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什麽原因導致了烏克蘭戰爭？
Joseph Nye 名譽教授和哈佛肯尼迪政府學院前院長
2022年10月4日
在關於導致俄羅斯於 2022 年 2 月 24 日入侵烏克蘭的因素的激烈辯論中，它有助於區分深層、中間和直接原因。 但是，雖然每個人都以自己的方式發揮作用，但即使他們都在場，也不必認為戰爭是不可避免的。
坎布裏奇——俄羅斯在烏克蘭的戰爭是歐洲自 1945 年以來最具破壞性的衝突。雖然西方許多人認為俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京選擇了一場戰爭，但他說北約 2008 年支持烏克蘭最終加入的決定帶來了生存威脅 到俄羅斯的邊界，還有一些人將衝突追溯到冷戰結束以及蘇聯解體後西方未能充分支持俄羅斯。 我們如何辨別一場可能持續數年的戰爭的起源？
第一次世界大戰發生在一個多世紀前，但曆史學家仍在撰寫書籍討論其起因。 是因為塞爾維亞恐怖分子在 1914 年暗殺了奧地利大公，還是與崛起的德國勢力挑戰英國，或整個歐洲民族主義高漲有關？ 答案是“以上所有，再加上更多”。 但直到 1914 年 8 月戰爭真正爆發，戰爭才不可避免。 即便如此，接下來的四年大屠殺也並非不可避免。
為了解決問題，它有助於區分深層原因、中間原因和直接原因。 想想生一堆篝火：把原木堆起來是深因； 添加火種和紙張是中間原因； 劃火柴是誘發因素。 但即便如此，篝火也並非不可避免。 大風吹滅了火柴，突如其來的暴雨浸濕了木頭。 正如曆史學家克裏斯托弗·克拉克 (Christopher Clark) 在 1914 年關於第一次世界大戰起源的著作《夢遊者》(The Sleepwalkers) 中指出的那樣，“未來仍然是開放的——隻是。” 錯誤的政策選擇是災難的關鍵原因。
在烏克蘭，毫無疑問，普京在 2 月 24 日命令俄羅斯軍隊入侵時點燃了火柴。就像 1914 年的大國領導人一樣，他可能認為這將是一場短暫而激烈的戰爭，並會迅速取得勝利， 有點像蘇聯在 1956 年接管布達佩斯或 1968 年接管布拉格。空降部隊將占領機場，前進的坦克將占領基輔，推翻烏克蘭總統沃洛德米爾·澤倫斯基並建立傀儡政府。
普京告訴俄羅斯人民，他正在進行一項“特殊軍事行動”，以“消除”烏克蘭的納粹化，並阻止北約向俄羅斯邊境擴張。 但考慮到他失算的嚴重程度，我們必須問問他到底在想什麽。 我們從普京自己的著作以及菲利普·肖特等傳記作家那裏得知，中間原因是拒絕將烏克蘭視為合法國家。
普京曾擔任克格勃官員，對蘇聯解體表示遺憾，而且由於烏克蘭和俄羅斯在文化上的密切聯係，他認為烏克蘭是一個虛假國家。 此外，烏克蘭忘恩負義，在 2014 年發動獨立廣場起義推翻了親俄政府，並加深了與歐盟的貿易關係，從而激怒了俄羅斯。
普京想要恢複他所謂的“俄羅斯世界”，在他年近 70 歲之際，他一直在思考自己的遺產。 早期的領導人，如彼得大帝，在他們自己的時代擴大了俄羅斯的實力。 鑒於 2014 年俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭並吞並克裏米亞半島後西方製裁力度減弱，普京似乎在問自己：為什麽不走得更遠？
北約東擴的前景是次要的中間原因。 雖然西方確實成立了北約-俄羅斯委員會，俄羅斯軍官可以通過該委員會參加一些北約會議，但俄羅斯對這種關係抱有更多期望。 盡管美國國務卿詹姆斯·貝克在 1990 年代初告訴他的俄羅斯外長，北約不會擴大，但像瑪麗·薩羅特這樣的曆史學家已經表明，貝克迅速推翻了他的口頭保證，而該口頭保證背後從未有過書麵協議。
當美國總統比爾克林頓在 1990 年代與俄羅斯總統鮑裏斯葉利欽討論此事時，俄羅斯勉強接受北約的一些擴張，但雙方的期望不同。 北約在 2008 年布加勒斯特峰會上決定將烏克蘭（和格魯吉亞）納入潛在的未來成員，這證實了普京對西方的最壞預期。
盡管如此，盡管北約在 2008 年的決定可能被誤導了，但普京的態度轉變早於此。 他曾在 2001 年 9 月 11 日的襲擊事件後幫助美國，但他在 2007 年慕尼黑安全會議上的講話表明，他在布加勒斯特峰會之前就已經對西方產生了厭惡。 因此，北約擴張的可能性隻是幾個中間原因之一——在法國和德國宣布他們將否決烏克蘭加入北約的布加勒斯特峰會後不久，這一原因就變得不那麽突出了。
此外，經過七十年的中央計劃，突然轉變成繁榮的市場經濟是不可能的。 強行通過如此迅速的變化的努力必然會產生巨大的破壞、腐敗和極端不平等。 雖然一些寡頭和政客因國有資產的快速私有化而暴富，但大多數俄羅斯人的生活水平卻下降了。
1997 年 2 月在達沃斯，下諾夫哥羅德州長鮑裏斯·涅姆佐夫（後來被暗殺）報告說，俄羅斯沒有人納稅，政府拖欠工資。 然後，在次年 9 月，自由派議員格裏戈裏·亞夫林斯基在哈佛大學肯尼迪學院的一次晚宴上說：“俄羅斯完全腐敗，葉利欽沒有遠見。” 由於無法應對經濟狀況惡化帶來的政治後果，當時健康狀況每況愈下的葉利欽求助於普京這位名不見經傳的前克格勃特工，以幫助他恢複秩序。
