Ng Eng Hen 新加坡前防長解讀北京和華盛頓在亞洲的意圖

黃永宏（1958 年 12 月 10 日出生）[1] 是新加坡政治家和前腫瘤學家，自 2011 年起擔任國防部長。他是執政的人民行動黨 (PAP) 成員，自 2001 年起擔任碧山-大巴窯集選區大巴窯中區國會議員。進入政界之前，黃永宏是新加坡中央醫院 (SGH) 的外科顧問醫生，後來成為伊麗莎白醫院的私人外科腫瘤學家。

這個城市國家的國防部長解讀了北京和華盛頓在亞洲的意圖。

《外交政策》主編拉維·阿格拉沃爾 (Ravi Agrawal) 撰稿 2024 年 7 月 18 日

很少有國家比新加坡更善於解讀中美關係。這個小而富裕的城市國家與華盛頓和北京有著廣泛的聯係，了解雙方。它知道利害關係。它致力於將兩國拉到一起，避免印太地區發生衝突。新加坡主辦一年一度的香格裏拉對話，世界各地的國防部長都出席了會議。上個月，該峰會成為中美國防部長高層會晤的舉辦地。

很少有國家比新加坡更善於解讀中美關係。這個小而富裕的城市國家與華盛頓和北京有著廣泛的聯係，了解雙方。它知道利害關係。新加坡致力於將兩國拉近距離，避免印太地區發生衝突。新加坡每年都會主辦香格裏拉對話，各國國防部長都會出席。上個月，中美國防部長在香格裏拉對話峰會上舉行了高層會晤。

那麽，新加坡如何看待世界？在科羅拉多州阿斯彭安全論壇開幕之夜，我與新加坡國防部長黃永宏就一係列問題進行了交談，從美國的軟實力到中國的自信。以下是談話記錄，為清晰起見，我們對其進行了輕微編輯和壓縮。

拉維·阿格拉沃爾：黃部長，毫無疑問，在過去十年左右的時間裏，中國變得更加好戰。正如您所理解的那樣，您認為為什麽中國人在過去十年左右的時間裏變得更加自信和好戰？

黃永宏：我並不假裝了解中國，也不假裝為中國辯護。那麽讓我來闡述一下我們的觀點。我們有兩個衝突戰場，對吧？一個在烏克蘭。另一個在 10 月 7 日哈馬斯襲擊之後開始。以色列國防軍的報複和報複對我們所有人都是痛苦的。但更大的問題是，它可能擴展到加沙和以色列之外。

我們承受不起亞洲第三個衝突戰場。首先，我認為體製無法承受。但我認為更重要的是，我認為開戰的理由根本不存在，至少現在還沒有。

RA：當然。但你是一位敏銳的中國觀察家。從與對話者的交談中，你能試著解釋一下他們如何看待世界以及他們為什麽這樣做嗎？

NEH：好吧，如果你把自己放在中國，他們做的很多事情對他們來說都是有意義的。我並不是說他們沒有犯過任何錯誤。但是，比如在南海修建島礁，將他們的前沿防線向前推進幾百公裏，這在軍事戰略上是完全合理的。島鏈概念是美國的概念，旨在遏製中國。從這個角度來看，如果他們能做到，他們就會這麽做。他們也確實這麽做了。

你所描述的在南海的強硬態度可能是一種糟糕的外交政策。如果你平靜而坦率地和他們交談，他們會說他們並沒有對每一寸海域都提出主權要求。他們公開這麽說，但私下裏卻說他們沒有。如何收回這些主權是他們需要處理的問題。

RA：讓我反過來問這個問題。美國對華政策在過去七八年裏也發生了巨大變化。這讓你擔心嗎？

NEH：是的。但讓我試著重新審視一下。今天的中國是對 20 世紀 60 年代到 21 世紀美國偉大外交政策的精彩見證。事實上，整個亞洲都是如此。從肯尼迪總統開始，曆屆政府都曾表示，“任何形式的殖民控製都不應被鐵腕專製所取代”，當時美國率先發起了反共鬥爭。克林頓總統支持中國加入世貿組織。

