【1】
黨媒宣傳的拜登大政府新政宏圖：
為了支付大政府的征稅計劃：
大政府：參見 沒招？美國趕緊向中國學招
【2】為了對抗中國的一帶一路，拜登建議（英國總理）莊生也來一個：
這就是拜登唯一的一句話，可笑。英國的財政開支自己還緩不過來，莊生又要第二艘航母，拜登自己還要新的3萬億大政府，“民主陣營”，美國英國自己不帶頭？
BCI良好棉花上海辦公室終於發話，就看總部敢不敢與中國斷交
【3】美中在巴西的較量：華為
《紐時》一周前在報道巴西疫情的時候，把巴西從中國拿到疫苗和巴西重新允許華為競投5G項目放到同一個句子裏，暗示中國用疫苗威逼巴西讓步（參見：美國一手疫苗好牌，給拜登活生生打臭），巴西媒體揭露這整個是《紐時》的慣用伎倆，用以詆毀中國：
實際情況是華為一直沒有出局，中國與巴西在疫苗上一直有合作，但這都不在中央政府層次發生，因為總統反華，為了討好美國，為了選票不惜犧牲本國的利益，華為是政府批準的符合安全標準的商戶，總統在國內很孤立，地方政府和商界都反對，到了巴西死人成山的時候，總統終於老實，對中國開始友善起來。
【4】華爾街和西方的資本抵擋不住中國的吸引力：
【5】戰略考慮
America's Alliances After Trump: Lessons from the Summer of '69 - Texas National Security Review (tnsr.org)【這個分析很能見到美國的出發點：“美國”是一個代表正義的勢力，“中國”是一個危害和平、訛詐鄰國的反動勢力】
If there is going to be a grand strategy focused on China ... - The Washington Post是對The U.S. and China Finally Get Real With Each Other - The Atlantic一文的延伸想法，原文是說撕下麵子反而是好，沒有幻想，本作者則沒那麽樂觀，“The United States excels at shooting itself in the foot — and also at recovering from shooting itself in the foot far more quickly than foreigners expect”
內鬥？
東歐人（羅馬尼亞）：
（新加坡）馬凱碩 （Kishore Mahbubani）
most Chinese thought that their policymakers won the public argument in Alaska. So too, did many other Asians
@mahbubani_k
戰狼：
But when Merkel and Xi spoke on Wednesday, China’s official account of the call did not mention the trade deal or Xinjiang
“We had seven years of negotiations for the deal,” said Joerg Wuttke, head of the European Chamber of Commerce in China. “Now it looks like it will take another seven years.”
【6】台灣
China iterates twice as fast through military development and fielding cycles | Acquisition Talk〔 資料：Competing in Time〕
台灣的“民主”是民主專製，任何不同聲音被打擊成有位民意而被拒絕，而且台灣的民主鬥士（boba liberals），西方的反應：
台灣《聯合報》在官網發起的一項民意調查顯示，在投票的3.3萬餘名網友中，有超過78%的網友表示“不讚同，感覺有政治力介入”，僅有20%選擇“讚同，累計多項違規記錄，早該下架”。
中情局老分析員：中國壓根兒沒準備武統台灣
人口老化，剩男，經濟增長低於社會需求
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.
The U.S. government does not have such a concise rendering of its One-China policy as Beijing does. When American officials say that “we have a One-China policy,” they usually elaborate by listing several defining elements: adherence to the three U.S.-PRC communiqués of 1972, 1978, and 1982; implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act enacted in April 1979; an abiding interest in the peaceful resolution of the differences between the two sides; opposition to either side unilaterally changing the status quo and non-support for de jure independence of Taiwan; the “six assurances”conveyed to Taiwan in August 1982; and a preference for continuing dialogue and cooperation between Beijing and Taipei, among others
對中國最關鍵的，大概是美國不支持台灣獨立。不支持獨立，還要武力支持台灣，是因為美國許諾“雙方都不應改變現狀”
The PRC definition of the One-China principle for international consumption is that, “there is only one China in the world, Taiwan is a part of China and the government of the PRC is the sole legal government representing the whole of China.”
The United States takes no position on how the two sides of the Taiwan Strait should resolve their differences on substantive issues. It does, however, consistently state an “abiding interest”in peace and security in the Taiwan Strait. The Taiwan Relations Act conveys a political commitment to come to Taiwan’s defense if the PRC were to attack the island militarily. Taiwan’s democratization complicated how the United States should act on its interest in preserving peace and security, and it has, at times, employed an approach of “dual deterrence.”
美國所說的：美國不當兩岸將來的仲裁者，但卻不得不當仲裁者，因為你們不能以訴諸武力
台海一戰將無法避免，因為中國對“時間在我們一邊”的判斷因時而變，未必會
卜睿哲（Richard Bush），何瑞恩（Ryan Hass），葛來儀（Bonnie Glaser）
China has drawn blood along the contested Indian border, threatened Vietnam, expanded its military presence in the South China Sea, increased the tempo of its operations near the Senkaku Islands and trampled Hong Kong's autonomy — to say nothing of the atrocities it is perpetrating against its own citizens in Xinjiang and elsewhere
解放軍在台灣全方位演習
to deter Taiwan independence rather than compel unification
While it is true that some in China have concluded that time is no longer on China's side and Beijing should use force to compel unification, Xi has resisted such pressure. In the latest five-year plan, launched this year, Beijing reaffirmed the policy guideline of pursuing "peaceful development of cross-strait relations,"
五年計劃說“和平發展”並不排除和統或武統，主要看是不是時勢所迫，如果美國承認台灣，或台灣宣布獨立，這都將是不可扭鑽的事件
Beijing has its own incentives to avoid war. Foremost among them is that any attempt to take Taiwan by force would very likely invite a military conflict with the United States. Such a conflict would be difficult to limit from escalating or spreading beyond the Taiwan Strait三人覺得美國占上風，並不一定是指美國在局部一定會勝，隻是當兩國交戰後，雙方就進入一種戰爭對峙狀態，那麽任何手段都可以在使用的範圍之內
“中國的目的是要把台灣嚇死，主動投降，宣揚中國軍事實力就是幫了中國”
注：如果台灣民意已經不可逆轉地走向獨立，那麽中國還有什麽可能和平統一？香港2019暴動的影響：蔡英文當時未必有連任的絕對勝算，蔡抓住了香港暴動，積極扇風，使得局勢發展是一國兩製
還是有兩個可能：一是十幾年後中國發展，自己製度有所有所改善，二是經濟地位穩定到不懼美國搗亂，實力強大到足以逼敵接受城下之盟
中國沒招，因為中國自身問題多，另外還有更多更大的目標，完成建設之前，中國也沒用十分把握，
本文根本沒提執意性含糊，因為不需要，並沒有討論風險、價值、後果
“No other country in the world – not Taiwan, Japan or South Korea – are talking about the likelihood of war on a day-to-day basis. In Australia we seem to be focused on the distant threat of war rather than the very real support that the Taiwanese people need today.”
同意：
但是可能要讓日本和菲律賓失望了，南海南沙群島本身就是中國的領土，與菲律賓沒有什麽關係，所以並不存在侵犯主權這一說，所以我們也沒有必要撤離。
不過，也有可能是我國漁民的一次的集合活動，中美高層戰略對話已經落幕，中國在阿拉斯加的表現讓中國人熱血沸騰，對於中國的實力更加有自信，對於捍衛中國主權的決心也更加堅定。捍衛我們的權益，本身就是所有中國人的事情，所以，在我們看來，即便是漁民自發組織的宣示主權行動，也沒有什麽意外的。
什麽話？
Money to deter China, Russia: The plan falls short of the 3 to 5 percent boost GOP lawmakers are pressuring the White House to endorse. They argue the range, laid out by Pentagon leaders during the Trump administration, is what’s needed to adequately fund a military transformation to counter threats from China and Russia
"The May 1 deadline gives Biden a way out, and it is bizarre that he doesn’t want to take it."
