Chas Freeman 美國如何勾結他國苟延殘喘

查斯·弗裏曼：我們對中國撒的謊

Chas Freeman: The Lies We Tell Ourselves About China

Glenn Diesen 2025年5月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiMU8-0Id1I

查斯·弗裏曼認為，美國對中國撒的謊，最終導致自身傷害，因為合作的機會被浪費，衝突被不必要地引發。

大家好，歡迎來到今天的節目。我最喜歡的嘉賓之一查茲·弗裏曼曾任國防部國際安全事務助理部長，也被稱為前美國駐沙特阿拉伯大使。不過，今天的話題……嗯，很有意思的是，他曾擔任美國國務院中國事務主管，也曾在基辛格開放中國的時候與他共事。所以，嗯，歡迎回到節目，謝謝你，很高興和你在一起。格倫，稍微更正一下，我……我寫了基辛格1971年秘密訪問北京所依賴的文件，我記得是1971年6月9日、7月9日至11日，去北京的，但我當時沒有隨行。嗯，我沒有肚子疼，也沒有去巴基斯坦的山上避難，然後飛去別的地方。嗯，嗯，盡管如此，我認為這段經曆非常重要。嗯，我想，在那個年代，中國的開放顯然有一個明確的目的，就是打破分裂。蘇聯和中國，還有呃，你知道，美國和中國之間的工作關係，呃，達成的協議，比如“一個中國”政策，所有這些都為美國和中國之間的和平與合作奠定了基礎。呃，呃，是的，今天我想和你們討論的話題是美中之間日益加劇的競爭。到目前為止，它主要集中在經濟領域，但當然可能會升級，呃，希望不要升級到軍事領域。呃，但我認為最好先問一個開放或寬泛的問題，也就是呃，呃，你抱怨說，美國對中國往往缺乏了解，這就是為什麽我們經常陷入刻板印象。你認為當今對中國的主要誤解是什麽？美國政界對中國有哪些不了解？

Chas Freeman

從哪裏開始呢？呃，錯覺和誤解的數量相當多，嗯，不幸的是當然，現在的美國人相當孤立，嗯，我記得在《二戰》的結尾，著名的戰地記者阿諾·德博斯告訴我，1947年，美國大約有2700名外國記者，而當時的報業非常分散，幾乎每家報紙都有自己的外國記者，美國人對世界形勢非常了解，嗯，今天，美國隻有不到100名外國記者，這就是為什麽當你聽到新聞時，如果是關於國外的事情，你可能聽到的是BBC特約記者或其他人的消息，嗯，所以我們對世界形勢了解得不是很多，我們的學校不再教授地理，人們開玩笑說，美國人是通過與任何國家打仗來學習地理的，嗯，嗯，嗯，但主要是，我們經曆了一係列階段，我們進行了有限的合作，目的有限，完全是出於地緣政治考慮，嗯，中國已經和蘇聯分裂了他們麵臨著來自莫斯科的壓力，蘇聯在20世紀60年代末確實存在著先發製人的入侵中國的危險，當時雙方發生了實際的戰鬥，尼克鬆總統明智地意識到我們可以爭取中國的支持來遏製蘇聯，我們也這麽做了，這並非偶然，也許中國在某種程度上是一個受保護的國家，就像二戰期間我們支持中國政府對抗日本一樣，主要不是因為我們指望中國能打敗日本，而是我們希望中國能牽製住大量的日本軍隊，否則這些軍隊可能會被部署到其他地方，所以這是一個戰略舉措，中國的繼續獨立對我們來說具有戰略重要性，冷戰時期也是如此，但是當冷戰結束，蘇聯解體，柏林牆倒塌後，我們就不再有共同的敵人了，同時，我認為關鍵的一年是1989年，柏林牆當然，柏林牆在十一月倒塌了。六月份，北京天安廣場發生了學生和工人起義，這場起義被武力鎮壓，徹底摧毀了美中關係。最終，那一年也是台灣不再是列寧主義獨裁政權，成為民主國家的一年。

所以，我們突然有三股力量引導我們走向對中國的反感。

地緣政治上合作的理由顯然消失了。意識形態上，泰貝和北京之間的平等關係消失了，因為泰貝不再是列寧主義者，而北京仍然是列寧主義者。當然，反共產主義的影響仍然存在。遏製，嗯，朝鮮戰爭和越南戰爭的經曆，所有這些事情仍然伴隨著我們，所以嗯，我相信，由於缺乏描述關係的詳細詞匯，我們在外交關係方麵受到了束縛，嗯，我已經了解了其中一些，聯盟是無條件地承諾在有條件的偶然關係中相互援助，這種關係設想某種有限的合作，也許是在有限的時間內，嗯，客戶國基本上嗯，從嗯，為他們的其他國家提供更大的特權和特權中獲得保護，嗯，許多國際關係隻是在平等的基礎上給予和接受，非常具有交易性，但是當你談到競爭或對抗的種類時，嗯，我認為有四種，首先是你提到的競爭，嗯，我會非常謹慎地使用這個詞，因為我認為它基本上意味著一種良性競爭，在這種競爭中，你試圖通過提高自己來超越對方，這就像去參加田徑比賽，如果你嗯你在跑道上奔跑，你打敗了對方，其他人，那是因為你訓練得更好，你身體更強壯，你跑得更快，不是因為他們更弱，或者其他什麽原因，也不是因為你破壞了他們，因為呃呃，在競爭之後，嗯，我們有，嗯，我們有，嗯，我所說的對抗性對抗，就是你試圖通過在跑道上絆倒或打斷對方來取勝，不是通過超越自己，而是通過傷害對方，使其無法匹敵你，然後最後，如果你，嗯，如果你把這種狀態發揮到極致，你就變成了你，你進入了敵意的境界，你的目標是消滅對方，嗯，我們在冷戰中看到過，受核交換恐懼的製約，所以我們與中國的處境是，我們已經經曆了整個過程，嗯，從二戰中的受保護國地位，到冷戰期間在阿富汗的軍事合作，反對蘇聯占領時期，嗯，交易關係競爭，非常良性競爭，現在我們處於對抗性對抗狀態，我們的目標是，如果可能的話，壓製中國，將其擊退，嗯，這當然是不可能的，因為我們的能力有限，而中國正在獨自推進，所以我很抱歉，回複得這麽冗長，但嗯，這是一種非常戰略性、非常複雜的關係，我們剛剛看到，嗯，美國和中國進行了嚴重的經濟戰，然後顯然，嗯，緊張局勢有所緩和，如果你願意的話，可以限製一天，但這不是停火，我們沒有放棄對抗，嗯，這不是停火，我們不會停止，嗯，互相采取措施，嗯，這隻是降低對抗的強度，同時，我們正在看看是否能夠達成某種長期諒解，嗯，結束貿易戰，或者至少將其限製在一定範圍內，某種軍備控製協議，如果你會的，嗯，但我們不是，你知道特朗普政府把這描繪成其極限施壓策略的重大勝利。這不是，嗯，中國人不想要關稅，他們進行了報複，嗯，美國現在已經讓步了，我很感謝你區分競爭和對抗，因為它做得很好。我非常支持美國的產業政策，也對它抱有希望，希望它能夠加強其技術主權和競爭力。但還有別的事情，那就是，如果這足夠了，我認為美國可以慢慢來，逐步建設，是的，重新工業化所有我認為應該做的事情，但似乎很多這些政策都過度了，因為目標不僅僅是提高競爭力，而且正如你所說，也要打破中國，所以這似乎超出了競爭的範圍，但是，他們需要打破中國，這是否與意識形態有關，還是那麽，世界觀是什麽呢？因為如果美國願意與中國平等分享舞台，那麽美國就可以采取更溫和的產業政策，重建自身實力，而不必再次打斷中國的膝蓋。這是否與意識形態有關？你如何解釋這種關係中對主導地位的需求？我認為，這一切的驅動力是失去主導地位所帶來的心理困擾。大約在1870年，美國成為世界最大經濟體。在20世紀，我們逐步成為世界主導的
政治和軍事力量，以及主導的金融力量，並且長期以來一直是經濟強國。現在我們看到中國，如果你用適當的標準來衡量兩國的GDP，比較標準是購買力平價，而不是名義匯率，因為名義匯率會波動，而且代表著外部因素。那麽，中國的中國的經濟規模已經比我們大了三分之一，嗯，它生產了超過世界三分之一的製成品，我們現在隻生產大約15%，嗯，嗯，它深深植根於二戰後的布雷頓森林體係，嗯，比如我們已經退出的世界貿易組織，所以我們麵臨著一個諷刺的局麵：中國人一邊捍衛我們創造的世界秩序，一邊試圖對其進行一些調整，嗯，當然，以利於他們自己，嗯，我們的行為具有破壞性，嗯，嗯，在這種情況下，嗯，我們不理會《聯合國憲章》和國際法，我們破壞了世界貿易組織，當我們不喜歡全球多數派的決定時，我們退出了各種聯合國專門機構，嗯，我們變得越來越孤立，而中國則越來越參與其中，所以這就是正在發生的事情，嗯，為了恢複競爭力，我認為這是一個非常合適的目標，我認為我們必須認識到一些經濟現實，首先，工業領域發生的事情與農業領域發生的事情完全一樣，所以1900年，我不知道挪威的情況，但在1900年的美國，大約80%的人口從事農業生產，呃，現在隻有不到1%，而我們生產的糧食比以往任何時候都多，呃，那是因為資本已經取代了勞動力，也就是說，人們變得更有生產力，因為他們 實現了農業機械化，嗯，農業機械化也帶來了科學和紅色，更抗病的優良品種等等，從而帶來了更高的產量，嗯，動物種群也是如此，嗯，所以，嗯，工業領域正在發生的事情和我說的完全一樣，1980年，%的人從事農業，15%左右從事工業，5%從事所謂的 服務業，這是一個非常模糊的類別，但如果你看看現在的情況，你會發現，農業領域不到1%，工業領域占8%，這相當於125年前的一半，嗯，還有
嗯，自動化和機器人技術嗯，各種各樣的生產管理技術從亨利·福特發明的流水線開始，嗯，嗯，然後，經過多個階段，美國工人的生產力大大提高，嗯，到目前為止，生產更多商品所需的人力更少，實際上，我們的產量比以往任何時候都多，但我們的就業行業正在下滑，最後，我們現在有，所以是91，讓我們看看，嗯，15，也就是8%，1%，嗯，也就是91%的人從事所謂的服務業，這基本上是一個毫無意義的類別，
嗯，需要經濟學家重新審視，他們在20世紀30年代發明了這個類別，GDP也急需理論上的
重新審視，嗯，所以我們看到中國也發生了同樣的事情，
農業勞動力正在迅速減少，工業勞動力正在減少，
工業就業崗位正在減少，嗯，我們現在看到中國年輕人失業，
那些接受過工業經濟教育的人現在不再需要它們了。
那麽，這一切的意義何在？美國正在發生的事情，引發了……大量的焦慮和不滿。我們……而不是……去探究這些與進步息息相關的根源，……我們……責怪外國人。那麽，誰才是最適合指責中國的外國人呢？為什麽？因為我們……有反華情緒的曆史，我們有在冷戰時期遏製中國的曆史，而中國是由……一個自稱共產黨的組織統治的。我們都知道，我們想象，如果你見過一個……共產黨員，你就見過他們。所有發表關於……中國和共產主義等等言論的人，他們既沒有見過中國人，也沒有去過中國……他們也從未見過……任何類型的共產黨員，除了反華的越南人，因此，盡管他們的……意識形態被誤導，但他們仍然是好人。所以，有很多因素導致了這種情況，但歸根結底，……我們對中國的看法非常扭曲，新聞報道不足。呃
我們媒體的編輯政策存在偏見，嗯，政治建製
把中國當成了首選的敵人，嗯，所以我們處於一個非常奇怪的境地。
如果你誤解了你的競爭對手，你就無法擁有有效的政策談判地位或
競爭，而我們
從根本上來說也是如此。除此之外，嗯，你提到了產業政策。
中國人已經製定出了一種非常有效的產業政策模式，
基本上，嗯，依賴於政策性銀行。
銀行通過放貸來支持國家目標，所以嗯，你知道，當你在某種程度上這樣做的時候，你會遇到一些奇怪的事情。嗯，例如，一家中國公司
在“一帶一路”倡議下收購了意大利輪胎製造商倍耐力的大部分股份，
因為它能夠將其描繪成與“一帶一路”有某種關聯。嗯，我覺得這有點牽強，
但顯然其中一家政策性銀行準備通過貸款來支持它，所以你嗯
基本上就是戴英的想法，嗯，如果你想要過河，你得有個目標，你得告訴別人，呃，你得過河，我不在乎怎麽做，嗯，如果你到了那裏從經濟角度來說，這很值得，所以他想出了摸著石頭過河的主意，嗯，中國人就是這麽做的。他們宣布了一個目標，比如說我們需要一個電力經濟，呃，我們需要呃，可再生能源，呃，他們說，如果你投資這些東西，我們會在經濟上支持你。結果就是，你知道，超過50%的在建水力發電項目在中國，70%的在建太陽能發電項目在中國，風能發電也類似，當然，中國在電動汽車方麵也處於領先地位，在高壓輸電係統方麵也處於領先地位，在……呃，電力生產效率等方麵也處於領先地位。我還可以舉其他例子，因為中國現在……在……呃，絕大多數……技術領域都處於領先地位，有些技術我們並不理解，我們想象出口管製……可以保護我們寶貴的體液不被中國人榨幹，如果你還記得奇異博士的愛……呃，他還活得好好的，在華盛頓的某個地方，嗯……呃，即使基辛格去世了，嗯，我本來想說，
把國內問題歸咎於外國勢力的傾向，如今在歐洲也經常看到，但嗯，我以為你們把所有問題都歸咎於瑞典人，
嗯，嗯，現在更多是指向俄羅斯人，嗯，嗯，嗯，對我來說，美國民族主義的獨特之處在於，它與世界各地的民族主義不同，因為民族主義往往以更醜陋的形式出現，嗯，看看你的偉大何時結束，嗯，它為什麽結束，誰應該受到責備，所以你回顧曆史，看看是誰奪走了你的偉大。我想，
美國民族主義一直以來的獨特之處在於，它通常非常積極，這是基於一種假設，即他最輝煌的日子就在前方，嗯，它看起來更溫和，更樂觀，嗯，但嗯，也許是因為美國一直在不斷強大，但現在當然相對衰落的美國似乎正在追隨所謂的歐洲道路，而我們當時所關注的是……你知道這個黃金時代是什麽時候，是誰奪走了它，然後中國被認定為……最終人們得出這樣的結論：……中國人搶走了我們的工作，不是外包，而是搶走了……但這確實引出了一個問題：……如果這對美國來說是一個挑戰，那麽……我們該如何……資本主義本身？鑒於官方說法是……中國是由……共產黨領導的，但……它是資本主義的……這種資本主義形式在很大程度上與19世紀的美國非常相似，非常工業化的資本主義，它限製……尋租者……尋求……和諧，確保社會不會成為自由市場的附屬物……你認為美國是否需要改變其資本主義本身的運作方式？如果是這樣，你認為中國是一個榜樣嗎？或者它不再適合美國？我不認為……中國為美國提供了一個典範，特別是因為它具有強烈的列寧主義特征，嗯，這與美國長期以來試圖效仿的歐洲啟蒙價值觀並不相容，而這些價值觀現在正被用來反對美國非常專製的總統製，嗯，所以我認為有些東西對中國有用，嗯，畢竟這是一個擁有15億人口的社會，嗯，以前從來沒有人真正有效地治理過這麽大的國家。中國人經曆過多次他們所謂的“一團亂麻”，無政府狀態，文化大革命就是一個最近的例子，嗯，他們非常重視秩序，嗯，如果我們有像中國人那樣的限製，我們也會這樣做。嗯，例如，嗯，美國的人口大約比中國人少1/4，但我們的農業用地是中國人的四倍，嗯，他們擁有世界7%的供水量，嗯，我們大約有25%的供水量。 27% 我們擁有極好的自然資源。
我們的鄰居，正如俾斯麥所說，嗯，北邊是溫順有禮的加拿大人，南邊是無憂無慮的墨西哥人。他們倆都對美國構成威脅，嗯，反正他們也沒有。我們正在努力解決這個問題。嗯，嗯，我們東西邊的鄰居是魚。嗯，你知道，中國與14個國家接壤，多年來與這些國家發生過多次衝突。嗯，在過去的一千年裏，中國有600年被外國人統治，所以這是一段非常不同的曆史。如果我們的耕地與人口比例和中國一樣，那麽美國就會有40億人，其中大多數可能在加利福尼亞。所以我不太擔心，因為我在
東海岸。嗯，嗯，所以，嗯，即使你
不了解曆史，這些也是差異。我認為我們誤解了東亞的曆史，嗯，就歐洲模式而言，歐洲是最血腥的大陸緊隨其後的是印度次大陸。嗯，它們都是歐亞大陸的延伸，擁有多種語言、文化等等，相互碰撞，形成了交戰國。嗯，中國在前基督教時代經曆過那段時期，但它已經度過了那段時期。東亞的情況從未像歐洲那樣。嗯，各國都向中國屈服，因為中國的規模、知識和科學實力、繁榮昌盛以及良好的治理，但中國並沒有出去征服這些國家。嗯，所以也有例外，比如越南。嗯，一些韓國的曆史也涉及到中國的征服，或者說，征服了現在的中國。嗯，但我認為我們從根本上誤解了這段曆史。嗯，我不確定中國人是否理解他們自己的曆史。嗯，如果他們理解的話，那也包含在“我們永遠不會稱霸”這句話裏。我認為中國是。唯一一個這麽說的國家，呃，在19世紀，美國說過我們永遠不會成為帝國主義者，但昭昭天命從未停止。
我們推翻了夏威夷的君主製，將其並入我們的國家。然後我們又去了菲律賓、關島等等，然後我們向南去了波多黎各和古巴。嗯，所以中國人說我們永遠不會成為帝國主義者。嗯，但我認為我們必須對他們是否會落入我們曾經犯下的陷阱保持懷疑態度。是的，不，這對美國來說是一件關鍵的事情，尤其是在19世紀。他們不會變得像歐洲人一樣。嗯，我認為這就是為什麽在1898年，