他說服兩黨的理由是，這對亞洲的安全很重要。從這個角度來看，從 1960 年代到 2010 年左右，美國的外交政策始終如一，致力於建立一個讓大國和小國都受益的全球體係。其成果十分驚人。從經濟上講，中國現在占世界貿易的 17%，經濟規模為 17 萬億美元。[美國仍以 28 萬億美元位居第一。]但有 8 億人擺脫了貧困。從曆史上看，沒有任何國家能做到這一點。在 1960 年代，如果把整個亞洲算在內，它占全球貿易的 4%。現在這個比例是 30%。所有這些都是美國的成功。

NEH：推動全球化的動力突然轉變，並決定為全球化創建的機構不適用於這一進程。該法案沒有通過，但美國試圖退出世貿組織。巴黎協定。拉

The city-state's defense minister decodes what Beijing and Washington want in Asia.

Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what's at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.

Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.

So, how does Singapore see the world? I spoke with the country’s defense minister, Ng Eng Hen, on a range of issues, from U.S. soft power to Chinese assertiveness, on the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. What follows is a transcript, lightly edited and condensed for clarity.

Ravi Agrawal: Minister Ng, there’s little question now that over the last decade or so, China has just become a lot more belligerent. As you understand them, why do you think the Chinese have shifted in the last decade or so to become more assertive and belligerent?

Ng Eng Hen: I don’t pretend to understand China or to be an apologist for China. So let me frame our perspective. We have two theaters of conflict, right? One in Ukraine. And you have one which started after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. The retaliation and the retribution by the IDF is painful for all of us. But the greater problem there is that it can expand beyond Gaza and Israel.

We can ill afford a third theater of conflict in Asia. First, I don’t think the system can take it. But I think more importantly, I think the reasons for casus belli are simply not there, or at least not yet.

RA: Well, sure. But you’re an astute observer of China. From speaking to your interlocutors, can you try and explain how are they seeing the world and why they’re acting as they are?

NEH: Well, if you situate yourself in China, a lot of things that they’re doing make sense to them. I’m not saying they didn’t make any mistakes. But to build, for example, features within the South China Sea to move their forward defense line a couple of hundred kilometers makes perfect military strategic sense. The island chain concept was an American concept, and it was meant to contain China. And, from that point of view, if they could do it, they would. So they did.

The assertiveness you were describing in the South China Sea was probably a bad foreign policy. If you speak to them quietly and candidly, they say that they don’t claim every inch of water. They’ve said so publicly, but in private, they say they don’t. How to roll it back is something that they need to deal with.

RA: So let me flip that question. America’s approach toward China has also changed dramatically in the last seven or eight years. Does that worry you?

But let me try to reframe it. The China of today is a wonderful testament to great American foreign policy from the 1960s to the 2000s. In fact, the whole of Asia is. Across administrations, starting from President Kennedy [who said] “one form of colonial control [shall] not … be replaced by an iron tyranny” in 1961 when America spearheaded the fight against communism. You talk about President Clinton, sponsoring China’s ascension into the WTO. The reason he gave to convince both sides of the aisle was that it was important for the security of Asia. Now, from that perspective, American foreign policy from the 1960s to somewhere in 2010 has been consistent in building a global system that benefited small and large countries. And the results have been spectacular. Economically, China is now 17% of world trade, with an economy of $17 trillion. [The U.S. still leads at $28 trillion.] But 800 million people were lifted out of poverty. No way, historically, has any country ever done that. In the 1960s, if you take all of Asia, it accounted for 4 percent of global trade. It’s now 30 percent. All these have been American successes.

NEH: The moving spirit did a volte-face and decided that the institutions created for globalization didn’t work for this process. The bill didn’t pass, but America tried to get out of the WTO. The Paris Agreement. Pulling out of the TPP. So America was the moving spirit for the globalized world, for trade, for finance that would benefit small and large countries. It’s now changed. We don’t know where it will go. And I don’t think China is the only reason. And we have to ask ourselves, where will the U.S. be and where will China be?

