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軍事工業複合體

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軍事工業複合體

維基百科,自由的百科全書

軍事工業複合體(英語:Military-Industrial Complex,MIC),也稱軍事工業國會複合體(Military-Industrial-Congressional Complex,MICC),中文簡稱軍工複合體,是指一國軍隊軍事工業政治經濟利益過於緊密而成的共生關係[1]。軍隊過分仰賴私營軍火企業提供軍需,私人國防工業會以政治及經濟手段(例如遊說國會議員,指支持軍工企業發展可為地方帶來大量就業機會)確保政府提供足夠預算,甚至為推銷武器而鼓動政府高層發動戰爭,令該國的軍事開支巨大。此名詞最常被用於美國,由第34任美國總統德懷特·戴維·艾森豪威爾在1961年的總統告別演說中首創。

 
美國海軍上將 Gary Roughead 於波音演講 P-8波賽頓海上巡邏機 的采購

作為一個貶義詞,軍事工業複合體主要用於美國的情境,這共生關係由國防承包商(軍事工業)、五角大廈(軍隊)以及美國政府立法部門行政部門)的要角所構成的聯合壟斷;此聯合壟斷關係為發“戰爭財”來獲取暴利,因而常與公眾利益相違背,發動或促進不需要(甚至有危害)的戰爭或軍事行動,在國際關係上可能引發不必要的軍備競賽及武器擴散。軍事工業複合體的貶義,主要來自於這種聯合壟斷的政經關係不受民主程序的監督、反省及控製。[2]

亞洲周刊專欄作家陳國祥認為,美國軍力過度擴張,財政難以支撐,而且“國防軍工企業永居優先的主導與分配地位,是兩黨政治的真正洗牌者”

早在上個世紀50年代,當時的美國總統德懷特·戴維·艾森豪威爾便在其著名的“告別演說”中,告誡美國民眾警惕“軍工複合體”這頭“怪獸”帶來的危害。然而,隨著時間的推移,美國與歐洲特別是美國的軍工複合體不僅沒有受到限製,反而一直在背後操縱美歐國家的政治、外交、軍事和軍事戰略。
所謂軍工複合體,乃是指由軍事部門、軍工企業、部分國會議員和國防研究機構組成的龐大利益集團。由於軍工複合體不僅涉及軍方,還涉及到國防企業,更牽涉到國會,因而它的影響是極其深遠的。

地位

軍工複合體發展到今,深刻的影響著美國政府的決策及社會。一方麵是它的魔影已滲透到老百姓的日常生活中,另外一方麵,軍工複合體迅速發展,也已使得各國國防經濟運行很難離開私人企業。美國的實踐證明,近年來在美國國防部的大型承包商中,位居前三位的依次為洛克希德·馬丁公司波音公司諾思羅普·格魯曼公司。其中,洛克希德·馬丁公司主要生產軍用飛機、導彈,是所謂的“純”國防承包公司,諾思羅普·格魯曼公司亦屬於美國的“純”國防承包公司,重點生產各種類型的導彈。而波音公司,實際上屬於“半”國防承包公司,該公司主要生產民用飛機,但也接受美國國防部訂貨。據統計,僅僅在2007年,上述三大國防承包商便從美國國防部分別拿到了278億美元、225億美元和146億美元的合同 [1]  。
 
除此之外,通用動力公司雷神公司、英國的BAE係統公司,也成為美國國防合同的主要接受者。
 
在歐盟,私人公司也是相關國家國防部的主要承包商。近年來,歐洲航空和宇宙公司(為歐盟主要國防承包商),不僅接受歐盟大國國防部訂貨,它還接受美國空軍訂貨,成為典型的全球跨國軍火公司;縱然歐洲空中客車公司,雖然該公司名為民用飛機公司,然而它也接受歐洲大國國防部軍事訂貨。
 
僅僅在法國,該國的達索公司每年便從法國國防部接受數億歐元的國防訂貨。法國的許多先進高技術武器大多來源於這家公司國防訂貨。說明,美歐國防部同私人公司的關係是何等的密切。事實上,離開了私人公司訂貨,美歐國防部便難以生存下去。
 
事件影響
 
軍工複合體作為一個複雜的龐大機構,由於它同美歐軍方與國會聯係相當密切,因而它實際上操縱著美國與歐洲國家的防務政策。
 
這集中體現在以下一些方麵:
 
首先,海陸空三軍需要先進的武器,必須經國防部予以備案,然後再向國會軍事撥款機構進行申請。而許多先進武器需要由國防科研機構加以研發。因而,上述部門和機構便形成一個密不可分的整體,誰也離不開誰。
 
