Michael Cox 權力轉移、經濟變革與西方的衰落？

Michael Cox 權力轉移、經濟變革與西方的衰落？

2012年11月28日

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/power-shifts-economic-change-and-the-decline-of-the-west/power-shifts-economic-change-and-the-decline-of-the-west

邁克爾·考克斯教授，倫敦政治經濟學院

0.1 摘要
21世紀初，我們熟知的西方世界正在迅速失去其主導地位，取而代之的是一個新的國際體係，這個體係要麽由所謂的“金磚四國”塑造，要麽由“其他國家”塑造，或者更通俗地說，由定義非常廣泛的亞洲塑造。至少，許多經濟學家、曆史學家和世界政治學者現在是這樣看待更廣闊的國際體係未來的。本文並不質疑一些不言而喻的經濟事實，也不假設50年後的世界仍將與現在一樣。然而，它確實質疑了“權力轉移”正在不可抗拒地發生，以及西方和美國正在急劇衰落的觀點。具體來說，它對這種新敘事提出了一些批判性論點。首先，它指出，這種敘事合理地聚焦於世界正在發生的明顯變化，卻不幸地忽略了那些沒有發生變化的事物；因此，它低估了美國及其主要西方盟友仍然享有的、可以籠統地稱之為持續的結構性優勢。其次，雖然許多新興國家確實在世界經濟中扮演著更重要的角色，但它們的崛起需要比以往更加謹慎地審視；事實上，當我們進行這樣的審視時，就會越來越清楚地看到，包括中國在內的其他國家的崛起仍然受到諸多內外因素的阻礙。第三，盡管亞洲地區以及作為其一部分的中國正在更廣泛的世界經濟中扮演著越來越重要的角色，但這種發展本身並不對西方構成重大挑戰。事實上，正如我在文章結尾所言，過去五到十年間作家們所關注的那些轉變，與其說是對西方的挑戰，不如說是對西方的補充。

0.2 引言
即使是最有曆史頭腦的人，記憶也常常會捉弄人，尤其是那些經曆過過去十年動蕩的人。事實上，現在幾乎不可能回想起，在那場最出乎意料的、震驚世界的事件——被統稱為“冷戰結束”——發生之後的十年裏，西方有多少人顯得多麽自信。平心而論，一些觀察家確實感覺到，後冷戰新秩序中存在著某種明顯的不真實感，甚至可能是暫時的。1 一些人甚至預測，我們很快就會懷念冷戰。2 但當時大多數評論家的看法並非如此。恰恰相反。在目睹蘇聯計劃的迅速瓦解以及隨後十年的全球市場擴張（亦稱全球化）之後，大多數專家開始相信，自由市場、民主擴張和美國實力的成功結合將確保下一個千年的秩序。3 誠然，當時的西方似乎正處於絕對的上升期，重組曾經的計劃經濟，開放先前封閉的體係，吸納昔日的敵人，並打破一度關閉的政治和經濟大門。誠然，西方有時未能采取行動，例如在盧旺達；而且，西方常常忽視這樣一個事實：一些行為體（後來因“9·11”事件而聲名鵲起）顯然尚未融入那個被稱為“國際社會”的傳說中的實體。但隨著一個世紀的更迭，從美國太平洋沿岸到新統一的歐洲中部的西方世界似乎可以期待數十年充滿自信的繁榮與和平。

這種樂觀情緒在最後一個超級大國的土地上最為盛行。事實上，美國似乎正處於一個尤其令人羨慕的地位。一些人繼續懷疑“單極時刻”是否真的隻是幻覺。4 一兩位分析人士甚至猜測美國實力的極限。5 偶爾也有特立獨行的人繼續重複保羅·肯尼迪的老話，認為美國正在衰落。6 除了最悲觀的人之外，很少有人預見到未來會有任何其他大國崛起來平衡其強大的實力。相反，在擊敗蘇聯，並經曆了自身八年的經濟繁榮之後，美國和美國人可以合理地期待下一個完全屬於美國的世紀。7 事實上，到20世紀90年代末，這種情緒如此高漲，以至於一些作家開始將美國描述為波托馬克河上的新羅馬，甚至是一個現代“帝國”，擁有全球影響力、無限的軟實力和龐大的軍事機器，可以

比賽。對某些人來說，美國的確已經成為曆史上最強大的國家，並且擁有一個非常明顯的特征：與從羅馬到英國的曆代強國不同，美國永遠不會衰落。8

人們常說，每一次衰落之前都會有一段寬限期。或許，二十世紀最後一個狂妄自大的十年也是如此。但衰落到來之時，其影響之深遠；以至於後來一家美國雜誌不得不承認，2000年至2010年簡直就是“地獄般的十年”。9 這十年當然始於“9·11”事件以及布什政府應對此事件的戰略失誤。10 隨著經濟確定性的逐漸喪失，情況持續惡化，最終導致西方金融危機在地緣政治上遭遇巨大挫折。11 而當西方自身日益明顯地麵臨來自世界資本主義經濟中其他非西方參與者的巨大挑戰時，一些人認為情況每況愈下。2001年，高盛提出“金磚國家”的概念時，隻有經濟學家（而且數量不多）認真對待。12 但隨著時間的推移，經濟數據開始湧現，人們開始意識到，最初提出這一概念的吉姆·奧尼爾似乎有著非凡的先見之明。13 事實上，他基於嚴謹的經濟研究的核心思想——即未來的經濟秩序——東亞將不再像巴西、俄羅斯、印度和中國等經濟體巨頭那樣受西方主導——這似乎提供了無可辯駁的證據，表明世界正處於一場全球革命之中。14 造成這種情況的原因是多方麵的。但有一點是顯而易見的。幾個世紀以來一直圍繞大西洋運轉的國際體係的軸心正在向其他方向移動——要麽轉向亞洲地區，15 要麽更籠統地轉向被著名專欄作家費雷德·紮卡裏亞含糊地稱為“其他地區”的地區。16 這不僅僅是紮卡裏亞或奧尼爾的觀點。2004 年，時任《外交》雜誌編輯警告西方，一場潛在的令人不安的“權力轉移正在醞釀中”。17 幾年過去了，一位在世界政治方麵頗具影響力的自由派作家也提出了同樣的觀點。根據約翰·伊肯伯裏的說法，問題不再是財富和權力是否正在從西方和北方轉移。這一點是不言而喻的。他現在繼續思考的問題是“由此將出現什麽樣的全球政治秩序”。18 自由主義傾向不那麽強的尼爾·弗格森對此表示讚同。但在他看來，不僅僅是曾經“充斥著應用程序”的西方正在衰落。19 他所選擇的“移居國”也是如此。“超級強國”不再是超級強國。20 美國的黃金時代已經過去，帝國正在衰落。21

不出所料，這些翻天覆地的變化在世界各地引發了激烈的爭論，尤其是在西方國家。22 觀點搖擺不定，一邊是極度悲觀的——他們認為所有權力轉移都隻會導致全球衝突加劇，23 另一邊則堅持認為，新興經濟體隻有將更多國家納入世界市場，才能增加世界財富。然而，引發最熱烈討論的卻是中國的崛起，正如羅伯特·阿特所觀察到的，其原因非常充分。24事實上，幾乎在一夜之間，似乎每個人都對中國發表了一些重要的看法。25觀點分歧很大，一兩位作者聲稱中國正迅速成為國際社會負責任的利益相關者，26少數人認為中國快速的經濟擴張是西方避免全球經濟衰退的唯一障礙，另一些人認為中國對美國霸權構成了真正的威脅，27還有更多的人認為，如果中國在西方從低增長跌至零增長的同時繼續增長，它可能很快就會統治亞洲，28甚至統治世界。29但無論如何評價中國，有一件事是顯而易見的。這個“不安分的帝國”30在經曆了相對平靜的十年（1999年一位作者甚至建議我們不要太認真地對待中國）31之後終於從沉睡中醒來，現在正準備登上世界霸主的寶座。一場重心轉移正在發生32——或者至少有人如此認為——無論人們是否將中國的經濟崛起視為必然結果33、將其視為對其19世紀屈辱時期的必要糾正34、是否擔心其對全球經濟和政治秩序的影響35，或是否認為其崛起必然會導致“激烈的安全競爭”36，有一件事是肯定的：國際體係正在經曆一場甚至連西方政府現在都認為將永遠改變世界的變革37。

接下來，我想探討一下許多人現在認為的世界秩序不可逆轉的變化所引發的問題。我這樣做的目的並非探究所有這些

他的方法，如果有的話，是為了國際關係理論（這在其他地方已經做過）38，而是質疑現在流行的我們已經進入“後西方世界”的觀點是否屬實。39 顯然，我並不質疑一些不證自明的經濟事實。40 然而，正如卡爾多年前指出的那樣，事實並不總是不言自明的；即使有些人似乎認為事實如此，它們仍然可以以某種方式被排列組合，從而描繪出一幅不完整的現代世界圖景。

我在下麵提出了幾個論點。其一，這個現代故事雖然令人興奮且有趣，但它往往幾乎完全關注正在快速變化的事物，而很少提及沒有變化的事物——而變化遠低於一些人現在認為的變化的是美國在世界上的地位。41 術語上也存在混淆。沒有一個嚴肅的人會否認過去幾年世界經濟形態發生了可衡量的變化。然而，太多的作家要麽假設經濟重心的轉移與權力轉移是一回事（事實並非如此）； 42 或者，他們得出結論，隨著這些經濟變化的持續，要麽導致權力從一個霸權國轉移到另一個霸權國（這一點值得懷疑），43 要麽創造一個現在經常（並且可疑地）被稱為新“亞洲世紀”的時代。44 我將努力表明，這些斷言包含嚴重的分析缺陷。我堅持認為，同樣有缺陷的是我們能夠對世界未來走向做出大膽預測的想法。但正如丹·加德納令人信服地表明的那樣，正確預測未來在過去已被證明是愚蠢的。45 我想說，這為那些現在自信地預測未來幾十年將發生重大權力轉移的人提供了重要的教訓。46 “其他國家”現在可能正在快速增長，而美國和歐盟則在萎靡不振。然而，正如更多冷靜的分析人士所指出的，西方的危機可能不會永遠持續下去，而其他國家（包括印度47和中國48）麵臨的諸多問題，可能會阻礙它們在經濟排行榜上看似勢不可擋的崛起。當然，沒有什麽是永恒的。一個新的世界或許正在形成。但它可能並非如今世界各地熱議的那個世界。

0.3 美國經濟衰退？
正如我們已經指出的，支持“權力轉移”正在發生這一觀點的大部分理由都基於這樣一個假設：西方的領頭羊——美利堅合眾國——正麵臨著一場不可阻擋的經濟衰退。如果這種衰退持續下去，要麽會讓其他國家趁虛而入，要麽會削弱其領導能力。當然，許多普通美國人以及那些評論當今美國的人都相信情況確實如此。49 當然，這個故事可以用，而且已經用非常不同的方式講述過。對於一些人來說，這個過程可能會很緩慢，並且可以相當容易地、甚至“禮貌地”進行處理。50 對於其他人來說，它必然會產生巨大的影響，不僅對美國外交政策的實施，而且對整個世界。當然，如果有人接受霸權穩定理論（並認為霸權正在衰落），那麽世界的未來看起來確實非常棘手。51 無論如何，鑒於美國在世界貿易中的份額下降、中國經濟崛起、債務增加、經濟自2008年以來放緩，以及其對外國債務購買者的依賴程度不斷上升，許多分析人士認為，至少美國要麽“需要收縮”，52 要麽更棘手地將接力棒交給其他更強大的大國。53

