風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
布林肯四年的任職總結
江寧知府 2024-10-04 國際領域興趣達人
2023年G20外長會議期間的布林肯和拉夫羅夫。布林肯以情緒穩定著稱，2024年7月的東盟與對話夥伴國外長會議期間，他曾主動與拉夫羅夫握手，給外界諸多遐想。
文章最後，布林肯以一種推卸責任的口吻總結道：
“作為國務卿，我不搞政治，隻做政策。從第一天起，拜登總統和哈裏斯副總統就做出了一個基本選擇——在一個競爭更加激烈的世界中，美國不能單打獨鬥，我們現在的選擇將決定未來實現新願景或回歸一個倒退的時代。”
不難體會，與美國曆史上許多大開大合的國務卿不同，布林肯的權力基礎相對薄弱，很像是一個外交裱糊匠，他處處小心謹慎，製定了一份《倉促的“大戰略”》。
或許等“采菊東籬下”之後，外界將在一些智庫場合或回憶錄裏窺探到一個更加放鬆自如的布林肯，聽他回憶阿富汗撤軍、烏克蘭危機和中東危機的內幕故事。
美國的複興戰略：為新世界重建領導地位
作者：安東尼·J·布林肯
2024 年 11 月/12 月 2024 年 10 月 1 日
美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯在迪拜向媒體發表講話，2023 年 12 月美國國務卿安東尼·布林肯在迪拜向媒體發表講話，2023 年 12 月
一場激烈的競爭正在進行中，以定義國際事務的新時代。少數國家——主要是俄羅斯，與伊朗和朝鮮以及中國結盟——決心改變國際體係的基本原則。雖然他們的治理形式、意識形態、利益和能力各不相同，但這些修正主義大國都希望在國內鞏固專製統治，並在國外確立勢力範圍。他們都希望通過脅迫或武力解決領土爭端，並將其他國家的經濟和能源依賴武器化。他們都試圖削弱美國實力的基礎：軍事和技術優勢、主導貨幣以及無與倫比的聯盟和夥伴關係網絡。雖然這些國家不是軸心，政府也明確表示不尋求集團對抗，但這些修正主義大國的選擇意味著我們需要采取果斷行動來防止這種結果。
當喬·拜登總統和卡馬拉·哈裏斯副總統上任時，這些修正主義大國已經在積極挑戰美國的利益。這些國家認為，美國國內正處於不可逆轉的衰落之中，與國外的朋友也產生了分歧。他們看到美國公眾對政府失去了信心，美國民主兩極分化、癱瘓不堪，美國的外交政策正在破壞華盛頓建立和倡導的聯盟、國際機構和規範。
拜登總統和哈裏斯副總統奉行複興戰略，將國內競爭力的曆史性投資與振興國外夥伴關係的密集外交活動相結合。他們認為，這一雙支柱戰略是消除競爭對手對美國正在衰落和缺乏自信的假設的最佳方式。這些假設是危險的，因為它們會導致修正主義者繼續破壞美國和大多數國家所追求的自由、開放、安全和繁榮的世界。這是一個各國可以自由選擇自己的道路和合作夥伴的世界，全球經濟由公平競爭、開放、透明和廣泛機會定義。這是一個技術賦予人民權力並加速人類進步的世界。這是一個維護包括《聯合國憲章》核心原則在內的國際法、尊重普世人權的世界。這是一個可以不斷發展以反映新現實、表達新興觀點和參與者並應對當前和未來共同挑戰的世界。
拜登政府的戰略使美國今天的地緣政治地位比四年前強得多。但我們的工作尚未完成。美國必須在曆屆政府中保持堅韌不拔，以動搖修正主義者的假設。它必須做好準備，讓修正主義國家深化彼此之間的合作，以彌補差距。它必須保持對朋友的承諾和信任。它必須繼續贏得美國人民對美國在世界上嚴謹領導的力量、目標和價值的信心。
重回遊戲
美國的戰略適應力在很大程度上取決於其經濟競爭力。這就是為什麽拜登總統和哈裏斯副總統帶領國會民主黨和共和黨通過立法，進行曆史性投資，以升級基礎設施，支持推動二十一世紀發展的行業和技術，為製造業基礎充電，促進研究，並引領全球能源轉型。
這些國內投資構成了拜登政府戰略的第一大支柱，它們幫助美國工人和企業推動了自 1990 年代以來最強勁的美國經濟。美國的 GDP 比排在其後的三個國家的總和還要大。通貨膨脹率已降至世界發達經濟體中最低水平。失業率在 50 多年來最長的時間內保持在 4% 或以下。家庭財富創下曆史新高。盡管太多美國人仍在努力維持生計，物價對許多家庭來說仍然過高，但經濟複蘇已經大幅減少了貧困和不平等，並將其好處惠及更多人和更多地方。
這些對美國競爭力的投資和美國經濟複蘇的成功具有強大的吸引力。在國會通過一項法案後，
2022 年，隨著《芯片和科學法案》和《通脹削減法案》（有史以來對氣候和清潔能源的最大投資）的出台，韓國三星承諾在德克薩斯州投資數百億美元製造半導體。日本豐田投入數十億美元在北卡羅來納州生產電動汽車和電池。全球五大半導體製造商都承諾在美國建立新工廠，投資 3000 億美元，創造超過 10 萬個新的美國就業崗位。
美國現在是世界上最大的外國直接投資接受國。它也是最大的外國直接投資提供者，顯示了美國私營部門在擴大全球經濟機會方麵無與倫比的力量。這些投資不僅使美國工人和社區受益。它們還減少了美國對中國和其他修正主義國家的依賴，並使美國成為那些也希望減少依賴的國家更好的合作夥伴。
雖然一些朋友起初擔心拜登政府的國內投資和激勵措施會威脅到他們的經濟利益，但隨著時間的推移，他們已經看到美國的複興如何能給他們帶來好處。它刺激了他們對商品和服務的需求，並催化了他們對芯片、清潔技術和更具彈性的供應鏈的投資。它還使美國及其盟友能夠繼續推動技術創新並製定技術標準，這對於維護他們共同的安全、價值觀和福利至關重要。
和平夥伴
拜登政府戰略的第二個支柱是重振和重新構想美國的關係網絡——使華盛頓及其合作夥伴能夠匯聚力量，推進共同的世界願景，並與那些試圖破壞它的人進行有力而負責任的競爭。
有力的競爭意味著使用美國權力的所有工具來推進美國的利益。這意味著增強美國的軍力態勢、軍事和情報能力、製裁和出口管製工具以及與盟友和夥伴協商的機製，以便該國能夠可靠地阻止——並在必要時防禦——侵略。雖然華盛頓並不尋求在升級行動中攀升，但它必須為更大的風險做好準備並加以管理。
與此同時，負責任的競爭意味著保持溝通渠道，防止競爭演變為衝突。這意味著明確表示美國的目標不是政權更迭，即使雙方競爭，也必須找到共存的方法。這意味著在符合國家利益的情況下尋找合作的方式。這意味著以有利於朋友安全和繁榮的方式競爭，而不是以犧牲他們為代價。
中國是唯一有意圖和手段重塑國際體係的國家。拜登總統早就明確表示，我們將把北京視為美國的“步調挑戰”——其最重要的長期戰略競爭對手。我們下定決心保護美國最先進的技術；保護美國工人、公司和社區免受不公平經濟行為的侵害；抵製中國在國外日益增長的侵略行為和在國內的鎮壓行為。我們與朋友建立了專門的渠道，分享華盛頓對北京政策和行動所帶來的經濟和安全風險的評估。盡管如此，我們恢複了兩軍之間的溝通，並強調與中國的嚴重分歧不會阻止美國與中國保持牢固的商業關係。我們也不會讓中美關係中的摩擦阻礙在對美國人民和世界其他國家都至關重要的優先事項上的合作，例如應對氣候變化、阻止合成毒品的流通和防止核擴散。
在俄羅斯問題上，我們對普京總統的複仇目標或“重啟”的可能性不抱任何幻想。我們毫不猶豫地對莫斯科的破壞穩定活動采取了有力行動，包括其網絡攻擊和幹涉美國大選。與此同時，我們通過延長《新削減戰略武器條約》和啟動戰略穩定對話，努力減少核危險和戰爭風險。
在伊朗和朝鮮問題上，我們同樣保持清醒的頭腦。我們增加了外交壓力，加強了美國軍方的武力態勢，以威懾和製約德黑蘭和平壤。特朗普政府單方麵和錯誤地退出伊朗核協議，使德黑蘭的核計劃擺脫了束縛，破壞了美國及其夥伴的安全。我們向伊朗表明，隻要伊朗願意，就有一條道路可以回到雙方遵守協議的軌道上來，同時保持強有力的製裁製度和我們對伊朗的承諾。
伊朗永遠不會被允許獲得核武器。我們明確表示願意與朝鮮進行直接談判，但我們不會屈服於朝鮮的武力威脅或先決條件。
拜登政府承諾以積極而負責任的方式開展競爭，這消除了修正主義者認為美國是維護國際和平與穩定的障礙的借口。這也為美國贏得了盟友的更多信任，同時也建立了更強大的夥伴關係。
我們努力通過四個方式充分發揮這些夥伴關係的潛力。首先，我們重新致力於國家的核心聯盟和夥伴關係。拜登總統向北約盟國保證，美國將履行將對一個國家的攻擊視為對所有國家的攻擊的承諾；重申了美國對日本、韓國和其他亞洲盟友的堅定安全承諾；並恢複了七國集團作為世界先進民主國家指導委員會的作用。