Because the reality now for China is that from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. Now, Joseph Nye talks about soft power. Kissinger talks about legitimacy. But here’s a question for you. Can the U.S. sustain its global presence and its military presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?

NEH: In case you haven’t noticed, Americans weren’t always popular in Asia. In the 1960s, there was a real anti-American backlash. Now in 1990, America became more popular because basically the foreign policy worked. “A rising tide lifts all boats,” and the Asian economies grew. But, when American forces had to pull out of Clark and Subic [military bases], we offered Singapore. Today, American ships and planes are the largest user of Changi Naval Base.

So from Singapore’s perspective, we’ve held that the U.S. presence in Asia is a force for stability. We’ve said it’s indispensable. But that was of a U.S. that was leading the global charge. And [then-Singaporean Prime Minister] Lee Kuan Yew, when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 1985, said America, as a superpower, will have to decide on the rules and enforce it, which America did marvelously, I would say, for 20 years hence. Today, I would argue that it’s a different America, and one that has to be careful to maintain its moral legitimacy, even in Asia.

The Chinese say to us, “You ASEAN countries or Asian countries, you’re very difficult. You choose China when it comes to trade, and you choose America when it comes to military power.” So we look at them and say, “Why not?”

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen (left) spoke at the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum today. The session was moderated by Foreign Policy Editor in Chief Ravi Agrawal (right).

Minister for Defence Dr Ng Eng Hen spoke at a fireside chat panel during the opening session of the Aspen Security Forum on 17 July 2024 (Singapore Time). The opening night was attended by more than 400 distinguished leaders and key players in the security and defence community, including policy experts, military leaders, and US national security officials.

In his fireside chat panel, which was moderated by Foreign Policy’s Editor in Chief Ravi Agrawal, Dr Ng discussed the role of the US and its presence in Asia. He said, “America, which would have been the moving spirit for the globalised world for trade and finance, that would benefit small and large countries, is now changed. We do not know where we will go, and I do not think China is the only reason. And we will have to ask ourselves where will the US be, where will China be? Because the reality now, from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. The question is: Can US sustain its presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?” On US-China relations, Dr Ng highlighted that, “The US-China conundrum will decide the fates of all our nations for this decade and the next. America has to decide – the policies of “small yard, high fences”, security alliances – ultimately, its foreign policy towards China ... there are good reasons to believe that if the US can have a positive trajectory with China, it will make for certain greater stability, and certain greater growth. And I believe it is within the powers of American leadership, if not now, maybe later.”

The Aspen Security Forum is a biannual security and foreign policy conference that brings together distinguished leaders and key players in the security and defence community. The Forum has been convened annually in Colorado since 2010. Dr Ng is in the US from 15 to 18 July 2024 (Singapore Time).

Minister hen it's a real pleasure to have you here welcome to the United States welcome to Aspen you must be
jetlagged um so there's a lot that I
want to cover with you and I thought I'd
begin with a topic that many of us in
the west like to ask singaporeans about
China and listening to the previous
discussion you know it's there's little
question now that over the last decade
or so China's just become a lot more
belligerent uh you can speak to the
Indians about that on their border speak
to the Filipinos uh speak to the
Australians uh China is of course uh
threatening Taiwan uh it is providing
components to Russia that are aiding it
in its war on Ukraine and the question
that I want to ask you and I have been
trying to understand for some time is
why you understand the Chinese well why
do you think they have shifted in the
last decade or so to become more
assertive and belligerent