嗯，美國擊敗了西班牙，嗯，獲得了許多殖民地，正如你所說，包括菲律賓。這引起了美國社會很大一部分人的厭惡。比如馬克·吐溫，以及其他人，他們認為帝國不是，是的，追求帝國是在浪費靈魂。歐洲的道路，但嗯嗯，不過這很有趣，因為有一種普遍的觀點認為，中國的行為方式與美國有根本區別，但嗯，我想這是兩種不同的視角，嗯，我知道，比如傑弗裏·薩克森就指出，中國的行為方式與美國內部有所不同。另一方麵，還有默奇默的觀點，認為一切都是外部因素。換句話說，如果“對衝”主義（hedgemon）本身是一個機會，那麽支持它的意識形態和理念也會隨之而來。所以，中國人也可能會有他們的帝國時刻，如果你願意的話，嗯，但是，你如何看待中國未來的政策？你認為它會衰落嗎？會開始追求更多的帝國野心嗎？或者，你認為我們未能認識到美國和中國的其他動機，因為我認為這是一個共同的主題，不僅對美國如此，對歐洲人來說也是如此。如今，人們缺乏認識到安全關切和利益的能力。對手……呃，在過去，這在任何討論中都是一個出發點。但我們何時討論過伊朗、俄羅斯或中國的安全或利益？我們停止討論這些……呃，我們對手的擔憂。呃，您如何看待這個問題？您認為中國會出於安全考慮采取行動嗎？還是您認為中國可能出於更多的霸權主義衝動？抱歉，
這是一個很長的問題。不，這是一個非常有趣的多層次問題。在談論中國之前，讓我先談談美國。嗯，馬克·吐溫和其他反對美國帝國主義的人是正確的，它最終被證明與美國民主格格不入。呃，我們現在看到了這一點。嗯，第二點是我們發明了一種新的帝國……呃，呃，一個……帝國。
與其說是占領，不如說是保護費。如果你願意的話，我們保護每個人免受他人侵害。嗯，這似乎是美國外交政策的天才之處，我們有一種不可抗拒的衝動，要保護每個人免受他人侵害。呃，這
讓我們陷入了麻煩。呃，它另外，嗯，我們也有一個源於我們戰爭經驗的傳統，這在我們的內戰、第一次世界大戰、第二次世界大戰以及冷戰中非常不尋常，我們
認為目標是對方無條件投降，然後進行道德重建，嗯，所以這就是我們在內戰中所做的，你知道，我們占領了南方，並試圖以不同的方式重建它，我們在第一次世界大戰後對德國也這樣做了，嗯，在第二次世界大戰後，嗯，我們再次試圖
追求無條件投降，最終蘇聯因自身缺陷而解體，然後出現了一個論點，嗯，我們需要幫助它，嗯，你知道，
懺悔它的罪過，並在道德上變得優越，但我們不願意
為此投入資金，嗯，傑弗裏·薩克斯和其他人做了一些事情，嗯，在這方麵沒有什麽幫助，盡管我欽佩傑弗裏·薩克斯目前的
觀點，但我還是這麽說嗯，所以關於中國的情況，嗯，我認為中國人想要的不是他們似乎認為聯盟實際上是對其他國家的保護，而不是聚集力量來增加他們的權力和影響力，而是會讓他們陷入麻煩的負擔，所以他們實際上沒有任何盟友。他們與朝鮮建立了受保護的國家關係，朝鮮是美國軍隊和日本軍隊之間的緩衝國。從他們的角度來看，他們與巴基斯坦也建立了類似的受保護的國家關係，這種關係的驅動力是希望抵消印度在南亞的霸權。西藏當然是南亞的一部分。所以中國人對南亞的力量平衡有著合理的擔憂，這就是他們支持巴基斯坦的原因。所以他們知道如何玩地緣政治遊戲，這很明顯。但我認為他們尋求的不是控製，他們當然不是在尋求對正在萎縮而不是增長的人口的依賴。他們不想引進更多的韓國人、越南人或其他外國人。他們想要什麽呢？他們不謀求對自然資源的軍事控製，他們已經吸取了教訓，隻要付出足夠的錢，就能買到你需要的東西，嗯，嗯，所以我認為他們想要的是作為一個獨立文明大國的尊嚴得到尊重。當然，如果其他國家想效仿他們，他們會感到榮幸，但他們並不堅持這一點，這與美國不同。美國的立場是，如果你想和我們打交道，你就必須……像我們一樣，中國人的立場是，你是外國人，我們很高興，你是外國人，請保持這種狀態，我們不在乎你做什麽，
隻要我們能賺錢，而且你不損害我們的尊嚴。所以我認為我們正在討論一種截然不同的世界秩序方法，嗯，嗯，它可能有帝國主義的方麵，但它們與英國、法國、俄羅斯帝國或嗯，嗯，或者美國準帝國所追求的那些不同，所以我不知道中國最終會走向何方，嗯，我認為在競爭領域，主要的……我沒注意到有什麽區別。我認為我們真正需要關注的是，根據經合組織的數據，到2030年，也就是僅僅五年之後，全球STEM領域的勞動力將有37%來自中國，37%來自印度，26%來自俄羅斯，4.5%來自俄羅斯，4.2%來自美國。這並非
在良性競爭中取得成功的秘訣，我將其定義為良性競爭，這就是為什麽我們以這種方式陷入對抗性對抗。
嗯，但底線是，如果我們想要競爭，如果我們想要超越，如果我們想要……呃，即使不是世界主要強國，也不是世界幾個主要強國之一，我們也需要效仿中國改革開放的做法，我們正在做相反的事情，我們正在加倍鞏固我們現有的經濟結構，我們不推行反壟斷政策，嗯，你知道，嗯，呃這是一個過時的觀察，但你可能知道，當我不住在新罕布什爾州吉澤爾倉庫的時候，我兼職一家國際公司的董事長。嗯，嗯，幾年前，我從事家具行業。當時，美國有120家家具公司，大部分歸底特律的馬努吉亞家族所有。他們是亞美尼亞裔美國人，是發明三角水龍頭的人的後裔。三角水龍頭是控製浴室水龍頭冷熱水流出的控製杆。嗯，嗯，在中國，有5萬家家具公司。他們參與了殘酷的競爭。所以你提到了19世紀的市場資本主義，也就是中國模式。驅動經濟的不是大型國有企業，而是眾多相互競爭的小型實體。所以我們看到，嗯，嗯，人工智能最近最大的進步來自DeepSeek，這是一個私人項目，
與政府無關，甚至沒有得到任何補貼，嗯，它基本上是一家擁有算法的公司，
一直在上海證券交易所進行股票交易，直到政府
取締了該算法，他們不得不想辦法利用他們的
技術，顯然他們在人工智能領域非常成功，所以我們
我們麵臨的是一場競爭，這場競爭不是軍事性的，盡管我們選擇將其視為軍事性的競爭，
這主要是經濟和技術性的競爭，取勝的關鍵在於國內經濟的開放和
改革，而我們沒有這樣做，嗯，我認為這些很重要，
是的，嗯，是的，中國實際做的一些事情，因為人們通常
沒有普遍認識到中國非常強大，或者嚴格反對結盟，這是他們堅持的，
我的意思是，如果他們這樣做，我相信俄羅斯人會對中國俄羅斯人更加開放。聯盟，但對中國來說，他們不想結盟，他們已經明確表示，這是一個長期存在的政策，正如你所說，他們也拒絕普世主義，這為對衝資金打開了大門。也就是說，如果你支持自由民主的普世主義，那麽你就可以聲稱自己有權代表其他民族的自由，比如中國人。他們一直堅持文明的獨特性，認為一個文明不應該告訴另一個文明如何發展，這至少在意識形態層麵上是矛盾的，這與對衝資金的原則或基礎相矛盾。此外，經濟去中心化的程度也很有趣。我的最後一個問題是，如果美國想遏製中國，那麽過去幾周甚至幾個月的一些政策似乎相互矛盾。所以我研究了台灣的情況，程度較輕，威脅要將所有半導體產業轉移到美國。但我認為更重要的是疏遠日本，因為日本一直非常……也許……屈從是一個很強烈的詞，但它一直……至少對美國來說，日本是一個非常忠誠的盟友。但我們現在看到，在這場關稅戰中，日本一直在使用一些非常強硬的言辭，他們不認為應該用這個詞，因為
他們不想被美國勒索，所以這在某種程度上是前所未有的，或者至少是新的。你認為，鑒於美國不確定的未來，或者至少它正在努力在國際經濟中尋找新的地位，你認為日本現在有可能尋求……而不是改變立場嗎？這行不通，但至少它應該使其經濟夥伴多元化，並……對中國進一步開放，即使不是為了在與美國的談判中獲得籌碼，至少你看到中日關係正在改變。是的，但這存在巨大的困難，雙方都承受著巨大的情感痛苦，原因各不相同。嗯，中國人認為，在1931年至1945年間，死於日軍之手的人數達到3500萬。日本帝國在中國的14年暴行
無論數字是否如此之高，都是一個爭議問題，但幾乎每個
中國中東部和北部的家庭都在那場衝突中失去了親人，呃，而且
西方人並不真正理解這一點，我們知道我們中的一些人無論如何都知道俄羅斯人犧牲慘重，或者
蘇聯人犧牲慘重，因為不僅僅是俄羅斯人參與了與
納粹的較量，但呃，我們不太了解亞洲的陸戰，呃，故事是關於
美國在太平洋戰場戰勝日本海軍，嗯，所以日本，呃，作為一個越來越獨立的大國，呃，它不會向美國屈服，
它在20世紀80年代的廣場協議中有過這樣做的經曆，那場協議使
日本走上了經濟停滯的道路，至今仍未完全恢複，嗯，呃，它不會重蹈覆轍，呃，它
承認日本和中國一樣，認為這場較量不那麽重要與其說是經濟問題，不如說是權力攫取、心理恐嚇或對美國的臣服。嗯，嗯，日本已經恢複了一些民族自豪感，而且它不會再這樣做了。嗯，所以我們看到的是，日本在多個領域都采取了積極主動的行動，例如，在特朗普第一任期內，美國退出了跨太平洋夥伴關係協定（TPP），盡管民主黨也提議退出。嗯，日本接管了這個項目，而這個項目的當前版本反映了日本在亞太地區的領導地位。嗯，嗯，日本在政治和軍事上也變得更加活躍。嗯，就在前幾天，兩艘日本護衛艦出現在中國剛剛建成的柬埔寨港口。據說那裏是一個中國基地，但它不是嗎？它是一個可以容納軍艦的基地。但第一批前往那裏的主要艦艇不是中國的，而是日本的。嗯，日本正在積極地為越南和菲律賓提供軍事援助，旨在平衡中國的力量。嗯，它正在積極尋求更廣泛的合作，不僅與韓國和印度尼西亞——該地區重要的工業強國——或歐洲——以及中國——保持密切聯係，所以日本正在成為一個我稱之為“全球節點”的……多節點國際架構，即它獨立運作，能夠……容納與其他國家緊密或疏密的聯係，並能夠改變這些聯係。這種聯係存在於三維空間中，並非二維連接線末端的一根極點。嗯，所以我們……看到日本和許多其他國家一起崛起，嗯，我認為，除了你提到的意識形態方麵之外，對中國霸權的製約之一……中國有著古老的……傳統，即崇尚仁義道德的蒙紮，他曾說過，如果你想要擁有國際影響力，嗯，你必須成為一個人們想要效仿的良好社會，不要出去……試圖推銷自己，嗯，要有道德，別人就會想要像你一樣。想向你學習，嗯，就是這樣19世紀的美國人認為，不幸地，帝國主義的倒退治愈了我們，但中國人，麵對著這樣一個世界：中等強國，包括一些他們自己國家的強國，包括亞太地區的強國，正在日益平衡多種關係，使其關係多樣化，不再僅僅依附於一個保護者，即亞太地區的美國。但我們看到，在西亞，隨著土耳其作為一個非常獨立且難以預測的角色的崛起，我們看到法國試圖在歐洲及其他地區重新確立獨立地位。我們看到沙特阿拉伯憑借其豐富的碳氫化合物資源和金融資源，正在崛起成為一個中等強國。我們，我們看到印度尼西亞是一個正在崛起的潛在大國。印度當然仍然保持著刻意的不結盟立場。我們看到拉丁美洲出現了一種名為“積極不結盟”的概念，這意味著我們不會隻與美國站在一起，也不會屈從於美國。門羅主義限製了我們
與歐盟、中國、印度、日本等等建立關係的權利，所以我們看到的是一個
我稱之為多極化、日益多節點化的世界，嗯 ...在中國，或者來自中國，嗯，嗯，這不會在技術上改變，正如我所說，我們正在輸掉這場兩極競爭。
與中國的競爭，嗯，澳大利亞戰略政策研究所評估了……誰在創新方麵做得最多，評估了64個技術領域，他們聲稱中國現在在57個領域領先於韓國，在2個領域領先於韓國，在5個領域領先於美國，所以技術競爭……嗯，你知道我們正在遠離那個……出口管製於事無補，
迫害華裔科學家於事無補，嗯，
學生交流的障礙於事無補，嗯，所以最終我們隻剩下……軍事方麵，這就是我們現在所擁有的一切……嗯，你知道人們在規避風險……嗯，他們不想卷入與中國的戰爭……嗯，他們當然也不想卷入……結束……中國內戰，我們必須記住，台灣問題……是戰敗方的產物中國內戰結束後，美國在美國的保護下撤退到台灣，並在那裏與中國其他地區分離，在美國的保護下駐紮在那裏。因此，美國反對承認一個中國，隻有一個中國，台灣是中國的一部分。但另一方麵，美國又阻止通過談判解決中國內戰。因為每次中國提出條件，我們都會提供軍事援助，這給了不想談判的台灣人借口。所以，這是一項非常混亂的政策，它既不利於美國利益，也不利於真正爭取該地區各國以某種方式聯合或共同反對中國。他們都希望美國能夠幫助他們，支持他們與處於其中心的國家建立長期可行的關係。我認為，華盛頓經常會警告其他國家不要與中國進行貿易或脫鉤，但這種做法經常被錯誤地理解。集團政治，但我認為，世界上大多數國家之所以對中國崛起表示歡迎，並非因為他們想屈從於一個中國集團，而不是美國集團，而是因為當擁有多個權力中心時，它所代表的意義是什麽？這給世界各國帶來了什麽希望？如果與中國、美國以及其他國家進行貿易，它們就能實現經濟多元化。嗯，你可以擁有更獨立的經濟政策，從而轉化為更大的政治自主權。我認為這就是它如此吸引人的原因。我認為，阻止各國實現經濟多元化的衝動，嗯，是的，這幾乎被視為對政治自主權的攻擊。嗯，嗯，這就是我所描述的世界秩序變化的淨效應，它賦予了中小型國家更大的回旋自由。嗯，在一個日益多元化的多元體係中，嗯，賦予了中小型國家以前沒有的自主權。你這讓他們有自由去追求自己的發展，按照自己希望的方式發展，所以在這方麵，美國的立場是失敗的，因為中國人說，你們如何發展取決於你們自己，我們對此無話可說，如果你們想向我們學習，那就去學習吧，如果你們想向別人學習，那我們也不會介意，我們說你們必須遵循我們的方式，否則你們……嗯，嗯，另一個問題是，中國人並沒有試圖阻止美國在任何地方銷售商品或服務，而我們試圖阻止他們，所以，正如有人所說，我……我想是拉裏·薩默斯說，他從一位非洲對話者那裏聽說，你知道，當中國人來的時候，他們會提供……道路、水壩和電氣化，而當你們來的時候，你們堅持要……我們遵循你們的政治立場，而你們什麽也不提供，所以，哪個……會贏你知道，如果美國想要成功……呃……繼續保持大國地位，保持我們一直以來的壓倒性優勢……呃……我們不僅需要進行國內改革，還需要改變我們的外交政策，承認其他國家的利益，並努力為他們服務，或者說，順應這些利益，而不是抵製它們。有人說，你知道，當變革之風吹起時，有些人築牆擋風，有些人造風車，我們需要造風車，所以我認為歐盟正確地將中國麵臨的挑戰描述為係統性挑戰。這是一個係統性挑戰，它是一個選擇，是在一個擁有眾多通往現代化的不同道路的開放世界，還是一個被保護主義主導的封閉世界之間做出選擇。順便說一句，我不認為關稅會讓美國重新工業化，但嗯，這隻是我國將怪異現象在理論上正常化的眾多方式之一。我看到大西洋兩岸都有很多弄巧成拙的政策。這些天，嗯，有很多自我傷害，呃，無論如何，我希望華盛頓的人們仍然關注你，因為呃，我們也許可以減少一些自我傷害，無論如何，非常感謝你的時間，呃，是的，總是從傾聽中學習，所以再次感謝你，謝謝你邀請我，我為我對你的非常簡單的問題的複雜回答道歉，不，這就是讓它變得有趣的原因，所以非常感謝，再見，再見

Chas Freeman: The Lies We Tell Ourselves About China

Glenn Diesen 2025年5月12日
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tiMU8-0Id1I

Chas Freeman argues that the US tells itself lies about China, which results in self-harm as opportunities for cooperation are wasted and conflicts are unnecessarily  pursued. 

hi everyone and welcome i am joined today by one of my favorite guests Chaz Freeman who was previously the assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs also known as the former US ambassador to Saudi Arabia  but for today's topic uh it's also very interesting that he was the director of Chinese affairs at the US State Department and also with Kissinger when uh he opened up China so uh yeah welcome
back to the program thank you glad to be with you Glenn uh a minor correction i I