其次,不管是國防企業,還是科研機構,他們需要大量撥款,勢必雇傭有關人員。而從國防部門退休人員,便成為上述企業與研究機構的爭奪對象。因為,這些退休人員同國防部的關係特別密切,不少人都是國防部原來的要員。讓他們參與公司或研究機構,可為企業和研究部門獲得更多實惠。
 
再次,為了從國會得到更多撥款,國防企業和國防研究機構通常還要在國會外展開院外活動,加強對國會議員的影響力,而這些國會議員不僅從國防企業及研究機構得到大量好處,還要為所選取的軍事基地和國防科研部門與企業提供大量就業機會而獲得選票。因此,這些議員為本地區的國防企業和研究機構向國會爭奪預算撥款而費盡心機。
 
最後,通過人事安排,達到最終控製防務政策的目標。在人事安排上,國防公司領導人被安排到國防部重要部門;國防部退休人員安排到國防公司擔任要職。這是一種雙向的人員流動。比如,美國現任副總統切尼,曾在老布什政府任期終結後卸任國防部長職位,以後又擔任了國防工業公司——哈利伯頓公司的高層職位。通過人事往來的雙向流動,促使國防企業通過各種關係直接參與美歐主要國家的防務政策製定。
 
不言而喻,軍工複合體的結果便是,國防企業代表直接進入國家權利機關,利用手中權力在防務政策中為集團謀求利益。況且,軍工複合體還利用各種途徑,進一步左右美歐國家政府的安全決策。
 
發展形式
 
“到2020年,美國擁有的先進隱形戰鬥機數量將是中國的20倍,中國是否將對美國構成直接的威脅?”2010年5月8日,美國國防部長羅伯特·蓋茨通過一連串的反問,嚴厲批評了“軍工鐵三角”為了拿到巨額訂單,對美國所麵臨的威脅進行不實渲染。羅伯特·蓋茨還表示將大幅縮減五角大樓的官僚成本。
盡管這個集團曾經高效地將權力、資本和技術集中,快速推進了美國軍隊現代化,但是目前已經走向了極端。由於軍隊要先進的武器裝備和更高的待遇,軍工企業要更多的訂單,美國國會議員想讓他選區內的軍工企業提供更多的就業機會,這些相互關聯的利益需求決定軍工鐵三角成為了一個靠軍備競賽發財的特殊利益集團。1961年,美國總統德懷特·戴維·艾森豪威爾在著名的告別演說中曾警告過“軍工鐵三角”這頭“怪獸”將損害美國國家利益。近半個世紀過去了,這頭“怪獸”不僅愈加強大,而且打著“愛國”、“公眾安全”等口號,挾持了美國政府
 
蓋茨表示,軍工鐵三角的危害之一表現在催生了國防官僚主義,通過在國防各環節層層設卡,“鐵三角”將撈取更多油水。蓋茨舉例稱,前線要增加一名軍犬飼養員,要通過五角大樓5個部門審核。自“9·11”事件以來,五角大樓預算幾乎翻番。而在軍事支出中,五角大樓行政費用幾乎占到40%。蓋茨表示,他準備在提交的2012年國防預算中將管理和運行費用調低2到3個百分點,力爭節省100億至150億美元的行政開支。
 
蓋茨還批評“鐵三角”過分誇大美國麵臨的威脅。“在美軍已經擁有3200架各種戰術飛機的情況下,我們是否應繼續強化力量?當前美國擁有和在建的作戰艦艇數量比其他13個海軍大國的艦艇總數還要多,這是否意味著美國還處在危險當中?到2020年,美國擁有的先進隱形戰鬥機的數量是中國的20倍,中國是否將對美國構成直接的威脅?”蓋茨通過一連串的反問,表達出對軍工鐵三角的憤怒。
 
蓋茨承認,和軍工鐵三角開戰是一個艱巨的任務,他已經下決心同國會展開激烈鬥爭。但美國聯合通訊社分析認為,蓋茨要打破軍工鐵三角,麵臨的阻力很大。該利益集團已經滲透進美國軍政界的方方麵麵,像前副總統理查德·布魯斯·切尼、前國防部長唐納德·亨利·拉姆斯菲爾德都曾經在軍火公司任職,蓋茨本人當初能夠進入前總統喬治·沃克·布什的視野,也與軍工鐵三角的推薦有密切關聯。要打破鐵三角,意味著同整個美國政壇為敵,阻力可想而知。

The Long War: A New History of U.S. National Security Policy Since World War II  

https://www.amazon.ca/Long-War-History-National-Security/dp/0231131593?

by Andrew Bacevich ; April 23 2009

Essays by a diverse and distinguished group of historians, political scientists, and sociologists examine the alarms, emergencies, controversies, and confusions that have characterized America's Cold War, the post-Cold War interval of the 1990s, and today's "Global War on Terror." This "Long War" has left its imprint on virtually every aspect of American life; by considering it as a whole, The Long War is the first volume to take a truly comprehensive look at America's response to the national-security crisis touched off by the events of World War II.