關於美國經濟衰退的爭論由來已久。54 事實上，自20世紀60年代末以來，一位又一位專家一直在預測美國將麵臨可怕的局麵，理由是，正如一位作家在1977年所言，美國正在變成一個非常普通的國家。55 十年後，保羅·肯尼迪也提出了類似的觀點，56 伊曼紐爾·沃勒斯坦在2002年也提出了類似的觀點，57 隨後大衛·卡萊奧也提出了類似的觀點。幾年後。58 事實上，自20世紀60年代末以來，幾乎沒有一個時刻——除了20世紀90年代的“單極時刻”（甚至那時也沒有）——人們不曾對美國經濟的未來進行猜測。但這一次，我們可以放心，衰退是“真實的”。根據最近一項研究（由一位英國記者撰寫），由於教育體係不再適用、中產階級正在倒退、政治體係陷入僵局，美國正處於自由落體狀態，幾乎沒有時間恢複。59

當然，美國存在諸多經濟問題，這一點毋庸置疑。同樣不容置疑的是，它今天在世界GDP中的份額遠低於，比如說，25年前，更不用說二戰結束時，它是世界資本主義體係中唯一重要的參與者了。60 但這絕不等同於暗示美國正處於不可逆轉的經濟衰退之中。

認為美國經濟正在衰退——現在是一種普遍觀點——或者認為中國已經趕超美國——同樣流行的觀點。即使以最簡單的 GDP 衡量標準，美國也遠遠領先於中國。因此，人口約占世界總人口 20% 的中國創造了全球 GDP 的七分之一到十分之一，而人口僅占世界人口 6% 的美國仍然創造了全球 GDP 的 20% 到 25%。事實上，按照簡單的 GDP 衡量標準，美國經濟仍然比接下來的四個最大經濟體（即中國、日本、德國和英國）的總和還要強大。比較世界各地的平均生活水平，尤其是與金磚國家相比，差距更大。顯然，這些國家數百萬人的生活正在改善；貧困正在減少；新的中產階級正在形成。盡管如此，金磚國家（最明顯的是印度和巴西）仍然存在大量貧困人口。此外，就生活水平而言，美國仍然遙遙領先，其總體平均水平比巴西高出四倍，比中國高出六倍，比印度高出十五倍之多。61

對於發展經濟學家來說，這一切或許並不令人意外。然而，奇怪的是，這卻讓美國公眾感到震驚，因為他們在2012年得出了一個略顯奇怪的結論：美國在經濟上已被中國超越，而且很可能將越來越落後於太平洋彼岸的中國這個經濟勁敵。62 事實上，《經濟學人》最近的一項研究巧妙地闡述了認知與現實之間的差距。在此，作者們對“衰落論者”的挑戰並非將美國與其他國家經濟體進行比較，而是將其他國家經濟體與聯邦內的特定州進行比較。結果很有啟發。舉個例子：加利福尼亞州。以GDP計算，它仍然略微比巴西和俄羅斯富裕，幾乎是土耳其和印度尼西亞（這兩個經濟體現在受到越來越多的讚揚）的兩倍。與此同時，德克薩斯州的經濟規模幾乎與俄羅斯相當，略小於印度。63 這聽起來不像是一個正在衰落的經濟體。

如果說美國並非當今許多文獻中所描述的那個正在衰落的經濟超級大國，那麽它仍然能夠做到其他國家夢寐以求的事情。這部分是由於它的規模；部分是由於地理位置的運氣（美國擁有大量的石油、天然氣、煤炭和糧食）；部分是由於它在更廣泛的世界經濟體係中的根深蒂固的地位。正如卡拉·諾洛夫最近所指出的，盡管自二戰結束以來經濟逐漸衰退，但美國仍然擁有一些關鍵特征，使其擁有她所謂的“區位優勢”，超越所有其他國家。她甚至挑戰了如今盛行的美國霸權負擔大於收益的觀點。她提出了相反的觀點：華盛頓在提供公共產品方麵實際上獲得的收益大於其付出的收益。64 美國還有另一個非常特殊的優勢：美元。正如道格·斯托克斯令人信服地指出的那樣，這種特殊的“金融實力賦予美國廣泛的特權”，歸根結底，這是“其他國家願意購買、持有和使用美元”的副產品。他們這樣做當然並非因為他們特別愛美國人，而是為了維護一個經濟體係，而他們的自身繁榮仍然依賴於這個體係的健康。此外，正如斯托克斯繼續指出的那樣，即使是金融危機也沒有像一些人認為的那樣削弱美國的地位。事實上，在一個充滿不確定性的世界（最明顯的是歐盟），最純粹的“貨幣”已經逃往安全之地，而沒有哪個地方被認為比美國更安全。諷刺的是，從這個意義上來說，金融危機非但沒有削弱美國的金融實力，反而鞏固了它。 65

我們評判經濟實力，不僅要看經濟規模，還要看“競爭力”這一定性標準。像中國、印度和巴西這樣的經濟體無疑規模龐大，而且隨著時間的推移，規模無疑會越來越大。但這並不一定意味著它們與大多數西方國家或美國相比具有競爭力。最近的一項調查顯示，美國在15個國家中位列世界第四。此外，這15個國家中有11個國家明確屬於西方國家，而其他4個國家包括日本、台灣、香港和新加坡——這些國家都與西方和美國關係密切。至於金磚國家，它們的排名則靠後。中國排在第27位，印度排在第51位，巴西排在第58位，俄羅斯排在第63位。66 其他研究也得出了類似的結論。

得出的結論大體上與此類似，即一些“新興”經濟體與許多較為成熟的經濟體（尤其是美國）之間仍然存在著質的差距。在尖端科技研究方麵，美國仍然保持著明顯的領先地位。2008年，美國占全球研發支出總額的40%，占全球專利新技術發明的38%。更重要的是，美國的科研成果占全球引用總數的49%，占被引用次數最多的論文的63%。美國還繼續聘用了全球約70位諾貝爾獎獲得者，並擁有其被引用次數最多的科技研究人員的三分之二。67

創新也是美國的一大優勢。68 其他國家顯然正在迎頭趕上。然而，美國仍然是一個在各個領域持續創新的國家。批評人士無疑會指出，美國的排名正在下滑。然而，它仍然位居世界第四。與此同時，中國在2009年僅排在第54位，印度排在第56位，巴西和俄羅斯則落後得更遠。當然，這還沒有考慮到長期的變化，也沒有考慮到像中國這樣的國家正在齊心協力建設更具創新性的經濟。69

但正如中國人也承認的那樣，它還有很長的路要走。事實上，盡管官方努力鼓勵中國所謂的“自主創新能力”，但中國政治經濟仍然存在一些弱點。其中最突出的是“知識產權執法不力、教育體係強調死記硬背而不是批判性思維，以及缺乏能夠評估科學進步的獨立機構”。70 此外，還有更廣泛的政治限製。創新通常需要公開辯論、挑戰既定真理的能力以及思考不可想象之事的動力；坦率地說，這些在當今的現代中國都鮮有體現。71

最後，就全球經濟實力而言，美國在另一個重要方麵仍然遙遙領先：企業實力。72一些新興經濟體正在開始迎頭趕上；美國在歐洲和亞洲的一些最親密的盟友則位居第二。73 但美國顯然仍處於“民意調查位置”，美國公司占據全球前 10 名公司中的 4 家，前 30 名中的 14 家，前 50 名中的 25 家。西方公司總體上仍然超過所有其他公司，美國和歐盟加起來在全球前 10 名公司中占據 6 家，前 30 名中的 22 家，前 50 名中的 37 家。金磚四國的一些經濟體確實有一些非常大的公司，其中中國毫無意外地處於領先地位，在前 10 名中占據 4 家，前 50 名中占據 8 家，在前 500 名中占據 61 家；對於一個僅在25年前在世界經濟中幾乎無足輕重的國家來說，這無疑是一項非凡的成就。74 然而，正如布魯金斯學會最近的一項研究表明，這並不意味著這些公司在國際上活躍，甚至不應被視為真正意義上的“跨國公司”。事實上，中國排名前57位的大陸公司中，有49家仍然處於國家控製之下；除極少數例外，絕大多數公司主要在國內運營——原因有很多，包括缺乏具備必要語言技能和海外工作經驗的管理人員、缺乏透明度、全球品牌影響力較弱，以及難以輕鬆適應外國的法律、稅收和政治環境。75

0.4 硬實力——軟實力：什麽是實力？
如果美國保留了一些非常強大的經濟資產，那麽它在更廣泛的國際體係中仍然非常強大的地位也同樣如此。當然，這種觀點已不再是流行的觀點。事實上，正如我們已經指出的，伊拉克戰爭的失策、“反恐戰爭”中的酷刑、2008年美國金融體係的瀕臨崩潰以及此後美國經濟的緩慢複蘇，這些因素共同導致許多人質疑美國領導其他國家或爭取其對外政策支持的能力。布讚或許對此做出了最深刻的闡釋。他早在2008年就宣稱美國代表著自由主義的未來，如今卻“破滅”了。與此同時，美國模式不再令人欽佩。想要效仿它的州的數量正在迅速減少。他繼續說道，更普遍地說，霸權在國際社會中變得越來越“不合法”。結果，美國在世界上的地位變得越來越“脆弱”。76

顯然，這種說法有其道理，這也是為什麽這種論點在那些認為我們正處於“權力轉移”之中的人中如此受歡迎的原因之一。

但顯然，該報告的一個問題在於，它嚴重低估了美國在奧巴馬總統提議的非常有限的削減之後仍能動員的硬實力。77 在弱者可以對強者造成巨大傷害的非對稱戰爭時代，軍事力量的重要性日益降低，這種觀點在學術界或許頗為流行。然而，美國能夠動員盡可能多的軍事人力（目前美國陸軍的男女士兵人數比“9·11”事件前夕還要多），78 能夠將軍事力量投射到地球的每個角落，仍然是亞洲和歐洲安全的主要提供者，並且在“國防”上的支出也依然如此——約占世界國防總支出的45%——這些事實本身就表明，美國距離成為超級大國還有很長的路要走。其他國家的軍事實力也無法與其相比，即使是中國，也擁有龐大的常備軍（自 1979 年災難性的入侵越南之後就沒有再打過仗）79 和日益壯大的遠洋海軍，現在擁有一艘航空母艦80。事實上，當中國的第一艘航空母艦終於在 2011 年首次進行海試時，該地區的警鍾就響了起來。81 然而，中國的一艘航空母艦根本無法與美國的 11 艘航母戰鬥群相比。中國軍隊的持續現代化也遠未達到美國的水平。最新數據顯示，美國在國家安全方麵的支出不僅是中國的五倍，而且其在該地區的許多盟友（其中包括日本、韓國、印度和澳大利亞）的軍費開支也高於中國，而且差距很大——美國近 2000 億美元，而中國為 1150 億美元。 82

