《道德情操論》第一卷 （第一篇5章）

 

 

《道德情操論》第一卷  論行為得體

The Theory of the Moral Sentiments

 

By Adam Smith  （1759）

 

 《道德情操論》

   
亞當·斯密  著   宋德利 譯

 

第一卷  論行為得體

 

Section I   Of the Sense of Propriety

 

第一篇    論得體

 

Chap. I   Of Sympathy

 

第一章  論同情 

1． 

How selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him, though he derives nothing from it except the pleasure of seeing it. Of this kind is pity or compassion, the emotion which we feel for the misery of others, when we either see it, or are made to conceive it in a very lively manner. That we often derive sorrow from the sorrow of others, is a matter of fact too obvious to require any instances to prove it; for this sentiment, like all the other original passions of human nature, is by no means confined to the virtuous and humane, though they perhaps may feel it with the most exquisite sensibility. The greatest ruffian, the most hardened violator of the laws of society, is not altogether without it.

    一個人的性格中，顯然存在某些天性，無論他被認為私心有多重，這些天性也會激勵他去關注別人的命運，並且將別人的快樂變為自己不可或缺的快樂。他因目睹別人快樂而快樂，舍此無他。同情或憐憫，就是這種天性，亦即這樣一種情感：當我們或親眼目睹，或浮想聯翩地設想他人的痛苦時，我們就會感同身受。我們時常因他人之悲而悲，其實這種情況朗如白晝，無需例證；這種情感，與人性中其它所有的原始激情毫無二致，既不為德高望重者所專美，也不為慈悲為懷者所獨善，誠然，他們對這種情感的體察可能極盡幽微。因此，即便是為非作歹、罪大惡極的暴徒，及至冥頑不化、違反社會公德的惡棍，也絕非毫無同情之心的冷血動物。 

2． 

As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiving what we ourselves should feel in the like situation. Though our brother is upon the rack, as long as we ourselves are at our ease, our senses will never inform us of what he suffers. They never did, and never can, carry us beyond our own person, and it is by the imagination only that we can form any conception of what are his sensations. Neither can that faculty help us to this any other way, than by representing to us what would be our own, if we were in his case. It is the impressions of our own senses only, not those of his, which our imaginations copy. By the imagination we place ourselves in his situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same torments, we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person with him, and thence form some idea of his sensations, and even feel something which, though weaker in degree, is not altogether unlike them. His agonies, when they are thus brought home to ourselves, when we have thus adopted and made them our own, begin at last to affect us, and we then tremble and shudder at the thought of what he feels. For as to be in pain or distress of any kind excites the most excessive sorrow, so to conceive or to imagine that we are in it, excites some degree of the same emotion, in proportion to the vivacity or dullness of the conception.

我們對於他人的感受缺乏直接體驗，隻能設身處地加以想象，否則就無法感同身受。如果我們采取事不關己、高高掛起的態度，即使親兄弟遭受嚴刑拷打，我們的官能也會麻木不仁，無法感知他的痛苦。可惜的是，無論過去，還是現在，官能的作用隻囿於自身，因此無法使我們超脫自我。有鑒於此，我們隻能憑借想象，才能對那位兄弟的感覺有點概念。想象力所能做的，也隻是向我們呈現彼時彼地我們自己可能有何感受。這隻是我們自己的而非那位兄弟的感覺所獲得的印象，是我們想象力摹擬的結果。通過身臨其境的想象，設想自己正在遭受同樣的折磨，我們似乎已經融入他的體內，在某種程度上已變成和他一樣的人，因而對他的感受有了一些概念，此等概念雖不算切膚之痛，卻也庶幾近之。當他的痛苦被如此這般地傳遞給我們時，當我們又這般如此地接納他的痛苦時，當我們將他的痛苦變成我們自己的痛苦時，他的痛苦就終於開始影響我們了。於是乎，當我們想到他的感覺時，我們就會戰栗發抖。親身經受痛苦或失望，會激發極度的悲傷，想象經受痛苦或失望，在某種程度上也會激發相同的情感，而這種情感的鮮活度或呆滯度，都與想象形成的概念之鮮活度或呆滯度互成比例。 

3． 

That this is the source of our fellow-feeling for the misery of others, that it is by changing places in fancy with the sufferer, that we come either to conceive or to be affected by what he feels, may be demonstrated by many obvious observations, if it should not be thought sufficiently evident of itself. When we see a stroke aimed and just ready to fall upon the leg or arm of another person, we naturally shrink and draw back our own leg or our own arm; and when it does fall, we feel it in some measure, and are hurt by it as well as the sufferer. The mob, when they are gazing at a dancer on the slack rope, naturally writhe and twist and balance their own bodies, as they see him do, and as they feel that they themselves must do if in his situation. Persons of delicate fibres and a weak constitution of body complain, that in looking on the sores and ulcers which are exposed by beggars in the streets, they are apt to feel an itching or uneasy sensation in the correspondent part of their own bodies. The horror which they conceive at the misery of those wretches affects that particular part in themselves more than any other; because that horror arises from conceiving what they themselves would suffer, if they really were the wretches whom they are looking upon, and if that particular part in themselves was actually affected in the same miserable manner. The very force of this conception is sufficient, in their feeble frames, to produce that itching or uneasy sensation complained of. Men of the most robust make, observe that in looking upon sore eyes they often feel a very sensible soreness in their own, which proceeds from the same reason; that organ being in the strongest man more delicate, than any other part of the body is in the weakest.

這就是我們同情他人痛苦的因由，亦即在想象中與遭受痛苦者換位，去設想他的感覺或受其感染，此中道理若非全然自明，也有許多顯見的觀察足資為證。當我們看到有人揮手，想朝另外一個人的腿或手臂打去的時候，或者已經打過去的時候，我們自己的腿和手臂就自然而然地往回縮；而一旦打到對方，我們則會在某種輕度上感覺打到自己身上，並像被打者那樣感到疼痛。當觀眾凝視一位舞者置身鬆弛的繩索之上，扭動搖擺以求平衡時，他們也會身不由己地做出同樣的動作;因為換作是他們自己站在繩索上，他們也不得不這樣做。性格脆弱或體質羸弱者經常抱怨說，看到乞丐在大街上露出潰瘍或膿瘡時，他們自己身體的相應部位也會感到瘙癢或不適。他們對那些可憐人的痛苦加以想象所產生的恐怖，對他們自身那個部位產生的影響，要超過任何一位其他部位；因為那種恐怖起源於這樣的想象：如果他們自己真的就是親眼目睹的那些可憐人，如果他們自身那個部位確實遭受同樣的痛苦，他們自己將可能經受何種折磨。這種基於想象形成的概念，其力甚巨，足以使他們脆弱的軀體產生為其所抱怨的那種瘙癢或不適感。即便身體極其強健的人，有時也會注意到：當他們看到別人紅腫的眼睛時，經常敏感地感覺到自己的眼睛也會疼痛，而這種情況也於相同的原因；眼睛是個極其脆弱的器官，即便是體質最強者的眼睛，與體質最弱者身上的其他任何器官相比，也還是脆弱得多。

4．

Neither is it those circumstances only, which create pain or sorrow, that call forth our fellow-feeling. Whatever is the passion which arises from any object in the person principally concerned, an analogous emotion springs up, at the thought of his situation, in the breast of every attentive spectator. Our joy for the deliverance of those heroes of tragedy or romance who interest us, is as sincere as our grief for their distress, and our fellow-feeling with their misery is not more real than that with their happiness. We enter into their gratitude towards those faithful friends who did not desert them in their difficulties; and we heartily go along with their resentment against those perfidious traitors who injured, abandoned, or deceived them. In every passion of which the mind of man is susceptible, the emotions of the by-stander always correspond to what, by bringing the case home to himself, he imagines should be the sentiments of the sufferer.

      身體強健者所注意到的上述兩種情況，都決然不是產生痛苦或憂傷，以及激發我們同情心所需的絕無僅有的條件。對於每一位關心他人痛癢的旁觀者來說，當他設想自己所傾心關注者的處境時，都會為之動情，無論這種情源於被關注者身上的何種部位，也都是大同小異，趨於雷同。悲劇或浪漫劇中為我們所關注的英雄人物一旦獲得釋放，我們就會為之喜不自禁，這種喜，與他們的不幸在我們心中所激發的悲，同樣真誠不二。不幸引發憐憫，幸福激發熱情，二者相比，同樣真切，不分伯仲。他們感謝自己那些逆境中不舍不棄的忠實朋友，他們也對那些傷害自己、背棄自己、欺騙自己的背信棄義的叛徒極其憤慨，而我們則亦步亦趨，有樣學樣，隨他們而感恩戴德，因他們而恨之入骨。大凡最煽情的激情，都能使旁觀者設身處地去設想一些自認為是受害者必有的情緒，進而做出回應。

5．

Pity and compassion are words appropriated to signify our fellow-feeling with the sorrow of others. Sympathy, though its meaning was, perhaps, originally the same, may now, however, without much impropriety, be made use of to denote our fellow-feeling with any passion whatever.

       用“憐憫”和“體諒”這兩個字眼來表示因他人哀傷所產生的同情，這是再貼切不過的了。“感同身受”這個字眼，其原意也許和上述兩者毫無二致，然而現在，用它去飽含激情地抒發同情之心，這未嚐不算得體之舉。 

6．

Upon some occasions sympathy may seem to arise merely from the view of a certain emotion in another person. The passions, upon some occasions, may seem to be transfused from one man to another, instantaneously and antecedent to any knowledge of what excited them in the person principally concerned. Grief and joy, for example, strongly expressed in the look and gestures of any one, at once affect the spectator with some degree of a like painful or agreeable emotion. A smiling face is, to every body that sees it, a cheerful object; as a sorrowful countenance, on the other hand, is a melancholy one.