"There is no excuse for Biden’s apparent backtracking on yet another promise, and he should move quickly to correct this serious and unforced error."
"His conceit that Russia, China, and Iran all belong to the same enemy camp is similarly wrongheaded and harmful."
拜登當局“怕軟症”
還尤其怕在國內被人指責自己軟，一軟就不是男子漢
Taiwan is a vibrant democracy and a force for good in the world. Today we issued guidelines to encourage U.S. government engagement with Taiwan and strengthen our relationship in accordance with our “one China” policy. https://t.co/01TxaArdKz
— Ned Price (@StateDeptSpox) April 9, 2021
Washington can make this change in a manner that is consistent with its one-China policy and that minimizes the risk to U.S.-Chinese relations
為什麽呢？因為美國說美國？？
的台灣關係法（Taiwan Relations Act）裏美國
Maintaining this policy of ambiguity, however, will not keep the peace in the Taiwan Strait for the next four decades. China now has the capability to threaten U.S. interests and Taiwan’s future 美國第一
he trend lines continue to move in China’s favor時間不在我們這一邊
習近平四處出擊，到處冒險，就是武力侵犯
不用擔心台灣獨立，因為台灣意識到獨立就是武統，所以不會貿然，
One thing, however, has not changed over these four decades: an imposed Chinese takeover of Taiwan remains antithetical to U.S. interests. If the United States fails to respond to such a Chinese use of force, regional U.S. allies, such as Japan and South Korea, will conclude that the United States cannot be relied upon and that it is pulling back from the region
美國信譽論
leading to the dissolution of U.S. alliances and the crumbling of the balance of power, or they would seek nuclear weapons
Why ambiguity: Kissinger understood that settling this issue on terms acceptable to all sides was out of reach.
But ambiguity is now unlikely to preserve the status quo.
哈斯的出發點是，如果美國明確表示一旦中國用武，美國亦將以武力介入，那麽中國就會謹慎得多，不至於誤算，但哈斯還是不能理解中國人的決心，中國不誤算，但並不意味著放棄，不會因為美國軍事威懾就會放棄統一台灣，其實我覺得這整個瞎扯，如果中國用武的軍事計劃是建立在“估計美國害怕，不會出兵”這一假設之上，那麽如果中國慘敗就是活該。
The White House could articulate this new policy through a presidential statement and accompanying executive order that reiterates U.S. support for its one-China policy but also unequivocally states that the United States would respond should Taiwan come under Chinese armed attack. The statement would make clear that the United States does not support Taiwan independence, thus deterring Taiwan from attempting to capitalize on the new U.S. policy
對中國來說，維護現狀就是事實獨立，但然這也可以另一種理解，維護現狀中國就有機會，等中國發展、壯大
How can you stated "Whether the United States could prevail in a Taiwan conflict is no longer certain, and the trend lines continue to move in China’s favor." w/o asking the question if the US will defend Taiwan regardless cost, as it does in NATO for Europe, is our commitment unwavered in the face of certain defeat
The CCP derives much of its legitimacy from its ability to provide sustained economic growth. Therefore, the United States should make clear that using force against Taiwan would put China’s continued growth at risk. Congress should pass a law that would impose severe sanctions on China should it attack Taiwan. The United States should coordinate with its Asian and European allies so they send similar signals.
Blatant interference of "sovereignty"
Similar points, diff conclusion
Those who argue that this new policy extends an additional U.S. commitment at a time when the country is already overextended should not delude themselves: U.S. allies in Asia already assume that the United States will come to Taiwan’s defense完全避開回答，好像美國聯盟係統必然代表美國利益
中國不行：
The PLA’s ground, air, and naval forces were sizable but mostly obsolete. Its conventional missiles were generally of short range and modest accuracy. The PLA’s emergent cyber capabilities were rudimentary; its use of information technology was well behind the curve; and its nominal space capabilities were based on outdated technologies for the day. Further, China’s defense industry struggled to produce high-quality systems. Even if the PRC could produce or acquire modern weapons, the PLA lacked the joint organizations and training needed to field them effectively. The report assessed that the PLA’s organizational obstacles were severe enough that if left unaddressed they would “inhibit the PLA’s maturation into a world-class military force.
Land-based conventional ballistic and cruise missiles: The PRC has more than 1,250 ground-launched ballistic missiles (GLBMs) and ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers. The United States currently fields one type of conventional GLBM with a range of 70 to 300 kilometers and no GLCMs.此處中國強
半導體
Why a Chinese invasion of Taiwan would be a catastrophe for China and the world - doxa (substack.com)【台積電完全依賴美國技術，美國一封，台積電就死】
https://hullcitytigers.com/p/worldnews/comments/mqovx8/taiwan_says_its_chip_firms_will_adhere_to_new_us/
Strategic Ambiguity（執意性含糊）
Why Strategic Ambiguity Is No Longer Viable For U.S.-Taiwan Relations | The National Interest（香港、台灣人）
Eric Chan is a China/Korea strategist for the U.S. Air Force’s Checkmate office，2020.09
China also had a policy of strategic ambiguity: a refusal to renounce the use of force against Taiwan, but emphasizing the economic gains of cooperation. The viability of strategic ambiguity rests on an assumption: that time is on our side
Chinese leader Xi Jinping has taken concrete steps all but formally renouncing strategic ambiguity
2000 to 2008, China-Taiwan trade tripled
The U.S. strategy of promoting stability and long-term democratic influence has instead flipped to an embrace of greater risk to deter China.
For Beijing, the illusion of long-term advantage disappeared following the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong and the Sunflower student movement in Taiwan
It has led to the collapse of the pro-engagement Kuomintang (KMT) at the national level. The KMT is now attempting a “redesign,” to include a realignment with the United States.
the KMT collapse has given Tsai political breathing room to continue diversifying Taiwan’s economy away from China, openly align Taiwan’s foreign policy with the U.S.
譴責中國、習近平冒險激進，武統，台灣、美國得給中國足夠的警告，讓中國知難而退，台灣美國愛和平（簡單：事實獨立，你咋辦）
used to discuss slow “strangulation” methods such as a blockade or the seizure of outlying islands to intimidate Taiwan. However, PLA literature is now fixated on achieving a fait accompli
To achieve this, the PLA has developed aggressive operational concepts that are prone to miscalculation
美國明明就是挑戰
A Tripwire to hasten to decline of the American Empire
It's not common to see such a poorly argued strategy to defend #Taiwan
https://www.forbes.com/sites/lorenthompson/2021/03/26/taiwan-tripwire-a-new-role-for-the-us-army-in-deterring-chinese-aggression/?sh=68166968738c
According to the Domino Theory of American Credibitlity, Taiwan will set to end America's presence in the Pacific, perhaps the world. Why? B/c if you back off in face of war, you lose. But you can't win a war with China on *Taiwan* unless this escalates into a total war, whose outcome is unpredictable. You lose again.
So "strategists" try to outcompete one another with strongest "deternrance". But despite rehtorics from Taiwan, everyone knows its fate is sealed less direct US intervention.
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-taiwan-defence/taiwan-says-will-fight-to-the-end-if-china-attacks-idUSKBN2BU0HJ
The Biden regime is doing everything to show the world Taiwan is de facto independent. The only diff w the Trump regime is it maintains the facade of the status quote w/o provocation of declaring formal independence.