這些都不意味著烏克蘭戰爭不可避免。 但隨著時間的推移，這種可能性確實越來越大。 2022年2月24日，普京失算點燃了燃起大火的火柴。 很難看到他把它拿出來。
What Caused the Ukraine War?
Oct 4, 2022 JOSEPH S. NYE, JR.
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/what-caused-russia-ukraine-war-by-joseph-s-nye-2022-10
Amid heated debates about the factors that led Russia to invade Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it helps to distinguish between deep, intermediate, and immediate causes. But while each can matter in their own ways, war need not be considered inevitable even when they are all present.
CAMBRIDGE – Russia’s war in Ukraine is the most disruptive conflict that Europe has seen since 1945. While many in the West see a war of choice by Russian President Vladimir Putin, he says that NATO’s 2008 decision in favor of eventual Ukrainian membership brought an existential threat to Russia’s borders, and still others trace the conflict back to the Cold War’s end and the failure of the West to support Russia adequately after the collapse of the Soviet Union. How can we discern the origins of a war that may last for years?
World War I occurred over a century ago, yet historians still write books debating what caused it. Did it start because a Serbian terrorist assassinated an Austrian archduke in 1914, or did it have more to do with ascendant German power challenging Britain, or rising nationalism throughout Europe? The answer is “all of the above, plus more.” But war was not inevitable until it actually broke out in August 1914; and even then, it was not inevitable that four years of carnage had to follow.
To sort things out, it helps to distinguish between deep, intermediate, and immediate causes. Think of building a bonfire: piling up the logs is a deep cause; adding kindling and paper is an intermediate cause; and striking a match is a precipitating cause. But even then, a bonfire is not inevitable. A strong wind may extinguish the match, or a sudden rainstorm may have soaked the wood. As historian Christopher Clark notes in his book about the origins of WWI, The Sleepwalkers, in 1914, “the future was still open – just.” Poor policy choices were a crucial cause of the catastrophe.