在某種情況下，之所以會產生憐憫之心，看似僅僅是因為目睹了他人身上流露出的某種情感。這種情感，在某些場合裏，看似能從一個人那裏傳遞給另一個人，而這種傳遞的奇妙之處就在於，這“另一個人”尚未知曉這種情感何以會在對方身上產生，情感傳遞就閃電般結束了。以悲傷和愉快為例，任何一個人都可以通過眼神和手勢來表達這兩種情感，而同時也會像痛苦或愜意的情感那樣，立即感染旁觀者。一張滿麵春風的陽光之臉，人見人愛，那是因為它令人心曠神怡；一張愁雲密布的苦瓜之臉，人見人怕，那是因為它令人心塞肺悶。

7．

This, however, does not hold universally, or with regard to every passion. There are some passions of which the expressions excite no sort of sympathy, but before we are acquainted with what gave occasion to them, serve rather to disgust and provoke us against them. The furious behaviour of an angry man is more likely to exasperate us against himself than against his enemies. As we are unacquainted with his provocation, we cannot bring his case home to ourselves, nor conceive any thing like the passions which it excites. But we plainly see what is the situation of those with whom he is angry, and to what violence they may be exposed from so enraged an adversary. We readily, therefore, sympathize with their fear or resentment, and are immediately disposed to take part against the man from whom they appear to be in so much danger.

       誠然，這種情況既非放諸四海，皆準無疑，亦非千人一麵，毫無例外。有一些感情，在旁觀者弄清其產生的來龍去脈之前，表達者在人們心中所激發出來的並非同情，而是厭惡或怨怒。一個怒火中燒的人，其暴躁如雷的表現更像是要激怒我們和他本人作對，而不是與他的敵人作對。因為我們並不了解此人大發雷霆之怒的原因，所以我們既無法將他的情況與我們自己掛鉤，也無法想象使此人大為光火的導火索。但是我們卻清楚地看到被他發飆者的情況，以及他們可能會從這位凶悍的對頭那裏遭到何等的狂暴蹂躪。因此我們就自然而然地同情這些人由此產生的恐懼或怨恨，更有甚至，還會立即和他們一起，去反對那個看來要對他們形成嚴重危害的河東獅吼者。

 

8．

If the very appearances of grief and joy inspire us with some degree of the like emotions, it is because they suggest to us the general idea of some good or bad fortune that has befallen the person in whom we observe them: and in these passions this is sufficient to have some little influence upon us. The effects of grief and joy terminate in the person who feels those emotions, of which the expressions do not, like those of resentment, suggest to us the idea of any other person for whom we are concerned, and whose interests are opposite to his. The general idea of good or bad fortune, therefore, creates some concern for the person who has met with it, but the general idea of provocation excites no sympathy with the anger of the man who has received it. Nature, it seems, teaches us to be more averse to enter into this passion, and, till informed of its cause, to be disposed rather to take part against it.

       如果悲傷和快樂的情感流露，能在某種程度上激發我們產生類似的情感，那是因為這種流露能使我們對感情流露者或好或壞的命運產生一種總體概念：悲傷和快樂這些激情足能使我們產生些許共鳴。悲傷和快樂產生的效果最終隻會顯現在那個具有相同情感的人身上，但是如果另外有人在情致上與他相左，那麽悲傷和歡樂的表達，就和怨怒的表達一樣，無論此人如何表達這些情感，我們對他也依然會一無所知。至於命運，無論好壞，隻要人們對它產生一個總體概念，它就能使命運的主人贏得外界關注。然而震怒則當別論，無論他給人以何種總體概念，也無法贏得他人的同情。天性似乎在勸誡我們，對於動輒河東獅吼這種激情，不要輕易介入，更有甚者，在知曉獅吼的原因之前，甚至還應該與他人一起，合力對其大加撻伐。

 

9．

Even our sympathy with the grief or joy of another, before we are informed of the cause of either, is always extremely imperfect. General lamentations, which express nothing but the anguish of the sufferer, create rather a curiosity to inquire into his situation, along with some disposition to sympathize with him, than any actual sympathy that is very sensible. The first question which we ask is, What has befallen you? Till this be answered, though we are uneasy both from the vague idea of his misfortune, and still more from torturing ourselves with conjectures about what it may be, yet our fellow-feeling is not very considerable.

       即便我們體諒他人的悲傷與快樂，但在弄清悲傷與快樂的原因之前，我們的這份體諒之心也總是極不完美的。一般的悲傷，它所表現的隻不過是事主的極度痛苦，而它在別人身上所產生的效果，與其說是一種切合實際的同情，毋寧說僅僅激發別人產生渴望了解事主的好奇，以及催生一種同情事主的意向。我們要提出的第一個問題就是，你究竟怎麽啦？在這一問題得以解答之前，我們的心情總是忐忑不安，這是因為我們對事主的不幸所產生的印象十分模糊，更有甚者，是因為我們需要對可能發生的情況加以揣測，而這將使我們大吃其苦，然而盡管如此，我們的同情之心，體諒之情，依然無關宏旨。

 

10．

Sympathy, therefore, does not arise so much from the view of the passion, as from that of the situation which excites it. We sometimes feel for another, a passion of which he himself seems to be altogether incapable; because, when we put ourselves in his case, that passion arises in our breast from the imagination, though it does not in his from the reality. We blush for the impudence and rudeness of another, though he himself appears to have no sense of the impropriety of his own behaviour; because we cannot help feeling with what confusion we ourselves should be covered, had we behaved in so absurd a manner.

      因此，同情之心的起源並非是目睹情感本身，而是目睹激發這種情感的環境。我們有時對別人產生同情之心，而這種同情之心，對方本人卻似乎全然不知；這是因為這種同情之心並非來源於實際，而是由於我們隻是設身處地加以想象，同情之心才油然而生。我們為別人的失禮或粗魯感到羞愧難當，雖然對方對自己的行為並未感到不得體；這是因為如果我們的行為也是如此荒唐，我們就會情不自禁地感到如此這般地難為情。

11．

Of all the calamities to which the condition of mortality exposes mankind, the loss of reason appears, to those who have the least spark of humanity, by far the most dreadful, and they behold that last stage of human wretchedness with deeper commiseration than any other. But the poor wretch, who is in it, laughs and sings perhaps, and is altogether insensible of his own misery. The anguish which humanity feels, therefore, at the sight of such an object, cannot be the reflection of any sentiment of the sufferer. The compassion of the spectator must arise altogether from the consideration of what he himself would feel if he was reduced to the same unhappy situation, and, what perhaps is impossible, was at the same time able to regard it with his present reason and judgment.

      麵臨滅頂之災時，對於人性稍存者來說，喪失理智最為恐怖，他們帶著他人難以企及的憐憫之心，見證人類終極的苦難。然而置身其中的那個可憐蟲卻開懷大笑，或放聲高歌，對於自己的悲苦卻麻木不仁，了然無知。因此，在目睹實情之際，出於人性所感知的痛苦，就絲毫沒能反映出這位蒙受苦難者的真實情感。由此可知，旁觀者的同情之心則完全是出自他自己一廂情願的設想，即，如果他本人置身於同樣悲苦的情況之下 - 這也許是不可能的 - ，而且能以現有的理智和判斷水準加以思考，他該有何感覺。

 

12．

What are the pangs of a mother, when she hears the moanings of her infant that during the agony of disease cannot express what it feels? In her idea of what it suffers, she joins, to its real helplessness, her own consciousness of that helplessness, and her own terrors for the unknown consequences of its disorder; and out of all these, forms, for her own sorrow, the most complete image of misery and distress. The infant, however, feels only the uneasiness of the present instant, which can never be great. With regard to the future, it is perfectly secure, and in its thoughtlessness and want of foresight, possesses an antidote against fear and anxiety, the great tormentors of the human breast, from which reason and philosophy will, in vain, attempt to defend it, when it grows up to a man.

        一位母親聽到自己病魔纏身卻有苦難言的寶寶在呻吟時，她該是多麽地痛苦不堪。她按照自己的想法，把自己對寶寶獨孤無助的猜想，把自己因設想寶寶病情之不可逆料的後果而產生的恐懼，與寶寶實際的獨孤無助融為一體，正因為所有這些，她根據自己的悲情，才對痛苦和抑鬱產生了最全麵的印象。然而，寶寶感覺到的隻是眼前一時的不適，沒什麽大不了的，以後完全能痊愈。兒時的無知與缺乏遠見，乃是戰勝恐懼與憂傷的萬應靈藥，至於人類內心的巨大悲痛則當別論，寶寶一旦長大成人，就會拋棄那種萬應靈藥，試圖以理智和哲理去戰勝恐懼與憂傷，但結果總是徒勞無功。

 

13．

We sympathize even with the dead, and overlooking what is of real importance in their situation, that awful futurity which awaits them, we are chiefly affected by those circumstances which strike our senses, but can have no influence upon their happiness. It is miserable, we think, to be deprived of the light of the sun; to be shut out from life and conversation; to be laid in the cold grave, a prey to corruption and the reptiles of the earth; to be no more thought of in this world, but to be obliterated, in a little time, from the affections, and almost from the memory, of their dearest friends and relations. Surely, we imagine, we can never feel too much for those who have suffered so dreadful a calamity. The tribute of our fellow-feeling seems doubly due to them now, when they are in danger of being forgot by every body; and, by the vain honours which we pay to their memory, we endeavour, for our own misery, artificially to keep alive our melancholy remembrance of their misfortune. That our sympathy can afford them no consolation seems to be an addition to their calamity; and to think that all we can do is unavailing, and that, what alleviates all other distress, the regret, the love, and the lamentations of their friends, can yield no comfort to them, serves only to exasperate our sense of their misery. The happiness of the dead, however, most assuredly, is affected by none of these circumstances; nor is it the thought of these things which can ever disturb the profound security of their repose. The idea of that dreary and endless melancholy, which the fancy naturally ascribes to their condition, arises altogether from our joining to the change which has been produced upon them, our own consciousness of that change, from our putting ourselves in their situation, and from our lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their inanimated bodies, and thence conceiving what would be our emotions in this case. It is from this very illusion of the imagination, that the foresight of our own dissolution is so terrible to us, and that the idea of those circumstances, which undoubtedly can give us no pain when we are dead, makes us miserable while we are alive. And from thence arises one of the most important principles in human nature, the dread of death, the great poison to the happiness, but the great restraint upon the injustice of mankind, which, while it afflicts and mortifies the individual, guards and protects the society.

