風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
英國：高級代表/副主席何塞普·博雷爾在牛津大學關於麵臨戰爭的世界的演講
視頻鏈接：https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256530
May 3 2024
[要點]
我看到冷戰後我們習慣的國際體係已經不複存在。美國已經失去了霸主地位。1945年後的多邊[世界]秩序正在節節敗退。中國正在崛起為超級大國。過去40年，中國所做的事情在人類曆史上是絕無僅有的。在過去的30年裏，按購買力平價計算，中國占世界GDP的份額從6%上升到近20%，而我們歐洲人從21%降到14%，美國從20%降到15%。這是經濟格局的巨大變化。中國正在成為我們和美國的競爭對手。不僅在製造廉價商品方麵，而且作為一個軍事強國，處於技術發展的最前沿，並構建將塑造我們未來的技術。中國已經與俄羅斯建立了“無限的友誼”—盡管所有的友誼都是有限度的—這標誌著威權政權在民主國家麵前日益結盟。
I see [that] the international system, that we were accustomed to after the Cold War, no longer exists. America has lost its status of a hegemon. And the post-1945 multilateral [world] order is losing ground.
I see – as you know - China rising to the super-power status. What China has done in the last 40 years is unique in the history of humankind. In the last 30 years, China’s share of the world’s GDP, at PPP, has gone from 6% to almost 20%, while we, Europeans, went from 21% to 14% and the United States from 20% to 15%. This is a dramatic change of the economic landscape.
China is becoming a rival for us and for the United States. Not just in manufacturing cheap goods, but also as a military power, at the forefront of the technological development and building the technologies that will shape our future. China has embarked on a “friendship without limits” - although all friendships have limits - with Russia, which signals a growing alignment of the authoritarian regimes in front of democracies.
May 3 2024 牛津 EEAS 新聞團隊
發貨時請核對！
尊敬的各位老師、親愛的同學們、女士們、先生們：
親愛的蒂莫西（牛津大學加頓·阿什），感謝您邀請我來牛津。我很榮幸能夠在聖安東尼學院演講。
我以前來過這所大學幾次。我認識你們的一些教授。很高興在這裏見到一些美國學生——我們六年前在耶魯大學見過麵。
謝謝。感謝您的關注。
這所學院培養了許多傑出的作家，甚至還培養了世界各地相當多的外交部長。
因此，能夠發表達倫多夫演講是一種特別的榮幸。拉爾夫·達倫多夫是一位傑出的人物：德國和英國的政治家、歐盟專員、政治學家和開放社會的堅定捍衛者。
正如你所說，我努力成為一名學者。我人生的一部分是在大學度過的，另一部分則是在政治生活中度過的。我一直對將思想世界和政治世界結合在一起非常感興趣。思考的人，行動的人。
這就是為什麽我很高興。我喜歡與那些深入思考這個充滿爭議和充滿挑戰的世界中正在發生的事情的人們一起度過這樣的時刻。也許你比我有更多的時間思考，所以我需要你啟發我們的決定。我希望，在這些話之後，我們將有機會與大家交流一些想法。
是的，我是外交與安全[政策]高級代表——感謝您強調“和安全政策”。站在這個優越的位置上，我有很好的機會觀察世界。我看到了什麽？
嗯，我看到對抗多了，合作少了。近年來，這種趨勢越來越明顯：對抗多了，合作少了。
我看到一個更加支離破碎的世界。我看到了一個不遵守規則的世界。
我看到更多的極性，更少的多邊主義。
我看到依賴性如何成為武器。
我看到冷戰後我們習慣的國際體係已經不複存在。美國已經失去了霸主地位。 1945 年後的多邊[世界]秩序正在節節敗退。
正如你所知，我看到中國正在崛起為超級大國。過去40年，中國所做的事情在人類曆史上是絕無僅有的。在過去的30年裏，按購買力平價計算，中國占世界GDP的份額從6%上升到近20%，而我們歐洲人從21%上升到14%，美國從20%上升到15%。這是經濟格局的巨大變化。
中國正在成為我們和美國的競爭對手。不僅在製造廉價商品方麵，而且作為一個軍事強國，處於技術發展的最前沿，並構建將塑造我們未來的技術。中國已經與俄羅斯建立了“無限的友誼”——盡管所有的友誼都是有限度的——這標誌著威權政權在民主國家麵前日益結盟。
我說過世界更加多極化了——是的，確實如此。
[同時]中等強國，[例如]印度、巴西、沙特阿拉伯、南非、土耳其正在崛起。他們正在成為重要的演員。無論是金磚國家還是非金磚國家，除了渴望在世界上獲得更高的地位和更強的話語權，以及為自身發展獲得更大利益之外，沒有什麽共同點。
為了實現這一目標，他們正在最大限度地發揮自主權，不願意選邊站隊，根據具體情況，根據具體情況，對某一方進行對衝。他們不想選擇營地，我們也不應該強迫他們選擇營地。
我們，歐洲人，想在我們的社區建立一個朋友圈。相反，我們今天擁有的是火環。一圈火環從薩赫勒地區傳到中東、高加索地區，現在又來到了烏克蘭戰場。
法國國際關係研究所所長托馬斯·戈馬特一直在分析全球經濟的瓶頸是什麽。其中有幾個地點離我們非常近：貿易的紅海、石油和天然氣的霍爾木茲海峽以及穀物出口的黑海。它們就在我們附近，在其中一些地區我們甚至參與了[歐盟]海軍任務，就像在紅海的情況一樣。
並且有兩場戰爭。兩場戰爭。當我來到布魯塞爾時，還沒有戰爭。
有兩場戰爭，人們為爭奪土地而戰。這表明地理又回來了。有人告訴我們，全球化使地理變得無關緊要，但事實並非如此。我們附近的大多數衝突都與土地有關，
他們是有領土意識的。就巴勒斯坦而言，這是一塊許諾給兩個人的土地；就烏克蘭而言，這是一塊位於兩個世界十字路口的土地。 “這是我的土地”，“不，這是我的”。而這場土地之爭更是流了很多血。
與此同時，我們看到全球趨勢正在加速。氣候變化不再是未來的問題。氣候崩潰已經到來——不是為了明天，而是為了今天。技術變革——特別是每個人都在談論人工智能——正在帶來我們無法完全掌握的變化。人口結構也在迅速變化。當我談論人口平衡時，我談論的是移民，特別是在非洲，到 2050 年，世界上將有 25% 的人生活在非洲。到 2050 年，四分之一的人將生活在非洲。與此同時，我們看到不平等現象日益加劇，民主製度日趨衰落，自由受到威脅。