Of course this comes with a wave of recent claims that China "can invade at any moment". Can't see this is just coincidence.
To be indenpendent w/o the formality of independence obvously runs into the irks Of China. What else can you expect? But that's the point. Taiwan is not a card Vis-à-vis Trump, but "Taiwan is the anchor of the so-called First Island Chain, which U.S. planners have identified as the most promising location from which to oppose Chinese naval moves"
In other words, fotress of Democracy
So how to start a war w China we are so eager to fight but don't want? Well ending the strategic ambigouity or formally recognnize Taiwan will seal the fate on all 3 sides, bluffing (threatening) China into submission is not, after all that's what military deterance is all about. Yes despite "The Economist warned on February 20 that “America is losing its ability to deter a Chinese attack on Taiwan", we can achieve all, no formal indenpendence, no invasion, by simply
To avoid a blockade of Taiwan, we must "credibly threaten to sink all of China’s military vessels, submarines, and merchant ships in the South China Sea within 72 hours"
https://www.economist.com/china/2021/02/20/china-faces-fateful-choices-especially-involving-taiwan
Weaponize SMTC on the agenda
https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/china-hypersonic-missiles-american-technology/2021/04/07/37a6b9be-96fd-11eb-b28d-bfa7bb5cb2a5_story.html
中國有可能近期內武統嗎？我和大部分美國人想法一樣，不太可能，原因是如果美國不正式承認台灣（如建交），台灣不正式宣布獨立，中國就沒有動武的借口，沒有借口而動武則與世界為敵，那是如果美國號召全世界封鎖中國，響應的可能不少，這對中國發展將會是個致命性的打擊。台灣不形式上獨立而事實獨立，你怎麽辦？沒辦法，這是曆史遺留下來的難題，當時你打不過去，現在長大了，短時間內誤解。那麽如果中國強大到足以能與美國海軍一戰，不是說戰勝，而是有把握試試那時候，美國還會這麽堅持嗎？
不過台海一戰也不是那麽簡單，美國不僅不會穩操勝券，而且不論中國有沒有借口，失敗的可能性極大，根據“美國信譽：的多米諾理論，失去台灣美國在亞洲太平洋的霸權，也許在世界的霸權都將會失去。尼爾• 弗格森（Niall Ferguson）
為什麼？因為如果你在戰爭麵前退縮，你就輸了。但你不可能在*台灣問題上贏得與中國的戰爭，除非這場戰爭升級為一場全麵戰爭，其結果是不可預測的。你又輸了。
其實如果美國公投問美國人民是不是要保衛台灣，這是很難通過的，但美國政府通常不需要征求民意,，正如地緣國際關係大師米爾斯海默（John Mearsheimer）所言：“美國政府誇大敵人威脅和煽動民眾打仗的本事天下莫及，政府要打，老百姓絕對傻乎乎跟著上。”
前幾天美國將軍，前國安委主任麥克馬斯特（H.R. MCMASTER）在回顧川普當局早期製定對華政策轉型的過程時透露【1】，當2017年習近平一行到達海湖莊園時，美方直接指責中方不對等貿易，中國使團有點猝不及防，但一直相信美中這“21世紀最主要的雙邊關係”的中國還是相信自己有能力說服維穩是美國的利益。美方的真實用意，中國花了兩年多時間才弄清楚，由於一直以為糊弄就能過關，欠缺準備，中國倉卒采用了全麵反擊的策略，這一策略隨著美國逐漸升級，最後到封殺華為，全麵技術戰才最終讓中國轉過彎來【2】，這不是誰退誰進多少的問題，而是你死我活的全麵冷戰，此刻中國對時局誤判再也沒有可以辯護的了。
【3】習近平的十萬億芯夢
【4】中國在詐唬，別被她懵了
去年中國開始重新製定美中對抗下的國策，為十四五定調，這包括雙循環，把科技放在八項重點任務的第一項（參見【3】）和碳中和，隨著拜登當選，中國更是把希望寄托在美國新政府為了扭轉美國惡劣的國際形象將會有一個回調的過程，而這一過程恰恰是中國需要的和平穩定使得十四五能平穩展開，習近平那套“時與勢在我們一邊”，“‘東升西降’是趨勢，國際格局發展態勢對我有利”【4】也得有一個好的開頭，所以中國一直放出風聲，希望、“要求”美國重整美中關係（reset），包括撤銷關稅，還給美國一個台階，一方麵說“責任全在美國”，另一方麵說“責任全在川普當局”，暗示對拜登既往不咎。大家老以為楊潔篪那一番宣言多厲害，但那是在中國向美國拋媚眼幾個月後才似乎轉過彎來，終於發現美國不但不會重新調整美中關係，而且會采用全方位、全社會戰爭來孤立、打擊中國，美國官方媒體現在已經很少隱瞞美國的目的：摧毀中國挑戰美國霸權地位的機會。
米爾斯海默（John Mearsheimer）
可以說盡管中國意識到美國的戰略目的是全方位扼殺中國，中國還是對美國的策略、手段的威脅依舊缺乏認識，這體現在中國還是依靠戰狼、五毛大軍這種快人心卻得罪人，適得其反的策略【5，6】，而美國則到處打造民主人權陣營，這個陣營難以掩蓋美國的意圖，美國是利用其他國家來達到圍剿中國的目的，然而中國的內政外交政策都強調維護自己的利益，那就很難贏得人心，雖然美國的這個陣營主要局限於發達國家和印度，但這個陣營是很威風的，還控製著世界經濟和技術的絕大部分，還控製著輿論的製高點，對罵是解決不了問題的。
為什麽美國有說服力？因為美國抓住了中國當前的兩個策略失誤：香港和新疆。說香港和新疆都有美國的黑手，我是信的，不是說中情局真的派了特務，而是整個西方官方媒體都主動站隊詆毀中國，中國成了人類公敵，使得中國沒有後退之路，可這就讓美國有一個把中國描述成不合法政府（illegitimate）的借口，美國時時處處民主人權來威脅利誘盟友，讓大家站隊，在中國四處樹敵
The Chinese embassy in Iceland on Friday announced sanctions against an Icelandic individual for spreading lies and disinformation on so-called human rights issues in China's Xinjiang without naming the person https://t.co/zPJj2URb4o
— CGTN (@CGTNOfficial) April 16, 2021
日本近來一直怕中國，因為在崛起，取代了日本在亞洲的地位，而且釣魚島
日本在美國新政府剛上任不久就能下決心與中國升級，中國政府也應當自省一下，
“the importance of peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait”
“oppose” coercion or force in the South and East China Seas
美國和西方已經邁向表明“一中”，實質上否認台灣是
We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-Strait issues. We share serious concerns regarding the human rights situations in Hong Kong and the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The United States and Japan recognized the importance of candid conversations with China, reiterated their intention to share concerns directly, and acknowledged the need to work with China on areas of common interest.
美國明明就是挑戰
茂木敏充表示，日中互為近鄰，日中關係保持穩定發展對兩國和地區乃至世界都非常重要。日美同盟不針對特定第三方，日方高度重視對華關係，確保日中關係穩定發展的態度沒有變化。日方願同中方保持溝通，加強對話，增進互信，妥善管控分歧，為共同慶祝日中邦交正常化50周年營造良好氛圍。日方願同中方加強各領域交流合作，就互相支持辦好東京奧運會和北京冬奧會保持溝通
Biden administration is cementing the position of Japan as an indispensable ally in tackling vexing regional and global challenges and reaffirming the high priority he attaches to the Indo-Pacific.