第二，我們為美國的聯盟和夥伴關係注入了新的目標。我們提升了四方安全對話（與澳大利亞、印度和日本的夥伴關係），並采取具體措施實現自由開放的印度太平洋共同願景，從加強海上安全到生產安全有效的疫苗。我們成立了美國-歐盟貿易和技術委員會，調動世界上最大的經濟夥伴關係來製定新興技術的全球標準，保護美國和歐洲最敏感的創新。我們提升了美印戰略夥伴關係等重要雙邊關係的雄心，並恢複了區域參與，拜登總統主持了與非洲、拉丁美洲、太平洋島嶼和東南亞領導人的峰會。
我們讓北約比以往任何時候都更大、更強大、更團結。
第三，我們以新的方式在各個地區和問題上將美國的盟友和夥伴團結在一起。我們啟動了印度-太平洋經濟框架，該框架將占世界 GDP 40% 的 14 個國家聚集在一起，以建立更安全的供應鏈、打擊腐敗和向清潔能源過渡。我們創建了三邊防禦夥伴關係 AUKUS，通過該夥伴關係，澳大利亞、英國和美國聯手建造核動力潛艇，並深化其科學、技術和工業合作。
第四，我們建立了新的聯盟來應對新的挑戰。我們團結了各種政府、國際組織、企業和民間社會團體，生產和分發數億劑免費 COVID-19 疫苗，結束了疫情的急性期，挽救了生命，並加強了世界預防和應對未來衛生緊急情況的能力。我們發起了一個全球聯盟，以應對非法合成毒品的禍害，並發起了一項區域性努力，以分擔西半球曆史性移民挑戰的責任。
在建立這些和其他聯盟時，拜登政府始終將其他民主國家作為第一站。這就是總統發起民主峰會的原因，該峰會將來自各個地區的民主領導人和改革者聚集在一起。但如果目標是解決美國人民麵臨的問題，民主國家就不能成為美國的唯一夥伴。例如，人工智能不斷演變的機遇和風險需要通過包括非民主國家在內的多個聯盟來應對，隻要它們願意為本國公民服務並願意幫助解決共同的挑戰。這就是為什麽拜登政府與七國集團的其他國家合作製定了人工智能治理框架，然後帶領包括中國在內的 120 多個國家在聯合國大會上製定並通過了聯合國有史以來第一份關於利用人工智能造福人類的決議。這也是為什麽政府製定了一個負責任地開發和使用軍事人工智能的框架，並有 50 多個國家簽署了該框架。
對修正主義的反應
雖然我們的戰略鞏固了美國在國內外實力的基礎，但我們的治國方略利用這種實力將危機轉化為機遇。在拜登政府執政的第一年，我們在加強與盟友和夥伴在戰略競爭方法上的協調方麵取得了重大進展。盟國首都的對話導致了明顯的轉變。例如，在為北約製定新戰略概念的談判中，我看到盟國首次高度關注中國對跨大西洋安全和價值觀的挑戰。在與東亞盟國官員的討論中，我聽到他們正在努力應對北京在南海和台灣海峽的脅迫行為。
普京決定試圖將烏克蘭從地圖上抹去——以及中國決定先為俄羅斯提供掩護，然後助長其侵略——加速了
俄羅斯入侵前，我們采取了一係列準備措施：警告世界莫斯科即將發動侵略，與盟友分享情報，為烏克蘭的自衛提供軍事支持，並與歐盟、七國集團和其他組織協調，計劃立即對俄羅斯實施嚴厲的經濟製裁。美國從阿富汗撤軍是必要但艱難的，我們從中吸取了慘痛教訓，從應急計劃到盟國協調等各方麵都吸取了教訓，並加以運用。
當普京最終發動全麵入侵時，北約迅速調動軍隊、飛機和艦船作為反應部隊的一部分，加強了北約的東翼。歐盟及其成員國向烏克蘭提供了大量軍事、經濟和人道主義援助。美國成立了烏克蘭防務聯絡小組，該小組已發展到 50 多個國家與烏克蘭軍方合作，以滿足緊急需求。而一個由多國組成的廣泛聯盟實施了有史以來最雄心勃勃的製裁，凍結了俄羅斯一半以上的主權資產。
因為這不僅是對烏克蘭的攻擊，也是對《聯合國憲章》核心的主權和領土完整原則的攻擊，普京的戰爭引發了歐洲以外的恐懼。如果允許普京不受懲罰地繼續下去，世界各地的潛在侵略者都會注意到這一點，從而打開衝突的潘多拉魔盒。中國決定援助俄羅斯，凸顯了美國在歐洲和亞洲的盟友的命運緊密相連。在此之前，許多歐洲人仍然將中國視為經濟夥伴——即使他們越來越擔心過度依賴北京。但當北京做出選擇時，越來越多的歐洲人將中國視為係統性競爭對手。
2023 年 7 月，北京，中美官員會晤錄像 2023 年 7 月，北京，中美官員會晤錄像
普京堅持戰爭的時間越長，俄羅斯就越依賴同胞修正主義者的支持來繼續戰鬥。朝鮮運送了滿載武器和彈藥的火車，包括數百萬發炮彈、彈道導彈和發射器，直接違反了聯合國安理會的多項決議。伊朗在俄羅斯建造了一家無人機工廠，並向莫斯科運送了數百枚彈道導彈。中國公司加快了俄羅斯生產武器、彈藥和其他物資所需的機器、微電子產品和其他兩用物品的供應。
俄羅斯對他們的支持依賴程度越高，修正主義者期望的回報就越多——也得到了回報。普京同意與朝鮮分享俄羅斯先進的武器技術，這加劇了日本和韓國本已嚴重的威脅。他和朝鮮領導人金正恩重啟了冷戰時期的一項協議，承諾如果任何一方開戰，將向其提供軍事援助。俄羅斯增加了對伊朗的軍事和技術支持，並加快了與伊朗建立戰略夥伴關係的談判，盡管德黑蘭繼續為在中東對美國人員和合作夥伴以及紅海國際航運進行恐怖襲擊的代理人提供武器、訓練和資金。俄羅斯和中國的合作幾乎擴展到所有領域，兩國舉行了越來越激進和廣泛的軍事演習，包括在南海和北極地區。
中國、俄羅斯、伊朗和朝鮮有著複雜的曆史和不同的利益，他們之間的夥伴關係與美國長期以來的聯盟架構相去甚遠。在他們宣稱的友誼和支持的背後，這些國家的關係主要是交易性的，他們的合作需要權衡和風險，隨著時間的推移，每個國家都可能發現這些權衡和風險越來越令人厭惡。對於中國來說尤其如此，中國國內的經濟健康和國外的地位受到其修正主義夥伴煽動的全球不穩定的威脅。然而，這四個修正主義者都堅定地致力於挑戰美國和國際體係的總體目標。這將繼續推動他們的合作，特別是在美國和其他國家站出來反對他們的修正主義的時候。
拜登政府對這種日益增長的聯盟的回應是加速盟友之間對威脅的共識。我們讓北約比以往任何時候都更大、更強大、更團結，盡管芬蘭和瑞典長期以來一直不結盟，但北約仍然歡迎他們加入。在本屆政府執政之初，30 個北約成員國中有 9 個履行了將其 GDP 的 2% 用於國防的承諾；今年，32 個盟國中至少有 23 個將實現這一目標。
我們深化和現代化了美國在印度太平洋地區的聯盟，加強了美國軍隊的軍事部署
通過簽署新協議升級從日本到菲律賓再到南太平洋的基地，我們提高了軍事實力。我們還找到了將盟友團結在一起的新方法。2023年，拜登總統在戴維營與日本和韓國舉行了有史以來第一次三邊領導人峰會，三國同意加強合作，以防禦來自朝鮮的彈道導彈襲擊和網絡攻擊。今年，他在白宮主持了有史以來第一次與日本和菲律賓的三邊峰會，三方承諾深化共同努力，捍衛南海的航行自由。
大融合
可以說，我們實現的最重要的轉變不是在地區內部，而是在地區之間。當普京發動入侵時，他認為他可以利用歐洲對俄羅斯天然氣、石油和煤炭的依賴來製造分裂，削弱其對烏克蘭的支持。但他低估了歐洲國家的決心——以及亞洲盟友幫助他們的意願。
日本已承諾向烏克蘭提供超過 120 億美元的援助，並於 6 月成為第一個與基輔簽署為期十年的雙邊安全協議的歐洲以外國家。澳大利亞已向烏克蘭提供了超過 10 億美元的軍事援助，並加入了在英國培訓烏克蘭人員的多國聯盟。韓國已宣布將考慮向烏克蘭提供武器，此外還將提供大量經濟和人道主義支持。美國的印度太平洋夥伴正在與歐洲協調，對俄羅斯實施製裁並限製俄羅斯石油價格，從而減少普京可以投入其戰爭機器的資金數額。
與此同時，中國對俄羅斯的支持——以及美國政府創新地利用情報外交來揭示這種支持的範圍——使美國在歐洲的盟友進一步關注北京構成的威脅。普京入侵造成的巨大經濟混亂使台海危機可能造成的災難性後果成為現實，每年大約有一半的世界商業集裝箱船要經過台灣海峽。全球 90% 以上的最先進半導體都是在台灣製造的。
拜登政府上任時，歐洲主要夥伴決心從美國獲得自主權，同時深化與中國的經濟聯係。然而，自入侵以來，他們已將大部分經濟議程重新調整為“去風險化”中國。2023 年，歐盟通過了《關鍵原材料法案》，以減少對中國在製造電動汽車和風力渦輪機等產品所需投入方麵的依賴。2024 年，歐盟啟動了新的舉措，以進一步加強其經濟安全，包括改進對外國和對外投資的審查、研究安全和出口管製。愛沙尼亞、拉脫維亞和立陶宛退出了中國在中東歐的“17+1”投資倡議。意大利退出了中國的“一帶一路”倡議。越來越多的歐洲國家，包括法國、德國和英國，已禁止中國科技公司為其關鍵基礎設施提供設備。
作為國務卿，我不搞政治；我製定政策。