well thank you Ravi first thank you very much to the
Aspen uh security forum for inviting me
here it's my first time to Aspen I I
don't pretend to be to understand China
or to be want to be an apologist for
China so let me frame our
perspective we have uh two theaters of
conflict right one in Ukraine from
February 24th 2022 as uh J I said the
third year of conflict military
objectives can't be achieved on either
side uh zinski doesn't want to deal with
a diplomatic ex solution which he says
publicly and he said in shangala
dialogue you have one which started
October 7 Hamas attack uh the
retaliation the retribution by the IDF
is painful for all of us but the greater
problem there is that it can expand
Beyond Gaza and Israel and I would say
that uh we can ill afford a third
theater of conflict in
Asia first I don't think we would the
system can take
but I think more importantly I think the
reasons for kasus Bai are simply not
there and not yet or at least not yet so
uh I know you ask a lot of questions but
let me stop there because I'm sure
having framed it uh the way Singapore
sees it uh you would have more specific
questions

sure well I mean so once again
you're such an astute Observer of China
can you try and explain from speaking to
them from your interlocutors there how
are they seeing the world them why do
you think they're acting as they are

答
well if you sort of situate yourself in
China a lot of things that they're doing
seem to make sense to them I'm not
saying they didn't make any mistakes so
to uh build for example features within
the South China Sea to move their
forward defense line a couple of hundred
kilometers forward makes perfect
military strategic sense uh the island
chains concept was an American concept
and it was meant to contain China and uh
from their point of view if I could do
it I would and they did uh Us's
attention was elsewhere after 9911 and
uh they have fortified some of the
features the tribunal ruling said that
they couldn't claim anything beyond the
features tribunal ruling talked about
what uh effectivities these uh Islands
or land masses or low tide elevations
had from I think the South China Sea the
cess of the South China Sea excuse me
was probably a bad foreign policy if you
speak to them quietly and
candidly they say that they don't claim
every inch of water they've said so but
in private they say they don't how to
roll it back I think is something that
they need to deal with so that would be
um positioned in South China see we can
talk about Taiwan and we can talk about
trade uh they articulate articulated a
number of aspects on us on your position
Visa us I think um some of some of it
was born out of huis uh it helps for
economies to go through cycles and I
think it'll be a salutary effect for
China uh to be going through a difficult
period I I hope it tempers and it gives
some sense of reality but not all that
they did over the last 30 years uh would
be from their position
uh
uh against their interests so you talk
about India I agree with you uh people
didn't realize that at one point of time
we had 400,000 troops 200,000 on each
side and it could have gone very wrong
yeah indeed

so let me flip that question
now when you look at how America's
approach towards China has changed
dramatically in the last seven or eight
years does that worry you do you think
it's Justified

it does but let me try to
reframe it China China today is a
wonderful Testament of Great American
foreign
policy from the 1960s to 2000 uh in fact
the whole of Asia uh you talk across uh
administrations starting from President
Kennedy that one form of colonial
control should not be replaced by an
iron tyranny uh that was in 1961 where
America spearheaded the fight against
communism uh talk about Ronald Reagan uh
in for the coming down the Berlin Wall
winning the cow War as it were you talk
about President Clinton uh sponsoring
China's Ascension into WTO and the
reason he he gave and that he could
convince both sides the AL was that it
was important for the security of Asia
now if you ask yourself from that
perspective American foreign policy from
1960s to I think somewhere in 2010
consistent building a Global system that
benefited small and large
countries uh and the results have been
spectacular e economically China uh is
now 177% of World Trade economy of 17
trillion the US is still leading at 28
trillion but 800 million people lifted
out poverty nowhere historically is any
country ever done that asan uh in 1960s
if you take all of Asia they accounted
for 4% of global trade it's now 30% all
these have been American successes now
what's changed since then

the moving
Spirit did a vault phase and decided
that the institutions in which created
for globalization didn't work in its
process and I think the former director
general of WTO Pascal Lami lamented this
I mean the building passed in 2022 but
this was America trying to get out of
the WTO right that was one two uh
terrorists pulling out of the TPP so
America would have been the moving
spirit for a globalized world for trade
finance that was that would benefit
small and large countries is now change
we don't know where it will go and I
don't think China is the only
reason and we'll have to ask ourselves
uh and that panel where proceeding was
fascinating we have to ask ourselves in
the future where will us be where will
China be because the reality now for
China uh from the Asian perspective
China is now the largest trading partner
for almost all countries in Asia
now we jonai talks about soft power kiss
talks about legitimacy and he has a
question for you can us sustained its
Global presence and its military
presence in Asia solely predicated on military power

