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William Moloney 經濟和政治潮流是否正在從美國轉向中國
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經濟和政治潮流是否正在從美國轉向中國？
作者：威廉·莫洛尼，觀點撰稿人 - 04/20/23
威廉·莫洛尼是科羅拉多基督教大學百年研究所保守思想高級研究員，曾在牛津大學和倫敦大學學習，並獲得哈佛大學博士學位。他曾擔任科羅拉多州教育專員。
有趣的是，當今世界軍事學院中研究最廣泛的戰爭論文之一是由 27 個世紀前的一位中國將軍撰寫的。 《孫子兵法》中最著名的名言是“不戰而屈人之兵”，但還有很多其他格言值得那些想預測中國意圖並將該國戰略與美國戰略進行對比的人關注。特別相關的是“欲勝必先利”及其推論“沒有一個國家能從長期戰爭中受益”。
自朝鮮戰爭結束以來，中國已有 70 年沒有派軍隊參戰。相比之下，在同一時期，美國幾乎一直在直接或通過代理人參戰。除了極少數例外，中國和俄羅斯一樣，曆史上隻在與其有著長期民族和/或文化聯係的邊境地區展示軍事力量。美國與其前身大英帝國一樣，經常試圖通過軍事手段將自己的意誌強加到世界各個角落。
美國與其前身大英帝國一樣，長期以來一直能夠憑借其巨大的經濟實力在全球發揮非凡影響力，而直到最近，中國——在現代社會中從未成為富裕或經濟上占主導地位的國家——一直更加謹慎，寧願炫耀武力，也不願動用武力。
現在，正當中國的經濟和軍事實力不斷飆升、全球影響力迅速擴大之際，美國卻越來越受到長期戰爭累積效應的拖累，並被英國曆史學家保羅·肯尼迪在 1987 年所說的“帝國過度擴張”所削弱。
中國實力的增強和美國實力的衰落並沒有被忽視，美國的敵人和盟友最近都采取了大膽的獨立舉措，而這些舉措在幾年前似乎是不可想象的。中國成功促成伊朗與沙特阿拉伯和解，隨後俄羅斯又支持沙特與另一個宿敵敘利亞舉行會談，這打亂了美國建立共同陣線打擊伊朗支持的恐怖主義的努力。在不安的美國盟友中，日本直言不諱地拒絕遵守對俄羅斯的能源製裁，以維護自己的國家利益，震驚了華盛頓；隨後法國總統埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍在訪華期間發表講話，暗示北約可能不會在加強台灣防禦方麵形成統一陣線。
美國兩黨政客對馬克龍的言論表達了強烈的憤慨，卻忽視了一個事實，即法國總統表達的情緒很可能是許多歐洲公民的共同感受，歐洲外交關係委員會 2019 年的一項民意調查顯示，當時的受訪者堅信他們的國家應該在中美之間的任何衝突中保持中立。顯然，團結歐洲人對抗近在咫尺、曆史上威脅歐洲的俄羅斯是一回事，但爭取支持與遙遠的中國發生潛在軍事衝突則完全是另一回事，因為中國與歐洲之間沒有侵略曆史，而且對每個歐洲國家的經濟都至關重要。
值得注意的是，歐洲人對美國領導層的質量和可靠性的懷疑日益增加，尤其是考慮到最近美國在從阿富汗撤軍時沒有征求意見，而且毫無準備，這令人痛苦不已。因此，如果一些歐洲人認為美國人有點傲慢，認為他們應該忠誠地、毫無疑問地跟隨美國卷入另一場亞洲衝突——這一次的對手比塔利班強大得多，這也並非不合理。
令美國的老朋友感到擔憂的是，如今的美國似乎被日益惡性的內鬥政治所困擾——用亞伯拉罕·林肯的一句經典名言來說，“內部分裂”——因此，與那些可能對世界有更清晰認識的盟友進行理性對話時，美國的反應較弱。馬克龍可能就是這樣一個值得尊重而不是譴責的朋友。
Are economic and political tides turning away from America and toward China?
BY WILLIAM MOLONEY, OPINION CONTRIBUTOR - 04/20/23
It is interesting that one of the most widely studied treatises on war in the world’s military academies today was written by a Chinese general who lived 27 centuries ago. The best-known quotation from “The Art of War” by Sun Tzu (544-496 BC) is, “[The] supreme art of war is to subdue the enemy without fighting,” but there are many other maxims that should merit the interest of those who would divine the intentions of China and contrast the strategy of that country with that of the United States. Of particular relevance is,“Who wishes to win must first consider the cost” and its corollary, “There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged war.”
China has not sent its armies to war in 70 years, since the end of the Korean War. In contrast, the United States, over the same period, has been at war directly or by proxy almost constantly. With rare exception, China, like Russia, has historically flexed its military muscle only in areas on its borders with which it has longstanding ethnic and/or cultural ties. The United States, like its imperial predecessor, Great Britain, has regularly sought to impose its will militarily in far-flung corners of the world.
The United States, again like its British forebear, has long been able to exert extraordinary global leverage owing to the immense might of its economy, whereas until quite recently, China — never in modern times a wealthy or economically dominant nation — has been more cautious, preferring to rattle its sabers rather than use them.
Now, at the very moment when China’s economic and military might is surging and its global influence rapidly expanding, the United States is increasingly being weighed down by the cumulative effect of prolonged war and weakened by what British historian Paul Kennedy described in 1987 as “imperial overstretch.”
The waxing of Chinese power and the waning of America’s has not gone unnoticed and U.S. enemies and allies alike have recently undertaken bold independent initiatives that would have seemed unthinkable just a few years ago. China’s success in brokering a rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia — soon followed by Russia’s sponsoring talks between Saudis and another longtime foe, Syria — has unhinged U.S. efforts to build a common front against Iran-backed terrorism. Among disquieted U.S. allies, Japan stunned Washington by asserting its own national interest by bluntly refusing to honor energy sanctions against Russia, and then French President Emmanuel Macron made remarks while visiting China that signaled there may be no united NATO front in efforts to bolster the defense of Taiwan.
The intemperate expressions of indignation over Macron’s remarks by U.S. politicians of both parties blithely overlooks the fact that the French president is voicing sentiments likely shared by the many European citizens, as revealed by a 2019 poll done by the European Council on Foreign Relations that showed respondents strongly believed then that their countries should remain neutral in any conflict between the United States and China. Clearly, it is one thing to rally Europeans against a nearby and historically threatening Russia, but an entirely different proposition to enlist support for potential military conflict with distant China, with whom there is no history of aggression and which is vitally important to the economies of every European country.
It is pertinent to note the context of growing European doubts about the quality and reliability of American leadership, particularly in light of the recent painful memory of being unconsulted and blindsided regarding the disastrous withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Accordingly, it is hardly unreasonable if some Europeans see more than a touch of arrogance in Americans who think they should loyally and unquestioningly follow the United States into yet another Asian conflict — this time against an adversary vastly more formidable than the Taliban.
Also of concern to America’s longtime friends is the United States today appears as a nation deeply distracted by its increasingly vicious internecine politics — in Abraham Lincoln’s timeless phrase, “A house divided against itself” — and thus less responsive to reasoned discourse with allies who might see the world a little more clearly. Macron may be one such friend deserving of respect, not condemnation.