這反過來又應該警示我們美國在世界上的顯赫地位的另一個方麵：其極其廣泛的聯盟體係。布讚或許是對的。或許現在願意像冷戰時期那樣“追隨”美國的國家越來越少。此外，巴基斯坦、土耳其和埃及等一些“問題”國家與華盛頓的關係也日益緊張。盡管如此，即使是那些對美國領導能力心存疑慮的人，也發現他們別無選擇，隻能與美國結盟。對於那些除了美國之外看不到其他安全保障的歐洲人來說，情況顯然如此。但對於拉丁美洲、非洲和亞洲的一些關鍵國家來說，情況也是如此。更確切地說，在亞洲，情況尤其如此；事實上，隨著中國的崛起，大多數亞洲國家（包括共產黨領導的越南）都要求美國在該地區加強而非削弱其存在。因此，中國如今陷入了一種矛盾的境地：在亞洲，經濟影響力日漸增強，但朋友卻越來越少。83 從這個意義上講，其不斷增長的經濟實力並沒有轉化為更大的政治影響力。84 其在亞洲的強硬政策也於事無補。恰恰相反，中國宣稱對南海擁有主權，85 並對其唯一盟友朝鮮的侵略行為保持沉默，這實際上增強了美國的地位，而不是削弱了美國的地位。86 事實上，正是因為中國並不“令人信服”，該地區大多數國家才有可能將美國視為眾所周知的“不可或缺的國家”，其自身的安全最終取決於其持續存在。87

美國在亞洲的持續存在引發了一個更廣泛的問題：廣義上的“權力”是否真的像現在經常聲稱的那樣，正在從西方傾斜。中國很可能成為推動世界經濟的新引擎。它在非洲、巴西和澳大利亞的經濟作用可能已經變得至關重要。中國的新興中產階級或許正在購買越來越多西方樂於出售的高端產品。然而，迄今為止，中國在贏得其他國家友誼和建立信任關係方麵遠未成功。說中國在世界範圍內“普遍受到懷疑”或許有些誇張。88 但中國在與世界互動時確實麵臨一些嚴重困難。部分問題在於文化。盡管中國已經邁出了新的開放步伐，但仍然對“外國人”心存疑慮。此外，絕大多數中國人的觀念極其封閉，對中國境外的世界缺乏經驗，也幾乎不了解。89 事實上，許多中國高級決策者也麵臨同樣的境況，他們中的大多數人很少出國，外語也不太流利，而且都是在中國共產黨的隱秘世界中長大的。但還有一個更大的意識形態和政治問題。中國或許是一個貿易超級大國。但它缺乏遠見，也不知道如何才能成為一個嚴肅的

擔任領導職務，承擔隨之而來的所有責任和風險。如果說中國有什麽不同的話，那就是它極不具備領導能力，因為它對世界抱有防禦性、近乎懷疑的態度，並且不斷重申威斯特伐利亞的舊咒語：國家應該管好自己的事情。而且，也沒有太多跡象表明它願意這樣做。當然，中國人自己也非常坦誠。他們重申，我們的外交政策目標是創造一個國際環境，使我們能夠專注於國內事務和經濟增長；任何幹擾我們完成這項需要數十年才能完成的長期任務的因素都應該不惜一切代價避免。90 中國甚至不確定自己是否認為自己是其他國家效仿的榜樣。事實上，在一個民主——無論多麽不完美——已經成為政治常態的世界裏，它怎麽能做到這一點呢？國外人士可能會欽佩中國取得的成就；一些人甚至希望中國的崛起能夠為國際體係帶來一定程度的平衡。但當中國囚禁異見藝術家，反複攻擊備受敬仰的達賴喇嘛，然後又試圖懲罰另一個主權國家，因為一個完全獨立的委員會向其公民頒發和平獎時，這很難在更廣泛的世界範圍內贏得它的擁護。91

如果說中國在展現自身或它想要構建的世界的積極自信形象方麵真的存在問題，那麽美國很難說存在同樣的問題。92 伊拉克戰爭或許已經讓美國在世界上的地位大幅下降；而更普遍的西方經濟模式也可能因經濟危機而遭受打擊。然而，前者因2008年奧巴馬當選而受到部分損害；而後者至今尚未引發任何人認真地提出替代方案。此外，“西方”盡管存在種種缺陷——日益加劇的不平等、道德標準下滑等等——但看起來仍然比其他任何方案都更具吸引力。最近的一項研究表明，“軟實力”幾乎完全是西方國家，或者更確切地說是民主國家的專利。在包括大多數西歐國家以及兩個亞洲國家——日本和韓國——的排行榜上，美國仍然位居榜首。另一方麵，在接受評估的30個國家中，中國排在第20位，略高於第21位的巴西，其次是第27位的印度和第28位的俄羅斯。93

西方國家在軟實力方麵持續保持高分有幾個原因，最明顯的是西方國家擁有多元化的政治文化，持有不同政見的人通常不會被判處長期監禁或更糟的後果。但另一個原因——顯然與之相關——與其開放的高等教育體係有關。即使是備受詬病的美國，也仍然具有強大的吸引力，而中國本身的吸引力尤其強大，因為每年都有大量中國學生尋求進入美國高校深造。他們中的許多人最終可能會回到中國。然而，他們顯然相信，在美國大學接受教育將改善他們在日益嚴峻的中國就業市場中的就業前景。94 這種暫時的“人才流失”並非曆史偶然。事實上，西方和美國持續強大的一個更明顯的標誌就是其大學部門。95 其他國家和大洲當然也有大學。但其中很少有在國際上排名特別靠前的。96 金磚國家在提高標準方麵似乎麵臨著幾乎無法克服的困難。例如，巴西和印度沒有一所大學進入前100名，俄羅斯隻有一所，中國僅有5所——其中3所位於香港。與此同時，美國擁有世界排名前十的大學中的8所，前五十的37所，以及前一百的58所。即使是英國，也有17所大學上榜，而整個亞洲隻有13所。97

如果高等教育的標準仍然由西方製定，那麽更普遍地規範國際關係的規則和相關機構也同樣如此。誠然，當今世界上許多最重要的機構並未發揮應有的作用：隨著時間的推移，國際經濟的變化顯然必須反映在世界治理方式中。因此，關於世界是否應該從八國集團轉變為二十國集團的爭論仍在持續。但事實是，幾乎所有管理全球經濟的關鍵規則，以及處理核不擴散、貿易自由化、婦女權利和知識產權保護等極其重要問題的大多數規則，都是由西方國家製定的，而且更有可能由西方國家遵守。98此外，

雖然許多新興經濟體或許對西方過去的行為以及美國現在的行為有很多完全合理的抱怨，但它們中沒有一個真正有意願或能力以任何有意義的方式挑戰西方。這在很大程度上與它們仍然高度依賴西方市場和西方外國直接投資有關。但更重要的是，它們意識到過去25年的成功在某種程度上取決於它們廣泛采用西方的經濟規則。這並不是要貶低它們對自身成功的貢獻。我們也不應該認為像中國和印度這樣的國家已經采用了純粹的西方模式。它們並沒有。盡管如此，它們備受矚目的崛起，隻有在它們放棄一種相當自給自足的經濟模式，開啟漫長的旅程，邁向一個設計西化、視野自由、以市場為導向的全球經濟時，才真正開始。

0.5 一個新的亞洲世紀？
如果如我所言，西方的全球影響力遠超許多近來作家的設想，那麽，我們該如何解釋如今許多分析人士似乎不言而喻的事實：我們正在進入一個新的亞洲世紀，在這個世紀裏，傳統意義上的西方將擁有更少的財富，總體上也更加弱小？99 這僅僅是無知、一廂情願，還是一種誤解？又或者，正如保羅·肯尼迪等作家所堅持的那樣，100 而美國公眾現在似乎也相信了這一點？至少有一項民意調查顯示，大多數美國人現在認為亞洲比歐洲重要得多。101 這似乎也是許多美國政策製定者的觀點——尤其是奧巴馬政府，他們並沒有完全忽視歐洲，而是對亞洲表現出了比世界其他任何地方都更大的積極性和興趣。

在許多與現代亞洲相關的問題上，人們不可能存在嚴重的分歧。亞洲在世界經濟中的比重顯然已經增強。亞洲擁有兩個金磚國家——中國和印度。它提供了巨大的投資機遇，也是東盟這一日益重要的區域組織的所在地。過去二十年，亞洲的快速增長也伴隨著貧困人口的大幅減少。僅在東亞和太平洋地區，目前日生活費不足1.25美元的人口比例就已從1990年的55%下降到2006年的17%。僅中國就在過去二十五年裏使近2億人擺脫了貧困。102

這些成就都是實實在在的。此外，與歐洲許多地區目前糟糕的經濟形勢相比，這些成就簡直堪稱奇跡。但我們應該謹防誇大其詞，尤其是在宣布尚未到來的“亞洲世紀”時。亞洲在世界上的比重確實上升了。但我認為，上升幅度遠低於人們普遍的預期。事實上，仔細觀察這些數據就會發現，經濟實力從西方向東方的轉移可能被誇大了。例如，1995 年亞洲占世界 GDP 的比重（按市場匯率計算的名義值）已達到 29%。十五年後，這一比例並未提高。至於現在普遍接受的觀點，即亞洲生產商正在快速獲得越來越大的全球出口份額，數據表明，1995 年整個地區可占到總出口的 28%，但到 2009 年卻隻達到 31%，十五年間僅增長了 3%。這些基礎數字也沒有考慮其他重要指標，其中許多指標都指向亞洲經濟體的重大缺陷。例如，沒有一個亞洲巨人擁有內生的技術進步。中國產品的質量與世界標準不符。而在硬件和軟件技術等關鍵的尖端領域，美國仍然占據主導地位。103簡而言之，亞洲要趕上西方還有很長的路要走——順便說一句，西方的總產出仍然是東方的兩倍。 104

如果我們距離所謂的“亞洲世紀”還很遙遠，那麽另一個原因是，我們稱之為亞洲的這個實體幾乎不存在一個集體行為體。正如許多觀察家指出的那樣，亞洲政治格局最顯著的特征之一就是其碎片化程度。因此，許多亞洲國家（尤其是中國）對日本懷有深深的怨恨。反過來，日本也對中國的崛起心懷怨恨。印度與幾乎所有亞洲鄰國，尤其是中國，都存在問題。大多數亞洲國家也都擁有非常強烈的後殖民認同感。這不僅加劇了彼此之間的猜疑，也削弱了任何共同目標的意識。

最後，在我們談論新的亞洲世紀之前，我們應該提醒自己，世界上還有其他地區，國家之間的關係

各國之間的關係更加穩定和友好——尤其是在跨大西洋關係的各國之間。亞洲可能正在崛起，“金磚四國”也正在興起。然而，我們不應低估構成更廣闊跨大西洋空間的主要國家所擁有的諸多優勢。即使在危機中，美國和歐盟仍然占全球經濟的 40% 以上。105 最重要的國際銀行也位於歐洲和美國。此外，歐洲和美國是其幾乎所有主要商學院的所在地；在石油勘探、航空和化工等領域，它們仍然處於領先地位。兩國也是世界上最重要的外國直接投資來源，也是迄今為止世界上最重要的市場。它們還大量投資於彼此的未來。事實上，2010 年，美國在歐洲的投資遠遠超過其在亞洲或中國的投資——準確地說是三倍。與此同時，歐盟在美國的投資是其在整個亞洲的投資的八倍。如今的美國人或許並不覺得歐洲有什麽特別令人興奮之處。毫無疑問，歐洲人仍會擔心自己在華盛頓的現狀，因為華盛頓幾乎把所有事情都放在歐盟之外。但這並不會降低雙方經濟關係的重要性。正如一位作者所言，盡管新興經濟強國的崛起被大肆炒作，西方國家即將衰落的論調也甚囂塵上，“跨大西洋區域間經濟聯係依然是世界上最大的……”。作者或許還會補充說，如果沒有這種持續的聯係及其帶來的繁榮，“其他地區”可能根本不會出現。106