wrote the papers that Kissinger relied upon for his secret trip in 1971 I think June 9 July 9 to 11 uh 1971 to Beijing but I wasn't on the trip um I didn't have a stomach ache and retreat to a hill station in Pakistan and fly off to somewhere else okay well um nonetheless I think a lot of this uh experience is uh of great importance well I guess back in those days the opening up of China obviously had a well a clear purpose of breaking splitting up the Soviets and the Chinese but also uh you know working relationship between the United States and China uh the deals that were made such as one China policy all of this has laid the foundation for what the yeah peace and cooperation between the Americans and Chinese have been since and uh and uh yeah the topic I want to discuss with you today is the growing rivalry between the US and China so far it's primarily in the economic realm but of course it could escalate uh hopefully not into the military sphere uh but I thought it's good to start maybe with a bit of a open or wide question which is uh uh uh that you've complained that there are in the United States there's often a lack of knowledge about China which is why we often lean into stereotypes and what do you see as being the main misperceptions about China today what is it that the political establishment in the United States don't understand about China 

Chas Freeman
where to begin um uh the number of delusions misperceptions is quite large um and unfortunately of course Americans these days are quite insular um I remember being told at the end of by Arno Debos who was a well-known journalist war correspondent in World War II that in 1947 there were I think 2,700 2,700 US foreign correspondents for a newspaper scene that was very fragmented almost every newspaper had its own foreign correspondent and Americans are really quite well informed about the world um today there are less than 100 foreign correspondents for the United States which is why when you uh hear the news you if it's about something abroad you're probably hearing a BBC stringer or someone um so u we're not very well informed generally uh our schools no longer teach geography u people joke that Americans learn geography by going to war with wherever it is and um the um uh but mainly uh we have gone through a series of phases we had a non-tiance limited cooperation for limited purposes uh driven entirely by geopolitical considerations uh the Chinese were already split from the Soviets uh and they were under pressure from Moscow there was a real danger of a preemptive Soviet invasion of uh China in the 1960s at the end of the 60s there was actual fighting and President Nixon had the wit to see that we could enlist China in support of the containment of the USSR which is what we did uh that was non tant um perhaps it was maybe China was a sort of protected state in the sense that uh it had been in World War II when we supported uh the Chinese government against Japan um mainly not because we had any expectation that China could defeat Japan but we had the hope that it would tie down a vast number of Japanese forces who might otherwise be deployed elsewhere so it was a strategic move the continued independence of China was strategically important to us and the same was true in the cold war but when the cold war ended um and the Soviet Union imploded u after the Berlin wall came down uh we no longer had a common enemy uh and uh simultaneously this is all I think the crucial year was 1989 the Berlin wall came down of course in November uh in June there was the uh student and worker revolt in Tenan Square in Beijing which was put down um with force that drained all the warmth from the USChina relationship and finally that year was also the year that Taiwan ceased to be a Leninist dictatorship and became a
democracy so we had suddenly three forces directing us toward antipathy to
China uh the geopolitical argument for cooperation had apparently disappeared um the um ideological uh equal equation of Taibbe with Beijing had disappeared because Taibbe was no longer Leninist while Beijing remained so and of course there was the lingering effects of anti-communism containment um the experiences of the Korean and Vietnam war all these things are still with us so um I have I I believe there are that we are u hamstring hamstrung in uh for foreign relations by the absence of uh a detailed uh vocabulary for describing relationships and um I've gone around some of them alliances are unconditional commitments to mutual assistance on conditional contingent relationships which envisage some kind of limited cooperation perhaps for a limited time um client states basically uh derive protection from uh affording the uh the their their other country the larger one privileges prerogatives uh and a lot of international relations are simply give and take on an equal basis very transactional but when you get to the dement the varieties of um competition or confrontation um I think there are there are four first is rivalry which you mentioned um I'd be very cautious about that word because I think it it basically means a healthy competition that is one in which you try to outdo the other by improving yourself That's like going to a track meet if you uh you run on the track it's and you beat the other side the other people it's because you train better you're physically stronger you're faster not because uh they are weaker or whatever or because you sabotage them because the uh uh after rivalry um we have um uh we have uh uh what I call adversarial antagonism that is where you you seek to win by tripping or hamstringing the other party on the track not by excelling yourself but by uh injuring the other side so that it can't match you and then finally if you um uh if you carry that far enough you become you you you enter the realm of enmity where your objective is the annihilation of the other side um we saw that in the cold war constrained by a fear of nuclear exchanges uh so what we are with where we are with China is we've gone through the whole circle uh from uh protected state status in World War II and again in the cold war on tant cooperation in Afghanistan against the Soviet uh uh occupation um transactional relationship rivalry very healthy competition and now we're at adversarial antagonism and our objective is to uh hold China down if possible push
it back uh and that is of course impossible because uh we have limited
capacity to do that and China is going ahead on its own so I'm sorry about the
long- winded uh response but uh this is a very strategically very complex