There was greater convergence on the strategic framing of the China challenge. Tokyo surprised many with its joint statement from the 2+2 meeting to directly call out Chinese assertive behavior that destabilizes the international order
joint emphasis on the importance of stability in the Taiwan Strait did not go unnoticed
to deliver public goods to the region and beyond is an important repositioning. An alliance that embodies a “can-do” attitude can help the United States recover the lost ground from the past four years of defensive and narrow bilateralism
trusted supplier network
There is unease in some Japanese policy circles about being too forward-leaning in countering China and sacrificing the carefully orchestrated rapprochement initiated a few years ago紐時、華爾街日報
“中國”這個“敵人”存在的目的
【7】這個對那個
如果中國打的是經濟牌，雖然中國不再泛太協定內，中國卻在區域協定，美國、印度那個都不在，那這印太戰略怎麽打？
美國“民主陣營”的真正意義
美國已經有聯盟了，而且和歐洲有曆史、價值、利益攸關天然合作，但全球化後的經濟合作關係讓大家意識到無法把中國推到一邊，可見聯盟的局限性。但美國到處跟大家談心是有後果的：一旦發生武裝衝突（如台海），“盟友”們就可以借機製裁後凍結、沒收中國資產，封鎖（或拒絕）給中國提供資源，甚至給美國提供軍事基地，徹底孤立中國。
【8】
【9】疫情與疫苗
To provide a backstop against regional Covid surges we need to pulse vaccine into these areas. Some excess portion of the large additional supply that's coming into the market should be pulsed into U.S. hot zones to quickly ring vaccinate around outbreaks. https://t.co/gH1KjFT87J
— Scott Gottlieb, MD (@ScottGottliebMD) March 28, 2021
As a wife, mother, daughter, physician & CDC Director, I ask you to hold on a little while longer. We are almost there, but not quite yet. Continue using #COVID19 prevention methods & get vaccinated when you can so that you and others will still be here once this pandemic ends.
— Rochelle Walensky, MD, MPH (@CDCDirector) March 29, 2021
2/
— Alexandre Bolze (@alexbolze) March 28, 2021
How did I pick these 7 states?
- Each had >50 positives (Cq N gene
- Alternative could be to use a threshold for % of positives in state coming from Helix
~5% of pos in these 7 states come from Helix
State Ns: https://t.co/3BeT7U2JKK
德國聯邦製和美國相像，結果也可以比較
【10】
【11】伊核協議，中伊協定
【12】全球經濟
印錢
【13】印度
新增案例：
死亡人數：
Many districts in the country are seeing clusters of cases emerging because of specific events and/or places where crowding happens, or where a large number of people are in close contact coupled with a lack of a COVID-appropriate behaviour.
rime Minister Narendra Modi himself have been addressing rallies and meetings of tens of thousands of people, sitting or standing shoulder-to-shoulder, with only a handful wearing masks
這就是民主，選舉了
"The worst days are yet to come for India. Our models are showing astronomic projections that we did not see last year. This wave is intrinsically different. People have thrown caution to the wind. The next few weeks are so critical..." ht @BhramarBioStathttps://t.co/IFzf0XAs1y
— Albert Pinto (@70sBachchan) April 5, 2021
long india
https://twitter.com/70sBachchan/status/1378901038447652868
@AmyKazmin
https://twitter.com/AmyKazmin/status/1380886406264852489?s=20
變種，疫苗失效未被證實
印度自己居然相信已經群體免疫了
The truth is that India’s COVID-19 fight has been derailed by an irresponsible, arrogant, and opportunist leadership, supported by a pliant and spineless media.
Modi’s government has also been accused of failures of political leadership from the top, with lax attitudes emulated by state and local leaders from all parties and even health officials across the country, which led many to falsely believe in recent months that India had defeated Covid
與中國截然不同的態度，沒法讓中國人覺得自己有責任
“Victory was declared prematurely and that ebullient mood was communicated across the country, especially by politicians who wanted to get the economy going and wanted to get back to campaigning. And that gave the virus the chance to rise again.”
Thadhani said this time round the virus was “much more aggressive and much more infectious” and was now predominately affecting young people. “Now it is people in their 20s and 30s who are coming in with very severe symptoms and there is a lot of mortality among young people,” he said.
年輕人免疫？不怕？
Still, many fear that it is too little, too late.
The devastation has sparked outrage at the lack of preparation among officials who believed that the worst of the pandemic was over. Only two months ago, India was revelling in its success of reining in the spread of the virus.
India’s fatality rate remains relatively low,
the roots of the crisis ran much deeper, exposing years of neglect of public health infrastructure. India’s spending on healthcare has long lagged behind global peers
自然比中國還差
全麵，但沒細節
多些
這裏：
Uttarakhand: Sadhus participate in the second 'shahi snan' of Maha Kumbh at Har Ki Pauri ghat in Haridwar
— The Times Of India (@timesofindia) April 12, 2021
(Pictures: ANI) pic.twitter.com/CSlQRNNxNF
無關：
【14】拜登加稅要把你加死
抗疫經濟紓困已經5萬億，基建2.3萬億，拜登還要2萬億
time for President Biden to follow through on his campaign promise to offer permanent federal help on issues of critical importance to working women, from paid parental leave, to more expansive federal child-care support, and permanent child tax credits
But the stalled drive for the $15 federal minimum wage
拜登表示在未來幾周內還會提出另一項經濟提案，稱為“美國家庭計劃”，重點放在醫療、育兒和教育方麵的投資，可能會使刺激計劃的總規模再增加2萬億美元，部分資金將來自於對美國最高收入者加稅
為什麽美國沒人提？
President Joe Biden will separate his sprawling plan to upgrade the nation’s infrastructure into two separate pieces
芝大教授
Spending has been spurred by a belief that, as long as the federal government can borrow without a rise in low interest rates, no one really needs to pay. In case markets disagree, the rich can be taxed.
Past experience suggests it will be hard to make the rich pay — they will oppose new taxes vigorously and avoid them if implemented.
But in later spending packages, politicians arguably did not want the populist goodies they were targeting at their constituencies to be assessed in the sobering light of the need to pay for them.
the cost to future generations of our eating up their fiscal room could be substantial.
The request is separate from Biden’s $2 trillion-plus infrastructure and jobs plan, and it only covers discretionary spending, which amounts to about a third of the federal budget. A fuller White House budget release, which will include proposals for mandatory spending and tax reform, will be released later this spring and will tie everything together
可支配政府預算：國防7530，民用7690（億）
亞馬遜對工會的態度比曹德旺還狠，恐嚇威脅，刁難打擊直至解雇，亞馬遜有自己的自幹五團隊，還監視監聽，最大的醜聞是亞馬遜底層員工不敢上廁所，隻能用瓶子，想想那是怎麽樣的羞辱。
這是個人稅，與這次基建無關
$2.4 trillion over the next decade，人均稅增是1500（美元），但全部由最上20%承擔
$330,000 and $790,000 would pay about $9,000 more on average in 2022
Those in the top 1 percent (who will make about $790,000 or more) would pay roughly $265,000 more in taxes on average, or 16 percent of after-tax income. Those in the top 0.1 percent (who will make $3.5 million or more) would pay $1.6 million more than under current law, a steep 22 percent reduction in their after-tax incomes.
