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James Galbraith 中國衰落 美國新敘事

(2024-07-29 15:08:42) 下一個

中國衰落?美國新敘事麵向 2024 年大選

https://www.scmp.com/comment/opinion/article/3231483/china-decline-new-us-narrative-geared-towards-2024-election

James K. Galbraith 2023 年 8 月 18 日

白宮和美國新聞媒體對中國經濟放緩感到憂心忡忡,認為這構成了威脅

中國應該專注於消費而不是投資的說法現在和 30 年前一樣荒謬,並且有助於增強西方的優越感

《紐約時報》最近發表的三篇文章表明了關於中國的“新”敘事。中國曾經因其不可阻擋的崛起而構成威脅,現在它構成威脅是因為它正在衰落。

美國總統喬·拜登為這一新敘事設定了條件。正如《紐約時報》的邁克爾·D·謝爾 (Michael D. Shear) 報道的那樣,白宮現在擔心“中國高失業率和勞動力老齡化的困境,使該國成為世界經濟核心的‘定時炸彈’”。拜登警告說,“當壞人遇到問題時,他們會做壞事”,但他沒有解釋失業和人口老齡化究竟是如何將中國變成威脅的。
謝爾給出了中國新近衰落的另一個原因:“總統已采取積極行動遏製中國崛起,並限製其從使用美國開發的技術中獲益的能力”。考慮到拜登新的半導體限製的範圍,他可能會加上“以及非軍事方麵”。

與此同時,經濟記者彼得·S·古德曼 (Peter S. Goodman) 指出了一係列支持新說法的發展。這些因素包括中國進出口下降、“從食品到公寓等一係列商品”價格下跌、房地產市場低迷以及房地產違約,後者造成了 76 億美元的損失(這是一個相當大的事件,但遠不及典型的美國銀行救助)。古德曼在回應中寫道:“鑒於中國債務不斷增加,目前估計占國民產出的 282%,中國當局的選擇有限。”
古德曼認為,中國的困難源於更深層次的問題,例如高儲蓄率、銀行體係的巨額存款、對房地產的新警惕,以及因此日益增長的“刺激國內需求”的需求。他和他的消息來源一致認為,正確的解決辦法是刺激——即增加消費,減少投資。
此外,古德曼引用了麻省理工學院經濟學家黃亞生的話,他指出,中國的出口和進口總額占國內生產總值的 40%,其中大部分是進口零部件的最終組裝和再出口。然而,盡管黃似乎給古德曼留下了減少這種“轉嫁”貿易將產生巨大影響的印象,但事實上,這種影響相當小,因為進口是 GDP 的減項。中國損失的隻是附加值,隻是整體產品價值的一小部分。

7 月 21 日,一艘集裝箱船停靠在上海洋山深水港。中國進出口額的下降引起了一些方麵的擔憂。照片:NurPhoto / Getty Images

最後,諾貝爾獎得主保羅·克魯格曼以經濟學家的“係統性”觀點完善了該報對中國“跌倒”的報道。克魯格曼認為,中國此前的增長“主要是通過追趕西方技術”,但現在它麵臨著儲蓄過多、投資過多、消費過少的問題。因此,它需要“根本性改革”,以“讓家庭擁有更多收入,這樣不斷增長的消費就可以取代不可持續的投資”。

克魯格曼關於儲蓄的關鍵觀點並不新鮮。30年前,當我成為中國國家計劃委員會宏觀經濟改革首席技術顧問時,西方經濟學家就已經開始推行這一路線。“少投資!多消費!”——當時,我完全不理解這個口號,現在仍然不理解。

中國應該有更多的汽車,但道路狀況更差,加油站更少嗎?它需要更多的電視機,但可以容納電視機的公寓更少嗎?盡管三十年前,中國人民已經基本吃得飽飽的,穿得體麵,但人民是否需要更多的食物和衣服?

的確,中國家庭為教育、醫療和養老儲蓄了大量資金。但他們之所以能這樣做,是因為他們有收入,而這些收入大部分來自公共和私人投資部門的工作。
中國工人的工資來自建造工廠、房屋、鐵路、道路和其他公共工程。典型的(統計平均)中國家庭不受收入限製。如果是這樣,他們就無法像現在這樣儲蓄。

此外,如果中國的投資項目耗盡,收入就會下降,儲蓄就會放緩,消費占收入的比例必然會上升。但儲蓄的下降會讓中國家庭的安全感下降,從而加劇如今的經濟放緩。
難怪政府不遺餘力地通過“一帶一路”等重大項目保持投資流動

主動性。即使中國自身已經完全建成(或過度建設),它仍然會在中亞、非洲和拉丁美洲做很多事情。

中國宣布在中亞投資 38 億美元進行“一帶一路”擴張

是的,中國經濟正在放緩。很難將任何事物的規模擴大到與已經存在的城市和交通網絡相匹配,或與消除極端貧困的運動相匹配。中國現在的主要任務在於其他方麵:教育和醫療保健、技能與工作相匹配、養老和控製二氧化碳排放。這些任務將以中國的方式實現:一步一步,隨著時間的推移。