0.6 結論
我在本文中提出了一個強有力的論斷，挑戰了“我們正處於某種更大規模的權力轉移之中”這一觀點。在我看來，這不僅誤解了構成“權力”這一複雜概念，而且在經驗上也值得懷疑。正如我試圖在此表明的那樣，美國仍然擁有強大的實力，無論現在還是在可預見的未來，都遠超世界上任何其他國家。與此同時，中國在國內外麵臨著一些基本問題（正如所謂的“金磚四國”的其他成員一樣）。而認為我們正不可避免地走向一些人所認為的……所謂的“亞洲世紀”是不可持續的。我這樣說，並非暗示世界完全靜止不動，也並非主張維持現狀。相反，我試圖透過新聞標題，正確解讀事物。這不僅出於純粹的理性原因，在我看來，也具有戰略意義。畢竟，如果像中國這樣的國家真的相信有一天它會真正統治世界，而美國人擔心情況會變得更糟，除了以他們認為必要的任何方式與之抗爭之外別無選擇，那麽這很容易導致這兩個非常強大的國家之間緊張局勢的升級，在我看來，這是完全不必要的。

我從上述分析中得出另外兩個非常重要的結論。

第一個是關於我們應該從過去吸取的教訓。冷戰在我的思考中占據了重要地位。我不會天真地認為二戰後美蘇之間某種形式的競爭很容易避免。但同樣毋庸置疑的是，西方基於對蘇聯崛起過度擔憂而做出的最壞情況思維，確實使這場衝突比原本可能的情況更加激烈和持久。同樣，盡管背景截然不同，涉及的國家類型也大相徑庭，但如今仍存在一個非常現實的危險：如果政策製定者和分析人士開始大談中國的優勢，而沒有意識到其真正的局限性，他們很容易最終造成又一個安全困境。107

這又讓我想到了未來。正如我之前提到的，如今有太多新的口號預測世界政治將不可避免地發生一場革命，一部分國家衰落，另一部分國家崛起，而這些口號都基於一個完全值得懷疑的理念：我們可以輕易預測五年、十年、十五年甚至近五十年後世界和世界經濟的走向。在此，我隻想呼籲大家更加謙虛謹慎。畢竟，就在冷戰結束前幾年，人們預測蘇聯將保持不變——但事實並非如此。當時人們預測日本將成為世界“老大”，但其金融體係卻崩潰了。2005年，時任美聯儲主席的美國決策者告訴美國市場永遠不會崩潰——然而，僅僅三年後，市場就崩潰了，而且相當戲劇性。由此得出的結論顯而易見：為什麽市場應該崩潰？

當經濟學家和專家告訴我們，金磚國家崛起已成定局，中國（就像之前的日本一樣）成為世界第一隻是時間問題時，我們還能更有信心嗎？

最後，我想在此呼籲一種更為精妙的現代國際體係理論。過去幾年，太多作家把世界描述成一連串台球，它們在某種類似零分製的比賽中互相撞擊，世界某個地方的國家和地區崛起，而世界其他地區的國家和地區則衰落。對一些現實主義者來說，這種說法或許完全有道理。108 然而，它幾乎忽略了其他所有因素，包括一個不言而喻的事實：現代國際經濟如今相互依存度極高，即使我們接受這個完全合理的觀點，即某些國家可以以犧牲其他國家為代價獲得相對利益，但最終大多數國家——其中最明顯的是美國和中國——的繁榮和安全已經完全依賴於彼此。從這個意義上講，我們不再生活在一個由明確的朋友和明確的敵人組成的世界，而是一個夥伴關係成為必需的世界。這種世界觀曾被批評者扣上自由理想主義的帽子。在我看來，在21世紀，它已成為現實主義的最高形式。

Power shifts, economic change and the decline of the west?

28 November 2012

https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/power-shifts-economic-change-and-the-decline-of-the-west/power-shifts-economic-change-and-the-decline-of-the-west

Professor Michael Cox London School of Economics and Political Science

0.1 Abstract

It has become the new truth of the early 21st century that the western world we have known is fast losing its pre-eminence to be replaced by a new international system shaped either by the so-called BRICs, the “rest” or, more popularly by that very broadly defined geographical entity known as Asia. This at least is how many economists, historians and students of world politics are now viewing the future of the larger international system. This essay does not dispute some self-evident economic facts. Nor does it assume that the world will look the same in fifty years time as it does now. It does however question the idea that there is an irresistible “power shift” in the making and that the West and the United States are in steep decline. Specifically it makes a number of critical arguments concerning the new narrative. First, it suggests that this story by reasonably focusing on what is obviously changing in the world unfortunately ignores what is not; as a result it underestimates what might loosely be termed the continued structural advantages still enjoyed by the United States and its major western allies. Secondly, while it is true that many new states are assuming a bigger role in the world economy, their rise needs to be looked at more carefully than it has been so far; indeed, when such an examination is undertaken, it becomes increasingly clear that the rise of others - China’s included - is still hemmed in by several obstacles, internal as well as external. Thirdly, though the Asian region, and China as part of it, is assuming an ever more important role in the wider world economy, this development does not in of itself represent a major challenge to the West as such. Indeed, as I suggest at the end, the shifts which have so preoccupied writers over the past five and ten years might even be viewed less as challenges to the West and more as additions to it.

0.2 Introduction

Memory can often play tricks on even the most historically-minded of individuals, particularly those who have had to live through the last ten turbulent years. Indeed, it is almost impossible now to recall how self-confident so many in the West seemed to be during the decade immediately following that most unpredicted of world shattering events known generically as the “end of the Cold War”. To be fair, some observers did sense that there was something distinctly unreal, possibly temporary, about the new post-Cold War order. 1 A few even forecast that we would all soon be missing the Cold War.2 But that is not how most commentators viewed things at the time. On the contrary. Having witnessed the speedy collapse of the Soviet project followed by a decade of global market expansion (otherwise known as globalization) most pundits came to believe that a successful marriage between free markets, democratic enlargement and US power would guarantee order well into the next millennium.3 Certainly, the West at the time looked as if it was definitely in the ascendancy, restructuring once planned economies, opening up previously closed systems, incorporating former enemies, and smashing down political and economic doors that had at one been time been closed. Admittedly, it sometimes failed to act, as say in Rwanda; and very often it ignored the fact that some actors (who later made their name on 9/11) were clearly not becoming socialized into that fabled entity known as the “international community”. But as one century gave way to another, it appeared as if the western world from the Pacific coast of the United States to the middle of a newly united Europe could look forward to decades of self-confident prosperity and peace.

Nowhere was this mood of optimism more prevalent than in the land of the last remaining superpower. Indeed, the US appeared to be in an especially enviable position. Some continued to wonder whether the „unipolar moment? was really an illusion.4 One or two analysts even speculated about the possible limits of US power.5 And the occasional maverick continued to repeat the old Paul Kennedy line that the United States was in decline.6 Few but the most pessimistic envisaged that any other power would likely rise to balance its vast power in the future. On the contrary, after having seen off the USSR, and then having experienced an eight year economic boom of its own, America and Americans could reasonably look forward to another very American century.7 In fact, so buoyant was the mood by the end of the 1990s, that several writers began to talk of the United States as the new Rome on the Potomac, even a modern “empire” possessing global reach, an infinite surplus of soft power, and a vast military machine to match. For some indeed the US had become the greatest power in history with one very obvious distinguishing feature: unlike its great power predecessors from the Romans to the British, this one would never decline.8

It is often said that before every great fall there is a period of grace. So it was perhaps with the last hubristic decade of the twentieth century. But the fall when it came was profound indeed; to such an extent that one American magazine was later forced to concede that the years between 2000 and 2010 had been nothing less than „the decade from hell?.9 It began of course with 9/11 and the strategically inept response to this by the Bush administration.10 It continued with the gradual erosion of economic certainty which finally culminated with the great geopolitical setback of the western financial crisis.11 And it went from bad to worse in some eyes when it became increasingly clear that the West itself was facing a massive challenge from other non-western players in the world capitalist economy. When Goldman Sachs launched the idea of the „BRICs? in 2001, only economists (and not many of them) took the idea very seriously.12 But as the years passed, and the economic data began to flow in, it began to look as if the author of the original notion, Jim O?Neill, had been brilliantly prescient.13 Indeed, his core idea based on careful economic study – namely that the future economic order would be less dominated by the West than it would be by giant economies like Brazil, Russia, India and China – seemed to provide irrefutable proof that the world was in the midst of a global revolution.14 The causes of this were multiple. But one thing was obvious. The axis of the international system which had for several centuries revolved around the Atlantic was moving elsewhere - either towards Asia as a region,15 or more generally towards something vaguely referred to by the influential columnist, Fareed Zakaria, as the “rest”.16 Nor was this Zakaria or O?Neill?s view alone. In 2004 the then editor of Foreign Affairs had warned the West that there was a potentially disturbing “power shift in the making”. 17 A few years on and one of the more influential liberal writers on world politics made much the same point. It was no longer a question of whether wealth and power were moving away from the West and the North, according to John Ikenberry. That much was self-evident. The big question now he continued was “what kind of global political order” would emerge as a consequence.18 The less liberal Niall Ferguson concurred. But in his view it was not just the once “app-laden” West that was in retreat.19 So too was his adopted country of choice. The “hyper-power” was hyper no more.20 America’s best days were behind it. The empire was on the slide. 21

Unsurprisingly, these seismic alterations generated much intense debate around the world: nowhere more so than in the West itself. 22 Here opinion veered between the deeply pessimistic – all power transitions it was assumed could only lead to intensified global conflict 23 - through to those who insisted that the new emerging economies could only add to the stock of the world’s wealth by bringing more states within the fold of the world market. It was the rise of China however that occasioned the greatest discussion of all, and for very sound material reasons as Robert Art has observed.24 In fact, almost overnight, it seemed as if everybody had something significant to say about China.25 Opinion differed sharply with one or two writers claiming that China was fast becoming a responsible stakeholder in international society, 26 a few that its rapid economic expansion was the only thing standing between the West and a global depression, others that it constituted a real threat to US hegemony,27 and many more that if it continued to grow while the West lurched from low growth to no growth at all, it might soon be running Asia28 or possibly even the world.29 But however one assessed China, one thing looked startling obvious. This “restless empire” 30 had at last been aroused from its slumber following a relatively uneventful decade (one writer in 1999 even suggested that we should not be taking China too seriously) 31 and was now set to take its seat at the top of the world?s table. A gravity shift was taking place32 – or so it was argued - and whether or not one viewed China?s economic rise as a foregone conclusion,33 necessary corrective to its nineteenth century period of humiliation,34 worried about its impact on the global economic and political order,35 or assumed that its rise was bound to lead to increased „intense security competition?, 36 one thing was certain: the international system was undergoing what even western governments now believed was a transformation that would alter the world for ever.37

In what follows I want to address the issues raised by what many are now assuming to be irreversible changes in the world order. I do so not by asking what all this means, if anything, for IR theory (this has been done elsewhere)38 but rather by wondering whether the now popular argument that we have moved into a “post-western world” is in fact true.39 Clearly I do not dispute some self-evident economic facts.40 However, as Carr noted many years ago, the facts do not always speak for themselves; and even if some seem to think they do, they can still be arranged in a certain way to paint a less than complete picture of the modern world.