拜登怎麽打土豪？
拜登最新的美國家庭投資計劃主要是靠向有錢人征稅來支付，拜登已經許諾，年入40萬（美元）的家庭不會多交一分錢稅，據統計，這些家庭隻占美國的1.8%【1】，這麽做，據說是因為擔心被別人戴帽，傷了“中產”，這真是發動全國打土豪，分錢銀【2】，前幾天提到過民主黨的這一意圖【3】，中期選舉執政黨肯定背鍋，不如這次做大，賭一把。
這次征稅一是把最高稅率從從37&上調到39.6%，這是很小的增加，大頭是資產增值稅（long term capital gain tax），從現在的2% 大漲到39.6%，加上醫保附加稅3.8%，最後達43.4%。
【3】拜登的MAGA
最新
遺產稅：從一千二百萬下降到一百萬，
As illustrated in Figure 2, only 0.7 percent of taxpayers would be affected by these two provisions and virtually all of the tax increase would fall on the richest 1 percent.
【15】“債務陷阱”是如何出籠的？
中國的一帶一路，按英國智庫漆鹹樓（Chatham House，正式名稱為皇家國際事務研究所，The Royal Institute of International Affairs）綜合西方的解釋， 是中國的一個地緣政治戰略，其目的是在歐亞大陸甚至整個世界建立以中國為中心的新秩序，包含了 “深思熟慮的中國大戰略”，旨在“重新奪回亞洲的地緣政治主導權，挑戰]美國的主導權，建立以中國為中心的秩序”，是一個“地緣政治和外交攻勢”，其目的“無異於改寫當前的地緣政治格局，建立世界主導權”，這些觀點也成為美國政府的看法，將之視為。漆鹹樓很權威
As the BRI has developed over the years, projects have been largely scaled back, and the ones we’ve seen in the last few years tend to be more in touch with local conditions.
The PRC has learned these lessons, and is getting better at this kind of work. The BRI isn’t going anywhere (it’s Xi’s signature FP and is in the CCP constitution) and the liberal world would do well not to write it off due to a few early failures
注：《2018年度中國對外直接投資統計公報》顯示，2018年末，中國對外直接投資存量達1.98萬億美元。）中國金融機構以及中國發起成立的多邊開發機構亞投行在“一帶一路”沿線國家的貸款餘額約為3500億美元，其中絕大部分是貸給外國的主權機構
Bruno Maçães
China pulled its most brilliant coup when it convinced everyone in the West that the Belt and Road was about infrastructure
China pulled its most brilliant coup when it convinced everyone in the West that the Belt and Road was about infrastructure
Joke
Loans are not obviously predatory; secrecy is sometimes a condition
These include confidentiality clauses that prevent borrowers from revealing the terms of the loans, informal collateral arrangements that benefit Chinese lenders over other creditors and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructurings - dubbed by the authors as “no Paris Club” clauses, the report said. The contracts also give substantial leeway for China to cancel loans or accelerate repayment, it added.
Maria Adele Carrai is an assistant professor in global China studies at New York University Shanghai
肯尼亞鐵路，To critics, Kenya’s railway project represents another example of Chinese-owed debt and China’s growing influence in Africa. Indeed, many commentators point out that Kenya has an estimated $9 billion in China-financed debt — and note their concerns that a growing number of projects under China’s Belt and Road Initiative,
My research on two Chinese railway megaprojects in East Africa — the Nairobi-Mombasa line and Ethiopia’s Addis Ababa-Djibouti project — suggests the fears that China is upending development guidelines might be misplaced
I analyzed primary sources like Chinese government corporate social responsibility
Chinese government and state-owned enterprises have made CSR a priority, yet these two railway megaprojects show that implementation largely depends on local conditions, suggests insufficient Chinese government enforcement of CSR policies encourages Chinese organizations and enterprises to follow host-government guidelines. At times, this means Chinese companies resort to what I call “adaptive governance” 主要的問題是中企【如果發現東道主國的法律要求低過中國政府的，就】采用東道主國的，這是
Beijing has actively worked to increase CSR within Chinese state-owned enterprises and banks since the early 2000s. The central government, ever cognizant of its international reputation, has vigorously promoted higher standards for state-owned and private Chinese enterprises operating abroad. Hundreds of Chinese regulations and codes require Chinese companies to respect local customs and cultures, honor social responsibilities and protect labor and the environment. In both Kenya and Ethiopia, however, the impact of China’s national directives appears to be limited. Here’s what I found
肯尼亞由中交承包，埃塞俄比亞由中鐵承包
中交在肯尼亞做的不錯，群眾反應好，中鐵施工周期是兩倍，經營、財政都有問題
埃塞俄比的規矩就比較差，中鐵按照當地政府的要求，結果欠缺考慮，商業上也不成功。
That is part of a proposed $300 million "countering China's influence fund" pic.twitter.com/oQooWDG0mZ
— Tom Hancock (@hancocktom) April 11, 2021
Brussels responds to Podgorica’s request — and whether it will bail the country out of a project long deemed unviable — will help to shape the bloc’s relationship with the region.
“This is the first time that Montenegro or any other country from the western Balkans has made this type of outreach towards Brussels to combat rising Chinese influence."
Montenegro raised eyebrows in 2014 when it signed a deal with China’s ExIm Bank to finance 85 per cent of the cost of a road with a dollar-denominated loan worth almost $1bn. The first 41km section, a quarter of the total length, cost €20m per km, making it one of the most expensive highways per km in the world, said Spajic.
黑山共和國受惑，中國國企推銷，結果背上巨債，現在成了國際事件
Its decision has been scrutinised given that two separate feasibility studies, in 2006 and 2012, concluded that the highway was economically unviable. The government also signed a €54m contract with a Montenegrin-Chinese consortium for a thermal power plant just before it was ejected from office.
signed by the previous Montenegro government led by the Democratic Party of Socialists, which was ousted in August after 30 years in power.
胡說：
Observers said Montenegro’s plea was an opportunity for Brussels. “The EU should step in,” said Tena Prelec, a scholar at the University of Oxford who studies the region. “Montenegro is in the EU’s backyard: it would be, finally, a concrete way to show that the EU is indeed a player, a true geostrategic actor.”
Bruno Maçães, Dec 27, 2020
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
And this for me was the piece that least contributed to the debate, sending us back a few years in our understanding of what the Belt and Road is
Boston University interactive
推動各國加強政治互信、經濟互融、人文互通
堅持對話協商、共建共享、合作共贏、交流互鑒，同沿線國家謀求合作的最大公約數
中國國內也很混亂
Based on the observation of its implementation, Beijing’s official statements, and my own research, I would argue it is a constantly changing group of policy settings, which encompasses almost all the various clarifications
In practice, the piecemeal realization of BRI projects is determined by local governments and their related political and economic interests via diverse and time-consuming bilateral interaction with Beijing
Yufan Huang is a PhD candidate in the government department of Cornell University
Chinese banks offered African countries significant debt restructuring before the pandemic and have continued to do so
中國主動與債務國協商遠超出西方報道
The G-20 effort marks the first time China is participating in multilateral debt relief. As Africa’s largest bilateral creditor, China holds at least 21 percent of African debt — and payments to China account for nearly 30 percent of 2021’s debt service, as shown in the figure below.
西方： they are not relaxing repayment requirements. Likewise, bondholders, who are responsible for 19 percent of 2021’s debt service, have held back from providing any debt relief.
Our research at the Johns Hopkins SAIS China-Africa Research Initiative (CARI) suggests that China has played a significant role in helping African countries to manage their debt. We documented 16 cases of debt restructuring worth $7.5 billion in 10 African countries between 2000 and 2019
Our research found that Chinese lenders have not pursued lawsuits in cases of debt default. We also found no asset seizures.
中國不總是讓步，“國家機構”和“商業機構”的手段也不一樣，但會針對特殊情況，鬆動、靈活
標準：
Chinese President Xi Jinping’s signature foreign policy undertaking and the world’s largest infrastructure program, poses a significant challenge to U.S. economic, political, climate change, security, and global health interests
China has not been the primary driver behind rising debt risks in the Pacific, although a continuation of business as usual would risk future debt problems in several countries.