relationship we've just seen um the United States and China engage in serious economic warfare and then achieve apparently um some sort of relaxation of tensions limited a day if you will but it's not a truce we haven't given up the antagonism uh it's not a ceasefire we're not going to stop um taking steps against each other uh all it is is a reduction in the intensity of the confrontation while we see if we can reach some kind of longer term  understanding uh that ends the trade war or at least confines it within limits a sort of arms control agreement if you will um but we're not uh you know the Trump administration portrays this as a major victory for its maximum pressure tactics It's not um the Chinese didn't want tariffs they retaliated um the United States has now backed down well I appreciate you differentiating between rivalry and antagonism because uh it does well I I'm I'm quite uh supportive and uh hopeful about American industrial policies to see strengthen its uh its technological sovereignty and competitiveness but there is something else though which is this uh if if that was enough I think the US could have uh take its time to do gradual buildup and yeah re-industrialize all all of the things which I think should be done but it
appears that a lot of these policies go into overdrive because the objective isn't simply to become more competitive but also as you said to break to break China as well so that's beyond the competition it seems to but uh they this need to break China is this does this go to the ideology or the view of the world then because if there was a willingness to essentially share the stage with China as an equal the US could have a more moderate industrial policy in terms of just rebuilding its own strength not necessarily again breaking the knees of the Chinese is this um does this go to ideology how do you explain the the the I guess the demand for primacy in this relationship well I think the uh the driver of all this is uh psychological distress at losing primacy um that is around 1870 the United States became the largest economy in the world and uh in the 20th century we became by stages the dominant
political and military force in the world as well as the dominant financial
power and uh and uh for a long time economic power uh now we see China uh if
you measure uh the GDP of the two countries uh by the proper standard for
comparison which is um uh purchasing power parody uh not nominal exchange
rates which fluctuate and which which represent extraneous factors then
China's economy is already one-third larger than ours um it produces over
one-third of the world's manufactured goods we produce about 15% now um and um
it is uh very embedded in the Bretonwoods post World War II uh institutions for example the World Trade Organization which we have walked away from so we have the ironic situation that the Chinese are defending the world order that we created while trying to tweak it a bit uh to their advantage of course um and we are acting destructively um and uh in this context um we don't pay any attention to the UN charter international law we've sabotaged the World Trade Organization we've walked
out of various specialized UN bodies when we don't like what the global majority decides and um we are becoming more isolated china is becoming more engaged so this is this is what is happening as to uh restoring competitiveness which I think is an an entirely appropriate goal i think we have to you know recognize some economic realities first of all what's happened in industry is exactly what happened in agriculture so in 1900 I don't know the situation in Norway but in 1900 in the United States roughly 80% of the population worked on the farm to produce food uh now it's
less than 1% and we produce more food than ever uh that is because capital has
substituted for labor that is people have become more productive because they've
mechanized agriculture um who also introduced science and red
better varieties of plants that are more resistant to disease and so forth give higher
yields um and the same is true with the animal population um so uh what is
happening in industry is exactly the same thing i said 1980% worked in
agriculture 15% or so were in industry 5% were in what was called
services a very vague category but if you look at the situation now you'll
find less than 1% in agriculture 8% in industry that is half of the percentage
of uh 125 years ago um and uh there too
um automation robotics um uh various uh techniques for managing uh production
beginning with the assembly line Henry Ford's invention and uh uh and
continuing uh through multiple stages have made the American worker vastly
more productive um so far fewer people are needed to produce much more goods we
actually produce more than ever but our employment industry is going down and
finally we've got now we have so that's 91 let's see uh 15 that is 8% 1% um that
is 91% are in something called services which is essentially become a meaningless category
um and needs to be re-examined by economists they invented that category
in the 1930s along with GDP badly needs a theoretical
re-examination um so uh we're seeing the same things happening in China
agricultural workforce is declining rapidly the industrial workforce is job
industrial jobs are going down uh we see unemployment now in China among youth
who were educated for an industrial economy that now no longer requires them
so uh what is the relevance of all this well we things are happening in the United States which produce uh a great
deal of angst um disqu um and rather
than looking at the causes of these which are uh intrinsic to progress we
blame foreigners so who is the perfect foreigner to blame china why because we
have a history of anti-Chinese sentiment we have a history of a containment of China in the cold war it's run by
something that calls itself the Communist Party we all you know we imagine that if you've seen one
communist you you've seen them all the people who make these statements about
China and communism and so forth have neither met a Chinese or never been to China uh nor have they ever met a
communist of any kind except the Vietnamese who are anti-Chinese and therefore good people despite their
misguided ideology so um there are many factors going into this but the bottom
line is uh we have a very distorted view of China inadequate press coverage uh
biased editorial policies in our media um the political establishment that has
made China the enemy of choice uh and so uh we are in a very strange
position you can't have a an effective policy negotiating position or
competition if you misunderstand who with whom you are competing and we
fairly fundamentally do on top of this uh you mentioned industrial policy the
Chinese have come up with a very effective uh pattern of industrial policy which
basically um relies on policy uh banks
banks that lend to support national objectives so um you know you get
strange things when you do this to some extent um for example Chinese company
acquired most of Pirelli the Italian tire maker under the belt and road
initiative because it was able to portray that as somehow related to the belt and road uh I find that rather
far-fetched but apparently one of the policy banks was prepared to bank support it with lending so you have uh