I make several arguments in what follows. One is that this modern story, exciting and interesting though it is, tends to focus almost entirely on what is rapidly changing but says little about what is not – and what is changing much less than some are now suggesting is America’s position in the world. 41 There has also been a confusion about terms. Nobody serious would want to deny that there have been measureable changes in the shape of the world economy over the past few years. However, too many writers have either assumed that a shift in economic gravity is the same thing as a power shift (it is not); 42 or, they have concluded that as these economic changes continue, they will either lead to a transfer of power from one hegemon to another (this is questionable), 43 or to the creation of something now regularly (and dubiously) referred to as a new “Asian Century”.44 As I will seek to show, these assertions contain serious analytical flaws. Equally flawed, I would insist, is the idea that we can make bold predictions about the where the world will be in the future. But as Dan Gardner has convincingly shown, getting the future right has in the past proven to be a fool’s errand.45 This I would want to argue, has important lessons for those now confidently predicting a major power shift over the coming decades. 46 The “rest” may now be growing fast while the US and the EU languish. However, as more sober analysts have pointed out, the crisis in the West may not last for ever, while the many problems facing some of the rest – including India47 and China48 - could derail their apparently irresistible rise up the economic league table. Nothing of course endures for ever. And a new world might indeed be in the making. But it might not be the one now being talked about so feverishly around the world today.

0.3 American economic decline?

As we have already suggested, a large part of the case in favour of the notion that a “power shift” is underway rests on the assumption that the leading western player – the United States of America – faces an irresistible economic decline that will, if it continues, either allow others to take advantage of its weakness or reduce its ability to lead. Certainly many ordinary Americans, and those who comment on the United States today, believe this to be the case.49 Of course, the story can be, and has been, told in very different ways. For some the process is likely to be slow and can be managed rather easily, “politely” even.50 For others, it is bound to have enormous consequences, not only for the conduct of US foreign policy but for the world at large. Certainly, if one accepts the theory of hegemonic stability (and believes that the hegemon is now in decline) then the future of the world looks very problematic indeed.51 Either way, with its share of world trade falling, China rising economically, its debt increasing, its economy in slowdown since 2008, and its dependency on foreign purchasers of its debt on the rise, it looks to many analysts at least as if the United States will either “need to retrench”52 or, more problematically, pass on the baton to other more capable powers.53

The debate about US economic decline is hardly a new one.54 Indeed, ever since the late 1960s, one pundit after another has been forecasting dire things for the United States on the grounds that it was becoming, as one writer put it in 1977, a very ordinary country.55 A decade later Paul Kennedy made much the same point, 56 as did Immanuel Wallerstein in 2002,57 and then David Calleo a few years later.58 In fact, there has hardly been a point in time since the late 1960s – with the possible exception of the “unipolar moment” in the 1990s (and not even then) - when there has not been speculation about America’s economic future. But this time, we are reassured, the decline, is for “real”. With an education system no longer fit for purpose, a middle class in retreat, a and a political system in gridlock, the United States according to one recent study (written by a British journalist) is in free fall with little time left to recover.59

There can of course be no doubting America’s many economic problems. Nor should there any doubt either that in simple its share of world GDP is much less today than it was, say, twenty five year ago, let alone at the end of the Second World War when it was the only serious player in the world capitalist system.60 But this is hardly the same thing as suggesting that the US is in irreversible economic decline – now a common view – or that China has now overtaken it - an equally popular view. Even on the simplest of GDP measures the United States is still well ahead of China. Thus whereas China with a population of around 20% of the world’s total generates something between one seventh and one tenth of global GDP, the United States with only 6% of the world?s population still manages to produce between twenty and twenty five per cent. Indeed, by a simple GDP measurement, the US economy remains more powerful than the next four biggest economies combined: that is to say China, Japan, Germany and the UK. Comparisons between average living standards around the world reveal an even grater gap, especially when the comparison is made with the BRIC countries. Clearly life is improving for many millions of people in these countries; poverty is falling; and a new middle class is being created. Still, in each of the BRICs (India and Brazil most obviously) there are still vast pools of poverty. Furthermore, in terms of living standards, the USA continues to be ahead by a long way with an overall average four times higher than that of Brazil, six times higher than that in China, and as much as fifteen times higher than in India.61

Now none of this would come as any great surprise to a developmental economist. Oddly though it would come as something of a shock to the American public who by 2012 had come to the somewhat bizarre conclusion that the United States had been economically overtaken by China, and would, presumably, fall further and further behind its great economic rival on the other side of the Pacific. 62 Indeed, the gap between perception on the one hand, and the facts on the ground on the other, was cleverly illustrated in a recent study by The Economist. In this the authors challenged the „declinists? not by comparing the United States with other national economies, but comparing other national economies with specific states within the Union. The results were telling. To take one example: California. In GDP terms it alone remains slightly more wealthy than Brazil and Russia respectively, and almost twice as wealthy as both Turkey and Indonesia (two economies now discussed in increasingly glowing terms). The Texan economy meanwhile is nearly as big as Russia?s and just slightly smaller than India?s. 63 This hardly sounds like an economy on the wane.

If the United States is hardly the declining economic superpower portrayed in much of the literature today, it also continues to be able to do things that others can only dream of. In part this a function of its size; in part a function of geographical luck (the US possesses enormous quantities of oil, gas, coal, and food); and in part a function of its embedded position in the wider world economic system. As Carla Norloff has recently shown, despite a gradual economic decline since the end of the World War II, the United States still possesses critical features that give it what she calls “positional advantages” over all other states. She even challenges the now fashionable view that America’s hegemonic burdens are outweighing the benefits. She suggests otherwise: Washington actually reaps more than it pays out in the provision of public goods.64 The United States also has one other, very special, advantage: the dollar. As Doug Stokes has convincingly argued, this particular form of “financial power affords the US a broad range of privileges”, a by-product, in the last analysis, “of others willingness to purchase, hold and use the dollar”. They do this of course not because they especially love Americans, but in order to hold up an economic system upon whose health their own prosperity continues to depend. Furthermore, as Stokes goes on to argue, even the financial crisis has not weakened the position of the US anywhere near as much some have assumed. Indeed, in a world where uncertainty reigns (most obviously in the European Union) “money” in its purest form has fled to safety, and nowhere is regarded as being as safe as the United States. To this extent the financial crisis, ironically, has only affirmed US financial power rather than weakened it. 65

We also have to judge economic power not just in terms of the size of an economy but by the qualitative criteria of „competitiveness?. Economies like China, India and Brazil are undoubtedly large, and will no doubt get larger over time. But this does not necessarily make them competitive in relationship to most western countries or the United States. In a recent survey, the United States came fourth in the world in a group of fifteen countries. Moreover, eleven within the fifteen were definably western, while the other four included Japan, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore – countries all closely tied to the West and to the US. As for the BRICS they came well down the list. Thus China came in at twenty seven, India at fifty one, Brazil at fifty eight, and Russia at sixty three.66 Other studies have arrived at not dissimilar conclusions concerning the qualitative gap which continues to exist between a number of the “rising” economies and many of the more established ones, the United States in particular. In terms of cutting edge research in science and technology the US continues to hold a clear lead. Thus in 2008 the United States accounted for 40 percent of total world R&D spending, and 38% of patented new technology inventions. More significantly, scientific research produced in the US accounted for 49% of total world citations and 63% of the most highly cited articles. The United States also continued to employ around seventy of the world’s Nobel Prize winners, and could lay claim to two thirds of its most-cited individual researchers in science and technology.67

Innovation is also an American strength. 68 Other countries are clearly beginning to catch up. The United States however is still a country that continues to innovate across the board. Critics would no doubt point to the fact that the US is slipping down the league table. However, it still ranks 4th in the world. China meanwhile only came in at 54th in 2009, India at 56th, and Brazil and Russia even further behind. Of course, this does not take account of change over the longer term, or of the fact that a country like China is making a concerted effort to build a more innovative economy.69

But as even the Chinese would accept, it still has very long way to go. Indeed, in spite of official efforts to encourage what is termed in China a “capacity for independent innovation”, there remain several weaknesses in the Chinese political economy. Amongst the most significant, it has been noted, are “poor enforcement of intellectual property rights, an educational system that emphasizes rote learning over critical thinking, and a shortage of independent organizations that can evaluate scientific progress”.70 There is also wider political restraint as well. Innovation usually requires open debate, a capacity to challenge established truths, and incentives to think the unthinkable; and none of these, to be blunt, are much in evidence in modern China today.71

Finally, in terms of global economic power, the United States is still well ahead in one other vital respect: corporate strength.72 Some of the emerging economies are beginning catch up; and some of America?s closest allies in Europe and Asia run it a good second.73 But the US clearly remains in ‘poll position? with American companies constituting 4 of the top 10 corporations in the world, 14 of the top 30, and 25 of the top 50. Western companies more generally still out-perform all others, with the US and the EU together representing 6 of out of the top 10 global corporations, 22 out of the top 30, and 37 out of the top 50. Some of the BRIC economies do have some very large companies with China, unsurprisingly, leading the way with 4 out of the top 10, 8 of the top 50, and 61 out of the top 500; a remarkable achievement for a country which only twenty five years ago was virtually irrelevant in the world economy.74 Still, as a recent Brookings study has shown, it does not follow that these companies are internationally active or should even be regarded as “multinationals” in the true sense of that word. Indeed, 49 of the top 57 mainland companies in China remain under state control; and with a very few exceptions the overwhelming all operate predominantly within the country – and for several good reasons including a shortage of mangers with the necessary linguistic skills and experience of working abroad, a lack of transparency, poor global brand presence, and a very real difficulty in adapting easily to foreign legal, tax and political environments.75

0.4 Hard Power - Soft Power: What is Power?

If the US retains some very formidable economic assets, the same can just as easily be said about its still very powerful position within the larger international system. This is no longer a fashionable view to defend of course. Indeed, as we have already suggested, a combination of an ill-judged war in Iraq, the use of torture in the “war on terror”, the near meltdown of the American financial system in 2008, and the slow recovery of the American economy since, has led many to question America’s capacity either to lead others or garner support for its policies abroad. Buzan has probably theorized this best. America?s claim to represent the liberal future he argued back in 2008 was “blighted”. At the same time. the American model no longer inspired admiration. The number of states who wanted to follow it was fast declining. More generally, he continued, hegemony had become increasingly „illegitimate? in international society. As a result America?s position in the world was becoming more and more “fragile”.76