答
in the 1960s in case you haven't noted
I'm sorry to have to say this Americans
weren't always popular in Asia in the 1960s as I said uh there was a real
anti-American backlash even though they
understood the fight against communism
uh Soo uh spoke against us and the
situation in Laos in Cambodia the
bombing didn't help my Prime my founding
prime minister was man great wisdom and
he stuck to the courage of its
convictions in 1966 he announced that
American soldiers who were based in
Vietnam could come to Singapore for an
RNR now in 1990 when America uh America
been more popular because basically the
foreign policy worked the Assan
economies that had decolonized had
rising Rising tide lifted all boats and
the assian economies grew but uh when
American American forces had to pull out
of clock and Subic we offered Singapore
not as a base because we're just too
small but even today americ American
ships and planes are the largest user
they rotate through uh Changi and Naval
bases so from Singapore's perspective
we've we've felt that the US presence in
Asia is a force for stability we say
it's indispensable but that was of a us
that was leading the global charge and
Mr leanu when you address the US
Congress in 1985 he had he said this he
said America as a hyper power superpower
will have to decide on the rules and
enforce it which America did marvelously
I would say for 20 years
hence today I would argue that it's a
different America and one that may has
to be careful to maintain its moral
legitimacy even in Asia

let me find another way of
asking you this question
so um I'll talk about a few other Arenas

答
so there's let me answer that in the
Chinese yes the Chinese say to us you
know you Assan countries or Asian
countries you're very
difficult you choose China when it comes
to trade and you choose America when it
comes to military power so we look at
them and says why not

fair um and you know in a sense
there are many countries now in the
global South that you know sense a
shifting world order that sense not
absolute American decline but relative
uh in relative terms relative American
Decline and a relative rise for China
and that changes things and I'm curious
as you know we're here at Aspen security
conference but you host Shangri La and
you get to see all these defense
ministers from around the world who come
there just last month your counterparts
from America and China were there I'm
curious if there were to be a skirmish
uh in the Indo Pacific what would that
look like what happens

that would be
cataclysmic whatever the
outcome uh it would
test PEX
Americana and Discovery I think is what
we want to avoid and let me clarify that
in the third Taiwan Straits in 1995 1996
you remember President Clinton mobilized
two AC Carriers uh Chinese and missiles
pointing towards Taiwan and thankfully
uh both stood down or at least both
claimed that they stopped their
exercises uh if you had another
situation today I'm not sure what the
outcome is and I'm not sure that we want
to discover it because it won't be a
simple
uh or short outcome i' I've said
that Taiwan is not Ukraine and China is
not Russia Taiwan is an island to
resupply Taiwan you would need Japan and
Korea and draw them in uh in China is
not right Russia China is uh has got
military capabilities 177% of trade but
the effect on us will be devastating so
this is a very complex situation we
talked about you know what American's
policy is when it comes to Commerce and
trade uh the truth is we really not
quite sure how that goes but from the
security perspective I think all of us
should be very very careful to avoid any
physical conflict for for at least this
decade if not for the longer because
Discovery will be very painful and will
be probably lifechanging
if America is able
to maintain its military Supremacy in
Asia that won't stop China China will
hunker down global trade will end with
China China will spend more on military
spending and the contest will go on for
another couple of decades maybe even
more than one generation if America we
discover can't maintain its military
Supremacy I think that's the beginning
of the end of PEX
Americana uh um

hypothetically hope this year
recovers yeah we all do we in all
seriousness we all do but hypothetically
we we've all heard now several potential
ranges of what a trump 2.0 China policy
could look like ranging from you know we
will dismiss managed competition we're
in it to win it um you heard about the
trade tariffs um a lot of that would
rock the boat significantly um is
anything going on behind the scenes to try