essentially Diaing's idea that um if you want to get across the river you have an
objective you just tell people uh you get across the river i don't care how
you do it um if you get there it'll be worth your while financially so he came
up with the idea of feeling your way across the river with your toes on the rocks um and that's what the Chinese do
they announce an objective let's say we need an electric economy uh we need uh renewable energy
uh and they say and if you invest in these things we'll back you financially
so the result is you know over 50% of the hydraulic hydro hydroelectric power
under construction is in China 70% of the solar power under construction is in
China similar pattern for wind power and of course China leads in electric
vehicles it also uh leads in high voltage transmission systems it leads in
uh the efficiency of electric power production and so forth i could take other examples because China is now
ahead in um the vast majority of uh
technologies something which we don't understand we imagine export controls
can preserve our precious bodily fluids from being drained by by the Chinese from us if you remember Dr strange Love
uh he's alive and well in Washington uh somewhere and um uh even if Kissinger is
dead well uh I was going to say the the the
tendency to blame um foreign powers for domestic ills is also something we're
seeing a lot in Europe these days as well but uh I thought what you blame the Swedes for all your problems
well well pointing more towards the Russians these days but yeah uh well
what was always for me unique about American nationalism though is that it was uh uh unlike the uh yeah nationalism
around the world cuz nationalism often the uglier form tends to be uh look towards when was your greatness and uh
why did it end and who's to blame so you go through history and see who robbed you of your greatness now I guess what's
always been exceptional about American nationalism is that it's been usually very positive that is with the assumption that his greatest days are
ahead of it it's uh comes off as more benign again optimistic uh but uh
perhaps this is because the United States always gone from strength to strength but now of course in relative
decline it appears that the Americans are kind of following the call it the European path where we where it looks
towards you know when was this golden age who took it away and then China is identified and one ends up with this
narratives that the yeah the Chinese took our jobs not that it was outsourced but took it uh but it does beg the
question though if it's a challenge for the United States a bit how to do
capitalism itself i again we're in a bit of a strange situation given that officially yeah the Chinese are led by
the communist party but uh but it's capitalist it form of capitalism appears
to resemble to a large extent what America had in the 19th century very industrial capitalism where it limits
the rent seekers yeah seek to yeah harmonize make sure that society doesn't become an
appendage of a free market uh do you see the United States needing to change how
it does capitalis ism itself and if so do you think China is a model or is it not appropriate for the US anymore i
don't think uh China presents a model for the United States uh in particular because of its strong
Lenist character um it's not compatible with the enlightenment European
enlightenment values that the United States uh long tried to exemplify and
which are being now asserted against a very authoritarian uh presidency um in the United States so
I don't I think there's certain things uh that work for the Chinese um after all this is a society of a billion and a
half people um nobody has ever really effectively governed anything that large
before the Chinese have multiple experiences of what they call one chaos
anarchy a cultural revolution being a recent case in point uh and uh they put
a huge emphasis on order uh so would we if we had the constraints that the
Chinese do for example uh the United States um has
uh about 1/4 as many people less than that actually uh than as the Chinese but
we have four times as much agricultural land um they have 7% of the world's
water supply we have something like 25 27% we have a terrific endowment our
neighbors as Bismar said uh are the meek and mild and polite Canadians to the
north and the happy golucky Mexicans to the south neither of whom pose a challenge well they didn't anyway we're
working on that but um um and to our east and west our neighbors are fish uh
you know China borders 14 countries with which it's had multiple conflicts over the years um for the for 600 of the past
thousand years China was ruled by foreigners so this is a very different history and if we had the same
u u arable land to population ratio that the Chinese do we would have four
billion people in the United States most of them in California probably so I don't worry about it too much i'm on the
East Coast um but um uh so um these are differences even if you
don't get to history and I think we misunderstand the history of East Asia
uh in terms in terms of European models europe is the bloodiest continent uh of
all followed closely by the subcontinent of India um these are both uh extensions
of the Eurasian landmass uh that have multiple languages cultures
and so forth bumping up against each other they both produce waring states um
China had that period uh in the pre-Christian era and it got over it uh
and the situation in East Asia never resembled that um of uh of in Europe um
uh countries um deferred to China because of its size its intellectual and
scientific prowess its prosperity its good govern but China didn't go out and
conquer that uh so um there are exceptions Vietnam being a key one uh
some Korean history also involves Chinese conquest or conquest from what
is now what is now China um but I think we fundamentally misunderstand uh this
history um and I'm not sure the Chinese understand their own history either uh
or if they do it's encapsulated in the phrase we will never be
hegemonic now I I think China is the only country that says that uh in the
19th century the United States said that we will never be imperialists but manifest destiny never
stopped we overthrew the monarchy in Hawaii and incorporated that into our
country then we went on to the Philippines and Guam and so forth then we south to Puerto Rico and Cuba and um
so the Chinese are saying we will never be imperialist uh but I think we have to be a bit
skeptical about whether they will not uh fall into the same trap that we did
yeah no this was a key thing for the United States especially 19th century they wouldn't become like the Europeans uh I think this is why in 18 1898 when
uh the US defeated the Spanish uh and uh acquired a lot of its colonial possessions as you said including
Philippines that this is something that created a uh yeah um distaste by large part of US