Obviously, there is something to this, which is one of the reasons why this kind of argument has proved so popular amongst those who now hold to the view that we are now in the midst of a “power shift”. But one of the problems with it, clearly, is that it seriously understates how much hard power the United States can still mobilize, even after the very limited cuts proposed by President Obama.77 It might be intellectually fashionable to argue that military power is becoming less and less salient in an age of asymmetric war where the weak can do a great deal of damage to the strong. However, the very fact that the United States is able to mobilize the military manpower it can (currently it has more men and women under arms than it had on the eve of 9/11)78, can project power to every corner of the earth, is still the main provider of security in Asia and Europe, and spends as much as it still does on “defence” – about 45% of the world’s total – suggests that the country has a very long way to go before one can talk about it becoming less of a superpower. The military power of other states moreover does not compare, even China’s with its huge standing army (which has not fought a war since the disastrous invasion of Vietnam in 1979)79 and its increasingly large blue water navy that now includes one aircraft carrier.80 Indeed, when its first aircraft carrier was finally given its first sea trials in 2011, the alarm bells went up in the region.81 However, China’s one aircraft carrier hardly compares with America’s eleven carrier groups. Nor has the ongoing modernization of China’ss military brought it anywhere close to US levels. The most recent figures show that the US not only expends five times more on national security than China. Taken together its many allies in the region (including amongst others Japan, South Korea, India, and Australia) also spend more on their military forces than China, and do so by a significant margin - nearly $200 billion compared to China’s $115 billion. 82

This in turn should alert us to yet another aspect of America’s impressive position in the world: its formidably wide alliance system. Buzan may be right. There might be fewer states willing to “follow” the US in ways that they did during the Cold War. There are also a few “problem” countries like Pakistan, Turkey and Egypt that have increasingly difficult relations with Washington. Nonetheless, even those who have doubts about American leadership skills, still find that they have no alternative but to ally themselves with it. This is obviously true of the Europeans who can see no other security guarantor than the US. But it is also true of key states in Latin America, Africa and Asia. If anything, it has become even more true in Asia; in fact, as China has risen, most Asian countries (including communist-led Vietnam) have demanded more, and not less, of an American presence in the region. China as a result now finds itself in the paradoxical position of having greater economic influence in Asia but fewer friends.83 To this degree, its growing economic power has not translated into it having more political influence as well.84 Nor have its heavy- handed policies in Asia helped. On the contrary. By laying claim to the South China Seas85 and remaining silent about the aggressive behaviour of its single ally North Korea, it has actually made America?s position stronger rather than weaker.86 Indeed, precisely because China does not “inspire confidence” , it has been possible for the US to be viewed by most countries in the region as that well known “indispensable nation” upon whose continued presence their own safety ultimately depends.87

America?s continued presence in Asia raises a wider question about whether “power” in the broader sense is in fact tilting away from the West as is now so often claimed. China may well be the new engine puling along the world economy. Its economic role in Africa, Brazil and Australia may have become crucially important. And its new middle class may be buying more and more of the high end products that the West is only too happy to sell it. Yet thus far, China has been much less than successful in winning friends and building relations of trust with other countries. It might be an exaggeration to say that China “is generally held in suspicion” around the world.88 But China does confront some serious difficulties when interacting with the world. In part the problem is cultural. This is still a country after all that for all its new openness continues to harbour a suspicion of “foreigners”. The overwhelming majority of its people moreover are deeply insular in outlook and have little experience, and hardly any understanding of, the world outside of Chinese borders.89 Indeed, this is even true of many of its senior policy-makers, the bulk of whom travel abroad infrequently, do not speak foreign languages with any degree of fluency, and who have been brought up politically in the hidden world of the Chinese Communist Party. But there is also a larger ideological and political issue. China might be a trading superpower. But it has no vision and no sense of what it might take to become a serious superpower in a leadership position with all the responsibilities and dangers that would entail. If anything, China is extraordinarily ill-equipped to lead with its defensive, almost suspicious view of the world, and its constant reiteration of the old Westpahalian mantra that states should keep their noses out of other people?s business. Nor is there much sign that it is keen to do so. In this of course the Chinese themselves have been perfectly candid. Our foreign policy goal, they repeat, is to create an international environment that will permit us to focus on domestic affairs and economic growth at home; and anything disturbing that derails us from this very long-term task stretching over several decades should be avoided at all costs.90 It is not even certain that China even regards itself as a model for others to follow. Indeed, how could it do so in a world where democracy – however imperfect – has become the political norm? People abroad may admire China for what it has achieved; a few may even hope that its rise will lead to a degree of balance in the international system. But when it imprisons dissident artists, repeatedly attacks the much admired Dalai Lama, and then seeks to punish another sovereign state for an entirely independent committee awarding a peace prize to one of its citizens, this is hardly likely to win it converts in the wider world.91

If China has a real problem in projecting a positive and confident picture of itself or of the world it would like to build, the same can hardly be said of the United States.92 The republic may have lost good deal of standing in the world because of the Iraq War; and the western economic model more generally might have suffered a blow because of the economic crisis. However, the first was partially vitiated by the election of Obama in 2008; and the second has not led to anybody serious proposing an alternative. Moreover, the “West” for all its faults – growing inequality, ethical standards in decline and all the rest – still looks a more attractive proposition than anything else on offer. As a recent study has shown, “soft power” is almost entirely the preserve of western, or more precisely democratic, countries with the United States still leading a league table that includes most West European countries as well as two countries from Asia – Japan and South Korea. China on the other hand comes in 20th, just ahead of Brazil at 21st , followed by India at 27th,and Russia 28th out of a total of 30 countries assessed.93

There are several reason why the West continues to score well in terms of soft power, the most obvious being that western countries have a pluralist political culture where having dissident views, will not, by and large, end up with one spending a rather long-term in prison or worse. But another reason – clearly connected – has to do with its open system of higher education. Here even the much-maligned US continues to have great magnetic pull, nowhere more so than in China itself judging by the enormous number of Chinese students who every year seek a place in US institutions of higher learning. Many of them may in the end return to China. However, they clearly believe that getting an education in a US college will improve their job prospects in an increasingly tough Chinese job market.94 Nor is this temporary “brain drain” a mere accident of history. Indeed, one of the more obvious signs of continued western and American strength is its university sector.95 Other countries and continents obviously have universities. But very few of them rank especially high in international terms.96 The BRIC countries in particular seem to face almost insuperable difficulties in raising standards. Brazil and India for example have no universities in the top 100, Russia only one, and China a mere 5 – three of these being in Hong Kong. The United States meanwhile is home to 8 of the top 10 ranked universities in the world, 37 of the top 50, and 58 of the top 100. Even the United Kingdom does well having 17 ranked universities compared to a total of 13 in the whole of Asia.97

If standards in higher education are still being set in the West, the same can also be said about the rules and associated institutions that govern international relations more generally. Admittedly, many of the most important institutions in the world today are not functioning as well they might: and over time, it seems clear that changes in the international economy will have to be reflected in the way the world is managed. Hence the ongoing debate about the world moving from being a G-8 world to a G-20 world. The fact remains however that nearly all of the key rules governing the global economy, and most of those dealing with critically important issues such as nuclear non-proliferation, trade liberalization, women?s rights, and the protection of intellectual property rights, have been laid down by, and are still more likely to be upheld by, countries in the West.98 Furthermore, while many of the emerging economies might have many entirely legitimate complaints about how the West has behaved in the past, and how the US still behaves now, none of them have either the desire or the capability of really challenging the West in any meaningful way. This in large part has much to do with their still very high dependency on western markets and western Foreign Direct Investment. But more importantly, it is because they realize that their own success over the past twenty five years has been in some part determined by them adopting broadly western economic rules. This is not to play down their own contribution to their own success. Nor should we assume that countries like China and India have adopted a pure western model. They have not. Nonetheless, their much-heralded rise only began in earnest when they abandoned one, rather self-sufficient way of doing economics, and started the long journey towards a global economy that was western in design, liberal in outlook, and market-oriented in fundamentals.

0.5 A New Asian Century?

If, as I have suggested, the West has far more global influence than many writers of late have suggested, how, then, do we explain what now seems self-evident to many analysts: that we are moving into a new Asian century in which the West as traditionally understood will have far less wealth and altogether less power?99 Is this merely a matter of ignorance, wishful thinking, or simply a misunderstanding? Or is it in fact true as writers like Paul Kennedy have insisted, 100 and the American public now seem to believe? According to at least one opinion poll, the majority of Americans now view Asia as being of much greater importance than Europe.101 This too would seem to be the view of many US policy-makers - the Obama administration in particular, which without ignoring Europe altogether, has shown a much greater degree of activism and interest in Asia than probably any other part of the world.

On a number of issues concerning modern Asia there can be no serious disagreement. Its weight in the world economy has clearly got bigger. It can boast two of the BRICs - China and India. It presents major investment opportunities. And it is home to an increasingly significant regional organization in the shape of ASEAN. Asia?s rapid growth over the last two decades has also been accompanied by a dramatic reduction in poverty. In East Asia and the Pacific region alone, the percentage of the population now living on less than $1.25 day has dropped from 55% in 1990 to only 17% in 2006. China alone has taken nearly 200 million people out of poverty over the last twenty five years.102

These achievements are all real enough. Moreover, when set alongside the miserable economic situation currently pertaining in many parts of Europe, they look almost miraculous. But one should beware hyperbole, especially when it comes to announcing an “Asian Century” that has not yet arrived. Asia?s weight in the world has certainly risen. But I would suggest by much less than is commonly assumed. Indeed, a closer look at the figures indicate that the shift in economic power from West to East can be overstated. In 1995 for instance Asia?s total share of world GDP (in nominal terms at market exchange rates) was already 29%. Fifteen years later it was no higher. As for the now widely accepted view that Asian producers were fast acquiring an ever-larger slice of global exports, the figures indicate that the region as a whole could lay claim to 28% of the total in 1995, but only 31% by in 2009, a rise of only 3% over fifteen years. Nor do these base figures take account of other significant indicators, many of which point to important flaws in the Asian economies. None of the Asian giants for example is yet blessed with endogenous technical progress. The quality of Chinese products does not match world standards. And in crucial cutting edge areas such as hardware and software technologies, the United States still dominate.103 In short, Asia still has long way to go before it catches up with the West – a West by the way, whose combined output is still double that of the East. 104

If we are nowhere near arriving at a so-called “Asian Century” one of the other reasons for this is that the entity we call Asia hardly exists as a collective actor. As many observers have pointed out, one of the more remarkable features of Asian political landscape is how fragmented it happens to be. Thus many in Asia (China in particular) harbour deep resentments towards Japan. Japan in turn bitterly resent China?s rise. And India has problems with nearly all of its Asian neighbours, China especially. Most Asian nations also have a very powerful sense of post-colonial identity. This not only fosters quite a degree of suspicion of each other; it also weakens any sense of common purpose.