Contributors consider topics ranging from grand strategy and strategic bombing to ideology and economics and assess the changing American way of war and Hollywood's surprisingly consistent depiction of Americans at war. They evaluate the evolution of the national-security apparatus and the role of dissenters who viewed the myriad activities of that apparatus with dismay. They take a fresh look at the Long War's civic implications and its impact on civil-military relations.

More than a military history, The Long War examines the ideas, policies, and institutions that have developed since the United States claimed the role of global superpower. This protracted crisis has become a seemingly permanent, if not defining aspect of contemporary American life. In breaking down the old and artificial boundaries that have traditionally divided the postwar period into neat historical units, this volume provides a better understanding of the evolution of the United States and U.S. policy since World War II and offers a fresh perspective on our current national security predicament.

<<<<<<<<<<<>>>>>>>>>>
1. INTRODUCTION
  1.  (pp. vii-xvi)
    Andrew J. Bacevich
     

    Growing up in the Midwest during the 1950s and early 1960s, I came to understand the narrative of contemporary history and the narrative of the Cold War as one and the same. That the Cold War provided the organizing principle of the age was self-evident, even to a young boy. Catch the headlines on WGN, read the Chicago Tribune, flip through an occasional issue of Time or Life, and the rest was easy: the era’s great antagonisms—the United States vs. the Soviet Union, West vs. East, Free World vs. Communist bloc—told you pretty much everything you needed to...

  2. 1. LIBERATION OR DOMINANCE? THE IDEOLOGY OF U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY
     (pp. 1-52)
    Arnold A. Offner
     

    In September 2002 President George W. Bush’s administration published “The National Security Strategy of the United States” (NSS), an unusually strong ideological statement explaining the U.S. government’s intent to combine American principles and power to effect American goals under the rubric of a new “American internationalism.”¹ The Bush NSS rests on four concepts. First is the belief that America’s unequaled power, sustained by its emphasis on freedom and constitutional government, imposes special responsibility on the United States to move the world toward similar political-economic models. Second is the view that the Cold War security strategies of containment and deterrence of...

  3. 2. VARIATIONS ON THE AMERICAN WAY OF WAR
     (pp. 53-98)
    James Kurth
     

    During the last third of the twentieth century, military strategists and historians developed the idea that there was a distinctive American strategic culture or “way of war.” There was general agreement that the American way of war was characterized by a reliance upon such American advantages as (1) overwhelming mass, i.e., a pronounced advantage in men and material; (2) wide-ranging mobility, i.e., a pronounced advantage in transportation and communication; and (3) high-technology weapons systems, i.e., a comparative advantage in capital investment versus manpower.¹

    Parallel to these three military qualities were a political feature and an international one. The political feature...

  4. 3. THE POLITICS OF CONVENTIONAL WARFARE IN AN UNCONVENTIONAL AGE
     (pp. 99-136)
    George H. Quester
     

    World War II set the stage for the evolution of American conventional war thinking in two very different ways. The first was the way in which it had been fought, with an unprecedented reliance on air power and on amphibious operations, with each of these innovations inevitably changing how Americans and anyone else thought about normal or “conventional” war.¹ The second was the way it was so abruptly ended, when in August of 1945 American atomic bombs fell on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, producing a surrender that most had not have expected until 1947 at the earliest.²

    The very phrase “conventional...

  5. 4. SHIELD AND SWORD U.S. STRATEGIC FORCES AND DOCTRINE SINCE 1945
     (pp. 137-206)
    Tami Davis Biddle
     

    The Second World War ineluctably altered the position of the United States in the world. At the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941, the United States was still a careful and often reluctant player in international politics; by 1945 the Americans had taken a major role in the defeat of Germany, had brought Japan to its knees, and had developed the most daunting military arsenal the world had ever seen. The preeminent symbol of America’s new role was the long-range bomber coupled with the atomic bomb. This pairing, which enabled monstrous destructive power to be delivered anywhere...

  6. 5. ELUSIVE BARGAIN: THE PATTERN OF U.S. CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS SINCE WORLD WAR II
     (pp. 207-264)
    Andrew J. Bacevich
     

    History, the American statesman Henry L. Stimson once observed, “is often not what actually happened but what is recorded as such.” This difference between reality and record does not emerge by accident. It reflects the interests of those in a position to influence the recording.