歐洲和亞洲的朋友也與美國一道采取協調行動，解決中國不公平的貿易行為和製造業產能過剩問題。今年，拜登政府提高了針對中國鋼鐵和鋁、半導體和關鍵礦產的針對性關稅——而不是全麵征收關稅，從而增加美國家庭的成本——歐盟和加拿大對中國電動汽車征收了關稅。我們從本世紀頭十年的“中國衝擊”中吸取了慘痛的教訓，當時北京釋放了大量補貼商品，淹沒了美國的工業，破壞了美國人的生計，摧毀了美國社區。為了確保曆史不會重演，並與中國的扭曲策略競爭，我們正在加大對美國及其盟友的生產能力的投資——並對這些投資實施更大的保護。
在新興技術方麵，美國及其歐洲和亞洲的盟友正在越來越多地合作，以保持他們的集體優勢。在我們的敦促下，日本和荷蘭與美國一道采取措施，阻止中國獲得最先進的半導體及其生產設備。通過量子開發小組，我們召集了九個歐洲和亞洲主要盟友，以加強供應鏈彈性，並深化研究和商業夥伴關係，該技術的能力甚至超過最強大的超級計算機。
從俄羅斯發動戰爭的那一刻起，美國的一些
tes 認為，美國對烏克蘭的支持會分散應對中國挑戰的資源。我們的行動證明了相反的事實：對抗俄羅斯對於實現亞洲和歐洲前所未有的融合至關重要，亞洲和歐洲越來越認為其安全不可分割。這種轉變不僅是莫斯科和北京做出的重大決定的結果。它也是美國盟友和合作夥伴做出的重大決定的產物——華盛頓鼓勵這些選擇，但沒有、不會、也不能決定這些選擇。
支持烏克蘭的全球聯盟是我職業生涯中見過的最有力的分擔負擔的例子。自普京全麵入侵以來，美國已向烏克蘭提供了 940 億美元的支持，而歐洲、亞洲和其他合作夥伴已貢獻了近 1480 億美元。通過加強協調、投資和工業基礎整合，美國在歐洲和亞洲的盟友的能力仍需大量工作來提升。美國人民期望，美國的安全要求盟友和合作夥伴隨著時間的推移承擔更多的國防負擔。但如今，由於我們建立了盟友的橋梁，美國在這兩個重要地區的地位明顯增強。事實上，美國的朋友也是如此。
跨地區的修正主義
修正主義者日益增長的自信和結盟所帶來的不穩定影響遠遠超出了歐洲和亞洲。在非洲，俄羅斯派出特工和雇傭兵開采黃金和關鍵礦產，傳播虛假信息，並幫助那些試圖推翻民選政府的人。莫斯科非但沒有支持結束蘇丹戰爭（世界上最嚴重的人道主義危機）的外交努力，反而通過武裝雙方來加劇衝突。伊朗及其代理人利用混亂局麵，恢複該地區的非法武器販運路線，加劇動亂。與此同時，北京避開了莫斯科在非洲的好戰行為，同時培養新的依賴關係，並讓更多國家背上不可持續的債務。在南美，中國、俄羅斯和伊朗正在向委內瑞拉尼古拉斯·馬杜羅的獨裁政府提供軍事、經濟和外交支持，這強化了他堅信其政權不受壓力影響的信念。
這種修正主義結盟在中東地區表現得更加激烈。俄羅斯曾支持聯合國安理會遏製伊朗核野心的努力；現在，它正在支持伊朗的核計劃並為其破壞穩定的活動提供便利。俄羅斯也從以色列的親密夥伴變成了——在 10 月 7 日的襲擊之後——加強了與哈馬斯的關係。拜登政府則一直在與中東及其他地區的夥伴不懈合作，以結束加沙的衝突和苦難，找到一種外交解決方案，使以色列人和黎巴嫩人能夠在邊界兩側安全生活，管理更廣泛的地區戰爭風險，並努力實現該地區（包括以色列和沙特阿拉伯之間）的更大一體化和正常化。
這些努力是相互依存的。如果加沙戰爭沒有結束，沒有一條既符合巴勒斯坦人合法願望又符合以色列安全需要的、有時間限製的、可靠的建國道路，那麽正常化就無法推進。但如果這些努力取得成功，正常化將使以色列加入地區安全架構，釋放整個地區的經濟機會，並孤立伊朗及其代理人。包括阿拉伯國家在內的各國聯盟展現了這種一體化的曙光，它們幫助以色列抵禦了 4 月份伊朗前所未有的直接攻擊。自 10 月 7 日以來，我對該地區的訪問證實，隻要那裏的領導人願意做出艱難的決定，就有一條通往更大和平與一體化的道路。
盡管我們付出了不懈的努力，但加沙戰爭對人類造成的後果仍然是毀滅性的。數以萬計的巴勒斯坦平民在這場他們沒有發起、也無法阻止的衝突中喪生。幾乎所有加沙人口都流離失所，絕大多數人營養不良。大約 100 名人質仍留在加沙，他們要麽已經被殺害，要麽仍然被哈馬斯關押在殘酷的環境中。所有這些苦難都使我們更加迫切地需要努力結束衝突，防止衝突重演，為該地區的持久和平與安全奠定基礎。
提出更強有力的條件
對於許多發展中國家和新興市場國家來說，過去的大國競爭意味著被迫在與他們日常鬥爭相去甚遠的競爭中選擇一方。許多人表示擔心，今天的競爭也沒有什麽不同。有些人擔心，美國對國內複興和戰略競爭的關注將以犧牲對他們最重要的問題為代價。華盛頓必須證明
事實恰恰相反。
拜登政府為全球基礎設施建設提供資金的努力正是為此而做出的嚐試。沒有哪個國家希望基礎設施項目建設質量低劣、破壞環境、進口或虐待工人、滋生腐敗並讓政府背負不可持續的債務。然而，這往往是唯一的選擇。為了提供更好的選擇，美國和其他七國集團國家於 2022 年啟動了全球基礎設施和投資夥伴關係。該倡議最終將釋放 6000 億美元的私人資本，用於資助高質量、環保的項目，並增強項目所在地社區的能力。美國已經在協調鐵路和港口的投資，以連接菲律賓的經濟樞紐，並增強對該國的投資。美國還在橫跨非洲的一條發展帶上進行一係列基礎設施投資——將安哥拉的洛比托港與剛果民主共和國和讚比亞連接起來，並最終連接大西洋和印度洋——這將為整個地區的社區創造機會，同時鞏固引領清潔能源轉型所必需的關鍵礦物的供應。
美國正與合作夥伴聯手建設和擴大數字基礎設施，以便各國不必放棄安全和隱私即可獲得高速、實惠的互聯網連接。華盛頓與澳大利亞、日本、新西蘭和台灣合作，投資建設了電纜，將數字接入擴展到太平洋島嶼的 10 萬人。它還在亞洲其他地區、非洲和南美洲率先開展了類似的努力。
美國政府還試圖使國際機構更具包容性。盡管聯合國和其他類似機構可能不完美，但它們的合法性和能力是無可替代的。參與並改革國際秩序是鞏固國際秩序、抵禦破壞國際秩序行為的最佳方式之一。正因如此，在拜登政府的領導下，美國重新加入了世界衛生組織、聯合國人權理事會和聯合國教科文組織。這也是為什麽美國政府提議擴大聯合國安理會，增加兩個非洲常任理事國、一個拉丁美洲和加勒比地區常任理事國和一個小島嶼發展中國家的民選席位。除此之外，我們長期以來還提議增加德國、印度和日本的常任理事國席位。這也是為什麽我們敦促二十國集團將非洲聯盟列為常任理事國，非洲聯盟於 2023 年實現了這一目標。2021 年，我們支持國際貨幣基金組織撥款 6500 億美元特別提款權，幫助在全球衛生、氣候和債務危機重壓下苦苦掙紮的貧窮國家。我們還推動世界銀行進行改革，允許各國政府在自然災害和氣候衝擊後推遲償還債務，並擴大中等收入國家可獲得的可負擔融資。在拜登總統的領導下，美國向發展中國家提供的氣候資金增加了四倍，以幫助它們實現氣候目標，並幫助超過五億人應對氣候變化的影響。
拜登政府一次又一次地證明，美國是其他國家可以依靠的國家，可以幫助它們解決最大的問題。例如，當烏克蘭戰爭加劇全球糧食安全危機時，美國投資了 175 億美元來解決糧食不安全問題，並動員 100 多個國家采取具體措施應對挑戰及其根源。美國在做到這一切的同時，仍然是迄今為止全球最大的救生人道主義援助捐助國。
國內戰線
盡管一些美國人支持更大的單邊主義和孤立主義，但事實上，拜登政府戰略的支柱得到了廣泛支持。《芯片和科學法案》以及對烏克蘭和台灣的多輪資助在國會獲得兩黨支持。參眾兩院的民主黨和共和黨都致力於加強美國的聯盟。一次又一次的民意調查顯示，大多數美國人認為，有原則、有紀律的美國領導世界至關重要。
鞏固這一聯盟對於說服盟友和對手至關重要，盡管華盛頓的執政黨可以改變，但美國外交政策的支柱不會改變。這將使盟友相信美國值得信賴，會留在他們身邊，這反過來會使他們成為美國更可靠的盟友。這將使華盛頓能夠繼續以強勢地位應對其對手，因為他們會知道，美國的力量不僅植根於美國政府的堅定承諾，也植根於美國人民不可動搖的信念。
作為國務卿，我不搞政治；我搞政治冰冷。政策關乎選擇。從第一天起，拜登總統和哈裏斯副總統就做出了一個根本性的選擇，即在一個競爭更加激烈、更易爆發的世界中，美國不能孤軍奮戰。如果美國想要保護其安全並為本國人民創造機會，就必須與那些對自由、開放、安全和繁榮的世界有利益的人站在一起，並對抗那些威脅這個世界的人。美國在這個決定性十年的後半段做出的選擇將決定這一考驗時刻是繼續複興還是回歸倒退——華盛頓及其盟友能否繼續戰勝修正主義勢力，還是讓他們的願景定義二十一世紀。
America's Strategy of Renewal Rebuilding Leadership for a New World
November/December 2024 October 1, 2024
