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新加坡如何應對中美緊張局勢
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/singapore-manage-u-s-china-tensions-ng-eng-hen/?
這個城市國家的國防部長解讀了北京和華盛頓在亞洲的意圖。
《外交政策》主編拉維·阿格拉沃爾 (Ravi Agrawal) 撰稿。
拉維·阿格拉沃爾 (Ravi Agrawal)
2024 年 7 月 18 日
很少有國家比新加坡更善於解讀中美關係。這個小而富裕的城市國家與華盛頓和北京有著廣泛的聯係，了解雙方。它知道利害關係。它致力於將兩國拉到一起，避免印太地區發生衝突。新加坡主辦一年一度的香格裏拉對話，世界各地的國防部長都出席了會議。上個月，該峰會成為中美國防部長高層會晤的舉辦地。
很少有國家比新加坡更善於解讀中美關係。這個小而富裕的城市國家與華盛頓和北京有著廣泛的聯係，了解雙方。它知道利害關係。新加坡致力於將兩國拉近距離，避免印太地區發生衝突。新加坡每年都會主辦香格裏拉對話，各國國防部長都會出席。上個月，中美國防部長在香格裏拉對話峰會上舉行了高層會晤。
那麽，新加坡如何看待世界？在科羅拉多州阿斯彭安全論壇開幕之夜，我與新加坡國防部長黃永宏就一係列問題進行了交談，從美國的軟實力到中國的自信。以下是談話記錄，為清晰起見，我們對其進行了輕微編輯和壓縮。
拉維·阿格拉沃爾：黃部長，毫無疑問，在過去十年左右的時間裏，中國變得更加好戰。正如您所理解的那樣，您認為為什麽中國人在過去十年左右的時間裏變得更加自信和好戰？
黃永宏：我並不假裝了解中國，也不假裝為中國辯護。那麽讓我來闡述一下我們的觀點。
我們有兩個衝突戰場，對吧？一個在烏克蘭。另一個在 10 月 7 日哈馬斯襲擊之後開始。以色列國防軍的報複和報複對我們所有人都是痛苦的。但更大的問題是，它可能擴展到加沙和以色列之外。
我們承受不起亞洲第三個衝突戰場。首先，我認為體製無法承受。但我認為更重要的是，我認為開戰的理由根本不存在，至少現在還沒有。
RA：當然。但你是一位敏銳的中國觀察家。從與對話者的交談中，你能試著解釋一下他們如何看待世界以及他們為什麽這樣做嗎？
NEH：好吧，如果你把自己放在中國，他們做的很多事情對他們來說都是有意義的。我並不是說他們沒有犯過任何錯誤。但是，比如在南海修建島礁，將他們的前沿防線向前推進幾百公裏，這在軍事戰略上是完全合理的。島鏈概念是美國的概念，旨在遏製中國。從這個角度來看，如果他們能做到，他們就會這麽做。他們也確實這麽做了。
你所描述的在南海的強硬態度可能是一種糟糕的外交政策。如果你平靜而坦率地和他們交談，他們會說他們並沒有對每一寸海域都提出主權要求。他們公開這麽說，但私下裏卻說他們沒有。如何收回這些主權是他們需要處理的問題。
RA：讓我反過來問這個問題。美國對華政策在過去七八年裏也發生了巨大變化。這讓你擔心嗎？
NEH：是的。
但讓我試著重新審視一下。今天的中國是對 20 世紀 60 年代到 21 世紀美國偉大外交政策的精彩見證。事實上，整個亞洲都是如此。從肯尼迪總統開始，曆屆政府都曾表示，“任何形式的殖民控製都不應被鐵腕專製所取代”，當時美國率先發起了反共鬥爭。克林頓總統支持中國加入世貿組織。
他說服兩黨的理由是，這對亞洲的安全很重要。從這個角度來看，從 1960 年代到 2010 年左右，美國的外交政策始終如一，致力於建立一個讓大國和小國都受益的全球體係。其成果十分驚人。從經濟上講，中國現在占世界貿易的 17%，經濟規模為 17 萬億美元。[美國仍以 28 萬億美元位居第一。]但有 8 億人擺脫了貧困。從曆史上看，沒有任何國家能做到這一點。在 1960 年代，如果把整個亞洲算在內，它占全球貿易的 4%。現在這個比例是 30%。所有這些都是美國的成功。
RA：我注意到你止步於 2010 年。那麽 2010 年至 2024 年呢？
NEH：推動全球化的動力突然轉變，並決定為全球化創建的機構不適用於這一進程。該法案沒有通過，但美國試圖退出世貿組織。巴黎協定。拉
How Singapore Manages U.S.-China Tensions
https://foreignpolicy.com/2024/07/18/singapore-manage-u-s-china-tensions-ng-eng-hen/
The city-state’s defense minister decodes what Beijing and Washington want in Asia.
By Ravi Agrawal, the editor in chief of Foreign Policy. July 18, 2024
Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.