Finally, before we can talk of a new Asian Century we should remind ourselves that there are other parts of the world where relations between states are a good deal more settled and amicable – most notably between those countries making up the Transatlantic relationship. Asia may be rising and the BRiCs emerging. However, one should not underestimate the many strengths possessed by the key states constituting the wider Transatlantic space. Even in the midst of the crisis, the United States and the European Union still account for over 40% of the global economy.105 The most important international banks are also to be found in Europe and the United States. Europe and the United States moreover play host to nearly all of its major business schools; and in areas such as oil exploration, aviation and chemicals, they still lead the way. The two together are also the world?s most important source of Foreign Direct Investment, and by far and away the world?s most important markets too. They also invest in each other?s future in vast amounts. Indeed, in 2010, the United States invested far more in Europe than it was ever likely to do in Asia or China - three time more to be precise. Meanwhile the EU had eight times more invested in the United States than it had in the whole of Asia. Americans today may not view Europe as being terribly exciting. And no doubt Europeans will continue to worry as to their current status in a Washington fixated on nearly everything else except the European Union. But that does not make the economic relationship any the less significant. As one writer has put it, for all the hype about the emergence of new economic powers, and talk of the West?s imminent decline, „the transatlantic economic inter-regional link remains easily the largest…in the world?. The author might also have added that without this continued link and the prosperity it has engendered, the “rest” might never have emerged in the first place. 106

0.6 Conclusion

I have made the strong claim in this article which challenges the notion that we are in the midst of some larger power shift. This in my view not only misunderstands the complex notion of what constitutes “power”. It is empirically dubious too. As I have tried to show here, the United States still has a great deal of power, much more than any other country in the world, now and for the foreseeable future. China meanwhile confronts several basic problems at home and abroad (as indeed do the other members of the so-called BRIC family). And the idea that we are moving ineluctably into what some have termed an “Asian Century” is unsustainable. In making this case, I am not implying that the world is an entirely static place. Nor am I making a plea for the status quo. Rather, I have tried to go behind the headlines and to call things by their right name. Not only is this important for purely intellectual reasons. In my view, it is strategically important too. After all, if a country like China really does come to believe that one day it really will be ruling the world, and Americans fearing the worse see no alternative but to combat this in whatever way they see necessary, this could very easily lead to an increased, and in my view, a quite unnecessary escalation of tension between these two very powerful states.

I draw two other very important conclusions from the foregoing analysis.

The first concerns the lessons we should be drawing from the past, Here the Cold War looms large in my thinking. I am not naïve enough to think that it would have been easy to have avoided some form of competition between the US and the USSR after World War II. But there is little doubt either that western worse case thinking based on exaggerated fears of a rising Soviet Union did make the conflict far more intense and long-lasting than it might have been otherwise. In the same way, though in a very different context involving a very different kind of state, there is a very real danger today that if the policy-makers and analysts begin to talk up Chinese strengths without recognizing its very real limits, they could easily end up creating yet another security dilemma.107

This brings me in turn to the future. As I earlier suggested, too much of what has become the new mantra predicting an almost inevitable revolution in world politics, with one part of world declining and another rising, is based on the altogether questionable notion that we can easily know what the world and the world economy is going will look like in five, ten, fifteen, or nearly fifty years time. All I would make a plea for here is a little more modesty and a lot more circumspection. After all, only a few years before the end of the Cold War it was predicted that the USSR would remain the same – and it didn?t. It was then predicted that Japan would become „number one? in the world – and its financial system collapsed. And in 2005 the then head of the Federal Reserve in the United States told policy-makers in the US that the market could never fail – and it did, rather dramatically only three years later. The conclusion to be drawn is obvious: why should we be any more confident today when economists and pundits tell us that the rise of the BRICs is a foregone conclusion and that it is only matter of time before China (like Japan before it) also becomes number one?

Finally, I want to make a plea here for a far more subtle theory of the modern international system. Too many writers over the past few years have talked of the world as if it were like a series of billiard balls banging up against each in some zero-like contest in which states and regions in one part of the world rise, while others in other parts of the world fall. This might make perfect sense to some realists.108 However, it ignores just about everything else, including the fairly self-evident fact that the modern international economy is now so interdependent that even if we accepted the perfectly reasonable idea that certain states can make relative gains here at the expense of other states there, in the end most states – including most obviously the United States and China - have become entirely dependent on each other for their prosperity and security. To this degree we no longer live in a world composed of clearly specified friends and well-defined enemies, but rather in one where partnership has become a necessity. Once upon a time this way of looking at the world was branded by its critics as liberal idealism. In the 21st century it has, in my view, become the highest form of realism.

0.7 Acknowledgements

This much revised paper is adapted from the Kenneth Waltz Annual Lecture delivered to the Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University on 9 March 2012 entitled “The decline of the West and the rise of the rest: myths of power shifts and economists”. I would like to thank Ken Booth for inviting me to give the lecture, and to develop my thoughts above.