    When it comes to the history of U.S. civil-military relations since the end of World War II, the gap between actual events and the story woven from those events looms especially large. It does so because that gap has served and continues to serve an important function. What we might term the approved interpretation of...

  7. 6. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY STATE UBIQUITOUS AND ENDLESS
     (pp. 265-301)
    Anna Kasten Nelson
     

    The national security state was created by the Cold War, sustained and enlarged by that war, and further refined by the Gulf War in the Middle East. It is now the handmaiden of the “war” on terrorism, using the structure created by the Cold War more than fifty years ago to fight terrorism. The national security state has grown even more pervasive in recent years, tainting our republican institutions, defying congressional oversight, and alienating our former allies.

    In the national security state the perceived need for security from the nation’s enemies, known or unknown, influences every part of national life....

  8. 7. INTELLIGENCE FOR EMPIRE
     (pp. 302-334)
    John Prados
     

    Americans today take it for granted that the United States maintains a vast array of agencies and entities that collect, process, and disseminate information, and carry out such other activities as are ordered by the president. In fact, the origins of this so-called “intelligence community” are relatively recent. It grew like topsy under pressure of war—World War II that is. Many analysts trace the beginnings of the U.S. intelligence community to the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, to our determination never again to be taken by surprise as we were on that Sunday morning in December 1941. Another school...

  9. 8. THE MILITARY-INDUSTRIAL COMPLEX LOBBY AND TROPE
     (pp. 335-370)
    Alex Roland
     

    The military-industrial complex was both a historical phenomenon and a political trope. The phenomenon was a lobby that campaigned intensely in the United States to promote increased military spending and arms production. It flourished for a quarter of a century during the Cold War. The trope gained currency in the antiwar movement of the Vietnam era. It, too, is best understood in a Cold-War context.¹

    Both meanings of the term are captured by the Oxford English Dictionary. It defines “military industrial” as

    (orig. U.S.), of or relating to a nation’s armed forces and to its industries (esp. those producing military...

  10. 9. PAYING FOR GLOBAL POWER ASSESSING THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF POSTWAR U.S. MILITARY SPENDING
     (pp. 371-404)
    Benjamin O. Fordham
     

    In the summer and fall of 1950 the administration of President Harry S Truman entered into uncharted fiscal territory, committing the United States to very high levels of military spending on an open-ended basis. The rationale for this move was set forth in NSC 68, one of the foundational documents of U.S. postwar national security policy, completed just a few months before the start of the Korean War. In spite of the undeclared war in Korea, both military planners and their critics understood that the successive supplemental spending proposals that nearly quadrupled the fiscal 1951 military budget were not short-term...

  11. 10. THE CHANGING MORAL CONTRACT FOR MILITARY SERVICE
     (pp. 405-455)
    James Burk
     

    Military service is sometimes thought of in instrumental terms. Service members receive the “king’s shilling” and in exchange the state may use them as soldiers to fight wars. Once enrolled for pay, as Thomas Hobbes observed, soldiers are obliged to go into battle and not run away, at least not without the state’s permission, no matter how much they may want to do so.¹ Put in the language of current social science, the instrumentalist view thinks about military service in terms of a “principalagent” model, in which the state is the principal and those in the military are the principal’s...

  12. 11. AMERICAN INSECURITY DISSENT FROM THE “LONG WAR”
     (pp. 456-516)
    Charles Chatfield
     

    American leaders have always prided themselves on seeing the United States as a beacon to civilization. Early in their experience, however, Americans came down from their City on a Hill and pressed across the continent, then beyond the seas and around the globe. Relentlessly they carried forward the distinctive forms of political democracy and market economy with which they rationalized their achievement and elevated it to a Cause, imbued with liberty and justice for all.

    Interest and principle have ever been entwined in U.S. policy and rhetoric. Foreign policy has been both advanced and challenged on practical and principled grounds;...

  13. 12. THE “GOOD” WAR NATIONAL SECURITY AND AMERICAN CULTURE
     (pp. 517-550)
    William L. O’Neill
     

    This essay is concerned mainly with how the mass media—and especially film and television—treat war and the military. Although popular music and fiction have exercised considerable influence, no song, however widely played, and no book, regardless of sales, has anything like the reach and impact of the moving image. War movies have been an important genre since 1942, when Hollywood signed up for the duration, and became ubiquitous with the advent of cable television. TV shows on World War II, especially service comedies, are almost as old as the medium itself. Since cable channels began multiplying in the...

  14. LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS
     (pp. 551-554)
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