這就是我所看到的。我知道這不太好。在這種情況下，歐盟和英國的角色將被定義。我不知道我們將扮演哪個角色。但可以肯定的是，這將取決於我們對所麵臨挑戰的反應——這並不是什麽新鮮事。讓·莫內已經說過：“歐洲將在危機中鍛造”。但現在的緊迫性和嚴重性讓我們聽到了歐洲可能滅亡的警告。
歐洲，我們的罪孽。
哦，那好吧。我們需要做什麽？
首先，我們需要對俄羅斯的危險進行清晰的評估——俄羅斯被認為是歐洲最大的生存威脅。也許並非歐洲理事會中的每個人都同意這一點，但大多數人都支持這個想法。俄羅斯對我們來說是一個生存威脅，我們必須對這種風險有清醒的評估。
第二，我們要講原則、講合作、講實力。
但首先，關於俄羅斯。
在普京的領導下，俄羅斯又回到了帝國主義對世界的認識。普京夢想恢複昔日的規模和影響力，從而恢複了沙皇時代和蘇聯帝國時代的俄羅斯帝國。
這是2008年的格魯吉亞。這是2014年的克裏米亞。我們沒有看到，或者我們不想看到俄羅斯在普京統治下的演變。盡管普京本人曾在2007年的慕尼黑安全會議上警告過我們。重讀一下普京在2007年慕尼黑安全會議上所說的話很重要，恐怕沒有人願意聽到或理解。
我們建立了一個模式——歐洲模式——基於我們內部的合作和經濟相互依存——並且取得了巨大的成功。我們之間70年的和平。我們相信，相互依存將通過德國人所說的“Wandel durch Handel”帶來政治趨同。這將給俄羅斯甚至中國帶來政治變革。
好吧，這已被證明是錯誤的。但它並沒有發生。麵對俄羅斯獨裁主義，相互依賴並沒有帶來和平。相反，它變成了依賴，特別是對化石燃料的依賴，後來，這種依賴變成了武器。
今天，普京對我們所有人構成了生存威脅。如果普京在烏克蘭取得成功，他不會就此止步。歐洲人應該意識到基輔可能會出現像白俄羅斯那樣的傀儡政府，俄羅斯軍隊駐紮在波蘭邊境，俄羅斯控製著世界糧食市場的 44%。
每個人都越來越意識到這一點。就連法國總統埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍一開始也說過：“我不能讓俄羅斯感到羞辱。”現在，他是對俄羅斯勝利的全球後果發出更多警告的聲音之一。但世界各地也有其他聲音，比如幾天前日本首相岸田文雄。
但我知道並非歐盟的每個人都同意這一評估。一些歐洲理事會成員表示：“不，俄羅斯不是生存威脅。至少不適合我。我認為俄羅斯是一個好朋友。”數量不多，但也有一些。
在一個一致執政的聯盟中，我們對俄羅斯的政策總是受到一票否決的威脅——一票否決就足夠了——正如[匈牙利總理]維克托·歐爾班推遲我們對烏克蘭的最後一攬子援助計劃所證明的那樣。與此同時，在美國，政治兩極分化導致軍事援助計劃推遲了半年。在戰爭中，半年的時間已經很長了。它可以決定戰爭的輸贏。
普京以基輔“去納粹化”為借口入侵烏克蘭，認為我們無法做出反應。那是在喀布爾陷落之後。他堅信，我們對天然氣的強烈依賴將使我們的反應像 2014 年克裏米亞入侵時那樣緩慢而溫和。
2022 年 1 月，即入侵開始前幾周，我在頓巴斯。我會永遠記得我的談話
[烏克蘭，丹尼斯]總理什米哈爾。他問我：“當他們入侵我們時，因為他們會入侵我們——邊境另一邊有 15 萬俄羅斯軍隊——你打算做什麽？你要支持我們嗎？我相信年輕的歐洲人不會為基輔而死。但是你會向我們提供我們抵抗入侵所需的武器嗎？”這個問題，在那個時候，在一月份，在黑暗和寒冷的冬天裏，我無法回答。我不確定答案是什麽。
因為歐盟從未向處於戰爭狀態的國家提供過武器。但隨後，入侵來了，令人高興的是，我們的回答是出色的，而且非常團結，以便為烏克蘭提供抵抗所需的軍事能力。
英國在我們之前就做??到了這一點。一開始我們說提供頭盔，現在我們提供F-16[戰鬥機]。一件事和另一件事之間有很長的路要走。我們經曆了如此漫長的道路，因為事實證明烏克蘭人有能力抵抗。請記住，2014 年，[安吉拉]默克爾不想在俄羅斯入侵克裏米亞之前支持烏克蘭。當時的答案是“不”，因為它毫無用處。
現在答案是“是”，因為事實證明烏克蘭人有能力抵抗。
現在普京將整個西方視為對手。他在多次演講中都明確表達了這一點。俄羅斯電視台每天都在說和重複一切：“西方——整個西方，全球西方——是我們的敵人”。他們采取了相應的行動 - 通過虛假信息，毒害我們的信息環境，以及重要的謊言工廠：俄羅斯正試圖幹涉我們的民主進程，正如他們已經所做的那樣 - 我相信 - 在接下來的日子裏他們將會這樣做歐洲選舉。
是的，烏克蘭正在困難的情況下進行抵抗，克服了美國和歐盟沒有提供繼續戰鬥所需的一切的事實。
然後，另一場戰爭來臨了。 10 月 7 日哈馬斯的可怕[恐怖]襲擊和以色列的反應 — — 對許多人來說，反應過度 — — 使中東陷入了幾十年來最嚴重的暴力循環。就在10月7日之前，許多人認為《亞伯拉罕協議》淡化了巴勒斯坦問題。好吧，他們沒有。這是在阿拉伯人和以色列人之間建立和平的一種方式，但不是巴勒斯坦人和以色列人之間的和平。
傑克·沙利文在10月7日前一周表示，他認為中東從未如此平靜。嗯，心情並不平靜。不平靜，看看約旦河西岸發生的事情就知道一點也不平靜。
現在，我們有兩場戰爭。而我們歐洲人還沒有為世界的嚴酷做好準備。
但正如你，伊萬[克拉斯特夫]所指出的，醒來是一回事——我們已經被吵醒了——而起床是另一回事。在某些情況下，我們仍然躺在床上。覺醒是顯而易見的，但我們了解這一刻的嚴重性嗎？我有我的疑問。我想利用這個機會傳達這樣的信息：是的，現在是一個嚴肅而緊迫的時刻，因為我們麵臨著地緣政治、經濟和社會威脅。其中四個：地緣政治、經濟、技術和民主。
歐洲，歐盟，但不僅僅是歐盟，歐洲人的生活方式，這種人類從未能夠發明的政治自由、經濟繁榮和社會凝聚力的最佳結合，肯定處於危險之中。為了應對這些挑戰，我認為我們必須在三個維度上努力：原則、合作和力量。
讓我們從原則開始。原則很重要，因為我們說歐盟是一個價值觀聯盟。這就是我們的條約中所說的內容。我們是一個價值觀聯盟，這些價值觀都在條約中得到了列舉。它們都是好的，很難不同意這些原則。
然後，還有《聯合國憲章》所載的原則，以限製強者的行動。為了防範我們自己最壞的本能，[鑒於]我們歐洲人在半個世紀內讓世界著火，不是一次而是兩次。
用最簡單的術語來說，這些原則禁止“使用武力侵犯任何國家的領土完整或政治獨立”。
然後，還有國際人道主義法試圖規範戰爭的進行方式並保障對平民的保護。這些原則應該是防止我們在世界各地看到的使用武力正常化的最佳保障。
然而，我知道，為了能夠團結世界圍繞這些原則，我們需要表明我們歐洲人無論何時何地都尊重這些原則。這就是我們正在做的事情嗎？好吧，還沒有達到我們應該的程度。和
對於歐洲來說，這是一個問題。
無論我走到哪裏，我都會遇到雙重標準的指責。我曾經對我的大使們說，外交是管理雙重標準的藝術。當然，有些困難，但關鍵在於：管理雙重標準。
但事實是，世界人民並沒有忘記伊拉克戰爭。即使一些歐盟成員國沒有參加，其他成員國也熱情參與，還有一些國家迅速退出這場戰爭。這是我最了解的國家的情況。
加沙現在發生的事情以一種許多人根本無法理解的方式描繪了歐洲。他們看到了我們在支持烏克蘭方麵的快速參與和果斷，並想知道我們處理巴勒斯坦正在發生的事情的方式。