 

        我們甚至同情死者，但卻忽視在其所處環境中存在的真正重要的東西，等待他們的那種恐怖的前景即是一例，我們主要是被那些刺激感官的環境所感染，然而對他們的快樂卻不能施加任何影響。被剝奪陽光；被摒除於人們的生活及談資；被埋葬在冰冷的墳墓中，繼而腐爛變質成為蛆蟲果腹的獵物；在人世間不再為人所思念，旋即從至愛親朋的慈愛，乃至記憶中被驅離。凡此種種，都被我們視之為至悲至慘，蔑以加矣。誠然，對那些慘遭如此恐怖的滅頂之災者，我們清醒地認識到，同情之心僅限於此，除此之外，已是愛莫能助。他們處於被每個人都徹底遺忘的危險境地時，我們就會因同情而向他們大唱讚歌。我們已經對死者的苦難形成不無傷感的記憶，而現在我們則會通過向他們的記憶注入虛浮的榮耀，也為表達我們自己的痛苦，人為地、竭盡全力地確保這種痛徹心扉的記憶永不磨滅。然而我們的同情卻無法使死者得以慰藉，這對他們既有的災難來說不啻雪上加霜。我們所做的一切最終都將歸於徒勞。想一想吧！為緩解親朋因死者所產生的抑鬱、愧疚、眷戀、悲傷，我們無論如何去做，也絲毫不能使死者獲得慰藉，相反卻隻能加劇我們自己因死者的悲慘遭遇而感覺到的痛苦。然而千真萬確，死者的快樂不會受到這些客觀環境的影響，因客觀環境而產生的主觀意念也不會幹擾他們安然無虞的長眠。死者要經曆萬劫不複的苦難，其實這種想法隻是一種幻想，它的產生自然要歸因於死者所處的環境，而且也完全是因為我們將死者經曆的變化與我們本身對那種變化形成的意識緊緊相連，因為我們將自己置身於死者的處境，因為我們將自己鮮活的靈魂，附在死者了無生機的軀體上，如果我可以這樣說的話，而後再去想象這種條件該為我們催生出怎樣的情感。正是因為如此這般地浮想聯翩，我們才一想到死就毛骨悚然，我們才在活著的時候，一想到死後無疑不會令我們產生任何痛苦的環境而痛苦不堪。也正是因為如此，人類性格中的一種最重要的天性應運而生，那就是怕死，亦即危害快樂的烈性毒藥，然而它卻是降服人類不公正之魔的神力克星，它雖傷及個體，但卻捍衛和保護社會。

Chap. II

Of the Pleasure of mutual Sympathy

第二章  論互相同情的快樂

1．

    But whatever may be the cause of sympathy, or however it may

be excited, nothing pleases us more than to observe in other men

a fellow-feeling with all the emotions of our own breast; nor are

we ever so much shocked as by the appearance of the contrary.

Those who are fond of deducing all our sentiments from certain

refinements of self-love, think themselves at no loss to account,

according to their own principles, both for this pleasure and

this pain. Man, say they, conscious of his own weakness, and of

the need which he has for the assistance of others, rejoices

whenever he observes that they adopt his own passions, because he

is then assured of that assistance; and grieves whenever he

observes the contrary, because he is then assured of their

opposition. But both the pleasure and the pain are always felt so

instantaneously, and often upon such frivolous occasions, that it

seems evident that neither of them can be derived from any such

self-interested consideration. A man is mortified when, after

having endeavoured to divert the company, he looks round and sees

that nobody laughs at his jests but himself. On the contrary, the

mirth of the company is highly agreeable to him, and he regards

this correspondence of their sentiments with his own as the

greatest applause.

   無論產生同情的原因是什麽，也無論同情是如何產生的，最令我們快樂的莫過於看到我們發自內心的情感在別人身上產生共鳴；打擊我們最甚的莫過於看到與此相反的情形。有些人喜歡根據自愛之心的某些細膩的表現來推斷我們全部的情感。這些人自認為根據自己的原則已經把這種快樂和痛苦的原因說得一清二楚。他們說，人都能意識到自己的軟弱，也能意識到需要他人的幫助。看到別人受到自己激情的感染，他就心花怒放，因為他確信能獲得別人的幫助；不過看到相反的情況，他就會鬱悶悲傷。然而，無論是快樂，還是痛苦的感覺，都會轉瞬即逝，而且這種情況經常是在一些無關痛癢的場合發生。於是似乎很明顯，快樂與痛苦這兩種情感都無法從這種自我感興趣的考慮中產生。一個人竭盡全力想通過逗趣博得同伴一樂，但環顧四周，發現除他本人之外，再沒有別人對他的笑話捧腹時，他就感到很難為情。而相反，同伴的歡樂和他高度合拍的時候，他就把這種情感的合拍看作是最牛的喝彩。

2．

    Neither does his pleasure seem to arise altogether from the

additional vivacity which his mirth may receive from sympathy

with theirs, nor his pain from the disappointment he meets with

when he misses this pleasure; though both the one and the other,

no doubt, do in some measure. When we have read a book or poem so

often that we can no longer find any amusement in reading it by

ourselves, we can still take pleasure in reading it to a

companion. To him it has all the graces of novelty; we enter into

the surprise and admiration which it naturally excites in him,

but which it is no longer capable of exciting in us; we consider

all the ideas which it presents rather in the light in which they

appear to him, than in that in which they appear to ourselves,

and we are amused by sympathy with his amusement which thus

enlivens our own. On the contrary, we should be vexed if he did not

seem to been entertained with it, and we could no longer take

any pleasure in reading it to him. It is the same case here. The

mirth of the company, no doubt, enlivens our own mirth, and their

silence, no doubt, disappoints us. But though this may contribute

both to the pleasure which we derive from the one, and to the

pain which we feel from the other, it is by no means the sole

cause of either; and this correspondence of the sentiments of

others with our own appears to be a cause of pleasure, and the

want of it a cause of pain, which cannot be accounted for in this

manner. The sympathy, which my friends express with my joy,

might, indeed, give me pleasure by enlivening that joy: but that

which they express with my grief could give me none, if it served

only to enliven that grief. Sympathy, however, enlivens joy and

alleviates grief. It enlivens joy by presenting another source of

satisfaction; and it alleviates grief by insinuating into the

heart almost the only agreeable sensation which it is at that

time capable of receiving.

   歡樂與痛苦生成的軌跡大致如此，但仔細想來，他之所以歡樂，似乎並非全然因為從同伴那裏博得一樂而感到喜悅倍增，他之所以痛苦，亦非因為未能博得同伴共鳴而感到失望。我們翻來覆去閱讀一本書或一首詩，就不再能從獨自閱讀中發現樂趣，但如果讀給同伴聽，我們依然可以感到情趣盎然。對於同伴來講，此書或此詩堪稱新穎之至，樂趣充盈。於是我們就會發現對方驚喜莫名，讚不絕口，之所以如此，自然是此書或此詩使然。但是此時此刻，書也好，詩也罷，早已不能再在我們心中泛起任何激情的漣漪。由是觀之，在考慮詩書所描述的所有思想時，我們的著眼點與其說集中於我們自己，毋寧說是集中於那位夥伴。我們因為自己對他的愉悅之情感同身受而開心不已。

相反，如果同伴看上去並不欣賞這本書或這首詩，我們就會很鬱悶，於是就再也不能從對他閱讀詩書中獲得任何樂趣。這裏的情況也相同。同伴的歡樂，毫無疑問，使我們倍加歡樂；同伴的沉默，疑問毫無，使我們失望倍加。不過，雖然這能使我們在一種情況下獲得歡樂，而在另一種情況下產生痛苦，但這絕然不是二者產生的唯一原因；他人與我們的情感吻合，看來就是產生快樂的一個原因，而缺乏這種吻合，看來便是產生痛苦的一個原因，雖然如此，但這也不能完全用以解讀快樂與痛苦產生的根源。如果朋友對我的快樂產生同情，而這種同情反過來又能使我的快樂加倍，那我就感到很開心；但是如果朋友對我的悲傷產生同情，而這種同情反過來卻隻能使我的悲傷加劇，我就不能感到開心。然而，同情既能增加快樂，也能緩解悲傷。它為產生滿意的情緒提供另一個溫床，因而增加快樂；它使彼時彼刻能夠接受的愉悅情緒潛入心靈，從而緩解悲傷。

3．

    It is to be observed accordingly, that we are still more

anxious to communicate to our friends our disagreeable than our

agreeable passions, that we derive still more satisfaction from

their sympathy with the former than from that with the latter,

and that we are still more shocked by the want of it.

   因此可以說：我們更急於向朋友表達不快之情，而不是愉悅之情；我們從他們對前者，而不是對後者的同情中獲得更多的滿足；我們由於他們缺乏同情之心而受創更重。

4.

    How are the unfortunate relieved when they have found out a

person to whom they can communicate the cause of their sorrow?

Upon his sympathy they seem to disburthen themselves of a part of

their distress: he is not improperly said to share it with them.

He not only feels a sorrow of the same kind with that which they

feel, but as if he had derived a part of it to himself, what he

feels seems to alleviate the weight of what they feel. Yet by

relating their misfortunes they in some measure renew their

grief. They awaken in their memory the remembrance of those

circumstances which occasioned their affliction. Their tears

accordingly flow faster than before, and they are apt to abandon

themselves to all the weakness of sorrow. They take pleasure,

however, in all this, and, it is evident, are sensibly relieved

by it; because the sweetness of his sympathy more than

compensates the bitterness of that sorrow, which, in order to

excite this sympathy, they had thus enlivened and renewed. The

cruelest insult, on the contrary, which can be offered to the

unfortunate, is to appear to make light of their calamities. To

seem not to be affected with the joy of our companions is but

want of politeness; but not to wear a serious countenance when

they tell us their afflictions, is real and gross inhumanity.

   不幸者發現一個能與之傾訴悲傷原因的人，他們該是何等地如釋重負啊！有他的同情，他們就似乎能減輕自己的悲痛：說此人能與他們分擔痛苦未必欠妥。對於他們的悲傷，他不僅能夠感受到，而且還覺得似乎已經部分地加以分擔，他所能感受到的悲情，似乎能夠減輕他們所感受的重負。然而，傾訴不幸在某種程度上反而會使悲傷死灰複燃。他們會重新憶及已往使自己備受煎熬的環境。他們因此會加快從前淚水的流速，從而極易浸沉於哪怕是極度微弱的悲傷之中。不過他們會從所有這些當中獲得快樂，而且顯然會因此感到明顯的慰藉；因為獲得同情所產生的美好感覺，會對悲傷所引起的痛苦加以補償，至於這些悲傷，則是因為他們要去激發同情之心，而被重新賦予生機，進而卷土重來的。與之相反，不幸者大禍臨頭之際，卻遭他人熟視無睹，置若罔聞，這似乎就是對他們極度殘忍的戕害。麵對同伴的快樂而心如古井，無動於衷，這似乎隻是失禮而已；然而當他們傾訴衷腸，備述遭際時，我們卻依然故我，毫不動容，這實在是貨真價實的喪盡天良，毫無人性。

5.