well it is what it is but I
would remind you that you know we've
worked with the Trump Administration for
meeting Singapore and he was very happy
with Singapore Singapore because uh we
have a trade soace with
you and mil uh security wise it was in
20 uh 15 that my prime minister leisan
renewed
theou mou the military mou to continue
American ships and planes going through
Singapore so we've worked with the Trump
Administration I I I'm not so much
concerned because it makes a big
difference but on trade and uh you had
experts talking about it now when it
comes to list I think it's possible uh
to try to have small yard high fences
and you talk about strategic
non-strategic but when you break it down
you're not quite sure because the
fundamental aspect I think it was
touched upon if you talk about trade
it's not quite trade it's information uh
information and we talked about how
electric cars can and if you ask well if
if I'm trying to protect information and
that becomes a security risk then the
yard goes bigger if you talk about
security food security interdependency
the yard goes bigger if you talk about
Capital which is the most fungible of
all it's already begun you invest in a
Chinese company that has a whole in in a
which are security aspects and therefore
you cannot do business with America or
America's companies then it becomes very
difficult and probably I think we it's
not undoable but I would humbly submit
that we are not sure it's very hard to
decipher what the real outcome of this
new industrial policy is

fair I want to ask you about the war in Gaza um in
Southeast Asia you're surrounded by a
lot of countries that have significant
Muslim populations Indonesia Malaysia
your own country as well um what is the
mood like and how are you gauging uh the
West's role in the Middle East oh anger
uh the they Singapore has a Muslim
population of
15% and uh you we had just announced um
two people that were picked up because
they were radicalized to and this was a
14-year-old boy who pledged that he
would commit Jihad so obviously effects
and um it's been difficult for countries
of that whether they have Muslim
populations or not I think the problem
is that you've radicalized another
generation wouldbe terrorists in Gaza
and elsewhere so uh we we hope that um
the violence in Gaza would end soon and
all we have done is to try to help in
give humanitarian Aid we gave air drops
to Gaza by way of
but really this I think is a longer tale
and it's unfortunate that it happened
and uh but the larger problem of course
is Iran uh and the Israelis know it and
the the progressive uh Arab states know
it how much this has um upended the
Abraham Accord I think it has I think
some of the states want to resume um
relations
with Israel but domestically in their
politics
this has made it very very difficult for
them to sell that message do you think
America given what you're saying I mean
the first word you said was anger is
America losing soft power not so much
soft power but I think across many
countries we've lost the Young on this
the young are even in Singapore
particularly insens that about the
violence and the fact that nothing is
done to stop it uh so you would lose
political support I I don't think not
not so much in soft power and some of it
uh but
there are other issues that I talked
about in terms of what do America want
to do about trade what what Asians
people I suppose don't can't wrap their
minds around is how can the US say that
the trade practice is unfair when it's
to them they're the richest country in
the world where America's you know 28
trillion economy per capita GDP uh there
may be inequality in America but when
they see America they see a rich country
so when you talk about unfair unfair
trade practices and they're not talking
about us and China they're talking about
us and them they find that difficult to
understand so if there was a plea which
ever person occupies the White House is
that uh we believe that America's
military presence should continue and we
will facilitate that we believe that
America should continue to be a global
leader in setting the rules of trade we
believe that America should continue to
trade and we and I am fully in agreement
with the previous panel to talk about
engagement the last time um the defense
ministers visited each other from us and
China was in 2018 this was Jim Mattis
and wayer I think that has to resume
very quickly I think the lines of
communication should be set up between
military to military I completely with
Ana that it's very dangerous not to have
comms it's a good thing that t chin
who's the new defense minister agreed
that he wanted more Communications with
secretary Austin so I hope whoever
occupies the White House and the new
defense minister that they would follow
up on that um your country's been
investing a lot more in defense itself I
think uh if you look at the last four
years the percentage increase has been
you know ranging between 5 and 12%
increases year on year which is quite a
lot um you're a small country but a
mighty country talk to us a little bit
about how you're thinking about defense
regionally and is this coming from a
place of fear um about potential
adversaries well uh it comes from