是的，我可以嚐試解釋歐盟的決策過程是如何運作的：一致同意。我可以嚐試解釋我們成員國的不同曆史經曆——它們之間存在很大分歧。在聯合國大會上，當決定停火的時刻到來時，一方投了 18 票，另一方投了 2 票，其他人投了棄權票。
但人們普遍認為，烏克蘭平民的生命價值與加沙不同，那裏有超過 34,000 人死亡，大多數人流離失所，兒童正在挨餓，人道主義支持也受到阻礙。
人們的看法是，我們不太關心聯合國安理會決議是否被違反，就像以色列在定居點問題上的情況一樣，[而不是]俄羅斯違反了這些決議。
是的，我們在二戰後製定的原則是和平的支柱。但這要求我們的語言具有連貫性。如果我們在一個地方將某件事稱為“戰爭罪”，那麽當它發生在其他地方時，我們就需要用同樣的名稱來稱呼它。
我們都同意，哈馬斯的殘暴襲擊引發了新的暴力循環，我們必須一再譴責。但[接下來的]六個月加沙發生的事情又是另一場恐怖。一種恐怖無法證明另一種恐怖的合理性。
正如世界各地（尤其是美國）的激烈辯論和許多示威活動所表明的那樣，我們的社會越來越感受到這一點。
第二行：合作。
合作需要一個基本要素：信任。如果我信任你，我願意與你合作。如果我信任你，我就不會害怕依賴你。
但在一個依賴性日益武器化的世界裏，信任是短缺的。這帶來了與世界大部分地區脫鉤的風險。技術脫鉤、貿易脫鉤、價值脫鉤。
交易關係越來越多，但規則越來越少，合作也越來越少。但世界麵臨的巨大挑戰——氣候變化、技術、人口變化、不平等——需要更多的合作，而不是更少的合作。
所以，我們能做些什麽？
首先，當然是減少過度的依賴。在大流行期間，我們意識到在歐洲，我們沒有生產一克撲熱息痛。不是一克撲熱息痛。那是一個危機時刻，而在危機時刻，市場無法提供我們所需要的東西。因此，我們當然需要減少過度的依賴。
我們要推動貿易往來多元化，深化與親密朋友的合作。英國是親密朋友、親密夥伴。我們擁有相同的價值觀。我們在幾乎所有地緣政治問題上都有共同利益。在任何我們可以合作的領域，這對我們雙方都有好處。
但這還不夠。如果我隻與具有相同價值觀的人交談，我會在中午停止工作。不，世界上有很多人與我沒有相同的價值觀或有矛盾的利益。盡管如此，我還是必須尋找合作的方式。中國的情況就是如此。我們需要與不一定具有相同價值觀或興趣的人一起工作和合作。
然後，我們必須看看為什麽世界對我們感到不滿。是的，有一種怨恨的感覺，因為人們認為有不同的責任。讓我僅舉其中兩個。
首先，氣候變化。自工業革命開始以來，我們歐洲人產生的二氧化碳排放量約占全球累計二氧化碳排放量的 25%。 [撒哈拉以南地區] 非洲 3%，拉丁美洲 3%。撒哈拉以南非洲和南美洲幾乎不承擔任何責任，但他們卻承擔著最重要和最具破壞性的後果。
因此，當我們談論應對氣候變化時，我們必須理解他們的觀點，以及他們的感受：這是某人造成的問題，而其他人則要為此付出代價。而唯一可能的答案就是提供更多的資源來麵對這個問題。
更多資源——但事實並非如此。情況並非總是如此。
請記住，2009 年在哥本哈根開發了
各國承諾每年向受氣候變化影響最直接的國家提供 1000 億美元的支持 — — 而這一承諾需要很長時間才能兌現。
即使是現在，聯合國仍然告訴我們，為了實現“公正轉型”——我們每天都在談論“公正轉型”——我們每年需要 2.4 萬億美元來資助清潔能源和氣候適應能力。這需要前所未有地增強全球團結。
這筆錢從哪裏來？如果我們每年提供 1000 億美元都這麽困難，那麽世界將如何提供聯合國估計的 2.4 萬億美元？
這帶來了行動的另一麵，那就是財政正義。在加布裏埃爾·祖克曼（Gabriel Zucman）的倡議下，如果不對某些財政規則進行強有力的改變，就沒有出路。首先是對企業征收最低稅，然後對世界上最富有的人征收最低財富稅。這可以提供應對氣候變化所需的資金，氣候變化被認為是人類的生存威脅。
不滿的另一個原因是疫苗。當大流行來臨時，事關生死存亡，2021 年 12 月，富裕國家已經每 100 名居民使用了 150 劑疫苗。每 100 名居民中有 150 名。低收入國家隻有 7 劑[每 100 名居民接種疫苗]。我們有 150 個，他們有 7 個。
他們記得這一點。我一直在與世界各地的一些領導人交談，他們告訴我“在大流行期間，我想從你們那裏購買疫苗，而不是索要疫苗。我準備付錢了，但你告訴我：抱歉，我們沒有[疫苗]。然後，我去了俄羅斯和中國，他們也去了。”
是的，這一點並沒有被忘記。我們可以說我們是最大的出口國和最大的捐助國。那是真實的。但在人命垂危的關鍵時刻，我們這邊的答案並不好。人們提醒[我們]。氣候和疫苗是發展中國家對我們不滿的兩個例子。
必須考慮到這一點，因為當我們與他們交談並談論價值觀時，他們會說“是的，我們擁有相同的價值觀，但我們沒有相同的優先事項。根據您的發展水平，您有自己的優先事項。我有我的。”
如果你想把這兩件事放在一起，不可避免地，必須轉移大量資源，以便應對流行病和氣候變化。
最後一個詞是關於力量的，這將[我]帶到我工作的安全方麵。
獨裁政權最欣賞的莫過於實力。他們喜歡力量。他們最不尊重的就是軟弱。如果他們認為你是一個弱者，他們就會采取相應的行動。所以，讓我們在與獨裁者交談時嚐試[展示]力量。
這是我們歐洲已經忘記的教訓。也許是因為我們一直依賴美國的安全保護傘。但這把保護傘可能不會永遠打開，我相信我們不能讓我們的安全依賴於每四年一次的美國大選。
因此，我們必須製定更多的安全和國防政策。我沒想到我的投資組合的這一部分會花費這麽多時間和精力，但事實就是如此。
我們必須增強我們的防禦能力，並在北約內部建立強大的歐洲支柱。
過去，當我們談論北約內部的歐洲支柱時，這被描述為削弱北約、離開北約或忘記北約的一步。但有趣的是，今天，是美國自己在鼓勵我們前進，增強我們的能力，並以協調的方式做到這一點。
我認為，北約的歐洲支柱不能僅僅從歐盟的角度來理解，而應該從歐洲作為一個比歐盟更大的空間的地理角度來理解。不僅從機構的角度——27個[成員國]——而且從擁有“歐洲”理念的人們的角度來看。
因為你，你是英國，你離開了歐盟，但你仍然是歐洲的一部分。歐洲還有其他國家不是歐盟的一部分，因為他們從來不想成為歐盟的一部分，就像挪威一樣，或者他們決定不再加入，就像你一樣，或者他們仍在排隊成為歐盟成員。因此，要從地理角度而不是僅僅從製度角度來看待安全問題。
我認為，在安全和國防領域，我們可以與英國建立更牢固的關係。我們可以建設更多，因為這是歐盟內部純粹的政府間政策。擴大我們已有的雙邊條約——例如法國與英國的《蘭開斯特宮條約》——應該不難，以便使安全成為更好、更強合作的一個組成部分。
在。
當然，我們必須考慮誰將為這種安全買單。我想知道歐洲人如何能夠為更多的安全、更多地對抗氣候變化、與世界其他國家更多的合作付出代價，同時履行所有財政約束規則。
我想回顧一下，當歐元危機來臨時，我們發明了開箱即用的解決方案，以規避一致意見並尋找可以拯救歐元的方法。
今天，我們或多或少處於同樣的境地。我們必須為歐洲人提供更多的安全、更多的財政能力，以便與我們世界各地的合作夥伴合作，[並]成為值得信賴的合作夥伴。這將需要更多的資源。
今天，在歐洲，在布魯塞爾，關於如何做到這一點存在著一場激烈的辯論。我們是為了疫情才這麽做的。我們發明了下一代歐盟，因為它是一種生存威脅。人們死在街上。
好吧，現在他們不會死在街頭，但如果我們不能提供安全能力來阻止那些可能企圖將戰爭擴大到我們領土的人，他們可能會死在街頭。
這是歐洲人麵臨的重大挑戰之一。
另一個——我現在要回到中東局勢——是尋找和平計劃。