    Love is an agreeable; resentment, a disagreeable passion; and

accordingly we are not half so anxious that our friends should

adopt our friendships, as that they should enter into our

resentments. We can forgive them though they seem to be little

affected with the favours which we may have received, but lose

all patience if they seem indifferent about the injuries which

may have been done to us: nor are we half so angry with them for

not entering into our gratitude, as for not sympathizing with our

resentment. They can easily avoid being friends to our friends,

but can hardly avoid being enemies to those with whom we are at

variance. We seldom resent their being at enmity with the first,

though upon that account we may sometimes affect to make an

awkward quarrel with them; but we quarrel with them in good

earnest if they live in friendship with the last. The agreeable

passions of love and joy can satisfy and support the heart

without any auxiliary pleasure. The bitter and painful emotions

of grief and resentment more strongly require the healing

consolation of sympathy.

   愛是一種愉悅的激情，恨是一種鬱悶的激情。我們渴望朋友與自己共享友情，我們同樣也渴望朋友與自己同仇敵愾。我們春風得意，他們漠然處之，我們會原諒他們；我們水深火熱，他們若無其事，我們會忍無可忍。同樣，我們感恩戴德，他們置之不理，我們會怒火中燒；我們恨之入骨，他們置若罔聞，我們會五內俱焚。對於他們來講，避免成為我們朋友的朋友，簡直易如反掌；但避免成為我們敵人的敵人，則幾乎不可能。他們與朋友反目失和，我們很少抱怨，雖然有時我們也為此與他們小有口角。但如果他們與敵人和睦相處，我們就會與他們舌戰到底，難解難分。愛與歡樂的激情，無須添加額外的樂趣，就能使人由衷地感到心滿意足，受益匪淺。悲傷與怨恨引發的痛苦，亟需同情之心加以治愈。

6.

    As the person who is principally interested in any event is

pleased with our sympathy, and hurt by the want of it, so we,

too, seem to be pleased when we are able to sympathize with him,

and to be hurt when we are unable to do so. We run not only to

congratulate the successful, but to condole with the afflicted;

and the pleasure which we find in the conversation of one whom in

all the passions of his heart we can entirely sympathize with,

seems to do more than compensate the painfulness of that sorrow

with which the view of his situation affects us. On the contrary,it is always disagreeable to feel that we cannot sympathize with him, and instead of being pleased with this exemption from sympathetic pain, it hurts us to find that we cannot share his uneasiness. If we hear a person loudly lamenting his misfortunes, which, however, upon bringing the case home to ourselves, we feel, can produce no such violent effect upon us, we are shocked at his grief; and, because we cannot enter into it, call it pusillanimity and weakness. It gives us the spleen, on the other hand, to see another too happy or too much elevated, as we call

it, with any little piece of good fortune. We are disobliged even

with his joy; and, because we cannot go along with it, call it

levity and folly. We are even put out of humour if our companion

laughs louder or longer at a joke than we think it deserves; that

is, than we feel that we ourselves could laugh at it.

   對什麽事都非常感興趣的人，會因為我們的同情而感到高興，會因為無人同情而感到傷心，因此當我們能夠同情他的時候，我們自己似乎也十分高興，而不能這樣做的時候，我們也會感到傷心。我們不僅樂於祝賀因成功而春風得意者，也樂於安慰因落敗而愁腸寸斷者，與一個激情滿懷而我們又完全能夠同情的人談話，就會感到快樂，而這種快樂似乎遠不止於能夠解除因目睹其情況而產生的悲傷與痛苦。相反，我們感到無法同情他時就總是鬱悶不已。我們不會因為免除同情心導致的痛苦而高興，隻會因為發現自己不能分擔他的不快而感到痛心。我們聽到一個人因為自己的不幸而嚎啕大哭時，如果我們認為這種不幸一旦落到我們頭上，並不會對我們產生如此巨大的作用，那我們就會因為他的悲傷而感到震驚；因為我們無法進入這個角色，因此就將這種行為稱之為膽怯與懦弱。

另一方麵，看到別人因為交了點小運就十分高興，甚至心花怒放，我們就不屑一顧。我們甚至對他的快樂心生怨怒；因為我們對此無法苟同，便稱之為輕浮與愚笨。對於一個本不值得為之長時間哈哈大笑的笑話，如果我們感覺自己根本不會為之發笑，然而同伴卻笑得超過分寸， 我們甚至會怒火中燒。

Chap. III

Of the manner in which we judge of the propriety or impropriety

of the affections of other men, by their concord or dissonance

with out own.

第三章  通過我們和他人感情是否和諧一致來判斷表達方式是否得體

1．

    When the original passions of the person principally

concerned are in perfect concord with the sympathetic emotions of

the spectator, they necessarily appear to this last just and

proper, and suitable to their objects; and, on the contrary,

when, upon bringing the case home to himself, he finds that they

do not coincide with what he feels, they necessarily appear to

him unjust and improper, and unsuitable to the causes which

excite them. To approve of the passions of another, therefore, as

suitable to their objects, is the same thing as to observe that

we entirely sympathize with them; and not to approve of them as

such, is the same thing as to observe that we do not entirely

sympathize with them. The man who resents the injuries that have

been done to me, and observes that I resent them precisely as he

does, necessarily approves of my resentment. The man whose sympathy keeps time to my grief, cannot but admit the reasonableness of my

sorrow. He who admires the same poem, or the same picture, and admires them exactly as I do, must surely allow the justness of my admiration. He who laughs at the same joke, and laughs along with me, cannot well deny the propriety of my laughter. On the contrary, the person who, upon these different occasions, either feels no such emotion as that which I feel, or feels none that bears any proportion to mine, cannot avoid disapproving my sentiments on account of their dissonance with

his own. If my animosity goes beyond what the indignation of my

friend can correspond to; if my grief exceeds what his most

tender compassion can go along with; if my admiration is either

too high or too low to tally with his own; if I laugh loud and

heartily when he only smiles, or, on the contrary, only smile

when he laughs loud and heartily; in all these cases, as soon as

he comes from considering the object, to observe how I am

affected by it, according as there is more or less disproportion

between his sentiments and mine, I must incur a greater or less

degree of his disapprobation: and upon all occasions his own

sentiments are the standards and measures by which he judges of

mine.

   當事者激情四溢，旁觀者其情可憫，二者完全吻合，旁觀者就認為前者必定正確得體，主客一致；反之，後者如若恍然大悟，發現二者並非如所想的那樣天衣無縫，他就會認為前者的原始激情就既不正確，也不得體，與激發後者情緒的原因風馬牛不相及。認同他人的情感，因而認可它如實反映了客體，就如同說我們完全同情他們；如果不做上述的認同，那就如同說我們絲毫不同情他們。一個人如果對我所遭受的傷害表示不滿，而且認為我也和他有同感，那麽，一旦我真的表示不滿，他就必然會讚同。一個人如果完全同情我的悲傷，他就不能不承認我悲得合情，傷得合理。如果對同一首詩或同一幅畫，他和我都讚賞不已，毫無二致，那他就一定認可我讚賞的正確性。為相同的笑話大笑者，而且和我一同捧腹，他就無法否認我笑得十分得體。相反，如果這個人在這些不同場合裏，既不能全部，也不能部分地和我有同感，他就不可避免地反對我因與他情感不和而怨艾十足。如果我的怨恨超過朋友相應產生的憤慨，如果我的悲傷超過朋友溫情脈脈的憐憫之心，如果我對他的讚美過高或過低，以致無法與他自己的實際情況相吻合，如果我開懷大笑，而他僅僅是麵帶笑容，或者相反，他僅僅麵帶笑容，而我卻開懷大笑，在凡此種種的情況之下，他對客觀情況研究之後勢必加以思考，並且根據他和我在情緒之間存在的或多或少的差異，觀察我受客觀情況感染的來龍去脈，一旦如此，我就必然遭受程度不一的責難：在所有的場合下，他自己的情感就是判斷我的標準和尺度。

2．

    To approve of another man's opinions is to adopt those

opinions, and to adopt them is to approve of them. If the same

arguments which convince you convince me likewise, I necessarily

approve of your conviction; and if they do not, I necessarily

disapprove of it: neither can I possibly conceive that I should

do the one without the other. To approve or disapprove,

therefore, of the opinions of others is acknowledged, by every

body, to mean no more than to observe their agreement or

disagreement with our own. But this is equally the case with

regard to our approbation or disapprobation of the sentiments or

passions of others.

 

   讚同另外一個人的意見就是采納那些意見，采納也就是讚同。如果同樣的論據使你確信無疑，也使我確信無疑，那我自然讚同你這樣做；如果那個論據做不到這點，我自然不讚同它；我也不可能想象自己會做這個，撇那個，比如說光讚同，不采納。因此，對別人的意見是讚同，還是反對，自然就每個人都承認的那樣，其含義無非就是說，別人的意見和我們的是否一致。但是這與下述情況如出一轍，即，對待別人的情緒或激情我們是否認可。

3．

  There are, indeed, some cases in which we seem to approve

without any sympathy or correspondence of sentiments, and in

which, consequently, the sentiment of approbation would seem to

be different from the perception of this coincidence. A little

attention, however, will convince us that even in these cases our

approbation is ultimately founded upon a sympathy or

correspondence of this kind. I shall give an instance in things

of a very frivolous nature, because in them the judgments of

mankind are less apt to be perverted by wrong systems. We may

often approve of a jest, and think the laughter of the company

quite just and proper, though we ourselves do not laugh, because,

perhaps, we are in a grave humour, or happen to have our

attention engaged with other objects. We have learned, however,

from experience, what sort of pleasantry is upon most occasions

capable of making us laugh, and we observe that this is one of

that kind. We approve, therefore, of the laughter of the company,

and feel that it is natural and suitable to its object; because,

though in our present mood we cannot easily enter into it, we are

sensible that upon most occasions we should very heartily join in

it.