society mark Twain for example and others arguing that empire was not yeah that was wasting its soul by pursuing
the the European path but uh uh but it is interesting though because this it's a common argument that China would
behave fundamentally different from the United States but uh it's I guess two
different perspectives uh I know for example Jeffrey Saxon makes this point that is something internally different
there on the other hand then you have the Merchimer argument arguing it's all external so in other words if uh the
hedgeimon presents itself as an opportunity then essentially the ideologies and ideas supporting it would
follow so the the Chinese might also have their imperial moment if you will
uh but uh how do you see um China's uh go China's policies going
forward do you think it will fall uh will begin to pursue more I guess uh
yeah in imperial ambitions or and what what do you think the that we we we fail
to recognize as in terms of other motivations for the United so for for China because it is a common theme I
think not just for the US but also for the Europeans the the lack of ability these days to recognize the security
concerns and interests of opponents uh in the past this would be the point of departure in any discussion but when do
we ever discuss the security or interest of Iran or Russia or China we we stopped
discussing this uh concerns of our adversaries but uh how how do you see this then do you see China acting on its
security concerns or do you think more hegemonic impulses might play in sorry
that was a very long question no it's a very interesting multi-layered question
and let me make a few comments on of the United States before I talk about China
um Mark Twain and others who argued against American imperialism were correct it ultimately turned out to be
incompatible with American democracy uh we're seeing that now um
second point is we invented a new sort of empire uh which was uh uh an empire
not of occupation so much as a protection racket if you will we were
protecting everybody against somebody else um that seems to be the genius of American foreign policy that we have an
in irresistible impulse to protect everybody from everybody else uh this
gets us into trouble uh it also um we also have a tradition born of our
experience in war which is very unusual in our civil war in World War I World War II and again in the cold war we
imagined that the objective was unconditional surrender of the other side followed by its moral
reconstruction uh so that's what we did you know in our civil war we we occupied
the south and tried to rebuild it in a different way and we did that after World War I with Germany and um after
World War II uh uh we we again tried to
pursue unconditional surrender finally the Soviet Union imploded of its own
defects and then there was an argument well we need to help it uh uh you know
repent of its sins and become morally uh superior but we didn't weren't willing
to invest the money in that so um and Jeffrey Sachs and others um did some
things that uh weren't very helpful in that regard i say that despite my admiration for Jeffrey Sachs current
views um so on the case of China um I think what the Chinese want is not
the sort of empire we had uh they seem to regard alliances
uh which are in effect uh protection of other states not as uh aggregating power
to them adding to their power and influence but as liabilities that can
get them into trouble so they really don't have any allies uh they have a
protected state relationship with North Korea which is a buffer state between
American forces and Japanese forces uh from their perspective um and they have
a similar protected state relationship with Pakistan which is driven by the
desire to offset the otherwise inevitable Indian hegemony in South Asia
uh Tibet of course is part of South Asia uh so the Chinese have a legitimate concern about the balance of power in
South Asia and that's why they back Pakistan so um they know how to play
geopolitical games that's clear um but I think what they seek is not control
they're not they're not certainly not seeking leans for uh a population that
is uh contracting rather than growing um they don't want to bring in more
Koreans or Vietnamese or other foreigners um what they want they don't
seek control of natural resources militarily they've learned the lesson
that you can buy what you need uh if you pay enough um and um so I think what
they want is respect for their dignity as an independent major civilizational
state of course they're flattered if others wish to emulate them but they
don't insist on this unlike the United States the American position is if you want to deal with us you have to become
like us chinese position is you're foreigners we're happy you're foreigners stay that way please we don't care what
you do as long as we can make money and you don't injure our dignity so I think
we're talking about a very different approach to world order
uh and um and it may have imperial aspects but they're not the same as the
ones uh that the British or French empires or the Russian Empire for that
matter or um uh or the American quasi empire
um pursued so I don't know where China is going to end up um I think in the
competition realm the major uh no difference that I noticed and I think
the thing we really need to focus on is that according to the OECD in 2030 which is only 5 years from
now 37% of the world's STEM workforce will be Chinese 37%
uh 26% will be Indian 4.5% will be
Russian 4.2% 2% will be American now that is not a recipe for
success in rivalry as I define it as healthy competition uh which is why we have been
driven into adversarial antagonism uh in the way that we have
um but the bottom line is um if we want to compete if we want to excel if we
want to um remain u uh if not the primary power in the world one of the
one of several primary powers in the world we need to do what the Chinese did reform and opening uh we're we're doing
the opposite uh we're doubling down on our current economic structure we're not
pursuing antitrust policy um you know um
uh this is an outdated uh observation but uh as you may know I chair a comp
international company uh on the side uh when I'm not living in the Gizer warehouse in New Hampshire um and
um uh years ago I did some things in the furniture business uh at that time there
were 120 furniture companies in the United States most of them owned by the Manugian
family in Detroit Armenian Americans who are the descendants of the
man who invented the delta faucet uh the lever that
controls hot and cold coming out of your out of your faucet in your bathroom um
and made a fortune uh and um uh in China there were 50,000 furniture companies
and they were engaged in cut road comp cutthroat competition so you mentioned 19th century capitalism in market
