風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
Spotlight Ukraine
Munich Security Index 2023
Astonishingly, only six percent of Ukrainians feel unprepared to take on Russia’s invasion, and even during a winter marked by blackouts and shortages they feel more prepared to face the risk of energy supply disruption than any G7 public. Ukraine’s Western orientation is also unequivocal. The vast majority of Ukrainians want to live in a world shaped by European and, to a lesser extent, US rules (Figure 1.16). Russian and Chinese visions of order have virtually no purchase in Ukraine.
令人驚訝的是，隻有 6% 的烏克蘭人認為沒有準備好應對俄羅斯的入侵，即使在以停電和短缺為標誌的冬季，他們也比任何 G7 公眾都更願意麵對能源供應中斷的風險。 烏克蘭的西方取向也很明確。 絕大多數烏克蘭人希望生活在一個由歐洲規則塑造的世界中，在較小程度上由美國規則塑造（圖 1.16）。 俄羅斯和中國的秩序願景在烏克蘭幾乎沒有任何意義。
In striking contrast to some Western policy-makers, whose concerns about further military escalation appear to hamstring more determined support, Ukrainians have not been intimidated by Russian threats. As devastating as the use of a tactical nuclear weapon against a city or on the battlefield would be, an overwhelming majority of Ukrainians say they would still refuse to surrender if it occurred (Figure 1.17).
與一些西方決策者形成鮮明對比的是，他們對軍事進一步升級的擔憂似乎阻礙了更堅定的支持，烏克蘭人並沒有被俄羅斯的威脅嚇倒。 與在城市或戰場上使用戰術核武器一樣具有毀滅性，絕大多數烏克蘭人表示，如果發生這種情況，他們仍然會拒絕投降（圖 1.17）。
Moreover, nothing short of a complete Russian withdrawal from Ukrainian territory, including Crimea, suffices for most Ukrainians as acceptable conditions for a ceasefire (Figure 1.18). Even a Russian withdrawal from previously occupied areas would be unacceptable for the majority of Ukrainians if it does not also include Crimea. Premature peace negotiations, calls for which are particularly vocal in some Western capitals, would thus likely meet fierce resistance among the Ukrainian population.
此外，對於大多數烏克蘭人來說，隻要俄羅斯完全撤出烏克蘭領土（包括克裏米亞）就足以作為停火的可接受條件（圖 1.18）。 如果不包括克裏米亞，即使俄羅斯從先前占領的地區撤軍，對於大多數烏克蘭人來說也是不可接受的。 因此，過早的和平談判在一些西方國家的首都呼聲特別高，很可能會遭到烏克蘭民眾的強烈抵製。
The transatlantic partners also need to start planning for how to ensure Ukraine’s long-term security from Russian attacks. Ukrainian citizens are deeply aware of the lasting threat Putin's Russia poses and overwhelmingly believe that they require Western security guarantees (Figure 1.19). What these could look like is still unclear. But most Ukrainians believe that they will need permanent arms supplies from the West. A clear majority also fears that outside of NATO, Ukraine will never be secure, which is corroborated by the fact that Ukrainians place much less faith in the EU to protect them than in NATO.
跨大西洋合作夥伴還需要開始規劃如何確保烏克蘭的長期安全免受俄羅斯襲擊。 烏克蘭公民深刻意識到普京的俄羅斯構成的持久威脅，並且絕大多數人認為他們需要西方的安全保障（圖 1.19）。 這些可能是什麽樣子仍不清楚。 但大多數烏克蘭人認為，他們將需要來自西方的永久性武器供應。 絕大多數人還擔心，在北約之外，烏克蘭永遠不會安全，烏克蘭人對歐盟保護他們的信心遠低於對北約的信心，這一事實證實了這一點。
These patterns are also reflected in Ukrainians’ evaluation of other countries’ responses to the war (Figure 1.20). Those polled judge all G7 countries, as well as Turkey, unequivocally positively. But there are meaningful differences among them – unsurprising given the variation in material support provided, messaging, and urgency with which countries responded to the war. The UK tops the ranking, closely followed by the US, and Canada, while Western European states trail the Anglophone countries by around 30 percentage points. Meanwhile, Ukrainians perceive China and India to have responded particularly badly, but all actors from the “Global South” score negatively in the ranking.
這些模式也反映在烏克蘭人對其他國家對戰爭反應的評價中（圖 1.20）。 接受調查的人對所有 G7 國家以及土耳其都給予明確的正麵評價。 但它們之間存在有意義的差異——考慮到提供的物質支持、信息傳遞和各國對戰爭的反應緊迫性的差異，這不足為奇。 英國位居榜首，緊隨其後的是美國和加拿大，而西歐國家落後英語國家約 30 個百分點。 與此同時，烏克蘭人認為中國和印度的反應特別糟糕，但來自“南半球”的所有參與者在排名中的得分都是負數。