U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken speaking to media in Dubai, December 2023
A fierce competition is underway to define a new age in international affairs. A small number of countries—principally Russia, with the partnership of Iran and North Korea, as well as China—are determined to alter the foundational principles of the international system. While their forms of governance, ideologies, interests, and capabilities differ, these revisionist powers all want to entrench autocratic rule at home and assert spheres of influence abroad. They all wish to resolve territorial disputes by coercion or force and weaponize other countries’ economic and energy dependence. And they all seek to erode the foundations of the United States’ strength: its military and technological superiority, its dominant currency, and its unmatched network of alliances and partnerships. While these countries are not an axis, and the administration has been clear that it does not seek bloc confrontation, choices these revisionist powers are making mean we need to act decisively to prevent that outcome.
When President Joe Biden and Vice President Kamala Harris came into office, these revisionist powers were already aggressively challenging U.S. interests. These countries believed that the United States was in irreversible decline at home and divided from its friends abroad. They saw an American public that had lost its faith in government, an American democracy that was polarized and paralyzed, and an American foreign policy that was undermining the very alliances, international institutions, and norms that Washington had built and championed.
President Biden and Vice President Harris pursued a strategy of renewal, pairing historic investments in competitiveness at home with an intensive diplomatic campaign to revitalize partnerships abroad. This twin-pillared strategy, they believed, was the best way to disabuse competitors of their assumptions that the United States was declining and diffident. These were dangerous assumptions, since they would lead the revisionists to continue undermining the free, open, secure, and prosperous world that the United States and most countries seek. It’s a world where countries are free to choose their own paths and partners, and where the global economy is defined by fair competition, openness, transparency, and broad-based opportunity. A world where technology empowers people and accelerates human progress. A world where international law, including the core principles of the UN Charter, is upheld, and universal human rights are respected. A world that can evolve to reflect new realities, give voice to emerging perspectives and players, and meet the shared challenges of the present and future.
The Biden administration’s strategy has put the United States in a much stronger geopolitical position today than it was four years ago. But our work is unfinished. The United States must sustain its fortitude across administrations to shake the revisionists’ assumptions. It must be prepared for the revisionist states to deepen cooperation with one another to try to make up the difference. It must maintain its commitments to and the trust of its friends. And it must continue to earn the American people’s confidence in the power, purpose, and value of disciplined American leadership in the world.
BACK IN THE GAME
