
This article appeared in the Asia section of the print edition under the headline "Islands in the storm"