我來自利雅得，在利雅得我遇到了阿拉伯人和許多歐洲人。
我認為阿拉伯人必須提出尋求政治解決局勢的前景。我邀請阿拉伯國家外長來布魯塞爾解釋他們的建議。
我們必須讓每個人都明白，沒有軍事解決方案，你無法扼殺一個想法。扼殺一個想法的唯一方法就是提供一個更好的想法。什麽可能是“好主意”？
好吧，每個人都說他們想要兩國解決方案。自奧斯陸以來，我們三十年來一直在重複這一點。
但在奧斯陸，兩國解決方案並未成為協議的一部分。不是。他們說：“以後，也許，我們可以”，但文本中沒有。
如果我們認為兩國解決方案是唯一的解決方案，那麽國際社會就必須更多地參與其中，而不是將此作為起點，而是作為終點。
我們必須問那些說他們不想要兩國解決方案的人，他們想要什麽？
是的，你不想要它，那麽你的解決方案是什麽？如果我們排除對巴勒斯坦人的滅絕或強迫移民，解決方案是什麽？
當我們向內塔尼亞胡政府提出這個問題時，我們得到的唯一答案是：“我們不想要兩國解決方案”。但那麽，你想要什麽？
這也是國際社會必須一次又一次地提出的問題，以尋求避免另一場人類悲劇並讓兩國人民在和平與安全中並肩工作的答案。
它發生在北愛爾蘭，它發生在歐洲。昔日的敵人如今是好鄰居，而且不僅僅是好鄰居，更是最好的朋友。這應該是可能的，但為了成為可能，土地必須共享。他們不能生活在一起，他們必須和平與安全地毗鄰生活，但每個人都有自己的家園、他們的土地、他們的政府、他們的領土和他們的政治能力。
這是歐洲人必須解決的最重要的事情之一，因為這是我們之間最具分歧的事情。我們在烏克蘭麵前團結一致，在俄羅斯麵前仍然團結一致。我們沒有一致給出答案，一個基本的答案，譴責哈馬斯，要求人質自由，要求人道主義支持，要求政治解決。它必須在操作中進行轉換，而不僅僅是在聲明中。
從現在到今年年底，這將是歐洲政治議程上非常重要的事情。
我希望我們能夠與英國共同努力，尋找解決方案，使我們成為安全方麵的夥伴，成為努力盡快結束我們這個時代的地緣政治鬥爭的夥伴，因為我知道這不簡單。這從來都不是一件容易的事，但我們有道德責任為此做出貢獻，因為我們也是問題的一部分。我們以某種方式造成了這個問題，我們負有努力解決它的強烈責任。
烏克蘭的存在取決於我們。我知道如何結束烏克蘭戰爭。隻要削減供應，我就可以在幾周內結束烏克蘭戰爭。如果我切斷對烏克蘭的武器供應，烏克蘭就無法抵抗，他們將不得不投降，戰爭就會結束。
但這是我們希望戰爭結束的方式嗎？我不希望這樣，我希望歐洲的許多人也不希望這樣。
相反，我們將盡一切努力為烏克蘭人提供軍事和政治支持，我們將為中東人民提供一切政治參與，以支持他們的發展。
好的，為了公平的和平。
與此同時，我們必須繼續努力建立使歐洲成為現實的價值觀和原則——我在一開始就說過：人類從未能夠發明的政治自由、經濟繁榮和社會凝聚力的最佳結合。
謝謝。
United Kingdom: Speech by High Representative/Vice-President Josep Borrell at Oxford University about the world confronted by wars
03.05.2024 Oxford EEAS Press Team
Check against delivery!?
Distinguished faculty, dear students, ladies and gentlemen,
Dear Timothy [Garton Ash, University of Oxford], thank you for inviting me to Oxford. It is a special honour for me to speak at Saint Antony’s.
I have been in this College a couple of times before. I know some of your professors. It is a great pleasure to find here some American students – we met six years ago in Yale [University].
Thank you. Thank you for your attention.
This College has produced many brilliant writers – and even quite a number of Foreign Ministers around the world.
So, it is a particular honour to deliver the Dahrendorf lecture. Ralf Dahrendorf was an exceptional human being: a politician both in Germany and in the United Kingdom, a European Commissioner, a political scientist and a staunch defender of open societies.
As you said, I try to be an academic. I have been in universities [for] part of my life, and in the political life - [for] the other part. I have always been very much interested in bringing together the world of ideas and politics. People who think, and people who act.
That is why I am very happy. I enjoy moments like this with people who think deeply about what is happening in this contested and challenging world. You have, maybe, more time to think than I have, so I need that you inspire our decisions. And I hope that, after these words, we will have the opportunity to exchange some ideas with you.
Yes, I am the High Representative for Foreign and Security [Policy] - thank you for stressing “and Security Policy”. From this privileged position, I have the great opportunity of looking at the world. And what do I see?
Well, I see more confrontation and less cooperation. This has been a growing trend in the last years: much more confrontation and much less cooperation.