The United States’ strategic fitness rests in large measure on its economic competitiveness. That is why President Biden and Vice President Harris led Democrats and Republicans in Congress in passing legislation to make historic investments to upgrade infrastructure, bolster the industries and technologies that will drive the twenty-first century, recharge the manufacturing base, boost research, and lead the global energy transition.
These domestic investments constituted the first pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy, and they have helped American workers and businesses power the strongest U.S. economy since the 1990s. The United States’ GDP is larger than that of the next three countries combined. Inflation has fallen to some of the lowest levels among the world’s advanced economies. Unemployment has held at or below four percent for the longest stretch in more than 50 years. Household wealth has reached a record high. And while too many Americans are still struggling to make ends meet and prices are still too high for many families, the recovery has slashed poverty and inequality and spread its benefits to more people and more places.
These investments in American competitiveness and the success of the United States’ rebound are powerfully attractive. After Congress passed the CHIPS and Science Act and the Inflation Reduction Act in 2022—the largest-ever investment in climate and clean energy—South Korea’s Samsung committed tens of billions of dollars to manufacturing semiconductors in Texas. Japan’s Toyota put billions of dollars toward making electric vehicles and batteries in North Carolina. All five of the world’s top semiconductor manufacturers have pledged to build new plants in the United States, investing $300 billion and creating over 100,000 new American jobs.
The United States is now the world’s largest recipient of foreign direct investment. It is also the largest provider of foreign direct investment, showing the unmatched power of the American private sector to expand economic opportunity around the world. These investments don’t just benefit American workers and communities. They also reduce the United States’ dependencies on China and other revisionists and make the country a better partner to countries that want to reduce their dependencies, too.
While some friends worried at first that the Biden administration’s domestic investments and incentives would threaten their economic interests, with time, they have seen how American renewal can redound in their favor. It has boosted demand for their goods and services and catalyzed their own investments in chips, clean tech, and more resilient supply chains. And it has allowed the United States and its friends to continue driving technological innovation and setting technological standards that are crucial to safeguarding their shared security, values, and welfare.
PARTNERS IN PEACE
The second pillar of the Biden administration’s strategy was to reinvigorate and reimagine the United States’ network of relationships—enabling Washington and its partners to pool their strength in advancing a shared vision for the world and compete vigorously yet responsibly against those seeking to undermine it.
Competing vigorously means using all the instruments of U.S. power to advance U.S. interests. It means enhancing the United States’ force posture, military and intelligence capabilities, sanctions and export control tools, and mechanisms for consulting with allies and partners so that the country can credibly deter—and, if necessary, defend against—aggression. While Washington doesn’t seek to climb up the ladder of escalatory actions, it must prepare for and manage greater risk.