Few countries are better equipped to interpret the U.S.-China relationship than Singapore. The small but wealthy city-state has extensive contacts with Washington and Beijing and understands both sides. It knows what’s at stake. And it’s invested in trying to bring the two together and avoid conflict in the Indo-Pacific. Singapore hosts the annual Shangri-La Dialogue, attended by defense ministers from around the world. Last month, that summit was the site of a high-level meeting between the U.S. and Chinese defense chiefs.
So, how does Singapore see the world? I spoke with the country’s defense minister, Ng Eng Hen, on a range of issues, from U.S. soft power to Chinese assertiveness, on the opening night of the Aspen Security Forum in Colorado. What follows is a transcript, lightly edited and condensed for clarity.
Ravi Agrawal: Minister Ng, there’s little question now that over the last decade or so, China has just become a lot more belligerent. As you understand them, why do you think the Chinese have shifted in the last decade or so to become more assertive and belligerent?
Ng Eng Hen: I don’t pretend to understand China or to be an apologist for China. So let me frame our perspective. We have two theaters of conflict, right? One in Ukraine. And you have one which started after the Oct. 7 Hamas attack. The retaliation and the retribution by the IDF is painful for all of us. But the greater problem there is that it can expand beyond Gaza and Israel.
We can ill afford a third theater of conflict in Asia. First, I don’t think the system can take it. But I think more importantly, I think the reasons for casus belli are simply not there, or at least not yet.
RA: Well, sure. But you’re an astute observer of China. From speaking to your interlocutors, can you try and explain how are they seeing the world and why they’re acting as they are?
NEH: Well, if you situate yourself in China, a lot of things that they’re doing make sense to them. I’m not saying they didn’t make any mistakes. But to build, for example, features within the South China Sea to move their forward defense line a couple of hundred kilometers makes perfect military strategic sense. The island chain concept was an American concept, and it was meant to contain China. And, from that point of view, if they could do it, they would. So they did.
The assertiveness you were describing in the South China Sea was probably a bad foreign policy. If you speak to them quietly and candidly, they say that they don’t claim every inch of water. They’ve said so publicly, but in private, they say they don’t. How to roll it back is something that they need to deal with.
RA: So let me flip that question. America’s approach toward China has also changed dramatically in the last seven or eight years. Does that worry you?
NEH: It does.
But let me try to reframe it. The China of today is a wonderful testament to great American foreign policy from the 1960s to the 2000s. In fact, the whole of Asia is. Across administrations, starting from President Kennedy [who said] “one form of colonial control [shall] not … be replaced by an iron tyranny” in 1961 when America spearheaded the fight against communism. You talk about President Clinton, sponsoring China’s ascension into the WTO. The reason he gave to convince both sides of the aisle was that it was important for the security of Asia. Now, from that perspective, American foreign policy from the 1960s to somewhere in 2010 has been consistent in building a global system that benefited small and large countries. And the results have been spectacular. Economically, China is now 17% of world trade, with an economy of $17 trillion. [The U.S. still leads at $28 trillion.] But 800 million people were lifted out of poverty. No way, historically, has any country ever done that. In the 1960s, if you take all of Asia, it accounted for 4 percent of global trade. It’s now 30 percent. All these have been American successes.
RA: I noted you stopped at 2010 there. What about 2010 to 2024?
NEH: The moving spirit did a volte-face and decided that the institutions created for globalization didn’t work for this process. The bill didn’t pass, but America tried to get out of the WTO. The Paris Agreement. Pulling out of the TPP. So America was the moving spirit for the globalized world, for trade, for finance that would benefit small and large countries. It’s now changed. We don’t know where it will go. And I don’t think China is the only reason. And we have to ask ourselves, where will the U.S. be and where will China be?
Because the reality now for China is that from the Asian perspective, China is the largest trading partner for almost all countries in Asia. Now, Joseph Nye talks about soft power. Kissinger talks about legitimacy. But here’s a question for you. Can the U.S. sustain its global presence and its military presence in Asia solely predicated on military power?
RA: I’m guessing the answer is no. I mean, that was a rhetorical question.
NEH: In case you haven’t noticed, Americans weren’t always popular in Asia. In the 1960s, there was a real anti-American backlash. Now in 1990, America became more popular because basically the foreign policy worked. “A rising tide lifts all boats,” and the Asian economies grew. But, when American forces had to pull out of Clark and Subic [military bases], we offered Singapore. Today, American ships and planes are the largest user of Changi Naval Base.
So from Singapore’s perspective, we’ve held that the U.S. presence in Asia is a force for stability. We’ve said it’s indispensable. But that was of a U.S. that was leading the global charge. And [then-Singaporean Prime Minister] Lee Kuan Yew, when he addressed the U.S. Congress in 1985, said America, as a superpower, will have to decide on the rules and enforce it, which America did marvelously, I would say, for 20 years hence. Today, I would argue that it’s a different America, and one that has to be careful to maintain its moral legitimacy, even in Asia.
RA: Are you saying America has lost its moral legitimacy in Asia?
NEH: Has to maintain its moral legitimacy.
The Chinese say to us, “You ASEAN countries or Asian countries, you’re very difficult. You choose China when it comes to trade, and you choose America when it comes to military power.” So we look at them and say, “Why not?”