   千真萬確，有時我們似乎僅有讚同，沒有同情或情感的一致，因此在這些情況下情感的認可和感覺的一致之間就似乎存在差異。不過，稍加注意，我們就會確信，即使在這些場合裏，我們的認可最終依然是建立在這種同情或情感一致的基礎之上。我將從一些凡情瑣事中提取一例，因為在這些並不起眼的事情中，人們的判斷不易受到錯誤方法的誤導。我們可能經常會對一則笑話持有讚同的態度，認為同伴的大笑正常得體，雖然我們自己並不發笑，因為我們也許是當時的情緒低落，或正好將注意力集中在其它事情上。然而我們從切身體驗中已經明了，哪種笑話在絕大多數的場合下是能夠令我們發笑的，我們說，上述笑話即是一例。雖然由於此時此刻的情緒，我們不易介入此事，但是在多數場合下，我們應該能夠非常開心地介入其中，因此，我們對同伴的發笑就持讚同態度，感到他因那則笑話發笑，既自然又得體。

4.

    The same thing often happens with regard to all the other

passions. A stranger passes by us in the street with all the

marks of the deepest affliction; and we are immediately told that

he has just received the news of the death of his father. It is

impossible that, in this case, we should not approve of his

grief. Yet it may often happen, without any defect of humanity on

our part, that, so far from entering into the violence of his

sorrow, we should scarce conceive the first movements of concern

upon his account. Both he and his father, perhaps, are entirely

unknown to us, or we happen to be employed about other things,

and do not take time to picture out in our imagination the

different circumstances of distress which must occur to him. We

have learned, however, from experience, that such a misfortune

naturally excites such a degree of sorrow, and we know that if we

took time to consider his situation, fully and in all its parts,

we should, without doubt, most sincerely sympathize with him. It

is upon the consciousness of this conditional sympathy, that our

approbation of his sorrow is founded, even in those cases in

which that sympathy does not actually take place; and the general

rules derived from our preceding experience of what our

sentiments would commonly correspond with, correct upon this, as

upon many other occasions, the impropriety of our present

emotions.

   至於其它所有的情感，類似的情況也經常發生。一個神情痛苦的陌生人在大街上從我們身邊經過，我們就立即做出判斷，此人剛剛得知喪父的噩耗。在這種情況下，我們不可能不讚同他的悲傷。然而經常會發生這樣的情況，就我們自己而言，並非缺乏仁愛之心，但無論如何也不能介入對方的巨大悲痛，我們居然很少會考慮在第一時間向對方表示關切。他和他的父親也許都不認識我們，或者我們正好為它事所累，因此無暇想象另有一番悲情殘狀落在他的頭上。然而，我們從切身體驗中完全可以明白，這種不幸自然會激發如此之深的悲情，我們深知，如果肯花時間，充分全麵地考慮他的情況，毫無疑問，我們應該對他表現出誠摯的同情之心。

5．

    The sentiment or affection of the heart from which any action

proceeds, and upon which its whole virtue or vice must ultimately

depend, may be considered under two different aspects, or in two

different relations; first, in relation to the cause which

excites it, or the motive which gives occasion to it; and

secondly, in relation to the end which it proposes, or the effect

which it tends to produce.

   情感或心緒是行動的出發點，而最終行善抑或行惡，皆取決於此。對情感或心緒的研究可以從兩個不同的方麵，或兩種不同的關係著手：其一，情感或心緒與其產生原因之間的關係，或與其產生動機之間的關係；其二，情感或心緒與其預期結局之間的關係，或與其勢必產生的效果之間的關係。

6．

    In the suitableness or unsuitableness, in the proportion or

disproportion which the affection seems to bear to the cause or

object which excites it, consists the propriety or impropriety,

the decency or ungracefulness of the consequent action.

情感相對於產生它的原因或客觀條件來說，是否適宜，是否諧調，這其中就包含著隨後的行為是否得體，是儒雅抑或粗野。

7．

    In the beneficial or hurtful nature of the effects which the

affection aims at, or tends to produce, consists the merit or

demerit of the action, the qualities by which it is entitled to

reward, or is deserving of punishment.

   情感的預期效果，或勢必產生的效果是有益還是有害，這其中就包含著行為的是非曲直，亦即決定應該受到褒獎，還是懲罰的諸般品質。

8．

    Philosophers have, of late years, considered chiefly the

tendency of affections, and have given little attention to the

relation which they stand in to the cause which excites them. In

common life, however, when we judge of any person's conduct, and

of the sentiments which directed it, we constantly consider them

under both these aspects. When we blame in another man the

excesses of love, of grief, of resentment, we not only consider

the ruinous effects which they tend to produce, but the little

occasion which was given for them. The merit of his favourite, we

say, is not so great, his misfortune is not so dreadful, his

provocation is not so extraordinary, as to justify so violent a

passion. We should have indulged, we say; perhaps, have approved

of the violence of his emotion, had the cause been in any respect

proportioned to it.

   近年來，哲學家們的研究主要集中於情感的傾向性，幾乎沒有留意情感及其成因之間的關係。然而，我們在日常生活中判斷人們的行為以及行為所傾向的情感時，卻在不斷地從這兩方麵加以思考。當我們責備別人愛得過頭，悲得過火，狠得過深時，我們所考慮的不僅包括其勢必產生的破壞性後果，而且也包括其產生的微乎其微的誘因。或許，在證實他如此強烈的激情不無道理時，我們卻發現，他所尊崇的人並非如此偉大，他本人的不幸並非如此恐怖，惹他發怒的事情並非如此嚴重。如果激情的成因在各方麵都與激情諧調一致，也許我們早就應該放任他的激情，或許已經讚同他的激情也未可知 

9．

    When we judge in this manner of any affection, as

proportioned or disproportioned to the cause which excites it, it

is scarce possible that we should make use of any other rule or

canon but the correspondent affection in ourselves. If, upon

bringing the case home to our own breast, we find that the

sentiments which it gives occasion to, coincide and tally with

our own, we necessarily approve of them as proportioned and

suitable to their objects; if otherwise, we necessarily

disapprove of them, as extravagant and out of proportion.

   當我們以這種方式判斷情感是否與產生的原因互相諧調時，除我們自己與之相應的情感之外，我們幾乎不可能采用任何其它的尺度或標準。如果將這種情況與我們自己掛鉤，我們就會發現它所激發的情感與我們自己的完全相符，而且因為與客觀條件互相吻合，我們就必然加以讚同；否則我們就因為它們太過分和不協調而不會讚同。

10．

    Every faculty in one man is the measure by which he judges of

the like faculty in another. I judge of your sight by my sight,

of your ear by my ear, of your reason by my reason, of your

resentment by my resentment, of your love by my love. I neither

have, nor can have, any other way of judging about them.

       一個人的各種官能都是判斷他人相同官能的尺度。我以我的視覺判斷你的視覺，以我的聽覺判斷你的聽覺，以我的理智判斷你的理智，以我的怨恨判斷你的怨恨，以我的愛判斷你的愛。我沒有，也不可能有其它任何方法來對它們以判斷。

 

Chap. IV

The same subject continued

第四章  續前章

1.

    We may judge of the propriety or impropriety of the

sentiments of another person by their correspondence or

disagreement with our own, upon two different occasions; either,

first, when the objects which excite them are considered without

any peculiar relation, either to ourselves or to the person whose

sentiments we judge of; or, secondly, when they are considered as

peculiarly affecting one or other of us.

   我們判斷另外一個人的情感是否得體，可以根據這些情感在如下兩種情況下是否與我們自己的情感一致；第一，當激發情感的客體被認為與我們自己，或與我們需要對其情感做出判斷的那個人之間毫無特殊關係時；第二，當這些客體被認為對我們中間的某人產生特殊影響時。

2.

    1. With regard to those objects which are considered without

any peculiar relation either to ourselves or to the person whose

sentiments we judge of; wherever his sentiments entirely

correspond with our own, we ascribe to him the qualities of taste

and good judgment. The beauty of a plain, the greatness of a

mountain, the ornaments of a building, the expression of a

picture, the composition of a discourse, the conduct of a third

person, the proportions of different quantities and numbers, the

various appearances which the great machine of the universe is

perpetually exhibiting, with the secret wheels and springs which

product them; all the general subjects of science and taste, are

what we and our companion regard as having no peculiar relation

to either of us. We both look at them from the same point of

view, and we have no occasion for sympathy, or for that imaginary

change of situations from which it arises, in order to produce,

with regard to these, the most perfect harmony of sentiments and

affections. If, notwithstanding, we are often differently

affected, it arises either from the different degrees of

attention, which our different habits of life allow us to give

easily to the several parts of those complex objects, or from the

different degrees of natural acuteness in the faculty of the mind

to which they are addressed.

   1．關於那些被認為與我們自己和我們所要判斷其情感的人沒有任何特殊關係的客體；當他的情感與我們的完全一致時，我們就認為他品味高雅，判斷力強。平原的秀美，山峰的巍峨，建築的裝飾，圖畫的意境，演說的架構，第三者的行為，各種數量及數字的比例，宇宙的宏偉機器以其玄妙之輪及彈簧不斷產生並展示的千姿百態，科學及審美研究方麵所有一般性課題，這一切的一切，都被我們及同伴看作是與我們毫無特殊關係的。我們都以相同的觀點觀察它們，我們沒有任何動因驅使自己為與客體在情感上完全一致就產生同情心，也沒有任何動因驅使自己對激發同情心的環境變化加以想象。盡管如此，如果我們經常受到各種不同的影響，這是因為，我們不同的生活習性導致自己對一部分複雜客體的關注程度不同，或是因為，我們觀察客體時自己感官的先天敏感度不同。

3.