Competing responsibly, meanwhile, means maintaining channels of communication to prevent competition from veering into conflict. It means making clear that the United States’ goal is not regime change and that even as both sides compete, they must find ways to coexist. It means looking for ways to cooperate when it serves the national interest. And it means competing in ways that benefit the security and prosperity of friends, instead of coming at their expense.
China is the only country with the intent and the means to reshape the international system. President Biden made clear early on that we would treat Beijing as the United States’ “pacing challenge”—its most consequential long-term strategic competitor. We undertook determined efforts to protect the United States’ most advanced technologies; defend American workers, companies, and communities from unfair economic practices; and push back against China’s growing aggression abroad and repression at home. We set up dedicated channels with friends to share Washington’s assessment of the economic and security risks posed by Beijing’s policies and actions. We nevertheless resumed military-to-military communication and underscored that serious disagreements with China wouldn’t prevent the United States from maintaining strong commercial relations with the country. Nor would we allow friction in U.S.-Chinese relations to preclude cooperation on priorities that matter to the American people and the rest of the world, such as dealing with climate change, stopping the flow of synthetic drugs, and preventing nuclear proliferation.
On Russia, we had no illusions about President Vladimir Putin’s revanchist aims or the possibility of a “reset.” We did not hesitate to act forcefully against Moscow’s destabilizing activities, including its cyberattacks and interference in U.S. elections. At the same time, we worked to reduce nuclear danger and the risk of war by extending the New START treaty and launching a strategic stability dialogue.
We were similarly clear-eyed when it came to Iran and North Korea. We increased diplomatic pressure and strengthened the U.S. military’s force posture to deter and constrain Tehran and Pyongyang. The Trump administration’s unilateral and misguided exit from the Iran nuclear deal freed Tehran’s nuclear program from its confinement, undermining the security of the United States and its partners. We demonstrated to Iran that there was a path back to a mutual return to compliance—if Iran was willing to take it—while maintaining a robust sanctions regime and our commitment that Iran will never be permitted to obtain a nuclear weapon. And we made clear our willingness to engage in direct talks with North Korea, but also that we would not submit to its saber rattling or its preconditions.
The Biden administration’s commitment to compete vigorously yet responsibly along these lines took away the revisionists’ pretext that the United States was the obstacle to maintaining international peace and stability. It also earned the United States greater trust from its friends—and, along with it, stronger partnerships.
We worked to realize the full potential of these partnerships in four ways. First, we recommitted to the country’s core alliances and partnerships. President Biden reassured NATO allies that the United States would honor its pledge to treat an attack on one as an attack on all; reaffirmed the country’s ironclad security commitments to Japan, South Korea, and other allies in Asia; and restored the G-7 to its role as the steering committee of the world’s advanced democracies.
Second, we infused U.S. alliances and partnerships with new purpose. We elevated the Quad—the partnership with Australia, India, and Japan—and took concrete steps to realize a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific, from enhancing maritime security to manufacturing safe, effective vaccines. We launched the U.S.-EU Trade and Technology Council, marshaling the world’s biggest economic partnership to shape global standards for emerging technologies and protect the United States’ and Europe’s most sensitive innovations. We raised the ambition of critical bilateral relationships, such as the U.S.-India Strategic Partnership, and revived regional engagement, with President Biden hosting summits with leaders from Africa, Latin America, the Pacific Islands, and Southeast Asia.
We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever.
Third, we knit together U.S. allies and partners in new ways across regions and issues. We launched the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, which brings together 14 countries representing 40 percent of the world’s GDP to build more secure supply chains, combat corruption, and transition to clean energy. We created AUKUS, a trilateral defense partnership through which Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have teamed up to build nuclear-powered submarines and deepen their scientific, technological, and industrial cooperation.
Fourth, we built new coalitions to address new challenges. We rallied a variety of governments, international organizations, businesses, and civil society groups to manufacture and distribute hundreds of millions of free COVID-19 vaccines, end the acute phase of the pandemic, save lives, and strengthen the world’s capacity to prevent and respond to future health emergencies. We launched a global coalition to address the scourge of illicit synthetic drugs and a regionwide effort to share responsibility for the historic migration challenges in the Western Hemisphere.
In building these and other coalitions, the Biden administration has always made fellow democracies its first port of call. It’s why the president launched the Summit for Democracy, bringing together democratic leaders and reformers from every region. But if the goal is to solve the problems facing the American people, democracies can’t be the United States’ only partners. The evolving opportunities and risks of artificial intelligence, for example, need to be addressed through multiple coalitions that include nondemocracies, so long as they want to deliver for their citizens and are willing to help solve shared challenges. That is why the Biden administration worked with the rest of the G-7 to develop governance frameworks for AI and then led more than 120 countries—including China—in the UN General Assembly to craft and pass the first-ever UN resolution on leveraging AI for good. And it’s why the administration crafted a framework for the responsible development and use of military AI that more than 50 countries have signed on to.
REACTING TO REVISIONISM
While our strategy shored up the foundations of the United States’ strength at home and abroad, our statecraft capitalized on that strength to turn a crisis into opportunity. In the Biden administration’s first year, we made significant progress in deepening alignment with allies and partners on our approach to strategic competition. Conversations in allied capitals led to a palpable shift. For example, in negotiations to shape a new strategic concept for NATO, I saw that allies were, for the first time, intensely focused on the challenge China posed to transatlantic security and values. In my discussions with officials from allied countries in East Asia, I heard them grappling with how to respond to Beijing’s coercive behavior in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait.
Putin’s decision to try to wipe Ukraine off the map—along with China’s decision first to provide Russia with cover and then fuel its aggression—accelerated the convergence of views among Asian and European countries about the seriousness of the threat and the collective action required to address it. Before Russia’s invasion, we took a number of steps to prepare: warning the world of Moscow’s impending aggression, sharing intelligence with allies, sending military support for Ukraine’s self-defense, and coordinating with the EU, the G-7, and others to plan immediate and severe economic sanctions on Russia. We learned hard lessons during the necessary but difficult U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan, lessons about everything from contingency planning to allied coordination, and we applied them.
When Putin ultimately launched his full-scale invasion, NATO swiftly moved troops, aircraft, and ships as part of its Response Force, reinforcing the alliance’s eastern flank. The EU and its member states surged military, economic, and humanitarian aid into Ukraine. The United States created the Ukraine Defense Contact Group, which grew to more than 50 countries working with the Ukrainian military to fill urgent needs. And a broad coalition of countries imposed the most ambitious sanctions ever, freezing more than half of Russia’s sovereign assets.
Because it was an attack not just on Ukraine but also on the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity at the heart of the UN Charter, Putin’s war stoked fears beyond Europe. If Putin had been allowed to proceed with impunity, would-be aggressors everywhere would have taken note, opening a Pandora’s box of conflict. China’s decision to aid Russia underscored the degree to which the fates of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia were tied together. Until that point, many in Europe continued to see China primarily as an economic partner—even if they were increasingly wary of relying too much on Beijing. But when Beijing made its choice, more and more Europeans saw China as a systemic rival.