There is scope for a new Australian infrastructure financing facility to provide loans to the Pacific without causing debt problems, particularly as it has adopted key sustainable lending rules.
Pacific nations have an opportunity to obtain more favourable financing from official development partners but care must be taken to avoid overly geopolitical aid.
台灣凶：
“一帶一路”項目受到一些關於債務償還方麵的質疑，您如何看待“一帶一路”項目中的風險與質疑？”
海南大學“一帶一路”研究院院長梁海明
史誌欽清華大學“一帶一路”戰略研究院執行院長
How to frame something for what it is not
Trash #China is the thing. It works. It pays. It's a sport
https://theprint.in/economy/has-india-become-chinas-colony-seems-like-going-by-what-we-import-and-what-we-export/631656/
If this is to insult China, it will work. But it also insults @narendramodi
Great power competition doesn't have to be mean. But if one recalles
@PMOIndia
為什麽中國精英權貴都挺支持政府和習近平？因為精英權貴按定義就是既得利益者，既得利益就是在現有體製下得利，隻有極其理想主義者，近乎殉道那般執著的人才會對權利說不，結果正能量充斥一切輿論渠道，這跟美國的運作機製是一樣的，總統大肆吹捧減稅“給經濟帶來的好處”，而他自己陣營的隻盯著眼前的義憤，有意無意對減稅實質上損害自己的利益熟視無睹，
How Recipient Countries Shape China’s Belt and Road Initiative
Chatham House expose
This whole narrative misunderstands China and ignores the interests and agency of recipient countries
Sinologists have documented the reality of what they term fragmented authoritarianism, recounting fierce inter-agency rivalries and factionalism, which top leaders struggle to manage, even under Xi,
In reality, the idea of aggregating China’s long-standing infrastructure connectivity projects beneath a broad banner originated with the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC),
as party-state agencies jostled for resources.
Disbursements start with requests from abroad, not Chinese planners. The whole edifice—especially today, with growth slowing, profitability collapsing, and surplus capacity endemic—is skewed towards helping Chinese businesses expand overseas
* Asia Society report warns that Chinese officials’ ‘laissez-faire’ attitudes mean projects are not being properly vetted in Southeast Asia
Letter to the Editor: Why China Will NOT Seize the Port of Mombasa if Kenya Defaults on SGR Debt - The China Africa Project
首先關於“戰狼外交”，各方議論較多。給我們貼這個標簽，至少是對中國外交的誤解。要知道，中國從來就是禮儀之邦，以和為貴，從沒有主動挑釁別人，也沒有跑到別人家門口更沒有到別人家裏去挑事。現在恰恰是別人到我們家門口耀武揚威，對我們的家務事橫加幹涉，還喋喋不休地對我們進行辱罵抹黑，我們無路可退，不得不奮起自衛，堅定捍衛國家利益和尊嚴。顯而易見，“戰狼外交”實際上是“中國威脅論”的又一翻版，是又一個“話語陷阱”，目的就是要讓我們打不還手，罵不還口，放棄抗爭
中國在世界顯得很孤立，尤其是在發達國家圈子內顯得很孤立，日韓在地理上離中國這麽近，經濟極其密切，但在國際關係和文化上和中國的抵觸是很大的，民意對中國也不佳，可是中國並不這麽覺得：
有人說中國在國際上四麵樹敵。這不是事實。我們從來都是廣交朋友、廣結善緣，恰恰是個別大國為了打壓遏製中國，脅迫他國選邊站隊，製造非友即敵的“寒蟬效應”。但即使在這樣的情況下，中國的“朋友圈”並沒有變小，而是越來越大。許多發展中國家和友好人士頂住壓力同中國開展合作，在國際場合為我仗義執言。截至目前，有近170個國家和國際組織參與共建“一帶一路”，中方倡議的“亞投行”成員國已增加到103個。在今年的聯大三委會上，70多個國家以單獨或共同發言等方式支持我們，有力挫敗了個別國家借涉港、涉疆問題搞反華行動的圖謀。中國候選人高票當選國際法院法官和國際海洋法法庭法官。中國支持的聯合國新冠疫情決議以169比2高票通過。這些數字和事實都表明，中國站在曆史正確的一邊，合民心，順潮流，朋友遍天下
一帶一路債務陷阱和Iraq Production Sharing Agreement (PSA)
老的一帶一路
https://www.economist.com/briefing/2018/07/26/china-has-a-vastly-ambitious-plan-to-connect-the-world
一帶一路
一帶一路評估
還有這麽極端的
Brazilian vice-president: Embraer should now look to China
Nigerians living near a major Belt and Road project grew more positive toward China after it was completed
【16】
2020年2月，北大方正被北京法院裁定進行破產重組，集團總資產超3600億，一共負債3029.51億元
一、瘋狂舉債，不斷跨界收購，企業資產負債率甚至高於地產行業
二、內鬥不斷，“IT企業中內鬥最激烈的地方”
【17】
隻有中國阿Q才不在乎
民主：
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2021-03-16/yields-have-a-long-way-to-go-before-they-sting-yellen-s-treasury
中國陰謀論
戰狼是為了國內愛國情緒
Quantity has not meant quality. The narratives Beijing is pushing are a web of contradictions. One line seeks to justify government actions by citing terrorism in the region. Another spouts a clumsy moral equivalence with the west’s human rights record. At the same time, diplomats and state media push the “nothing to see here” narrative, churning out images of the sweeping landscapes of “#AmazingXinjiang” as if to say: “How could something so beautiful be bad?”
【18】
英國在想什麽？
英國難以解釋的怪象：
英脫歐後雙邊貿易受到巨大打擊
德國尤其嚴重
【19】
新加坡、南韓：不會在美中之間站隊
東盟
【20】伊朗作為例子。阿富汗
除了伊朗，中國還要主持以巴談判，土耳其-伊朗-巴基斯坦戰線，防美、印
https://twitter.com/yarbatman/status/1380135419464015872
【21】
對於強調價值的人來說，自由是人類最關鍵的價值，高於愛情生命。研究政治哲學的人很清楚，自由與資本主義結合起來就意味著對資本家來說自由就必須是個普世價值，普世價值的潛台詞是不僅我覺得這是最高價值，你也覺得這是最高價值，如果你不同意，那你也必須接受這是最高價值，這樣西方才能強迫其他國家開口通商，不幸的是對於被殖民的國家地區，所謂“講規則的國際秩序”真如楊潔篪所說的是“由少數人製定規則的國際秩序”，雙重標準是這規則的一部分，自由並不是倫理學的原則，而是一個政治概念，什麽是自由，怎麽自由，誰自由誰不自由，自然是指定規則的人說了算。
人愛自由這個出發點其實沒有錯，誰不愛？在中國除了官媒的觀點別人不能說話，這就難受，毀了十幾億大腦。問題是，一個自由的人有沒有責任去保證世界上所有的人都有自由，這是理解西方自由這一普世價值的關鍵，對西方來說，一個沒有自由的國家最終要威脅另一個自由的國家，所以隻要世界上隻有有不自由的國家，全人類就沒有解放，這種邏輯就是普世價值的威力，用自由武裝起來的資本界就有駕馭者帶有利炮的尖船把自由帶到五湖四海的動力，至於他們成了殖民者，倒是個意外，這種心態和基督徒布道引渡芸芸眾生皈依基督一模一樣。世界上還真難找到比白人更為你的靈魂操心的人。
當殖民殖到無地可殖之後，炮艦政策就不知道怎麽使了，但此時世界已經買入現代化，觀念成為主宰世界的機製，雖然民主與自由不總是兼容，推崇民主以保護自由成了新的使命，不過雖然威爾遜說這已經過百年了（Make the world safe for democracies）【1】，推行民主真正是在二戰後才開始的，那是美國確實是有實力了，而且二戰過程中美國精英屆達成一個共識，那就是美國必須以其強大的軍力控製全球，限製一切邪惡勢力的更生，如納粹主義，軍國主義，後來加上共產主義，來推行自己的體製，因為自己的體製代表自由和和平，從此，美帝國世界秩序（Pax Americana）就成了自由，平等，和平，繁榮的同義詞，加上聯合國在美國指導下通過的人權宣言，美國精神傳遍世界，隻是後來蘇聯太邪惡，玷汙的純潔的美國人，使得美國不得不使用政變、暗殺、酷刑、鎮壓、幹預內政，戰爭這種人類最野蠻、殘酷的手段，慢慢也墮落了。
【1】其實威爾遜的動機遠沒那麽高尚，隻是覺得民主國之間不打仗，所以民主好，隻是
【22】
【23】美國的朝貢體係（論文）
【24】記錄
https://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/66653/202101/4758.html
https://blog.wenxuecity.com/myblog/66653/202103/16552.html
（此圖是複合圖）
中國政府對新一代是用了洗腦教育，也管製信息流通，尤其是來自國外、西方的，但如果他們想“裏通國外”，還是能爬牆的，可爬出來發現西方“正值、進步”的媒體都是詆毀中國的言論，他們還有什麽選擇？
【26】股市泡沫
【27】中國債務
【28】香港，顏色革命
Support the Tropes — FAIR How media language encourages the left to support wars, coups and intervention
【中國人】
To come to America to become a "Chinese American" is meant to break with the past (China), embrace the present (America) & hope for (a better) future. To have come from a civilization is antithesis to being a free & cosmopolitan individual, or being American, where history means little, choice everything. The fantasy of entertainment and consumption is the new realism you settle on.