0.8 Further information

1. Michael Cox, Ken Booth and Tim Dunne, eds. The Interregnum: Controversies in World Politics. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999)
2. John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War”, Atlantic Monthly, August 1990.
3. I discussed this vision of the post-Cold War world many years ago in Michael Cox, US Foreign Policy After the Cold War: Superpower Without a Mission? (London: Chatham House, Pinter Press, 1995).
4. Christopher Layne challenged what he termed the illusion of unipolarity as early as 1993 in an article published in International Security (“The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers will Arise”) and returned to the same theme over ten years later in his “The Unipolar Illusion Revisited”, International Security,Vol. 32, No. 2, Fall 2006, pp. 7 -41.
5. Charles Kupchan, “After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of a Stable Multipolarity,” International Security, vol. 23, no. 2 (Fall 1998).
6. Donald W. White, The American Century: The Rise and Decline of the United States as a World Power (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1999).
7. Bruce Cummings, “Still The American Century”, in Review of International Studies, Vol 25, No 5, 1999.
8. I tried to capture this turn-of-the-century mood in the USA in Michael Cox, “Whatever Happened to American Decline?” New Political Economy, 2001. 2004.
9. See the front cover of Time magazine, 7 December 2009. The article inside was unambiguously clear about “the first 10 years of this century”…..”They will very likely go down as the most dispiriting and disillusioning decade Americans have lived through in the post–World War II era”.
10. On 9/11 and its impact see Ken Booth and Tim Dunne eds, Worlds in Collision: Terror and the Future of Global Order. (Palgrave, Macmillan, 2002).
11. Roger C. Altman, „The Great Crash, 2008: A Geopolitical Setback for the West?, Foreign Affairs, 2009, pp. 2-14.
12. See Jim O?Neill, Building Better Global Economic BRICs’ Goldman Sachs. Global Economics Paper No:66, 30th November 2001.
13. See “Goldman Sachs Jim O?Neill Reflects 10 Years After Coining BRIC” 27th November 2011.
14. Danny Quah summed this view up most succinctly. “As late as 1980” he noted, “North America and Western Europe produced more than two thirds of this planet’s income. Not unexpectedly then, the world economic center of gravity 30 years ago was a point deep in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean, 900 miles west of Morocco. By 2008, however, because of the continuing rise of India, China and the rest of East Asia, that center of gravity had shifted to a point just outside Izmir Turkey, east of Helsinki and Bucharest - a drift of 3000 miles, or about three quarters of the Earth?s radius. My projection has it that this move east will continue until 2050 when the world economic center of gravity will cluster on the border between India and China, 400 miles east of Katmandu”. See his analysis in CNN World April 2011.
15. Kishore Mahbubani, The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Power Shift to The East (New York: Public Affairs, 2008).
16. Fareed Zakaria, Post-American World, (New York: W.W. Norton, 2008).
17. James Hoge, „A Global Power Shift in the Making: Is the United States Ready??, Foreign Affairs, 83 (4) 2004, pp. 2 -7.
18. G. John Ikenberry, Foreign Affairs, “The Future of the Liberal Wolrd Order: Internationalism after America”, May-June 2011, p. 56.
19. Niall Ferguson, Civilization; The West and the Rest. (London: Penguin, Allen Lane, 2011).
20. On the emerging US decline debate see Michael Cox, “Is The United States in Decline – Again?” International Affairs, 83 (4) 2007, 2007, 643-653.
21. “The illusion of American hyperpuissance” wrote Niall Ferguson in 2010 “was shattered not once but twice in the past decade. Nemesis came first in the backstreets of Sadr City and the valleys of Helmand, which revealed not only the limits of American military might but also, more importantly, the naivety of neoconservative visions of a democratic wave in the greater Middle East. And it struck a second time with the escalation of the subprime crisis of 2007 into the credit crunch of 2008 and finally the “great recession” of 2009. After the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, the sham verities of the “Washington Consensus” and the “Great Moderation” were consigned forever to oblivion”. See his ‘China’2s Century?’ Niall Ferguson says yes’. 1 January 2010. The Peking Duck.
22. Paul Kennedy even invoked Lenin to make his point about the rapid change taking place in the international system. “The beauty about Lenin’s approach” he noted “is that he does not get himself embroiled in debates about some cultures and civilisations being superior to others, or Protestantism and capitalism, or relative resistance to disease, or democracy versus autocracy, or any of the other long-winded stuff, to explain the relative rise and decline of particular economies and their influence in the world. He simply points out – as any natural scientist observing a run of data would – that if the record shows one country’s productivity and economy growing faster than others, then there will be a steady shift in the balances of power towards it. The antecedent causes are mere intellectualism. It is what is happening that counts. And this it seems to me is the only sensible way we can discuss the most significant political phenomenon of our new century: the relative rise of Asia, perhaps China especially, and its natural concomitant, the relative decline of the west as a whole and more particularly of both of its two greatest components, Europe and the US” Paul Kennedy. “Rise and Fall. World Today”. August-September 2010.
23. A.F. Organski, World Politics (New York: Knopf, 1958) for the classic statement on power transitions in history and why all power transitions are bound to lead to intensified competition, heighted insecurity and possibly war.
24. By 2010 China held 11.5% of all outstanding US Treasury securities valued at $895 billion; accounted for nearly 12% of all world trade; had become the world’s largest producer of clothing (60% of the total), shoes (66%), toys (80%) and cars (13.8 million). It also consumed more imported coal and raw materials than any other state; it had already become the key economic player in its own region; and was fast becoming a major one in Australia, Latin America and Africa. Figures from Robert J. Art, Political Science Quarterly. 2011.
25. For one of the better popular studies on rising China by a non-Sinologist see Mark Leonard, What Does China Think? (London: Fourth Estate, 2008).
26. A view championed, oddly enough, by Henry Kissinger in his book On China (New York: Penguin, 2011). Kissinger even quotes Kant to support his notably non-realist conclusion that relations between the US and the USA are likely to remain peaceful and relatively amicable over the long term.
27. Stefan Halper, The Beijing Consensus: How China’s Authoritarian Model Will Dominate the 21st Century. (New York, Basic Books, 2010).
28. Aaron Friedberg, A Contest for Supremacy: China, America and the Struggle for the Mastery of Asia. (New York:: W.W.Norton, 2011)
29. Martin Jacques, When China Rules the World: The Rise of the Middle Kingdom and the End of the Western World (London, Penguin, Allen Lane, 2009; 2nd edition 2012).
30. Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World (London: The Bodley Head, 2012).
31. Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?”, Foreign Affairs, September-October 1999
32. Wendy Dobson, Gravity Shift: How Asia’s New Economic Powerhouses Will Shape the 21st Century. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2009).
33. Dominic Wilson and Roopa Purushothaman. Dreaming With the BRICs: The Path to 2050. Global Economics Paper No:99. 1st October 2003.
34. As did the “muse of the Asian century” Kishore Mahbubani in his The New Asian Hemisphere: The Irresistible Shift of Global Power to the East, (PublicAffairs, 2008).
35. John Plender, “Great Dangers Attend the Rise and Fall of Great Powers”, Financial Times, 21-22 August 2010.
36. John Mearsheimer, “China’s Challenge to US Power in Asia”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Volume 3, 2010, p. 396
37. It is not just the United States that is now officially changing its foreign policy priorities to adjust to the power shift under way (Hilary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century”,Foreign Policy, November 2011). In his first statement outlining the UK’s foreign policy in a “networked world”, the British Foreign Secretary in 2010 stressed that “the world has changed and if we do not change with it Britain’s role” was “set to decline”. The most significant of these changes, he continued, was the rise of new economic powers. “Economic power and economic opportunity” were he said “shifting to the countries of the East and South; to the emerging powers of Brazil, India, China and other parts of Asia and to increasingly significant economies such as Turkey and Indonesia”.See William Hague, “Britain’s Foreign Policy in a Networked World”, 1 July 2010.
38. See for example Avery Goldstein, “Power Transitions, Institutions, China’s Rise in East Asia”, Journal of Strategic Studies’, Vol. 30, Nos 4 and 5, August 2007, pp. 639-682, Renee Jeffery, “Evaluating the ‘China Threat’: Power Trnsitions Theoory, The Successor-State Image and the Dangers of Historical Analogies”, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 63, 2, June 2009, pp. 309- 324, and Barry Buzan, “China in International Society: Is ‘Peaceful Rise’ Possible?”, The Chinese Journal of International Politics, Vol. 3, 2010, pp. 5- 36.
39. See Simon Serfaty, “Moving into a Post-Western World”, The Washington Quarterly, 34: 2, Spring 2011, pp. 7 -23.
40. For a excellent guide to the economic shifts in the world economy see Danny Quah “The global economy’s shifting centre of gravity”, Global Policy, Volume 3, Issue I, January 2011, pp. 3 -9.
41. Susan Strange successfully demonstrated that problems facing the United States in the 1970s and early 1980s did not , in of themselves, undermine its “structural power”. See her “The Persistent Myth of Lost Hegemony”, International Organization, 41, 4, Autumn 1987, pp. 551-573.
42. See also Wendy Dobson, “Why the Shift of Economic Gravity Is Not a Power Shift”. The Globalist. 21st October, 2009.
43. Ian Clark discusses these issues in his “China and the United States: a succession of Hegemonies”, International Affairs, 87:1 2011, pp. 13-28.
44. In 2012, the Australian government entitled its future White Paper on Australia’s foreign policy: “Australia in an Asian Century”.
45. Dan Gardner, Future Babble: Why Expert Predictions – And Why We Believe them Anyway. (New York: Penguin.2011)
46. Such as Jim O’Neill in his The Growth Map: Economic Opportunity in the BRICs and Beyond. (London: 2011).
47. For a balanced view of India’s rise and why it has a very long way to go before it can be called a “superpower”, see David Malone, Does the Elephant Dance? Contemporary Indian Foreign Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011). For an equally sober view of India’s power position see Ramachandra Guha “Will India Become a Superpower?” in India: The Next Superpower? LSE IDEAS. Special Report, March 2012, pp. 6 -17
    48.For a wide-ranging survey of China’s many problems and flaws that challenge the “China-as-a-superpower in the making” literature, see Jonathan Fenby. Tiger Head: Snake Tail (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2011).
48. See for instance the front cover of one influential American magazine which carried the banner headline “American Decline: This Time It’s For Real”. Foreign Policy. January- February 2011.
49. Adam Quinn, “The Art of Declining Politely: Obama?s prudent presidency and the waning of American Power”, International Affairs. 87, 4, 2011, pp. 803 – 824.
50. For a contrary view, see Barry Buzan, „A World Order Without Superpowers: Decentred Globalism?, International Relations, 25, 1, 2011, pp. 3-25.
51. Christopher Layne, “The Global Power Shift from West to East”, The National Interest. Number 119, May-June 2012, p. 22.
52. See Jeffrey Sachs. “America has passed on the baton”, Financial Times, 30 September 2009.
53. See my discussion of this. Michael Cox, “Whatever Happened to American Decline? International Relations and the New united States Hegemony”, New Political Economy. 6:3, 2001, pp. 311 – 340.
54. Richard Rosecrance, America as an Ordinary Country: US Foreign Policy and the Future.(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977).
55. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of The Great Powers.(New York: Random House, 1987)
56. Immanuel Wallerstein, Decline of American Power: The U.S. in a Chaotic World. (New York: New Press.2003)
57. David Calleo. Follies of Power: America’s Unipolar Fantasy (Cambridge University Press)
58. Edward Luce, Time to Start Thinking: America in the Age of Descent (New York, Atlantic Monthly Press, 2012)
59. See Donald W. White, The Nature of World Power in American History, Diplomatic History, 11, 3, July 1987. 181-202
60. Figures compiled from the IMF and The CIA World Factbooks for the relevant years.
61. For a guide to the current state of American public opinion see Pew Research Centre. Pew Global Attitudes Project. Released 13 June 2012. This revealed that most people in the world in 2012 – including a majority of Americans – believed that China had become the world’s top economy. Moreover, whereas in 2008 - before the onset of the global financial crisis - a median of 45% named the U.S. as the world’s leading economic power (while just 22% said China) by 2012 only 36% said the U.S was in the top position. 42% of those polled in 2012 said China was now on top economic position.
62. The figures for this study were drawn from the 2010 Census Bureau, Un Wolrd Popualtion Prospects, the and the IMF amongst others. For a summary see Giancarlo Loquenzi. „$till top of the charts? Longitude#2
63. Carla Norloff, America’s Global Advantage: US Hegemony and International Co-operation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010)
64. See Doug Stokes, “A Post- Crisis Piper ? Assessing Dollar Decline and US Primacy”. Unpublished Manuscript.
65. Source
66. Source
67. See “A New Ranking of the World l’s Most Innovative Economies”. Economist Intelligence Unit. April 2009.
68. George Kee, “Chinese Innovation sidestaps US crisis”, Global Times. 12 August 2011.
69. Don Durfee and James Pomfret, “China Struggles to Find a Formula for Innovation”, International Herald Tribune, 6 May 2011, p. 16.
70. See Schumpeter, “Bamboo Innovation”, The Economist, 7 May 2011, p. 68.
71. The statistics in this paragraph are taken from the FT Global 500. 2011. FT Weekend Magazine. June 2011 and the Fortunes Global 500 list. 2011.
72. The UK is especially strong globally in relationship to the size of its domestic economy. It hosts 10% of the top 100 multinationals.
73. Of the others three BRICS, Brazil has 2 in the top 100 global companies, Russia only one, and India none.
74. David Shambaugh, “Are China’s Multinational Corporations Really Multinational?” Brookings. East Asia Forum Quarterly. 10 July 2012.
75. Barry Buzan, “A Leader without Followers”, International Politics,45. 2008, pp. 554-570.
76. For a sceptical assessment of America’s military retrenchment since 2008, see Edrwad Luce, “The Mirage of Obama’s Defence Cuts”, Financial Times, 30 January, 2012.
77. Luce, The Mirage of Obama’s Defence Cuts.
78. On the Chinese army’s many internal problems see John Garnaut’s useful 2012 analysis, “Rotting from Within”.
79. The Chinese themselves were keen to remind their neighbours that in spite of having acquired its first aircraft carrier, it did “not pose any threat to other countries”. See Zhao Lai and Zhang Xiaomin, “Maiden Run for aircraft carrier”, China Daily: European Weekly.12-18 August 2011
80. For the Chinese view see China’s People Daily
81. For figures on global military spending in 2012 see the SIPRI Handbook for 2012
82. Even the Chinese admit that while relations between “China and countries in its vicinity are generally good”…there remain what is referred to coyly as “certain prickly issues among them the Taiwan Strait, The Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, disputes in the South China Sea and to some extent in the East China Sea”. The article goes on to say that “owing mainly to China’s restraint”…none of these issues have “developed into large-scale conflicts”. See Zhou Fangyin, “New Developments in China’s Relationship with its Surrounding Countries”, China Today, May 2012, p. 35.
83. Contrary to what has been claimed by one writer who has naively asserted that as China becomes richer it is bound to become “more influential” too. See Gideon Rachman, “When China Becomes Number One”, Financial Times, 7 June 2011.
84. For a full discussion of the South China Sea question see “Stirring Up the South China Sea (I): Asia Report” No. 223, International Crisis Group. 23 April 2012.
85. See “Rising Power: Anxious State”. The Economist. Special report China. 25 June 2011.
86. See Banyan, “Not littoraly Shagri-La”, The Economist, 11 June 2011.
87. David Pilling, “China needs more than five year charm offensive”, Financial Times. 10 November 2011.
88. For an interesting discussion of why China often seems to get the outside world wrong see Hannah Beech, “Split personality” Time magazine, 24 January 2011. pp. 29-31.
89. See the influential Wang JiSi for an excellent discussion of China’s dilemmas. See his “China’s Grand Strategy: A Rising Power Finds its Way”, Volume 90, No. 2, Foreign Affairs, March-April 2011, pp. 289 – 79.
90. For a brief but very good analysis about why China is most certainly not bound to become a “superpower”, see the shrewd piece Guy de Jonquieres. What Power Shift To China?” in China’s Socio-Economic Strategy. LSE IDEAS Special Report, June 2012, pp. 48-53.
91. Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox eds, Soft Power and US Foreign Policy. (London, Routledge, 2010).
92. See Jonathan McClory, “The New Persuaders II: A 2011 Global Ranking of Soft Power”. Institute for Government.
93. Between 2010 and 2011 the number of Chinese students studying in the United Stats increased by 43%. Of the more than 700,000 overseas students in the United States in 2011, 22% of the total (around 158,000) had come from China. Significantly, students from that other BRIC country – India – were also looking to the USA for a higher education. In 2011 over 100,000 Indian students had enrolled in US universities. See Jenna Johnson, “Chinese students enrol in record numbers at US Colleges”. 14 November 2011.
94. See Times Higher Education World University Rankings 2011-2012. Times Higher Education, 6 October 2011 for a full break down of figures.
95. Latin America for instance has an extensive university system with Brazil having 3 in the top 10 on the continent. But only one Latin American university, University of Sao Paolo in Brazil, has made it into the world’s top 200. See “Universities in Latin America: the struggle to make the grade”. The Economist. 8 October 2011.
96. These figures from here
97. See Jorge G. Castaneda, “Not Ready for prime Time: Why Including Emerging Powers at the Helm Would Hurt Global Governance”, Foreign Affairs. No 89, No 5, 2010, pp. 109 – 122.
98. Nick Bisley. 2010
99. “The most significant political phenomenon of our new century” is going to be “the relative rise of Asia, perhaps China especially, and its natural concomitant, the relative decline of the west as a whole and more particularly of both of its two greatest components, Europe and the US”. Paul Kennedy, “Rise and Fall”, The World Today. August-September, Volume 66, Numbers 8-9, 2010, pp. 6-9.
100. Judy Dempsey, “Americans Now looking to Asia more than Europe”, The Global Edition of the New York Times, 26 September 2011.
101. These figures were obtained from “Asia’s Importance Growing in Global Economy”. IMF Survey Online.
102. Sarajit Majumdar, “Global Power Shift – West to East?” Asia Sentinel, 9 January 2009,
103. “The balance of economic power: East or famine?, The Economist, 27 February 2010, pp. 77-78.
104. Hamilton and Quinlan, 2010
105. Philip Whyte, Narrowing The Atlantic: The Way Forward for EU-US Trade and Investment. London. Centre for European Reform. 2009.
106. For the now definitive work on the security dilemma see Ken Booth and Nicholas J. Wheeler, The Security Dilemma: Fear, Co-operation and Trust in World Politics (New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).
107. John Mearsheimer in particular in, for instance, his The Rise of China Will Not be Peaceful After All, The Australian, 18 November 2005.Michael Cox