那麽,新的敘事到底是關於什麽的呢?它不是關於中國,而是關於西方。它是關於我們在技術方麵的領先地位、我們的自由市場體係,以及我們行使權力和阻止所有挑戰者的能力。它是關於強化西方人喜歡相信的東西:資本主義和民主的必然勝利。

最重要的是,它是關於我們的美國領導人戰勝可能做“壞事”的“壞人”。這是為 2024 年競選活動量身定製的敘述。

China in decline? New US narrative is geared towards 2024 election
  • The White House and American news media are wringing their hands over China’s economic slowdown, which is construed as posing a threat
  • The argument that China should focus on consumption instead of investment is as fallacious now as it was 30 years ago, and serves to bolster a Western sense of superiority

Three recent articles in The New York Times have signalled a “new” narrative about China. Once a threat by dint of its inexorable rise, now it poses a threat because it is in decline.

US President Joe Biden set the terms of this new narrative. As The New York Times’ Michael D. Shear reports, the White House now worries that “China’s struggles with high unemployment and an aging workforce make the country ‘a ticking time bomb’ at the heart of the world economy”. Biden warned, “When bad folks have problems, they do bad things”, but he did not explain how, exactly, unemployment and an ageing population turn China into a threat.
Shear gives another reason for China’s new-found decline: “the president has moved aggressively to contain China’s rise and to restrict its ability to benefit militarily from the use of technologies developed in the United States”. Given the scope of Biden’s new semiconductor restrictions, he might have added “and non-militarily as well”.
 
Meanwhile, Peter S. Goodman, an economics reporter, points to a “slew of developments” supporting the new narrative. These include declining Chinese exports and importsfalling prices “on a range of goods, from food to apartments,” a housing slump, and a real-estate default that has produced losses of US$7.6 billion (a sizeable event, but nothing close to the typical US bank bailout). In responding, Goodman writes, “Chinese authorities are limited in their options … given mounting debts now estimated at 282 percent of national output”.
According to Goodman, China’s difficulties stem from deeper problems such as a high savings rate, vast deposits in the banking system, a new wariness about real estate, and, consequently, a growing need “to boost domestic demand”. He and his sources agree that the proper cure is stimulus – meaning more consumption and less investment.

Moreover, Goodman cites MIT economist Yasheng Huang, who notes that exports plus imports in China total 40 per cent of gross domestic product, much of which comprises final assembly and re-exports of imported components. But while Huang appears to have left Goodman with the impression that reducing this “pass-through” trade would have a big effect, the fact is that the effect would be quite small, since imports are a subtraction from GDP. China is losing merely the value-added, a fraction of the overall product value.

A container ship at Yangshan deep water port in Shanghai on July 21. China’s declining imports and exports have elicited concern in some quarters. Photo: NurPhoto / Getty Images

Finally, Nobel laureate Paul Krugman rounds out the paper’s coverage of China’s “stumble” by offering an economist’s “systemic” view. According to Krugman, China previously grew “largely by catching up to Western technology”, but now it faces the problem of too much saving, too much investment, and too little consumption. It therefore needs “fundamental reforms” to “put more income in the hands of families, so that rising consumption can take the place of unsustainable investment”.

 

here is nothing new about Krugman’s key point about savings. Western economists were already pushing that line 30 years ago, when I became chief technical adviser for macroeconomic reform to China’s State Planning Commission. “Invest less! Consume more!” – the mantra made no sense to me then, and it still doesn’t today.

Should China have more cars but worse roads and fewer gas stations? Does it need more televisions, but fewer apartments to put them in? Does the population need more food and clothing, even though it was already mostly well-fed and decently dressed three decades ago?

True, Chinese families save prodigiously for education, healthcare and old age. But they can do that because they have incomes, which come in large part from jobs in the public and private investment sectors.

Chinese workers are paid for building factories, homes, rail lines, roads and other public works. The typical (statistically average) Chinese family is not income-constrained. If it were, it would not be able to save as much as it does.

Moreover, if China were to run out of investment projects, incomes would fall, savings would slow, and consumption as a share of income would necessarily rise. But this decline of savings would make Chinese families less secure, deepening today’s slowdown.
No wonder the government has taken pains to keep investment flowing through major programmes like the Belt and Road Initiative. Even after China itself is fully built (or overbuilt), it still will have plenty to do in Central Asia, Africa and Latin America.
 
China announces US$3.8 billion Belt and Road expansion in Central Asia
Yes, China’s economy is slowing. It will be hard to scale anything to match the cities and transport networks that are already in place, or the campaign to eliminate extreme poverty. China’s main tasks now lie elsewhere: in education and healthcare, in matching skills to jobs, in providing for the elderly, and in curbing carbon dioxide emissions. They will be pursued in Chinese fashion: step by step, over time.

So, what is the new narrative really about? It is not so much about China as it is about the West. It is about our lead in technologies, our free-market system, and our ability to wield power and to keep all challengers at bay. It is about reinforcing what Westerners like to believe: the inevitable triumph of capitalism and democracy.

Above all, it is about our American leaders winning out against “bad folks” who may do “bad things”. It’s a narrative that’s made-to-measure for the 2024 election campaign.
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