"This loss of history and crisis of civilization is not small", to cling to history is the rejection of the present, and as recognition the choice has been wrong
【Multiculturalism is just a word, "America" a dream. Such is the contradiction】
【新疆】光伏產業
【28】美國的永久戰
【29】霸權
【30】
美國被盜，間諜
【31】
看來美國維穩費用遠高於中國（incarceration $81.3 billion, FBI $9.9 billion, DHS $52 billion）
習近平內循環的餿主意：維穩1.5萬億
【32】疫苗
【33】月光族
【34】新疆種族滅絕
The US has applied the label "genocide" to both the Ottoman massacre of Armenians during WWI & China's repression of Uyghurs in Xinjiang.
— Fareed Zakaria (@FareedZakaria) April 25, 2021
Is the term being used correctly?
My conversation today w/ @philippesands, a leading authority on the concept: pic.twitter.com/zkEEwarfV0
人口
人才爭奪戰：很多極其有才的人願意留在西方
“The solution to have more American students pursue STEM studies is magical thinking,” says Peter Cowhey
Cotton, Hawly, Carlson
人口不會對中國增長帶來巨大的打擊
美國
【35】2020軍費
【美國經濟】
【】未分
中國的電動汽車行業和戰略，電池
the government told auto makers they would only qualify for subsidies if they used batteries from a list of approved suppliers, which included dozens of Chinese firms but excluded foreign ones
“The price is high, and the service is slow”
In June, Beijing announced plans to scrap its controversial restrictions on foreign EV batteries and reopen its market to the big Korean and Japanese players
為什麽香港暴動不是串通國外的顛覆罪？（Nury Vittachi）
美國三大媒體評論武漢封城周年
武漢封城周年，美國三大媒體這麽說
六人采訪
送貨小哥
沒想到這突如其來的疫情，竟然造成了大家都說謝謝的局麵。我當時就震驚了。對專家、學者、名人等人不是很尊重嗎？怎麽會去找一個送餐員呢？這讓我很高興。現在，一切又回到了去年的樣子。這就是人性。
對很多人來說，武漢基本恢複了正常，大部分居民都想繼續前進。20多歲的宋飛飛在武漢著名的江漢長廊邊的一家小吃店工作，她認為封鎖是值得的。
"禁閉也沒那麽糟，除了沒有自由。隻要給我們上網，我們這些年輕人就可以永遠呆在家裏了。"她暗暗開玩笑說。
不過，這一切都取決於問誰。對於數以千計的居民來說，封鎖帶來的身體和情感上的痕跡依然存在。
"我最大的遺憾就是把他送進了醫院。至少在家裏，他可以有東西吃，有人照顧他。"鍾先生對NPR說。"現在一想到他，我的心就疼得受不了。"
鍾要求隻用她的姓氏，因為當局已經逮捕了記錄地方政府如何在疫情發生時努力提供護理的人。
其他說出什麽的人也被關進了監獄。律師轉為博客的張展，上個月因 "編造謊言 "被判處4年監禁。
"一開始我覺得，這個病毒有什麽嚴重的？為什麽要鎖城？看了這個方斌的視頻，才知道事情有多嚴重！"一位在封鎖期間送醫療用品和食品的武漢誌願者回憶說。他還要求匿名。
很多健康專家表示，武漢封鎖應該更早開始，會減緩病毒的傳播。這位誌願者說，盡管如此，他還是不能原諒它給城市居民帶來的代價--他認為其他中國公民沒有把握住這種代價："封鎖造成了醫療資源的枯竭和恐慌感。許多患有冠狀病毒以外疾病的人因此無法得到治療，在封鎖期間死亡。"
當然不能說它們一點正麵的都沒有，也不能說這隻是西方片麵，“責任全在對方”。
【後記】
謹防中國版本的“歐債危機” ——中國地方政府債務風險分析及化解之道
殷劍峰 王蔣薑 國家金融與發展實驗室
殷劍峰 王蔣薑 國家金融與發展實驗室
台灣對大陸的出口順差占台灣總產值的近三分之一
中非自貿先例？
揭黑
China clamps down in hidden hunt for coronavirus origins (apnews.com)（Dake Kang on Twitter: "NEW: After Beijing announced the virus was spreading in Jan, Chinese scientists rushed to publish papers. Then, the tide slowed to a trickle. Now, documents obtained by @AP show this happened b/c President Xi ordered new restrictions on COVID-19 research. https://t.co/k0lUaQjKmZ" / Twitter）
《經濟學人》
Year in review: China - How the pandemic strengthened the Chinese Communist party | China | The Economist【絕對是所有描述中國，尤其是中國政府（共產黨）的，必須用貶義，否定的詞匯和語氣】
The great mall of China - Why retailers everywhere should look to China | Leaders | The Economist【相對正麵，也許事實太難否定了】
矛盾的
一讀
US President Joe Biden's administration has doubled down on the claim that China is mounting a genocide against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. But it has offered no proof, and unless it can, the State Department should withdraw the charge and support a UN-based investigation of the situation in Xinjiang.