Footage of a meeting between U.S. and Chinese officials, Beijing, July 2023
The longer Putin pressed on with his war, the more Russia relied on the support of its fellow revisionists to stay in the fight. North Korea delivered trainloads of weapons and ammunition, including millions of artillery rounds and ballistic missiles and launchers, in direct violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. Iran built a drone factory in Russia and sent Moscow hundreds of ballistic missiles. And Chinese companies quickened their supply of the machines, microelectronics, and other dual-use items Russia needed to churn out weapons, munitions, and other materiel.
The more dependent Russia became on their support, the more the revisionists expected—and got—in return. Putin agreed to share Russia’s advanced weapons technology with North Korea, exacerbating an already grave threat to Japan and South Korea. He and North Korean leader Kim Jong Un revived a Cold War–era pact pledging to provide military aid if either one went to war. Russia increased military and technical support to Iran and accelerated negotiation of a strategic partnership with the country, even as Tehran continued to arm, train, and fund proxies who carried out terrorist attacks on U.S. personnel and partners in the Middle East and international shipping in the Red Sea. Russia and China’s cooperation has expanded across nearly every domain, and the two countries have staged increasingly aggressive and wide-ranging military exercises, including in the South China Sea and the Arctic.
China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have complicated histories and divergent interests, and their partnerships with one another do not come close to the United States’ long-standing alliance architecture. Underneath their grand claims of friendship and support, these countries’ relationships are largely transactional, and their cooperation entails tradeoffs and risks that each may find more distasteful over time. That’s especially true for China, whose economic health at home and standing abroad are threatened by the global instability fomented by its revisionist partners. And yet all four revisionists share an abiding commitment to the overarching objective of challenging the United States and the international system. That will continue to drive their cooperation, especially as the United States and other countries stand up to their revisionism.
The Biden administration’s answer to this growing alignment has been to accelerate convergence among allies about the threat. We made NATO bigger, stronger, and more united than ever, with the alliance welcoming in Finland and Sweden despite their long history of nonalignment. At the start of the administration, nine of 30 NATO members were meeting their commitment to spend two percent of their GDP on defense; this year, at least 23 of 32 allies will meet that mark.
We have deepened and modernized U.S. alliances in the Indo-Pacific, strengthening the U.S. military’s force posture and capabilities by signing new agreements to upgrade bases from Japan to the Philippines to the South Pacific. And we have found new ways to weave allies together. In 2023, President Biden held the first-ever trilateral Leaders’ Summit with Japan and South Korea at Camp David, where the three countries agreed to increase cooperation to defend against ballistic missile attacks and cyberattacks from North Korea. This year, he hosted the first-ever trilateral summit with Japan and the Philippines at the White House, where the three parties committed to deepening joint efforts to defend freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.
THE GREAT CONVERGENCE
Arguably the most consequential shift we achieved has not been within regions but across them. When he launched his invasion, Putin thought he could use Europe’s reliance on Russian gas, oil, and coal to sow division and weaken its support for Ukraine. But he underestimated the resolve of European countries—and the willingness of allies in Asia to help them.
Japan has committed more than $12 billion in assistance to Ukraine, and in June, it became the first country outside Europe to sign a ten-year bilateral security agreement with Kyiv. Australia has provided more than $1 billion in military aid to Ukraine and is part of a multinational coalition training Ukrainian personnel in the United Kingdom. South Korea has declared that it will consider supplying weapons to Ukraine, in addition to the considerable economic and humanitarian support it is already providing. The United States’ Indo-Pacific partners are coordinating with Europe to levy sanctions on Russia and cap the price of Russian oil, shrinking the amount of money Putin can funnel into his war machine.
Meanwhile, China’s support for Russia—and the administration’s innovative use of intelligence diplomacy to reveal the breadth of that support—has further focused U.S. allies in Europe on the threat posed by Beijing. The massive economic disruption caused by Putin’s invasion has made real the catastrophic consequences that would result from a crisis in the Taiwan Strait, through which roughly half of the world’s commercial container ships pass every year. More than 90 percent of the world’s most advanced semiconductors are manufactured in Taiwan.
When the Biden administration came into office, key European partners were determined to gain autonomy from the United States while deepening economic ties with China. Since the invasion, however, they have reoriented much of their economic agenda around “de-risking” from China. In 2023, the EU adopted the Critical Raw Materials Act to reduce its dependence on China for the inputs required to manufacture products such as electric vehicles and wind turbines. In 2024, the EU launched new initiatives to further bolster its economic security, including improvements to its screening of foreign and outbound investments, research security, and export controls. Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania pulled out of China’s “17+1” investment initiative in central and eastern Europe. Italy left China’s Belt and Road Initiative. And a growing number of European countries, including France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, have banned Chinese tech companies from providing equipment for their critical infrastructure.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy.
Friends in both Europe and Asia have also joined the United States in taking coordinated action to address China’s unfair trade practices and manufacturing overcapacity. This year, the Biden administration raised targeted tariffs on Chinese steel and aluminum, semiconductors, and critical minerals—as opposed to sweeping tariffs across the board that raise costs for American families—and the European Union and Canada imposed tariffs on Chinese electric vehicles. We learned hard lessons from the “China shock” of the first decade of this century, when Beijing unleashed a flood of subsidized goods that drowned American industries, wrecked Americans’ livelihoods, and devastated American communities. To make sure history doesn’t repeat itself and to compete with China’s distortionary tactics, we are investing more in the productive capacity of the United States and its friends—and putting in place greater protections around those investments.
When it comes to emerging technologies, the United States and its allies in Europe and Asia are increasingly working together to maintain their collective edge. At our urging, Japan and the Netherlands joined the United States in taking measures to prevent China from gaining access to the most advanced semiconductors and the equipment used to produce them. Through the Quantum Development Group, we assembled nine leading European and Asian allies to strengthen supply chain resilience and deepen research and commercial partnerships in a technology with capabilities that exceed even the most powerful supercomputers.
From the moment Russia launched its war, some in the United States argued that U.S. support for Ukraine would divert resources from the challenge of China. Our actions have proved the opposite: standing up to Russia has been crucial to bringing about unprecedented convergence between Asia and Europe, which increasingly see their security as indivisible. This shift is a consequence not only of fateful decisions made by Moscow and Beijing. It is also a product of fateful decisions made by U.S. allies and partners—choices that Washington encouraged but did not, would not, and could not dictate.
The global coalition supporting Ukraine is the most powerful example of burden sharing I’ve seen in my career. While the United States has provided $94 billion in support for Ukraine since Putin’s full-scale invasion, European, Asian, and other partners have contributed nearly $148 billion. Significant work remains to boost the capabilities of U.S. allies in Europe and Asia through a combination of greater coordination, investment, and industrial base integration. The American people expect and U.S. security demands that allies and partners shoulder more of the burden for their own defense over time. But the United States is in a demonstrably stronger position in both consequential regions today because of the bridge of allies we have built. And so, for that matter, are America’s friends.
