Mearsheimer 零和博弈 大國將一國的收益視為其他國家的損失

米爾斯海默的“零和”博弈理論應用於“大霸主”的概念，表明國際關係中的大國將一國的收益視為其他國家的損失。這意味著，隨著一國權力或影響力的增強，其他國家會發現自己的權力和影響力正在減弱。米爾斯海默認為，這種零和博弈的視角會導致持續的權力鬥爭，並傾向於阻止其他國家獲得地區霸權，即使這意味著引發衝突。

闡述：

零和博弈：

在零和博弈中，一方的收益會直接被另一方的損失抵消。在國際關係的語境中，這意味著如果一國變得更強大，其他國家就會被認為變得更弱，從而形成競爭態勢。

大霸主：

“大霸主”一詞指的是霸權國家，通常指美國，它試圖通過阻止其他國家獲得類似的權力來維持其主導地位。

米爾斯海默的論點：

米爾斯海默在其著作《大國政治的悲劇》中概述了其理論，他認為，像美國這樣的大國，其根本驅動力在於生存和安全。為了實現這一目標，它們會努力爭取地區霸權，即在特定地區占據主導地位。

防止霸權：

大國，尤其是“大霸權”，對其他國家取得地區霸權心存疑慮。這是因為地區霸權可能對其自身的利益和安全構成重大威脅。
零和博弈視角：

這種對敵對霸權的恐懼源於零和博弈視角，即一個國家的崛起被視為對其他國家的直接威脅。因此，大國會采取行動對抗任何潛在的競爭對手，通常是通過軍事幹預或其他形式的施壓。

示例：

米爾斯海默列舉了美國對抗德意誌帝國、納粹德國、日本帝國和蘇聯等曆史案例，認為美國試圖阻止這些國家在各自地區實現區域霸權，體現了其在國際關係中的零和博弈策略。

原型博弈催生了多種權力、衝突與合作模式

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355330002_Archetypal_games_generate_diverse_models_of_power_conflict_and_cooperation

作者：布萊恩·布倫斯  2021年12月 

摘要與圖表
相互依存有多種形式。我們展示了三種權力模式如何催生出理解社會生態係統動態和轉型的多種模型。原型博弈所追蹤的路徑超越了對少數社會困境的關注，從而能夠識別和理解社會情境中的多樣性和複雜性，包括家庭協調和背叛問題。我們運用擴展的二人二選（2×2）博弈的拓撲結構，推導出簡單的相互依賴原型，從而生成具有重疊機會和挑戰的集體行動模型。通過均等化結果排序（建立平局以表明結果間的無差異性）來簡化收益矩陣，得到三個原型博弈，它們在順序上等同於社會心理學中相互依賴理論所定義的獨立、協調和交換的收益結構。這三種對稱的權力模式結合起來，構成了一個非對稱的零和衝突原型，並進一步構成了權力和依賴結構。區分結果排序（打破平局）將這些原始原型轉化為更複雜的配置，包括協同、妥協、慣例、競爭和優勢的中間原型。相互依存的原型模型及其產生不同情況的途徑有助於理解社會生態係統的製度多樣性和潛在轉變，區分組織的收斂和發散集體行動問題，並闡明治理中權力的基本模式。

Mearsheimer's "zero-sum" game theory, as applied to the concept of the "Big Bully," suggests that great powers in international relations view gains for one state as losses for others. This means that as one state gains power or influence, other states see their own power and influence diminishing. Mearsheimer argues that this zero-sum perspective leads to a constant struggle for power and a tendency to prevent other states from achieving regional hegemony, even if it means engaging in conflict. 
Elaboration:
Zero-Sum Game:
In a zero-sum game, one player's gain is directly offset by another player's loss. In the context of international relations, this means that if one state becomes stronger, other states are perceived to become weaker, leading to a competitive dynamic.
Big Bully:
The term "Big Bully" refers to a hegemonic state, often the United States, that seeks to maintain its dominance by preventing other states from achieving similar power.
Mearsheimer's Argument:
Mearsheimer's theory, outlined in his book "The Tragedy of Great Power Politics," argues that great powers, like the United States, are driven by a fundamental quest for survival and security. To achieve this, they will strive for regional hegemony, which is a position of dominance within a specific region.
Preventing Hegemony:
Great powers, especially the Big Bully, are wary of other states achieving regional hegemony. This is because a regional hegemon can pose a significant threat to the Big Bully's own interests and security.
Zero-Sum Perspective:
This fear of a rival hegemon stems from the zero-sum perspective, where the rise of one state is seen as a direct threat to the others. Therefore, great powers will act to counter any potential rivals, often through military intervention or other forms of pressure.
Examples:
Mearsheimer cites historical examples like the United States' actions against Imperial Germany, Nazi Germany, Imperial Japan, and the Soviet Union, arguing that the US sought to prevent these states from achieving regional hegemony in their respective regions, demonstrating a zero-sum approach to international relations. 

Archetypal games generate diverse models of power, conflict, and cooperation

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/355330002_Archetypal_games_generate_diverse_models_of_power_conflict_and_cooperation
December 2021
Authors: Bryan Bruns

Abstract and Figures
Interdependence takes many forms. We show how three patterns of power generate diverse models for understanding dynamics and transformations in social-ecological systems. Archetypal games trace pathways that go beyond a focus on a few social dilemmas to recognize and understand diversity and complexity in a landscape of social situations, including families of coordination and defection problems. We apply the extended topology of two-person two-choice (2 × 2) games to derive simple archetypes of interdependence that generate models with overlapping opportunities and challenges for collective action. Simplifying payoff matrices by equalizing outcome ranks (making ties to show indifference among outcomes) yields three archetypal games that are ordinally equivalent to payoff structures for independence, coordination, and exchange, as identified by interdependence theory in social psychology. These three symmetric patterns of power combine to make an asymmetric archetype for zero-sum conflict and further structures of power and dependence. Differentiating the ranking of outcomes (breaking ties) transforms these primal archetypes into more complex configurations, including intermediate archetypes for synergy, compromise, convention, rivalry, and advantage. Archetypal models of interdependence, and the pathways through which they generate diverse situations, could help to understand institutional diversity and potential transformations in social-ecological systems, to distinguish between convergent and divergent collective action problems for organizations, and to clarify elementary patterns of power in governance.