I see a world much more fragmented. I see a world where rules are not being adhered to.
I see more polarity, and less multilateralism.
I see how dependencies become weapons.
I see [that] the international system, that we were accustomed to after the Cold War, no longer exists. America has lost its status of a hegemon. And the post-1945 multilateral [world] order is losing ground.
I see – as you know - China rising to the super-power status. What China has done in the last 40 years is unique in the history of humankind. In the last 30 years, China’s share of the world’s GDP, at PPP, has gone from 6% to almost 20%, while we, Europeans, went from 21% to 14% and the United States from 20% to 15%. This is a dramatic change of the economic landscape.
China is becoming a rival for us and for the United States. Not just in manufacturing cheap goods, but also as a military power, at the forefront of the technological development and building the technologies that will shape our future. China has embarked on a “friendship without limits” - although all friendships have limits - with Russia, which signals a growing alignment of the authoritarian regimes in front of democracies.
I said the world is much more multipolar - Yes, that is true.
[At the same time] middle powers, [such as] India, Brazil, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Türkiye, are emerging. They are becoming important actors. Whether they are BRICS or not BRICS, they have very few common features, except the desire for getting more status and a stronger voice in the world, as well as greater benefits for their own development.
In order to achieve this, they are maximising their autonomy, not willing to take sides, hedging one side or the other depending on the moment, depending on the question. They do not want to choose camps and we should not push them to choose camps.
We, Europeans, wanted to create in our neighbourhood a ring of friends. Instead of that, what we have today is a ring of fire. A ring of fire coming from the Sahel to the Middle East, the Caucasus and now in the battlefields of Ukraine.
Thomas Gomart, the Director of the Institut français des relations internationales, has been analysing what are the chokepoints of the global economy. Several of these points are very close to us: the Red Sea for trade, the Strait of Hormuz for oil and gas, and the Black Sea for grain exports. They are in our immediate vicinity, and in some of them we are engaged even with [EU] navy missions, like it is the case in the Red Sea.
And there are two wars. Two wars. When I came to Brussels, there were no wars.
There are two wars where people are fighting for the land. This shows that geography is back. We were told that globalisation had made geography irrelevant, but no. Most of the conflicts in our neighbourhood are related to land, they are territorial. A land that has been promised to two people, in the case of Palestine, and a land at the crossroads of two worlds, in the case of Ukraine. “This is my land”, “No, it is mine”. And this fight for land is shedding a lot of blood.
