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Brad Setser 習近平讓全世界為中國的錯誤買單
習近平讓全世界為中國的錯誤買單
Xi Is Making the World Pay for China’s Mistakes
President Trump’s readiness to use coercive tariffs presents a profound threat to the postwar economic and political order, introducing an unpredictability to global commerce that makes it difficult for trade partners to know how to react — and next to impossible for businesses to plan.
But he is not the only danger the world economy faces and may not even be the biggest. That may be President Xi Jinping of China, whose more strategic and calibrated industrial and economic policies are fundamentally distorting and harming global trade.
Trade usually refers to the combination of imports and exports. But Mr. Xi has upended that idea, radically changing China’s trade interaction with the rest of the world, at least when it comes to manufactured goods. Over the past six years, China’s imports of such goods increased by an average of only $15 billion a year, essentially no change at all when inflation is taken into account. Its manufactured exports, on the other hand, have grown more than 10 times as fast, by over $150 billion a year. When it comes to manufactured goods, trade with China is virtually a one-way street.
China now dominates global manufacturing, and its trade surplus dwarfs the biggest run by Germany and Japan during their eras of postwar export supremacy. Countries around the world get cheap Chinese products, but they can’t sell nearly as many of their own to China. Their export sectors are hurting — see Germany — and not hiring.
China’s growing trade surplus in manufactured goods
The value of China’s trade surplus in manufactured goods now dwarfs that of the export champions of the 1990s.
Sources: Brad Setser, Council on Foreign Relations; Volkmar Baur
Note: Data for China is available beginning in 1994. Data for Germany and Japan is available through 2023.
Why is Mr. Xi doing this? To make up for the Chinese government’s mismanagement of its domestic economy.
The roots of the problem go back to the global financial crisis of 2008. The crisis caused Chinese exports to fall. The government could have offset this by strengthening the ability of Chinese consumers to buy the country’s products through policies that support household incomes and by reducing the hefty taxes on low-wage workers and domestic consumption that finance China’s state. This would have helped China transition to a more sustainable economic model that is balanced among industry, trade, investment and consumer spending.
Chinese leaders opted instead to funnel the country’s huge household savings into an immense investment boom. New bridges, roads and, above all, apartments were built, and all of that construction and related economic activity allowed China to rely a bit less on exports for growth. But this created a real estate bubble, and when Mr. Xi responded by cracking down on the housing sector in 2020, he triggered a deep property slump that has persisted.
Mr. Xi’s response to the Covid pandemic also played a role. To cushion the pandemic’s economic shock, advanced economies around the world opened up their government checkbooks to support consumer spending. The one major economy that didn’t take significant steps to stimulate its economy and support households was the country where the virus first took hold: China. He is ideologically opposed to cutting government checks or anything else that smacks of welfarism, believing that consumer stimulus — unlike investment — generates no lasting value. So while consumers in the United States and elsewhere began spending again, including on Chinese imports, China was able to recover on the back of other countries’ stimulus checks while throwing everything into building out its manufacturing sector to replace the growth that property wasn’t providing.
In other words, Mr. Xi is making China’s trade partners and competitors pay for the government’s misplaced bet on real estate and its longer-term failure to strengthen the spending of Chinese households.
China does import commodities and natural resources, such as oil and iron ore, as well as advanced semiconductors that it hasn’t figured out how to engineer. But China’s dominance in manufacturing and exports cannot be overstated.
Take automobiles, the anchor of so many industrialized countries’ manufacturing sectors for the past century. Around 20 years ago, China was a nonfactor in automaking. By 2018, it had the capacity to produce 40 million gasoline-powered cars per year, far more than the 25 million its economy needed. Since then, it has added, thanks in part to substantial government subsidies for the industry, the capacity to make 20 million electric vehicles annually, a number that may soon rise to 30 million. Annual global automotive demand is 90 million cars; China has the capacity to produce around two-thirds of that.
This pattern is replicated in sector after sector. China routinely produces more than half of the global supply of steel, more than half of the world’s aluminum and more than half of the world’s ships. In clean technology sectors such as solar cells and batteries, China can produce many multiples of current global demand, and there are fears that it could replicate these successes in memory and automotive chips. What’s more, China has partly made up for the fall in domestic steel demand (caused by the housing implosion) by subsidizing the building and equipping of new factories that use domestic steel in churning out yet more manufactured exports for overseas markets.
All told, Chinese export volume is growing three times as fast as global trade. This means China’s success is directly coming at the expense of manufacturers in other countries, which increasingly cannot compete and face pressure to abandon sectors that China targets. With China’s real estate market still in the doldrums, the pattern shows no signs of changing. This points to a world economy in which China has no need for the industrial inputs of other countries while leaving those countries dependent on Chinese-made goods — and vulnerable to Beijing’s political and economic pressure.
Mr. Trump’s tariffs compound the problem. It isn’t so much the tariffs themselves that pose a threat. Even a big change in U.S. policy such as the universal 10 percent tariff on imports that he proposed during the presidential campaign probably wouldn’t fundamentally upset global trade, as long as he stopped there. American consumers would face higher prices, and U.S. exporters would face retaliation from other countries. But the United States would continue to import a great deal, manufacturers around the world could fill some of the markets lost by U.S. exporters, and trading partners could plan for it all.
But Mr. Trump’s unpredictability makes that kind of planning extremely difficult. And if he cuts the United States off from world trade, there are no other countries that can reasonably absorb all of China’s exports. Europe’s economy is stalled, and big emerging economies like India and Brazil are worried that Chinese imports are undercutting their manufacturing sectors. Without the outlet that global markets provide, China would be stuck. The only way out would be for Mr. Xi to make the sort of fundamental changes to China’s economy that he seems dead set against.
Mr. Xi has a one-way vision of trade. Mr. Trump often sounds as if he doesn’t believe in any trade. Between the two of them, the global economy is in for a rough ride.
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Brad Setser is a senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of the “Follow the Money” blog. He previously served as a senior adviser to the United States trade representative and a deputy assistant secretary at the Treasury Department, among other U.S. government positions.
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