economic terms that's the Chinese model it's not the great state-owned enterprises that are the driving force
in the economy it's the multitude of competing smaller entities that that
that is and so we see that uh uh the
greatest advance in artificial intelligence recently is from deepseek which is a private thing had
nothing to do with the government didn't even get any subsidies uh it was basically a company that that had an
algorithm that was doing uh trading shares on the Shanghai stock market stock market until the government
outlawed that al algorithm and they had to figure out what to do with their
their technology and they went into AI very successfully apparently so um we're
we're confronting u uh we're in a competition which isn't military although we choose to treat it as such
it's primarily economic and technological and the key to winning that is domestic economic opening and
reform and we're not doing it yeah well I think these are important
yeah uh yeah parts of what China actually does because there's often yeah
not widespread recognition that China is very strong or strictly against alliances this is something they insist
on i mean if they I'm sure the Russians will be much more open to a Chinese Russian alliance but uh for the Chinese
they they don't want any alliances they made this the abundantly clear it's been a very long-standing policy and as you
said with they also reject the universalism that is uh which opens up for hedge money that is if you are for
liberal democratic universalism then you can claim the right to represent the freedom of other peoples the Chinese
they keep insisting on civilizational distinctiveness that you one civilization should not tell another one
how to develop now that's at least at least on ideological
level that's contradict well that contradicts the principle or the foundation for hedge money also it's
interesting the the extent to which econom is decentralized uh my last question though is about if the United
States wants to contain China with it appears as some of the policies over the past well at least weeks if not months
has been maybe contradictory so I looked then well lesser extent Taiwan the the
threats to to yeah shift all of its uh well to have all the semiconductor
industries move to the US but but I thought more the alienation of Japan uh because Japan's always been very maybe
subservient is a strong word but it's been a very loyal ally at least to the United States but we see now with in
this tariff war that the Japanese have been using some very strong language that they don't think the word because
they don't want to be extorted by the United States so this is um well to some
extent unprecedented or new at least do you see uh the possibility of uh with
the uncertain future of the United States or at least it's trying to find a new place in the international economy
do you see a possibility of Japan now seeking to well not switch sides this
doesn't work but at least there diversify its economic partners and open
up a bit more to China if not to gain leverage from within negotiations with
the United States well at least you see China Japan changing uh its relationship
yes but there are tremendous difficulties um there's a great deal of emotional distress involved on both
sides for different reasons um uh the Chinese believe the count 35 million
dead at the hands of the Japanese between 1931 and 1945 a 14-year rampage
through China by Imperial Japan whether the number is that high or not is a matter of dispute but virtually every
family in central east and north China lost someone in that conflration uh and
this is not really understood in the west we know some of us know anyway that the Russians sacrificed terribly or the
Soviets rather because it wasn't just Russians um in in the contest with the
Nazis but um we don't really know about the land war in Asia uh the story is of
American victory in the Pac Pacific over the Japanese Navy um so Japan uh is back
uh as an independent power more and more um it will not bow to the United States
it had the experience of doing so in the Plaza Accords in the 1980s which set
Japan on a course of economic stagnation from which it has never really fully
recovered um and uh it's not going to repeat this experience uh and it
recognizes Japan does as the Chinese do that this contest is less about
economics than it is about power grab or psychological intimidation or
subordination uh to the United States um uh and Japan has recovered a bit of its
national pride and it's not going to do that uh so what we see is the Japanese
acting proactively in a number of spheres for example after the United States withdrew from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership under Mr trump in the first term although the Democrats
also proposed to withdraw um Japan took over the project and the
current uh variant of that uh reflects Japanese leadership in Pacific Asia um
uh Japan has also become more active politically and militarily uh just the
other day two Japanese frigots turned up in the Cambodian port that the Chinese
just completed which is supposedly a Chinese base but isn't it's a a base
that can accommodate military vessels but the first major vessels to go there were not Chinese they were Japanese uh
Japan has got an active military aid program for Vietnam and the Philippines aimed at balancing China uh and it is
actively pursuing uh greater engagement not just with South Korea and um
Indonesia uh important industrial powers in the region uh or with Europe uh but
but also with China so Japan is becoming a uh what I call a node in the glo
uh multinodal international architecture that is it acts independently it can
accommodate thick and thin connections to other countries it can change those
connections it is exists in three dimensions it is not a pole at the end
of a two-dimensional uh connecting line um and uh so uh we
see that uh Japan emerging along with many others um and one of the checks on
Chinese hegemony I believe aside from the ideological one that you mentioned um where the Chinese have an ancient
tradition uh of menious monza who said that if you want international influence
uh you must become a good society that people want to emulate don't go out and
try to sell yourself uh be virtuous and others will want to be like you and will
want to learn from you um that was the American view in the 19th century uh the
lurch into imperialism unfortunately uh cured us of that um but the Chinese um
confront a world in which middle ranking powers uh including some in their own
Pacific Asian region um are now incre increasingly balancing multiple
relationships diversifying their relationships not cleaving solely to uh
one uh protector namely in Pacific Asia the United States but we see this you know
in in West Asia with the emerging emergence of Turkey as a very independent rather unpredictable actor