At the same time, we see an acceleration of the global trends. Climate change is no longer a future problem. The climate breakdown is already here – it is not for tomorrow, it is for today. The technological transitions – in particular, everybody talks about Artificial Intelligence – are bringing changes that we cannot fully grasp. Demography is also changing rapidly. And when I am talking about demographic balances, I am talking about migration, in particular in Africa where 25% of the world will be living in 2050. In 2050, one out of four human beings will be living in Africa. And at the same time, we see inequalities growing, democracies declining and freedoms at risk.
This is what I see. It is not very nice, I know. In this landscape, the role of the European Union, and the role of the United Kingdom, is to be defined. I do not know which is going to be our role. But it is sure it will depend on our response to the challenges we are facing – nothing new. Jean Monnet already said: “Europe will be forged in crisis”. But now the urgency, and the gravity of the moment is such that we hear warnings that Europe could die, nothing less.
L’Europe peut mourir, nous venons d’entendre.
Well, okay. What do we need to do?
First, we need a clear assessment of the dangers of Russia – Russia [is] considered as the most existential threat to Europe. Maybe not everybody in the European Council agrees with that, but the majority is behind this idea. Russia is an existential threat for us, and we have to have a clear-eyed assessment of this risk.
Second, we have to work on principles, on cooperation and on strength.
But first, about Russia.
Under Putin’s leadership, Russia has returned to the imperialist understanding of the world. Imperial Russia from the Tzar times and the Soviet empire times have been rehabilitated by Putin dreaming of a former size and influence.
It was Georgia in 2008. It was Crimea in 2014. We did not see, or we did not want to see, the evolution of Russia under Putin’s watch. Even though Putin himself had warned us at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. It is important to re-read what Putin said in 2007 at the Munich [Security] Conference that I am afraid that nobody wanted to hear or to understand.
We built a model – the European model - based on cooperation and economic interdependence inside us – and it has been a remarkable success. 70 years of peace among us. We believed that interdependence would bring political convergence through what the Germans call “Wandel durch Handel”. This would bring political change, in Russia and even in China.
Well, this has been proven wrong. It has not happened. Faced with the Russian authoritarianism, interpendence did not bring peace. On the contrary, it turned into dependence, in particular on fossil fuels, and later, this dependence became a weapon.
Today, Putin is an existential threat to all of us. If Putin succeeds in Ukraine, he will not stop there. The prospect of having in Kyiv a puppet government like the one in Belarus, and the Russian troops on the Polish border, and Russia controlling 44% of the world[‘s] grain market is something that Europeans should be aware of.
Everybody is becoming more and more aware of that. Even President [of France, Emmanuel] Macron who at the beginning said: “Il ne faut pas humilier la Russie.” Now, he is one of the voices which is warning more about the global consequences of a Russian victory. But [there are] other voices around the world, like some days ago, the Prime Minister of Japan [Fumio Kishida].
But I know that not everybody in the European Union shares this assessment. And some European Council’s members say: “Well, no, Russia is not an existential threat. At least not for me. I consider Russia a good friend.”. There are not many, but there are some.
In a Union governed by unanimity, our policies on Russia are always threatened by a single veto – one is enough - as [Prime Minister of Hungary] Victor Orbán proved by delaying our last assistance package to Ukraine. At the same time, in the United States, political polarisation has delayed the military assistance package for half a year. In the middle of a war, half a year is a lot of time. It can make the difference between winning or losing the war.
Putin invaded Ukraine under the pretext of the “de-Nazification” of Kyiv, believing that we would be unable to react. It was after the fall of Kabul. And he was convinced that our strong dependencies on their gas would make us to react as slowly and softly as we did in 2014 in front of the invasion of Crimea.
I was in [the] Donbas in January 2022, some weeks before the invasion started. And I will always remember my conversation with Prime Minister [of Ukraine, Denys] Shmyhal. He asked me: “When they invade us, because they will invade us – there are 150,000 Russian troops on the other side of the border – what are you going to do? Are you going to support us? I am sure that young Europeans will not go to die for Kyiv. But are you going to provide us with the arms that we need in order to resist the invasion?” That question, at that time, in January, in the middle of the darkness and the cold of the winter, I could not answer. I was not sure what was going to be the answer.
Because the European Union had never provided arms to a country at war. But then, the invasion came and happily, our answer was remarkable and very much united in order to provide Ukraine with the military capacity they need to resist.
The United Kingdom did that before us. At the beginning, we were talking about providing helmets, and now we are providing F-16 [fighter jets]. It is a long way between one thing and another. We went through this long way because Ukrainians have proved to be able to resist. Remember that in 2014, [Angela] Merkel did not want to support Ukraine in front of Russia’s invasion of Crimea. At that time the answer was “no”, because it was going to be useless.
Now the answer has been “yes”, because Ukrainians have proved to be able to resist.
Now Putin sees the whole West as an adversary. He made that clear in many of his speeches. Everything, every day is being said and repeated on Russian TV stations: “The West – the whole West, the global West - is our enemy”. And they act accordingly - through disinformation, poisoning our information environment, and the important factory of lies: [with] that Russia is attempting to interfere in our democratic processes, as they have already done and will do – I am sure - in the next European elections.
Yes, Ukraine is resisting in difficult circumstances, overcoming the fact that the United States and the European Union have not been supplying everything they need to continue the fight.
And then, another war came. The horrible [terrorist] attack by Hamas of 7 October and Israel’s response – for many people, the disproportionate response - plunged the Middle East into the worst cycle of violence in decades. Just before the 7th of October, many believed that the Abraham Accords had diluted the Palestinian issue. Well, they had not. It was a way of making peace between the Arabs and Israelis, but not between the Palestinians and the Israelis.
Jack Sullivan considered that the Middle East had never been so calm, he said one week before the 7th of October. Well, it was not calm. It was not calm, just have a look at what happened in the West Bank to realise that it was not calm at all.
Now, we have two wars. And we, Europeans, are not prepared for the harshness of the world.
But as you, Ivan [Krastev], have pointed out, one thing is to be awake – and we have been woken up - and another thing is to get out of the bed. In some cases, we are still in bed. The awakening was clear, but do we understand the gravity of the moment? I have my doubts. And I want to use this opportunity in order to send a message that yes, the moment is a moment of gravity and urgency because we are facing a mix of geopolitical, economic and societal threats. Four of them: geopolitically, economically, technologically, and democratically.