今昨天美國四月就業報告公布之前，美國的預測是這次一定火爆，過百萬個新崗位，但結果卻大失所望，隻有26萬：
過去一年新崗位數目
過去一年因為房產和裝修讓木材價格衝天而去，大家一直以為建築業很火：
結果房產業毫無起色，而製造業還收縮了：
餐飲旅遊業盡管有不少新的崗位，但遠遠未能恢複到疫情前的水平：
到此離疫情前還有一千萬（官方數字略低，八百萬左右）崗位尚未恢複：
官方失業率是6.1%，實際大約7.6%：
雖然男女總的失業率大體一致：
但投入到勞工大軍的婦女則遠低於男子，這個月崗位又少了64000人：
注：勞工參與率與適齡（priem age）勞工參與率不同
什麽原因讓大家大跌眼鏡？
首先這不是因為沒崗位，招工已經恢複到疫情前水平，大家的信心也恢複了：
領取失業救濟的人數也大幅降低：
工資也日趨穩定：
代表資方和市場經濟把矛頭直指政府，不就是你們福利太好了，大家呆在家裏跟找工作待遇一樣，幹嘛上班，美國商會還專門發表聲明，讓政府把每周300元補助給撤了【6】，這是在每人到手的1400元疫情救濟和正常失業金之外額外的，這麽多錢，最低工資又沒變，難怪大家不願意幹髒活累活險活。這麽多錢也是美國貿易赤字又創新高的原因【8】。不過政府黨媒的說法就不同，政府說目前有三個難題，一是照顧孩子，主要落在婦女頭上（所以那麽多婦女幹脆不找了），二是擔心冠疫，三是冠疫打擊下不知道下輩子是不是還接著幹同樣的活。《紐時》【9】《華郵》【10】提到雇主等著招人，就是招不到，但這些雇主都不願意漲工資，這裏說的是社會底層，美國平均工資是每小時30（美元），不低，但售貨員服務員參觀招待那些則低得多，但總的說一場“百年不遇大變局”對資方並沒有什麽影響，資方對拜登上台後帶動的社會主義（國家資本主義）變革也不以為然，可是大家真的願意拿著最低工資去幹那些挨罵受氣的髒活累活險活嗎？
在美國，教育、育兒和醫療成了大家最大的負擔【11】，刨去通脹，過去25年居住飛鷹增加了14%，育兒增加了49%：
大家記得基本工資基本上沒漲，所以育兒成了家庭一個大負擔，尤其是低收入家庭：
美國的這種負擔，源於政府一直不願意提供這類福利，在發達國家中，美國政府對家庭提供的援助幾乎是最低的【12】：
總育兒費用：
這種負擔絕大部分是落在媽媽身上。育兒教育的負擔，給美國人口帶來的壓力與中國無異，美國的出生率達到二戰後的新低【13】：
《華郵》引用皮尤的一項民調，三分之二的人覺得人生不易，不再想幹同樣的工作了，更不想拿最低工資，而美國的大企業，尤其是製造業，則在加速自動化，可見冠疫讓大家都有新的，各自的打算，而拜登當局“重新偉大”的宏圖顯然打動了低收入的群體，如果政府能提供基本福利，那真的，為什麽去幹髒活累活險活？拜登希望改變勞工的地位，卻無法通過最低工資法，隻能給大家提供福利，這又促使大家加大對政府的期望，最終對美國經濟的影響和政治的影響，還很難預料。
【資料】
NEW YORK/LONDON – The US government needlessly escalated its rhetoric against China by claiming that a genocide is being mounted against the Uighur people in the Xinjiang region. Such a grave charge matters, as genocide is rightly considered “the crime of crimes.” Many pundits are now calling for a boycott of the 2022 Winter Olympics in Beijing, dubbing them the “Genocide Olympics.”
The genocide charge was made on the final day of Donald Trump’s administration by then-Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, who made no secret of his belief in lying as a tool of US foreign policy. Now President Joe Biden’s administration has doubled down on Pompeo’s flimsy claim, even though the State Department’s own top lawyers reportedly share our skepticism regarding the charge.
This year’s State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (HRP) follows Pompeo in accusing China of genocide in Xinjiang. Because the HRP never uses the term other than once in the report’s preface and again in the executive summary of the China chapter, readers are left to guess about the evidence. Much of the report deals with issues like freedom of expression, refugee protection, and free elections, which have scant bearing on the genocide charge.
There are credible charges of human rights abuses against Uighurs, but those do not per se constitute genocide. And we must understand the context of the Chinese crackdown in Xinjiang, which had essentially the same motivation as America’s foray into the Middle East and Central Asia after the September 2001 attacks: to stop the terrorism of militant Islamic groups.
As the Hong Kong-based businessman and writer Weijian Shan has recounted, China experienced repeated terrorist attacks in Xinjiang during the same years that America’s flawed response to 9/11 led to repeated US violations of international law and massive bloodshed. Indeed, until late 2020, the US classified the Uighur East Turkestan Islamic Movement as a terrorist group, battled Uighur fighters in Afghanistan, and held many as prisoners. In July 2020, the United Nations noted the presence of thousands of Uighur fighters in Afghanistan and Syria.
The charge of genocide should never be made lightly. Inappropriate use of the term may escalate geopolitical and military tensions and devalue the historical memory of genocides such as the Holocaust, thereby hindering the ability to prevent future genocides. It behooves the US government to make any charge of genocide responsibly, which it has failed to do here.
Genocide is defined under international law by the UN Genocide Convention (1948). Subsequent judicial decisions have clarified its meaning. Most countries, including the United States, have incorporated the Convention’s definition into their domestic legislation without any significant alteration. In the past few decades, the leading UN courts have confirmed that the definition requires proof to a very high standard of the intentional physical destruction of a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group.
The definition specifies that one of five acts must be perpetrated. Obviously, killing tops the list. The State Department’s report on China says there were “numerous reports” of killings, but that “few or no details were available,” and cites only one case – that of a Uighur man detained since 2017 who died of natural causes, according to the authorities. The report doesn’t even explain why the official explanation should be questioned.
Technically, genocide can be proven even without evidence that people were killed. But because courts require proof of intent to destroy the group physically, it is hard to make the case in the absence of proof of large-scale killings. This is especially true when there is no direct evidence of genocidal intent, for example in the form of policy statements, but merely circumstantial evidence, what international courts refer to as a “pattern of conduct.”
International courts have repeatedly said that where genocide charges are based only upon inferences drawn from a pattern of conduct, alternative explanations must be ruled out definitively. That’s why the International Court of Justice rejected in 2015 the genocide charge against Serbia and the counter-charge against Croatia, despite evidence of brutal ethnic cleansing in Croatia.
So, what else might constitute evidence of genocide in China? The State Department report refers to mass internment of perhaps one million Uighurs. If proven, that would constitute a gross violation of human rights; but, again, it is not evidence, per se, of intent to exterminate.
Another of the five recognized acts of genocide is “imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group.” The State Department report refers to China’s notoriously aggressive birth-control policies. Until recently, China strictly enforced its one-child policy on the majority of its population but was more liberal toward ethnic minorities, including the Uighur.
Today, the one-child policy is no longer applied to the majority Han Chinese, but stricter measures have been imposed on Xinjiang’s Muslim minority, whose families are traditionally larger than China’s average. Still, Xinjiang records a positive overall population growth rate, with the Uighur population growing faster than the non-Uighur population in Xinjiang during 2010-18.
The genocide charge is being fueled by “studies” like the Newlines Institute report that recently made global headlines. Newlines is described as a “non-partisan” Washington, DC-based think tank. On closer inspection, it appears to be a project of a tiny Virginia-based university with 153 students, eight full-time faculty, and an apparently conservative policy agenda. Other leading human rights organizations have refrained from using the term.
UN experts are rightly calling for the UN to investigate the situation in Xinjiang. China’s government, for its part, has recently stated that it would welcome a UN mission to Xinjiang based on “exchanges and cooperation,” not on “guilty before proven.”
Unless the State Department can substantiate the genocide accusation, it should withdraw the charge. It should also support a UN-led investigation of the situation in Xinjiang. The work of the UN, and notably of UN Human Rights Special Rapporteurs, is essential to promote the letter and spirit of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.