    When the sentiments of our companion coincide with our own in

things of this kind, which are obvious and easy, and in which,

perhaps, we never found a single person who differed from us,

though we, no doubt, must approve of them, yet he seems to

deserve no praise or admiration on account of them. But when they

not only coincide with our own, but lead and direct our own; when

in forming them he appears to have attended to many things which

we had overlooked, and to have adjusted them to all the various

circumstances of their objects; we not only approve of them, but

wonder and are surprised at their uncommon and unexpected

acuteness and comprehensiveness, and he appears to deserve a very

high degree of admiration and applause. For approbation

heightened by wonder and surprise, constitutes the sentiment

which is properly called admiration, and of which applause is the

natural expression. The decision of the man who judges that

exquisite beauty is preferable to the grossest deformity, or that

twice two are equal to four, must certainly be approved of by all

the world, but will not, surely, be much admired. It is the acute

and delicate discernment of the man of taste, who distinguishes

the minute, and scarce perceptible differences of beauty and

deformity; it is the comprehensive accuracy of the experienced

mathematician, who unravels, with ease, the most intricate and

perplexed proportions; it is the great leader in science and

taste, the man who directs and conducts our own sentiments, the

extent and superior justness of whose talents astonish us with

wonder and surprise, who excites our admiration, and seems to

deserve our applause: and upon this foundation is grounded the

greater part of the praise which is bestowed upon what are called

the intellectual virtues.

   當同伴的情感在一些顯而易見的事情中和我們的情感一致的時候，雖然在這些事情中，其他所有的人都和我們一樣，無疑都會讚同他的情感，但他本人卻似乎並不能因為這些情感而獲得我們的讚賞。然而，當他的情感不僅能和我們的情感相一致，而且還能引領和指導我們的情感時，當他在這些情感形成的過程中，似乎已經關注到許多我們曾經忽略的事情，並且根據客體的不同環境來調整自己的情感時，我們就不僅讚同這些情感，而且還為他們那些非凡的、出人意表的敏感度和理解力感到驚異，而此時此刻，他似乎就值得我們高度讚揚了。因為感到驚異而被加強的認可度，這時就會產生那些也許可以被稱之為讚美的情感，而歡呼喝彩則是對這些情感的自然表達方式。經過判斷做出要美人不要醜八怪決定的人，或者做出二乘二等於四決定的人，必然會受到世人的讚同，然而卻並不一定大受讚美。隻有具備鑒賞能力的人，才具有高度的敏銳性和縝密的洞察力，也才能明察秋毫，才能在識別美醜的問題時極少出現誤差。是數學家所具備的綜合精準度，才能輕而易舉地解開盤根錯節令人迷惑不解的比例難題；是科學和審美學領域的領軍人物，引領和駕馭我們的情感，他們才華橫溢，成績斐然，令人驚詫不已，刮目相看；他們激發我們對其油然而生崇敬之情，他們看來很值得我們稱讚喝彩：人們對德藝雙馨者的讚美大多是建立在這個基礎之上的。

4.

    The utility of those qualities, it may be thought, is what

first recommends them to us; and, no doubt, the consideration of

this, when we come to attend to it, gives them a new value.

Originally, however, we approve of another man's judgment, not as

something useful, but as right, as accurate, as agreeable to

truth and reality: and it is evident we attribute those qualities

to it for no other reason but because we find that it agrees with

our own. Taste, in the same manner, is originally approved of,

not as useful, but as just, as delicate, and as precisely suited

to its object. The idea of the utility of all qualities of this

kind, is plainly an after-thought, and not what first recommends

them to our approbation.

   可以這樣認為，在談及上述那些才能的時候，最先讓我們想到的就是這些才能的實用性；毫無疑問，在我們注意到，並且考慮到這種實用性的時候，就賦予了這些才能一種新的價值。然而，我們起初讚同另一個人的判斷時，並不是因為它像某種東西那樣有用，而是因為它正確、精準、與真情實況相符：很顯然，我們之所以將那些才能歸因於正確的判斷，隻是因為發現他的判斷與我們的一致。同樣道理，鑒賞力起初受到讚許的時候，也同樣不是因為它有用，而是因為它正確，精準，而且完全與其鑒賞的客體相稱。對所有這些才能的實用性所形成的理念，顯然隻是一種事後產生的想法，而不是起初供我們加以認可的那些東西。

5．

    2. With regard to those objects, which affect in a particular

manner either ourselves or the person whose sentiments we judge

of, it is at once more difficult to preserve this harmony and

correspondence, and at the same time, vastly more important. My

companion does not naturally look upon the misfortune that has

befallen me, or the injury that has been done me, from the same

point of view in which I consider them. They affect me much more

nearly. We do not view them from the same station, as we do a

picture, or a poem, or a system of philosophy, and are,

therefore, apt to be very differently affected by them. But I can

much more easily overlook the want of this correspondence of

sentiments with regard to such indifferent objects as concern

neither me nor my companion, than with regard to what interests

me so much as the misfortune that has befallen me, or the injury

that has been done me. Though you despise that picture, or that

poem, or even that system of philosophy, which I admire, there is

little danger of our quarrelling upon that account. Neither of us

can reasonably be much interested about them. They ought all of

them to be matters of great indifference to us both; so that,

though our opinions may be opposite, our affections may still be

very nearly the same. But it is quite otherwise with regard to

those objects by which either you or I are particularly affected.

Though your judgments in matters of speculation, though your

sentiments in matters of taste, are quite opposite to mine, I can

easily overlook this opposition; and if I have any degree of

temper, I may still find some entertainment in your conversation,

even upon those very subjects. But if you have either no

fellow-feeling for the misfortunes I have met with, or none that

bears any proportion to the grief which distracts me; or if you

have either no indignation at the injuries I have suffered, or

none that bears any proportion to the resentment which transports

me, we can no longer converse upon these subjects. We become

intolerable to one another. I can neither support your company,

nor you mine. You are confounded at my violence and passion, and

I am enraged at your cold insensibility and want of feeling.

   關於這樣一些客體，它們既能以特殊方式影響我們自己，也能影響那些情感有待於我們判斷的人，保持這種和諧及一致絕非易事，但同時也極其重要。對於我遭遇的不幸，以及我受到的傷害，我的同伴自然不會和我以相同的觀點來看待。這種不幸與傷害對我產生的影響還要大很多。但是我們不會站在鑒賞一幅畫、一首詩、或一種哲學體係時的相同的立場來看待這些，因此它們就會以不同的方式來影響我們。有些客體對於我和同伴來說無關緊要，如果情感與這些客體達不到一致，我不會看得太重，不過有些客體卻與我遭遇的不幸和受到的傷害息息相關，如果情感和這些客體達不到一致，我卻很難采取輕視的態度。雖然你忽視我所讚賞的圖畫、詩歌、甚至哲學體係，但如果我們為此發生爭執，這對我形成的危險微乎其微。我們雙方都不會對此太感興趣。所有這些對我們雙方來說都無關宏旨；因此，雖然我們雙方的意見相左，我們的感情卻依然近乎相同。但是，如果涉及到那些對你和我都能產生特殊影響的客體，則當別論。雖然你經過沉思做出的判斷，你因鑒賞而產生的情感都與我大相徑庭，但我依然會輕易地包容這些截然相反的差異；而如果我有好的情緒，我還會發現你的談話情趣盎然，即使談到這些話題亦複如此。然而，如果你對我遭受的不幸，既無同情之心，也不分擔我的悲痛；對我受到的傷害，既不義憤填膺，也不分擔我因此產生的怨恨，我就會三緘其口，不再談論這些話題。一旦如此，我們彼此之間就會冰火不能同器，進而雞犬之聲相聞，老死不相往來。我的情之激，行之烈，你卻惑然不解，你如此麻木不仁，如此冷漠無情，實在令我五內俱焚，怒不可遏。

6．

    In all such cases, that there may be some correspondence of

sentiments between the spectator and the person principally

concerned, the spectator must, first of all, endeavour, as much

as he can, to put himself in the situation of the other, and to

bring home to himself every little circumstance of distress which

can possibly occur to the sufferer. He must adopt the whole case

of his companion with all its minutest incidents; and strive to

render as perfect as possible, that imaginary change of situation

upon which his sympathy is founded.

   在所有這些情況之下，旁觀者和當事者之間也可能存在某些情感的一致，不過旁觀者首先必須竭盡全力，通過設身處地的想象，細致入微地深切感受到受難者可能遭遇的險惡環境。他對同伴的情況必須全盤接收；而且力求不折不扣地去想象其憐憫之心賴以存在的環境變化。

7．

    After all this, however, the emotions of the spectator will

still be very apt to fall short of the violence of what is felt

by the sufferer. Mankind, though naturally sympathetic, never

conceive, for what has befallen another, that degree of passion

which naturally animates the person principally concerned. That

imaginary change of situation, upon which their sympathy is

founded, is but momentary. The thought of their own safety, the

thought that they themselves are not really the sufferers,

continually intrudes itself upon them; and though it does not

hinder them from conceiving a passion somewhat analogous to what

is felt by the sufferer, hinders them from conceiving any thing

that approaches to the same degree of violence. The person

principally concerned is sensible of this, and at the same time

passionately desires a more complete sympathy. He longs for that

relief which nothing can afford him but the entire concord of the

affections of the spectators with his own. To see the emotions of

their hearts, in every respect, beat time to his own, in the

violent and disagreeable passions, constitutes his sole

consolation. But he can only hope to obtain this by lowering his

passion to that pitch, in which the spectators are capable of

going along with him. He must flatten, if I may be allowed to say

so, the sharpness of its natural tone, in order to reduce it to

harmony and concord with the emotions of those who are about him.

What they feel, will, indeed, always be, in some respects,

different from what he feels, and compassion can never be exactly

the same with original sorrow; because the secret consciousness

that the change of situations, from which the sympathetic

sentiment arises, is but imaginary, not only lowers it in degree,

but, in some measure, varies it in kind, and gives it a quite

different modification. These two sentiments, however, may, it is

evident, have such a correspondence with one another, as is

sufficient for the harmony of society. Though they will never be

unisons, they may be concords, and this is all that is wanted or

required.