REVISIONISM ACROSS REGIONS
The destabilizing effects of the revisionists’ growing assertiveness and alignment go well beyond Europe and Asia. In Africa, Russia has unleashed its agents and mercenaries to extract gold and critical minerals, spread disinformation, and aid those trying to overthrow democratically elected governments. Rather than support diplomatic efforts to end the war in Sudan—the world’s worst humanitarian crisis—Moscow is fueling the conflict by arming both sides. Iran and its proxies have taken advantage of the chaos to revive illicit arms trafficking routes in the region and exacerbate unrest. Beijing, meanwhile, has averted its gaze from Moscow’s belligerence in Africa while fostering new dependencies and saddling more countries with unsustainable debt. In South America, China, Russia, and Iran are providing military, economic, and diplomatic support to Nicolás Maduro’s authoritarian government in Venezuela, reinforcing his conviction that his regime is impervious to pressure.
The revisionist alignment is playing out even more intensely in the Middle East. Russia once supported UN Security Council efforts to constrain Iran’s nuclear ambitions; now, it is enabling Iran’s nuclear program and facilitating its destabilizing activities. Russia has also gone from being a close partner of Israel to—after the October 7 attack—strengthening its ties with Hamas. The Biden administration, for its part, has been working tirelessly with partners in the Middle East and beyond to end the conflict and suffering in Gaza, find a diplomatic solution that enables Israelis and Lebanese to live in safety on both sides of the border, manage the risk of a wider regional war, and work toward greater integration and normalization in the region, including between Israel and Saudi Arabia.
These efforts are interdependent. Without an end to the war in Gaza and a time-bound, credible path to statehood that addresses the Palestinians’ legitimate aspirations and Israel’s security needs, normalization cannot move forward. But if these efforts succeed, normalization would join Israel to a regional security architecture, unlock economic opportunities across the region, and isolate Iran and its proxies. Glimmers of such integration were on display in the coalition of countries, including Arab states, that helped Israel defend itself against an unprecedented direct attack from Iran in April. My visits to the region since October 7
have affirmed that there is a path toward greater peace and integration—if leaders there are willing to take hard decisions.
Relentless as our efforts are, the human consequences of the war in Gaza continue to be devastating. Tens of thousands of Palestinian civilians have been killed in a conflict they did not start and cannot stop. Virtually the entire population of Gaza has been displaced, and the vast majority is suffering from malnutrition. Around 100 hostages remain in Gaza, either already killed or still being held in brutal conditions by Hamas. All this suffering adds even greater urgency to our efforts to end the conflict, prevent it from being repeated, and lay the foundation for lasting peace and security in the region.
MAKING A STRONGER OFFER
For many developing and emerging-market countries, great-power competition in the past meant being told to pick a side in a contest that felt far removed from their daily struggles. Many have expressed concern that today’s rivalry is no different. And some worry that the United States’ focus on domestic renewal and strategic competition will come at the expense of the issues that matter most to them. Washington must demonstrate that the opposite is true.
The Biden administration’s work to fund infrastructure across the world is an attempt to do just that. No country wants infrastructure projects that are poorly built and environmentally destructive, that import or abuse workers, or that foster corruption and burden the government with unsustainable debt. Yet too often, that has been the only option. To offer a better choice, the United States and other G-7 countries launched the Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment in 2022. The initiative will eventually unlock $600 billion in private capital to fund projects that are high quality and environmentally sound and empower the communities where they are built. Already, the United States is coordinating investments in railroads and ports to connect the Philippines’ economic hubs and turbocharge investment in the country. And it is making a series of infrastructure investments in a band of development that crosses Africa—connecting Angola’s port of Lobito to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Zambia and ultimately linking the Atlantic and Indian Oceans—which will create opportunities for communities throughout the region while shoring up the supply of critical minerals crucial to leading the clean energy transition.
The United States is teaming up with partners to build and broaden digital infrastructure so that countries don’t have to give up their security and privacy to gain high-speed, affordable Internet connections. Working with Australia, Japan, New Zealand, and Taiwan, Washington has invested in cables that will extend digital access to 100,000 people across the Pacific Islands. And it has spearheaded similar efforts elsewhere in Asia, as well as Africa and South America.
The administration has also sought to make international institutions more inclusive. Imperfect as the United Nations and other such bodies may be, there is no substitute for their legitimacy and capabilities. Participating in and reforming them is one of the best ways to buttress the international order against efforts to tear it down. That is why under the Biden administration, the United States rejoined the World Health Organization, the UN Human Rights Council, and UNESCO. It’s also why the administration has proposed expanding the UN Security Council by adding two permanent members from Africa, one permanent member from Latin America and the Caribbean, and an elected seat for small island developing countries. This is in addition to the permanent seats we have long proposed for Germany, India, and Japan. And it’s why we pressed for the G-20 to add the African Union as a permanent member, which it did in 2023. In 2021, we supported the International Monetary Fund’s allocation of $650 billion in Special Drawing Rights to help poor countries struggling under the weight of global health, climate, and debt crises. We also pushed for reforms at the World Bank that will allow governments to defer debt payments after natural disasters and climate shocks and will expand the affordable financing available to middle-income countries. Under President Biden, the United States has quadrupled climate financing to developing nations to help them meet their climate targets and helped more than half a billion people manage the effects of climate change.
Time and again, the Biden administration has demonstrated that the United States is the country others can rely on to help solve their biggest problems. When the war in Ukraine exacerbated the global food security crisis, for example, the United States invested $17.5 billion to tackle food insecurity and rallied more than 100 countries to take concrete steps to address the challenge and its root causes. It did all this while continuing to be the largest donor, by far, of lifesaving humanitarian aid around the world.
THE HOME FRONT
Although some Americans favor greater unilateralism and isolationism, there is in fact broad support for the pillars of the Biden administration’s strategy. The CHIPS and Science Act and multiple rounds of funding for Ukraine and Taiwan passed in Congress with bipartisan support. Democrats and Republicans in both houses are committed to strengthening U.S. alliances. And in poll after poll, most Americans see principled and disciplined U.S. leadership in the world as vital.
Cementing this alignment is crucial to convincing allies and rivals alike that although the party in power in Washington can change, the pillars of U.S. foreign policy will not. That will give allies the confidence that the United States can be trusted to stay by their side, which in turn will make them more reliable allies for the United States. And it will allow Washington to continue to meet its rivals from a position of strength, since they will know that American power is rooted not only in the firm commitments of the U.S. government but also in the unshakable convictions of the American people.
As secretary of state, I don’t do politics; I do policy. And policy is about choices. From day one, President Biden and Vice President Harris made a foundational choice that in a more competitive and combustible world, the United States cannot go it alone. If America wants to protect its security and create opportunities for its people, it must stand with those who have a stake in a free, open, secure, and prosperous world and stand up to those who threaten that world. The choices the United States makes in the second half of this decisive decade will determine whether this moment of testing remains a time of renewal or returns to a time of regression—whether Washington and its allies can continue to outcompete the forces of revisionism or allow their vision to define the twenty-first century.