Europe, the European Union, but more than the European Union, the way of living of the Europeans, this best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that the humanity has never been able to invent, is certainly in danger. And in order to face these challenges, I think that we have to work on three dimensions: Principles, Cooperation and Strength.
Let’s start with the Principles. Principles are important because we say that the European Union is a Union of values. That is what is being said in our treaties. We are a Union of values, and those values are enumerated in the Treaties. They are everything that is good, it is difficult to disagree with these principles.
Then, there are the principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, to put a limit to the actions of the stronger. To put safeguards against our own worst instincts, [given] that we Europeans put [the] world on fire, not once but twice, within half a century.
In the simplest possible terms, those principles outlawed “the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.”
Then, there is International Humanitarian Law to try to regulate how wars are fought and safeguard the protection of civilians. These principles should be the best safeguard against the normalisation of the use of force that we see all over the world.
I know, however, that to be able to rally the world around those principles, we need to show that we, Europeans, respect them always and everywhere. Is that what we are doing? Well, not to the extent we should. And for Europe, this is a problem.
Wherever I go, I find myself confronted with the accusation of double standards. I used to say to my Ambassadors that diplomacy is the art of managing double standards. Certainly, something difficult, but it is about [that]: to manage double standards.
But the fact is, people around the world have not forgotten the war in Iraq. Even if some EU Member States did not participate, others participated with a lot of enthusiasm and others withdrew quickly from this war. This is the case of the country I know best.
What is now happening in Gaza has portrayed Europe in a way that many people simply do not understand. They saw our quick engagement and decisiveness in supporting Ukraine and wonder about the way we approach what is happening in Palestine.
Yes, I can try explaining how the European Union’s decision-making processes work: unanimity. I can try to explain the different historical experiences of our Member States – very divided among them. At the United Nations General Assembly, 18 voted [on] one side, 2 on the other, and others abstained when the moment came to decide about the ceasefire.
But the perception is that the value of civilian lives in Ukraine is not the same than in Gaza, where more than 34,000 are dead, most others displaced, [where] children are starving, and the humanitarian support [is] obstructed.
And the perception is that we care less if United Nations Security Council resolutions are violated, as it is the case by Israel with respect to the settlements, [as opposed to] when it is violated by Russia.
Yes, the principles that we put in place after the World War II are a pillar of peace. But this requires that we are coherent in our language. If we call something a “war crime” in one place, we need to call it by the same name when it happens anywhere else.
We all agree that Hamas has sparked this new cycle of violence with their atrocious attack, that we have to condemn once and again. But what has happened in Gaza [in the following] 6 months is another horror. And one horror cannot justify another.
This is more and more what our societies are feeling, as the passionate debate and the many demonstrations around the world, and in particular in the United States, are showing.
Second line: Cooperation.
Cooperation requires an essential ingredient: Trust. If I trust you, I am ready to cooperate with you. I am not afraid to be dependent on you if I trust you.
But in a world where dependencies are increasingly weaponised, trust is in short supply. This brings the risk of decoupling with large parts of the world. Decoupling on technology, decoupling on trade, decoupling on values.
There are more and more transactional relationships, but less rules and less cooperation. But the great challenges of the world - climate change, technologies, demographic change, inequalities - require more cooperation, not less cooperation.
So, what can we do?
First, certainly, to reduce excessive dependencies. During the pandemic, we realised that in Europe, we were not producing a single gram of Paracetamol. Not a gram of Paracetamol. It was a moment of crisis, and in the moment of crisis, the market was not able to provide what we needed. So, we need to reduce excessive dependencies, for sure.
We need to diversify our trade links and deepen cooperation with our close friends. The United Kingdom is a close friend and a close partner. We share the same values. We have converging interests on almost all geopolitical questions. In any area where we can cooperate, it would be good for both of us.
But that is not enough. If I was only talking with people who share the same values, I would stop working at midday. No, there are many people around the world [with] whom I do not share the same values or have contradictory interests. In spite of that, I have to look for ways of cooperating. This is the case of China. We need to work and cooperate with people who [do] not necessarily share the same values or interests.
Then, we have to have a look at why the world is feeling some resentment about us. Yes, there is a feeling of resentment because people believe that there are different responsibilities. Let me cite only two of them.
First, climate change. We, Europeans, have produced about 25% of all cumulated global CO2 emissions since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution. [Sub-Saharan] Africa 3%, Latin America 3%. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Americans [have] almost nothing of the responsibility, and they share the most important and damaging consequences.
So, when we talk about fighting climate change, we have to understand their views and the feeling that this is a problem that someone has created, and others pay the consequences. And the only possible answer is to provide more resources in order to face this problem.
More resources – but it has not been the case. Not always the case.
Remember, in 2009 in Copenhagen, developed countries committed to $100 billion per year of support to the countries most directly affected by climate change – and this promise took a long time to [be] realised.
And even now, the United Nations tell us that in order to go through a “just transition” - how we talk everyday about the “just transition” -, we need $2.4 trillion annually to fund clean energy and climate resilience. This will require an unprecedented increase in global solidarity.
Where is this money going to come from? If it has been so difficult for us to provide $100 billion per year, [how will] the world provide $2.4 trillion, which is the United Nations’ estimate?
And this brings another side of the action, which is fiscal justice. And at Gabriel Zucman’s initiative, there is no way out without a strong change in some fiscal rules. To start with the minimum tax on corporations and with a minimum wealth tax on the world’s richest people. This could provide the amount of money required to face climate change, which is considered an existential threat for humanity.
The other reason for resentment are vaccines. When the pandemic came, and it was a matter of life or death, in December 2021 rich countries had already used 150 doses of vaccines per 100 inhabitants. 150 per 100 inhabitants. Lower income countries had just 7 [doses of vaccines per 100 inhabitants]. We had 150, they had 7.
And they remember that. I have been talking with some leaders around the world who told me “during the pandemic, I wanted to buy vaccines from you, not ask for them. I was ready to pay for them, but you told me: Sorry, we do not have [vaccines]. Then, I went to Russia and China, and they had.”