   然而在所有這些之後，旁觀者的情感將依然不會像受難者那樣激烈。人類，雖然同情之心與生俱來，但對於他人所遭遇的不幸，卻根本無法想象出當事者心中自然激發的情感究竟會激烈到何種程度。對憐憫之心賴以存在的環境變化所做出的想象，不過是瞬間即逝而已。對自身安全的考慮，對自己並非真是受難者的想法，依然繼續充斥他們的頭腦；不過這種情況既不妨礙他們對類似受難者所感受的一種激情加以想象，也不妨礙他們對任何勢必具有相同激烈度的事情加以設想。當事者對此當然十分敏感，而且同時還期待著獲得更充分的同情。他渴望得到寬慰，然而這種寬慰隻能使他體驗到旁觀者和他本人在情感上已臻於全然的和諧一致，僅此而已。從各方麵觀察並發現他們內心的激情，在那些強烈的鬱悶情緒中與他自己達成一致，一種絕無僅有的快慰便應運而生。不過，為達此目的，他隻能依靠降低自己激情的檔次，隻有如此，旁觀者才能與他並行不悖。他必須削減自己本能的銳氣，如果能允許我這樣說的話，才能降調行事，以便和那些與己相關者在情感上實現和諧一致。旁觀者的感受，的確在某些方麵，將永遠有別於受難者的感受，同情之心根本無法與原始悲痛絲毫不差；因為對同情之心賴以生成的環境變化所產生的潛意識，僅僅是想象而已，與真實情況相比，這種潛意識不僅在程度上有所降低，而且在性質上也有某種程度的區別，也正是因為如此，它才會受到各種不同的限製，從而麵目皆非。不過，這兩種情感顯然可能會達成一種足以促進社會和諧的諧調一致。雖然二者永遠不可能一致，但是卻可以和諧，而這，正是人們所缺乏或者所需要的。

8．

    In order to produce this concord, as nature teaches the

spectators to assume the circumstances of the person principally

concerned, so she teaches this last in some measure to assume

those of the spectators. As they are continually placing

themselves in his situation, and thence conceiving emotions

similar to what he feels; so he is as constantly placing himself

in theirs, and thence conceiving some degree of that coolness

about his own fortune, with which he is sensible that they will

view it. As they are constantly considering what they themselves

would feel, if they actually were the sufferers, so he is as

constantly led to imagine in what manner he would be affected if

he was only one of the spectators of his own situation. As their

sympathy makes them look at it, in some measure, with his eyes,

so his sympathy makes him look at it, in some measure, with

theirs, especially when in their presence and acting under their

observation: and as the reflected passion, which he thus

conceives, is much weaker than the original one, it necessarily

abates the violence of what he felt before he came into their

presence, before he began to recollect in what manner they would

be affected by it, and to view his situation in this candid and

impartial light.

   為了達到這種和諧，正如天性教導旁觀者們要設想當事者的處境一樣，她也教導當事者在某種程度上也要設想旁觀者們的處境。因為旁觀者們不斷地將自己置身於當事者的處境，因此就想象出了與當事者相似的情感；所以當事者也不斷地將自己置身於旁觀者們的處境，因此也就在某種程度上設想出自己命運的蕭條冷寂，而因為如此，他才敏感地意識到旁觀者們也必將會考慮這一問題。因為他們正在不斷地考慮，如果實際上他們就是受難者，他們自己將會有何感覺，與此相應，當事者也會不斷地被引導著去想象，如果他自己就是自己環境中的一名旁觀者，那該以何種方式受到影響。旁觀者們出於同情心，或多或少地會以當事者的觀點來看待這一問題，反之，由於當事者出於同情心，也或多或少地會以旁觀者的觀點來看待這一問題，尤其是當這位當事者的表現和舉動處在旁觀者的監督之下時，就更是如此：當事者通過假設產生的反射性激情，如果遠遠不如原始激情強烈，他就勢必會削弱自己置身於旁觀者監督之前形成的情感，削弱在開始回憶他們將以何種方式受到影響之前所產生的情感，削弱在開始以這種公正的，毫無偏見的觀點觀察環境之前產生的情感。

9．

    The mind, therefore, is rarely so disturbed, but that the

company of a friend will restore it to some degree of

tranquillity and sedateness. The breast is, in some measure,

calmed and composed the moment we come into his presence. We are

immediately put in mind of the light in which he will view our

situation, and we begin to view it ourselves in the same light;

for the effect of sympathy is instantaneous. We expect less

sympathy from a common acquaintance than from a friend: we cannot

open to the former all those little circumstances which we can

unfold to the latter: we assume, therefore, more tranquillity

before him, and endeavour to fix our thoughts upon those general

outlines of our situation which he is willing to consider. We

expect still less sympathy from an assembly of strangers, and we

assume, therefore, still more tranquillity before them, and

always endeavour to bring down our passion to that pitch, which

the particular company we are in may be expected to go along

with. Nor is this only an assumed appearance: for if we are at

all masters of ourselves, the presence of a mere acquaintance

will really compose us, still more than that of a friend; and

that of an assembly of strangers still more than that of an

acquaintance.

   思想於是就會出現少見的煩惱，但是有一位朋友陪伴卻能或多或少地使之恢複平靜與安寧。就在他進入我們的視野之際，情緒在某種程度上便會鎮定自若。我們立即就會想到他將會觀察我們的環境，而我們自己則開始以相同的觀點來審視自己的環境；因為同情心的作用稍縱即逝。以一位普通相識者與一位朋友相比，在我們的心目中，從前者那裏得到的同情要少於從後者那裏得到的：我們不能把對朋友公開的所有那些小環境，原封不動地展示給普通相識者：因此我們會設想在朋友麵前我們的心情會安靜得多，從而將我們的思想都集中到自己那些他樂於思考的環境之要點上。我們從一群陌生人那裏所能期待的同情心會更少，因此我們會設想在他們麵前我們心情的寧靜也會更少，於是堅持把我們的激情從隻有在特殊陪伴中才能達到的高度降低下來。其實下述情況並非僅僅是一種假設：因為如果我們能控製自己的情緒，一個僅僅是普通相識者的人出現在我們麵前時，就真的會比一位朋友更能令我們安心鎮靜；而以此類推，一位陌生人的出現則又比一位普通相識者的出現更能令我們安心鎮靜。

10．

    Society and conversation, therefore, are the most powerful

remedies for restoring the mind to its tranquillity, if, at any

time, it has unfortunately lost it; as well as the best

preservatives of that equal and happy temper, which is so

necessary to self-satisfaction and enjoyment. Men of retirement

and speculation, who are apt to sit brooding at home over either

grief or resentment, though they may often have more humanity,

more generosity, and a nicer sense of honour, yet seldom possess

that equality of temper which is so common among men of the

world.

   因此，無論什麽時候，如果情緒不幸一落千丈，交往和談話在恢複情緒平靜方麵則是最具威力的靈丹妙藥，同樣，保持均衡穩定的愉悅心情，在確保自我滿足以及自娛自樂方麵也是不可或缺的。退休和從事投機生意的人，極易坐在家裏因為悲傷和怨恨而愁腸寸斷，鬱鬱寡歡，雖然他們經常會有更多的仁慈之心，更強的慷慨之情，以及一份美妙的榮譽感，然而卻很少具備在世人中間極為普通的那種崇高品質。

Chap. V

Of the amiable and respectable virtues

第五章 論和藹可親及令人尊敬的品德

1．

    Upon these two different efforts, upon that of the spectator

to enter into the sentiments of the person principally concerned,

and upon that of the person principally concerned, to bring down

his emotions to what the spectator can go along with, are founded

two different sets of virtues. The soft, the gentle, the amiable

virtues, the virtues of candid condescension and indulgent

humanity, are founded upon the one: the great, the awful and

respectable, the virtues of self-denial, of self-government, of

that command of the passions which subjects all the movements of

our nature to what our own dignity and honour, and the propriety

of our own conduct require, take their origin from the other.

   旁觀者努力體諒當事者的情感，當事者則努力將自己的情感降低到能與旁觀者和諧一致的水平，就在這兩種努力的基礎之上，形成了兩大係列風格迥異的品德。溫順禮貌、和藹可親、公正謙卑、寬厚仁慈，這些美德建立在一種努力的基礎上；莊重嚴肅、自謙自律、精於自治、嚴於克己，這些美德則建立在另一種努力的基礎之上。而其中所謂的嚴於克己，則是指克製自己的激情，使之被納入我們自己的尊嚴榮譽以及行為規範所要求的限製之內。

2．

    How amiable does he appear to be, whose sympathetic heart

seems to reecho all the sentiments of those with whom he

converses, who grieves for their calamities, who resents their

injuries, and who rejoices at their good fortune! When we bring

home to ourselves the situation of his companions, we enter into

their gratitude, and feel what consolation they must derive from

the tender sympathy of so affectionate a friend. And for a

contrary reason, how disagreeable does he appear to be, whose

hard and obdurate heart feels for himself only, but is altogether

insensible to the happiness or misery of others! We enter, in

this case too, into the pain which his presence must give to

every mortal with whom he converses, to those especially with

whom we are most apt to sympathize, the unfortunate and the

injured.

   試想這樣的人該有多麽和藹可親呀！無論他和誰談話，其同情心似乎都要對他們所有的情感都做出回應，他不僅為他們遭遇的不幸感到悲傷，也為他們受到的傷害感到義憤，更對他們的時來運轉感到高興！當我們切身體會到他的憐憫之心時，我們就會和他們一樣產生感激之情，也能感覺到他們從這樣一位深情的朋友溫馨的同情心中獲得怎樣的慰藉。反之，他又該是怎樣的令人生厭！他那顆冷酷無情的鐵石心腸隻關心他自己，而對別人的快樂與痛苦毫不關心，麻木不仁。在這種情況之下，我們同樣會體會到他的表現給每一個和他談話的普通人，尤其是那些我們最易同情的不幸者和被傷害者所造成的痛苦。

3．

   On the other hand, what noble propriety and grace do we feel

in the conduct of those who, in their own case, exert that

recollection and self-command which constitute the dignity of

every passion, and which bring it down to what others can enter

into! We are disgusted with that clamorous grief, which, without

any delicacy, calls upon our compassion with sighs and tears and

importunate lamentations. But we reverence that reserved, that

silent and majestic sorrow, which discovers itself only in the

swelling of the eyes, in the quivering of the lips and cheeks,

and in the distant, but affecting, coldness of the whole

behaviour. It imposes the like silence upon us. We regard it with

respectful attention, and watch with anxious concern over our

whole behaviour, lest by any impropriety we should disturb that

concerted tranquillity, which it requires so great an effort to

support.