paranoia yeah you know paranoid survive
so but paranoid about what if you if you
know our history uh we were uh we we
separated from Malaysia and it was a
difficult time for Southeast Asia there
was threat of Communism actually our
defense spending has come down we used
to spend as much as 5% of our GDP on
defense and now spending about three
three 3.1 3.2 and I think it will be it
will stabilize of that but you're right
in nominal terms is absolutely and we
believe believe that defense is uh the
best deterrence we have we have no plans
or no capability of projecting ourselves
and we don't want to protect ourselves
anywhere but uh Mr Lee Mr Lee had this
term poison shrimp uh for for Defense
Forces we think we're bigger than a
shrimp now but we're still poison so
we'll keep it as that and we think that
we'll continue to spend by the way we
have conscription so every 18yearold
spends 2 years fulltime in a military
and then you know we call them back for
a few weeks 10 years after that so it's
it's a People's Army but uh we're fairly
well equipped so we we we think we
project the good image of deterrence and
if the government continues to fund it
the my department continue to raise that
armed forces that we think we need I
want to talk about your country's fairly
studied neutrality when it comes to
world events and that's of immense value
clearly I mean just listening to you
talk your perspective is so useful but
I'm curious how you think about
neutrality in a world that is in flux in
a world that is at
War um I'm not sure that we believe
neutrality I mean again I I I quote a
lot Mr Le because it's a profound
influence but he he and
the Prime Minister leis and L and all of
us are quite taken with you know the
milar dialogue the strong do what they
can and the weak suffer what they must
that's our ethos and if you're weak then
what do you do well we believe not so
much in neity but in information in
observing in trying to be ultimate
realists and saying what works what
doesn't and we don't believe that we can
balance superpowers but we would speak
to them and we would try to find some
space where all science need us whether
we can succeed I mean history will tell
but uh I think the US China conundrum
will will decide the fates of all our
Nations for
this decade and next and what America
has to decide and I understand all the
policies of small yard high fences
security alliances but ultimately what
is the foreign policy towards
China I'm not sure that I have a clear
idea is China me an enemy is China me
enemy for how long will CH can China be
your
friend and how would you go about
it those are difficult questions have
you asked those questions of constantly
every day we're looking at you and
saying what's
up what
gifts very quickly just a last thought
um I talked about a world in flux this
is also a world in which you know there
are all these Grand ideas and terms
being thrown around a new Cold War um a
new battle between democracies and
autocracies
and again I mean your point of speaking
to all sides uh is well taken um but how
do you fit in values when when you see
countries profess competing agendas and
values
essentially if you this is not a contest
of ideas ideology at least well not not
overtly like capitalism and communism it
is a
contest but if you look at us no one
should bet against the US uh we talked
about
advanced technology I'm trying to answer
your question but bear with me man for
men and I was minister of education so I
visited the universities in China
whether it was Chang or Shang or futan
university man for man uh the Chinese
students can match any American student
you know him you have them but systems
wise the American system is still ahead
and that's the reason why you have more
Chinese or Japanese who win Nobel prizes
when they come out of their countries to
come to he and that's what you still
still have and that's what you continue
to have uh what value system produces
that well that's psychoanalyzing us
which is too
difficult but whatever you have you have
it and you should keep at
it but is China led by the CCP the
Communist Party of
China one that has wrong values kissing
jel call China historical
Singularity right it's a what palum say
in other words if you strip away
different forms of government there is
still China and goes way down deep the
values deep uh and I think that if you
want to make China an enemy it'll be a
self-fulfilling prophecy but I I I feel
very strongly that engagement is
important that as you did
previously that China is worth becoming
a friend and we know Graham Allison's
book that you know says that the outcome
for may be War but there are good
reasons to believe that if us can have a
positive trajectory with China that I
think it'll make
for certainly greater stability certain
greater growth and I believe it is
within the powers of American leadership
if not now maybe later but I well
believe that when when when you you need
something Innovative when you need to
fix a difficult problem then Americans
have always shown us that you can do it
so we look to you for leadership this is
a really useful perspective Minister un
thank you very much Round of Applause

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