Yes, this has not been forgotten. We can claim that we have been the biggest exporter and the biggest donor. That is true. But at that critical moment, when people were dying, the answer from our side was not a good one. People remind [us about it]. Climate and vaccines are two examples of resentment of [the] developing world towards us.
This has to be taken into consideration because when we talk with them and we talk about values, they say “yes, we share the same values, but we do not share the same priorities. You have your priorities according to your level of development. I have mine.”
And if you want to put both things together, unavoidably, there has to be a strong level of resources transferred in order to face pandemics when it comes, climate change when it comes.
The last word is about Strength, and this brings [me] to the security side of my job.
There is nothing that authoritarian regimes admire [as] much as strength. They like strength. And there is nothing for which they have less respect than weakness. If they perceive you as a weak actor, they will act accordingly. So, let’s try [to demonstrate] strength when talking with authoritarian people.
This is a lesson that we [in] Europe had forgotten. Maybe because we had been relying on the security umbrella of the United States. But this umbrella may not be open forever, and I believe that we cannot make our security dependent on the US elections every four years.
So, we have to develop more our Security and Defence policy. I did not expect this part of my portfolio to take [up] so much time and effort, but this is the way it is.
We have to increase our defence capabilities and to build a strong European pillar inside NATO.
In the past, when we talked about the European pillar inside NATO, this was portrayed as a step towards weakening NATO, or leaving NATO, or forgetting about NATO. But the funny thing is [that] today, it is the United States themselves who are encouraging us to forge ahead, to increase our capacities, and to do that in a coordinated manner.
I think that the European Pillar of NATO has to be understood not from the point of view of the European Union alone, but from the geographical approach of Europe as a space which is bigger than the European Union. Not only from an institutional point of view – the 27 [Member States] - but from the point of view of the people who share what it is to be “European”.
Because you, you are the United Kingdom, you left the European Union, but you are still part of Europe. And there are other people in Europe who are not part of the European Union, because they never wanted to be, like Norway, or they decided to stop being, as you, or they are still queuing to become members of the European Union. So, look at that security issue from a geographical perspective, and not only [from] an institutional one.
And I think that there, in Security and Defence, we can have with the United Kingdom a stronger relation. We can build more because this is a pure intergovernmental policy inside the European Union. It should not be difficult to expand the bilateral treaties that we already have - like France with the United Kingdom, the Lancaster House Treaties – in order to make security an integral part of a better and stronger cooperation.
Certainly, we have to think [about] who will pay for this security. I wonder how the Europeans can be able to pay for more security, more fight [against] climate change, more cooperation with the rest of the world, and at the same time to fulfil all the rules of fiscal constraint.
I want to recall that when the euro crisis came, we invented out of the box solutions in order to circumvent unanimity and look for something that could save the euro.
Today, we are more or less in the same situation. We have to provide to the Europeans more security, more financial capacity, to work with our partners around the world, [and] to be a trusted partner. This will require more resources.
Today, in Europe, in Brussels, there is a great debate about how to do it. We did it for the pandemic. We invented the Next Generation EU because it was an existential threat. People were dying on the streets.
Well, now they are not dying in the streets but they could die in the streets if we cannot offer a security capacity in order to deter those who could have the tentation to expand the war into our territories.
This is one of the big challenges that Europeans are facing.
The other one - I am coming back to the situation in the Middle East – is to look for a peace plan.
I am coming from Riyadh, and in Riyadh I met the Arabs and many Europeans.
I think that the Arabs have to present their prospects for looking for a political settlement of the situation. I invited the Foreign Affairs Ministers of the Arab countries to come to Brussels and explain which are their proposals.
We have to make everybody understand that there is not a military solution, that you cannot kill an idea. The only way of killing an idea is to provide a better one. And what could be “the good idea”?
Well, everybody says that they want the two-state solution. We have been repeating that for 30 years, since Oslo.
But in Oslo, the two-state solution was not part of the agreement. It was not. They said: “Later, maybe, we could”, but it is not in the text.
If we believe that the two-state solution is the only solution, then the international community has to engage much more, taking this not as a starting point but as the endgame point.
And we have to ask to the ones who say that they do not want the two-state solutions, what do they want?
Yes, you do not want it, what is your solution then? If we exclude extermination or forced migration of the Palestinians, what is the solution?
When we ask this question to the Netanyahu government, the only answer we get is: “We do not want the two-states solution”. But then, what do you want?
And this is what the international community has to ask, once and again, in order to look for an answer that could avoid another human tragedy and make these two people work side by side in peace and security.
It happened in Northern Ireland, it happened in Europe. The old enemies are today good neighbours, and more than good neighbours, they are best friends. It should be possible, but in order [for it] to be possible, the land has to be shared. They cannot be living together, they have to live side by side, in peace and security but each one with their home, their land, their government, their territory, their political capacity.
This is one of the most important things that the Europeans have to solve, because it is the most divisive thing among us. We have been united in front of Ukraine, we remained united in front of Russia. We have not been united in giving an answer, a basic answer condemning Hamas, asking for the freedom of the hostages, asking for humanitarian support, asking for a political solution. It has to be converted in actions, not just in declarations.
This will be something that - from now until the end of the year - will be very high on the agenda of the European politics.
And I hope that we can work together with the United Kingdom in order to look for a solution, and to make us partners on security, to be partners on trying to look for the geopolitical battles of our time to finish as soon as possible knowing that it is not easy. It has never been easy, but we have the moral responsibility of contributing to it because we are part of the problem. We created this problem one way or another, and we have a strong responsibility in trying to solve it.
The Ukrainian existence depends on us. I know how to finish the war in Ukraine. I can finish the war in Ukraine in a couple of weeks just by cutting the supply. If I cut the supply of arms to Ukraine, Ukraine cannot resist, they will have to surrender, and the war will finish.
But is this the way we want the war to finish? I do not want [that], and I hope that many people in Europe do not want [that] either.
On the contrary, we will do whatever we can in order to provide the Ukrainians with the military and political support, and we will provide the people in the Middle East all our political engagement to look for a fair peace.
In the meantime, we have to continue fighting to make the values and principles that make Europe what it is - I said it at the beginning: the best combination of political freedom, economic prosperity and social cohesion that humanity has never been able to invent.
Thank you.
Link to the video: https://audiovisual.ec.europa.eu/en/video/I-256530