uh we see the the French trying to reassert an independent role um within
Europe and beyond it we see uh Saudi Arabia emerging as a middle ranking
power in its own right given its hydrocarbons and financial cloud uh we
see Indonesia as a rising potential great power um India of course remains
studiously non-aligned uh we see in Latin America the rise of a concept
called active non-alignment which means we're not going to stick just with the United
States or subject ourselves to the Monroe Doctrine constraints we reserve
the right to build a relationship with the European Union with China with India with Japan um and so forth so we see a
world in which which I I I describe as multi increasingly multinodal um and um
I think polarity thinking on the basis of polarity just doesn't fit with this
emerging world i don't know how it's going to end up looking but it doesn't seem to be compatible with any sort of
polarity you know G2 G3 um uh certainly not
um a single dominant power and a final comment because this is directly
relevant um we can't stop China from becoming the center of its own region uh
we've defaulted already on the trade and economic element of this when we withdrew from TPP
uh we're not part of any of the rulemaking councils in the region which
are composed of countries in the region india by the way has foolishly excluded itself from that but um the Chinese are
very much part of that everybody's trade in the region is directed at China or from China um and uh that's not going to
change technologically as I indicated we're losing the uh by bipart bipolar race
with China um the Australian Strategic Policy Institute which evaluates uh
who's doing the most innovation evaluates 64 areas of technology they claim that China's now ahead in 57 South
Korea in two and the United States in five so the technological competition uh is
not you know we are drifting away from that export controls don't help
persecution of scientists of Asian Chinese origin does not help um the
barriers to student exchange do not help and um so finally we're left with the
military side that's all we have now uh and there uh you know people are hedging
uh they don't want to be involved olved in a war with China uh and they certainly don't want to get involved in
finishing uh the Chinese civil war we we we have to remember that the Taiwan
issue is the product of the defeated side of the Chinese civil war retreating to Taiwan under American protection and
remaining there under American protection separate from the rest of China so the United States is in the
opposition of acknowledging one China there's only one China taiwan's part of
China but on the other hand preventing u a negotiated solution of the Chinese
civil war because every time the Chinese make an offer we up the Andy with
military assistance that gives people in Taiwan who don't want to negotiate the
excuse not to uh so this is a very confused policy and it's not one that is advancing American interests
uh or really enlisting the countries of the region in some sort of joint or shared opposition to to China they're
all um interested in America helping them backing them as they work out a
long-term viable relationship with the country that is at the center of their
region you know I think the the the impulse often to in
Washington to warn other countries about not trading with China or decoupling that is often seen I guess incorrectly
in the through the lens of block politics but it's a the reason why I
think a majority of the world is quite welcoming of China's rise is not that they want to subordinate themselves to a
Chinese block versus American but it's what it represents when you have many centers of power what what promise this
gives to states around the world is is the ability to diversify if you trade with both China and US as well as others
uh you can have more independent economic policy which translates into more political autonomy i think this is
the why it's so attractive i think often the the yeah the impulse to prevent
countries from uh diversifying it's uh it's yeah it's seen as almost an assault
on political autonomy uh well the the the the the net effect of the changes that uh
I've described in the world order which give greater freedom of maneuver to middlesized and smaller countries uh
within within an increasingly diverse um polyodal if you will uh system uh gives
smaller and medium-sized countries agency that they didn't have uh it gives them uh the freedom to pursue their own
development in the way they wish uh and uh so in this connection the American
position is u is a losing one um because the Chinese
say how you develop is up to you we don't have anything to say about that if you want to learn from us go ahead you
want to learn from someone else so that doesn't bother us um and we say you have to conform to our way or the highway you
Um and the um the other issue is that u
the Chinese are not trying to block the US uh from make selling goods or
services anywhere um and we're trying to block them uh so uh as someone said u I
think it was Larry Summers said he heard from an African interlocutor you know that when uh the Chinese come they offer
roads and dams and electrification and when you come uh you you you insist that
we conform to your political stances and you offer us nothing um so which is
going to win you know if the United States is going to be successful in uh
remain uh the great power the overwhelmingly superior power that we have been uh we need not only to reform domestically we need to change our foreign policy to recognize the interests of other countries and try to serve them or or surf those interests rather than resist them someone said you know when um when the winds of change blow uh some people build walls to keep the wind out other people build windmills we need to be build windmills and u so I think the Chinese challenge is correctly described by the European Union as systemic it is a systemic challenge it's a choice between an open
world of many uh many uh different paths to modernity and a closed world which is dominated by protectionism and by the way I don't think that tariffs are going to re-industrialize the United States but um that's that is a uh one of the many ways in which the weird has been normalized theoretically in my country well I see a lot of self-defeating policies on both sides of the Atlantic these days so um a lot of self harm uh anyways I hope people in Washington still pays attention to you as uh we can maybe reduce some of this self harm anyways thank you so much again for your time uh yeah always learn from listening to you so thanks again well thank you for uh having me on and I apologize for the convoluted nature of my responses to your very simple questions no that was that's what makes it interesting so thank you so much bye byebye