In Ukraine, there is no question that Putin lit the match when he ordered Russian troops to invade on February 24. Like the leaders of the great powers in 1914, he probably believed that it would be a short, sharp war with a quick victory, somewhat like the Soviet Union’s takeover of Budapest in 1956 or Prague in 1968. Airborne troops would capture the airport and advancing tanks would seize Kyiv, removing Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and installing a puppet government.
Putin told the Russian people that he was conducting a “special military operation” to “denazify” Ukraine and prevent NATO from expanding to Russia’s borders. But given how seriously he miscalculated, we must ask what he was really thinking. We know from Putin’s own writings, and from various biographers like Philip Short, that the intermediate cause was a refusal to see Ukraine as a legitimate state.
Putin lamented the breakup of the Soviet Union, which he had served as a KGB officer, and, owing to Ukraine and Russia’s close cultural affinities, he considered Ukraine a phony state. Moreover, Ukraine had been ungrateful, offending Russia with its 2014 Maidan uprising, which removed a pro-Russian government, and its deepening of trade relations with the European Union.
Putin wants to restore what he calls the “Russian world,” and, as he has approached the age of 70, he has been thinking about his legacy. Earlier leaders, like Peter the Great, had expanded Russian power in their own time. Given the weakness of the Western sanctions that followed Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and annexation of the Crimean peninsula in 2014, Putin seems to have asked himself: Why not go further?
The prospect of NATO enlargement was a lesser intermediate cause. While the West did create a NATO-Russia Council through which Russian military officers could attend some NATO meetings, Russia expected more from the relationship. And while US Secretary of State James Baker had told his Russian counterpart, in the early 1990s, that NATO would not expand, historians like Mary Sarotte have shown that Baker quickly reversed his verbal assurance, which never did have a written agreement behind it.
When US President Bill Clinton discussed the matter with Russian President Boris Yeltsin in the 1990s, there was grudging Russian acceptance of some NATO expansion, but expectations on both sides differed. NATO’s decision at its 2008 summit in Bucharest to include Ukraine (and Georgia) as potential future members simply confirmed Putin’s worst expectations about the West.
Still, while NATO’s decision in 2008 may have been misguided, Putin’s change of attitude predated it. He had helped the United States following the September 11, 2001, attacks, but his 2007 Munich Security Conference speech shows that he had already soured on the West before the Bucharest summit. The possibility of NATO expansion thus was merely one of several intermediate causes – one made less salient soon after the Bucharest summit by France and Germany's announcements that they would veto Ukraine's NATO membership.
Behind all this were the remote or deep causes that followed the end of the Cold War. Initially, there was a great deal of optimism, in both Russia and the West, that the Soviet Union’s collapse would allow for the rise of democracy and a market economy in Russia. In the early years, Clinton and Yeltsin made a serious effort to develop good relations. But while the US provided loans and economic assistance to Russian Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar’s government, Russians expected much more.
Moreover, after seven decades of central planning, a sudden transformation into a flourishing market economy was impossible. Efforts to force through such rapid changes could not fail to produce enormous disruptions, corruption, and extreme inequality. While some oligarchs and politicians became wildly rich from the rapid privatization of state-owned assets, most Russians' standard of living declined.
At Davos in February 1997, the governor of Nizhny Novgorod, Boris Nemtsov (later assassinated), reported that no one in Russia was paying taxes, and that the government was behind on paying wages. Then, in September of that next year, the liberal parliamentarian Grigory Yavlinsky told a dinner at the Harvard Kennedy School that “Russia is completely corrupt and Yeltsin has no vision.” Unable to cope with the political fallout of deteriorating economic conditions, Yeltsin, then in declining health, turned to Putin, the unknown ex-KGB agent, to help him restore order.
None of this means that the Ukraine war was inevitable. But it did become increasingly probable over time. On February 24, 2022, Putin miscalculated and lit the match that started the conflagration. It is hard to see him putting it out.