   另一方麵，在這樣一些人的行為中我們會感到他們該是多麽地高尚，多麽地有風度！他們自己盡力保持構成各種情感所不可或缺的平靜心情和自我克製，並且使之達到他人能夠體諒的程度。我們厭惡那種鬧鬧嚷嚷的悲傷，它使當事者毫無風度地呼喚我們以歎息和淚水，乃至的被迫而為的嚎啕痛哭來表達憐憫之心。然而我們尊敬那種有節製、沉默不語、體麵的悲傷，這種悲傷隻能在紅腫的眼睛中發現，隻能在抽搐的雙唇和麵頰上發現，隻能在行為中那些隱隱約約，但卻感人至深的冷漠中發現。它把類似的沉默灌注給我們。我們則以崇敬之心給予關注，進而焦慮地關注我們自己的行為，怕的是我們會因為自己舉止的不得體而幹擾相互和諧的寧靜，這種寧靜則需要以巨大的努力

加以維持。

4．

    The insolence and brutality of anger, in the same manner,

when we indulge its fury without check or restraint, is, of all

objects, the most detestable. But we admire that noble and

generous resentment which governs its pursuit of the greatest

injuries, not by the rage which they are apt to excite in the

breast of the sufferer, but by the indignation which they

naturally call forth in that of the impartial spectator; which

allows no word, no gesture, to escape it beyond what this more

equitable sentiment would dictate; which never, even in thought,

attempts any greater vengeance, nor desires to inflict any

greater punishment, than what every indifferent person would

rejoice to see executed.

   當我們毫無節製地大發雷霆之怒，因而表現得傲慢無禮，粗暴蠻橫時，這種表現無論針對何種客體都是最令人厭惡的。然而，我們卻讚賞那種高尚脫俗、寬宏大度的憤慨之情，這種憤慨能夠控製自身可能造成的傷害，而且憑借的手段並非那種易於產生在受害者心中的勃然大怒，而是憑借在公允旁觀者心中自然產生的義憤，這種憤慨的表達無需一言一詞，一舉一動，就能避免使之超乎與之相同的情感所能支配的程度；這種憤慨根本無意采取過於嚴厲的報複行動，所謂過於嚴厲，是指超出所有公允的人所樂於見到的程度。

5．

    And hence it is, that to feel much for others and little for

ourselves, that to restrain our selfish, and to indulge our

benevolent affections, constitutes the perfection of human

nature; and can alone produce among mankind that harmony of

sentiments and passions in which consists their whole grace and

propriety. As to love our neighbour as we love ourselves is the

great law of Christianity, so it is the great precept of nature

to love ourselves only as we love our neighbour, or what comes to

the same thing, as our neighbour is capable of loving us.

   因此，正是那種顧及他人多餘自己，既能自我克製，又能遍施仁慈的情操，才造就了最完美的人性；正是這種情操就能獨自在人間營造憤慨與激情的和諧，而憤慨與激情也隻有在這種和諧之中才顯得恰如其分，魅力無窮。愛鄰居就像愛我們自己，這是基督教的偉大法規，因此，愛我們自己就像愛我們的鄰居，或者同樣可以說，就像我們的鄰居能夠愛我們一樣，這是有關人性的偉大格言。

6．

    As taste and good judgment, when they are considered as

qualities which deserve praise and admiration, are supposed to

imply a delicacy of sentiment and an acuteness of understanding

not commonly to be met with; so the virtues of sensibility and

self-command are not apprehended to consist in the ordinary, but

in the uncommon degrees of those qualities. The amiable virtue of

humanity requires, surely, a sensibility, much beyond what is

possessed by the rude vulgar of mankind. The great and exalted

virtue of magnanimity undoubtedly demands much more than that

degree of self-command, which the weakest of mortals is capable

of exerting. As in the common degree of the intellectual

qualities, there is no abilities; so in the common degree of the

moral, there is no virtue. Virtue is excellence, something

uncommonly great and beautiful, which rises far above what is

vulgar and ordinary. The amiable virtues consist in that degree

of sensibility which surprises by its exquisite and unexpected

delicacy and tenderness. The awful and respectable, in that

degree of self-command which astonishes by its amazing

superiority over the most ungovernable passions of human nature.

   行為得體以及判斷準確被認為是值得讚揚與欽佩的美德時，它們也許正體現一種難得一見的細膩的情感和精確的理解，正如這樣，情感與自製的美德也不會被認為存在於一般品質中，而是存在於超乎尋常的品質中。人性中和藹可親的美德一定需要一種遠遠超乎凡夫俗子所具備的品質。寬宏大量這種崇高偉大的美德，所需要的情感自製無疑要超出意誌薄弱者所具備的水平。正如僅有一般的智力，才智無從談起，僅有一般的品德，美德也無從談起。美德乃出類拔萃，並非一般的偉大與美好，遠非庸俗粗鄙以及平淡無奇所能企及。和藹可親的美德賴以存在的情感，以其高雅脫俗、出人意表的細膩與溫馨令世人驚歎。而令人敬畏、令人欽佩的美德所賴以存在的情感自製，絕對能控製人性中存在的那些最難以駕馭的激情，而這，正是其驚人魅力之所在。

7．

    There is, in this respect, a considerable difference between

virtue and mere propriety; between those qualities and actions

which deserve to be admired and celebrated, and those which

simply deserve to be approved of. Upon many occasions, to act

with the most perfect propriety, requires no more than that

common and ordinary degree of sensibility or self-command which

the most worthless of mankind are possest of, and sometimes even

that degree is not necessary. Thus, to give a very low instance,

to eat when we are hungry, is certainly, upon ordinary occasions,

perfectly right and proper, and cannot miss being approved of as

such by every body. Nothing, however, could be more absurd than

to say it was virtuous.

在這方麵，在美德與僅僅得體之間，在那些值得欽佩與讚頌的品德及行動，與那些僅僅值得讚同的品德之間，都存在一種相當大的差異。在很多情況之下，即便行為極其得體，所需要的也不過就是最無足輕重的凡人都能具備的一般情感與自製，有時連這樣的水準都無需具備。於是乎，不妨舉一格最普通的例子，我們餓了就吃，這是理所當然之事，在一般情況下，完全正確，絕對適宜，不會受到任何人的反對。然而，如果說這就是美德，那可就再荒謬不過了。

8．

    On the contrary, there may frequently be a considerable

degree of virtue in those actions which fall short of the most

perfect propriety; because they may still approach nearer to

perfection than could well be expected upon occasions in which it

was so extremely difficult to attain it: and this is very often

the case upon those occasions which require the greatest

exertions of self-command. There are some situations which bear

so hard upon human nature, that the greatest degree of

self-government, which can belong to so imperfect a creature as

man, is not able to stifle, altogether, the voice of human

weakness, or reduce the violence of the passions to that pitch of

moderation, in which the impartial spectator can entirely enter

into them. Though in those cases, therefore, the behaviour of the

sufferer fall short of the most perfect propriety, it may still

deserve some applause, and even in a certain sense, may be

denominated virtuous. It may still manifest an effort of

generosity and magnanimity of which the greater part of men are

incapable; and though it fails of absolute perfection, it may be

a much nearer approximation towards perfection, than what, upon

such trying occasions, is commonly either to be found or to be

expected.

   恰恰相反，在那些並非完全得體的行為中，可能也經常會存在相當程度的美德；因為這些行為接近完美無缺的程度，依然會超過人們在另外一些情況下的期待，而在那些情況下，這些行為則絕難達到完美無缺：在那些需要極強自製力的情況下，這種情況並非少見。有一些情況對人性造成的影響巨大無比，以至於像我們人類這樣並非十全十美的生靈所具備的極度自製力，都既不能完全壓抑人類微弱的呼聲，也不能恰如其分地將激情降低到隻有為公允的旁觀者所能體諒的程度。雖然在那些情況下，受苦者的行為會因此無法盡善盡美，但依然值得讚賞，而且在某種意義上來說，甚至可以被稱之為美德。它依然可以表明為達到大多數人難以企及的寬宏大度而做出的努力；雖然無法達到至善至美，但與困境中所常見或可期待的程度相比，它依然可以算是最接近完美的。

9．

    In cases of this kind, when we are determining the degree of

blame or applause which seems due to any action, we very

frequently make use of two different standards. The first is the

idea of complete propriety and perfection, which, in those

difficult situations, no human conduct ever did, or ever can

come, up to; and in comparison with which the actions of all men

must for ever appear blameable and imperfect. The second is the

idea of that degree of proximity or distance from this complete

perfection, which the actions of the greater part of men commonly

arrive at. Whatever goes beyond this degree, how far soever it

may be removed from absolute perfection, seems to deserve

applause; and whatever falls short of it, to deserve blame.

在這種情況之下，當我們決定對某些行為采取何種程度的反對或讚同態度時，我們經常利用兩種不同的標準。第一種就是絕對的得體和完善，這在那些困境中，從來沒有人做到過，或者說根本就沒有人那樣去做；相比之下，所有人的行為看來都必然是可以指摘和有失完美的。第二種就是大多數人的行為對於盡善盡美所能達到的近似度或差距。無論是什麽情況，隻要高於這一普通程度，也不管它距離絕對完美的距離還有多遠，它似乎依然可以得到讚許；如果做不到這一點，那當然就隻能遭到指摘。

10．

    It is in the same manner that we judge of the productions of

all the arts which address themselves to the imagination. When a

critic examines the work of any of the great masters in poetry or

painting, he may sometimes examine it by an idea of perfection,

in his own mind, which neither that nor any other human work will

ever come up to; and as long as he compares it with this

standard, he can see nothing in it but faults and imperfections.

But when he comes to consider the rank which it ought to hold

among other works of the same kind, he necessarily compares it

with a very different standard, the common degree of excellence

which is usually attained in this particular art; and when he

judges of it by this new measure, it may often appear to deserve

the highest applause, upon account of its approaching much nearer

to perfection than the greater part of those works which can be

brought into competition with it.

 

      我們也以同樣的方式來判斷那些充滿想象力的所有藝術產品。當一位評論家評審任何一位詩歌或繪畫大師的作品時，他有時可能以自己一種完美無缺的思想做標準，而這一標準，無論是那位大師，還是任何其他人的作品都無法達到；隻要他以這種標準來衡量，他就會發現，那件作品除了謬誤和缺陷之外一無是處。然而，如果考慮到這件作品在其它同類作品中應有的等級時，他就自然會采用一種非常不同的標準，即，在這一特殊藝術品類中，這件作品通常會達到的一般的精彩度；而當他以這種新尺度來評判這件作品時，它就經常會顯得應該受到極高的評價，因為此時此刻，這件作品接近完美的程度，要遠遠超過同類大部分作品在與其競爭中所能達到的水平。