風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
法國重返歐洲
https://ip-quarterly.com/en/frances-pivot-europe
歐盟在 2024 年似乎迷失了方向。當需要領導力時，德國總理轉向華盛頓。剩下的就是法國總統埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍。
Jacob Ross 2024 年 3 月 22 日
2024 年春季刊：歐洲的投票，歐洲的未來
2024 年春季，德國總理奧拉夫·肖爾茨再次麵臨來自國內和國外的大量批評。在年初以歐洲領導人的身份出現，強調德國在援助烏克蘭方麵發揮主導作用並呼籲歐盟盟友采取更多行動之後，“金牛座辯論”現在再次追上了他。他拒絕采取主動並同意向烏克蘭交付強大的巡航導彈，這加劇了國內外對德國轉變的嚴肅性的懷疑，即所謂的“時間轉變”。
德國作為平民大國，歐盟作為和平項目——這兩項原則都受到俄羅斯帝國主義的挑戰，俄羅斯在 21 世紀繼續以武力轉移邊界。為此，需要德國在歐洲發揮領導作用，但跡象並不好。在距離下次聯邦選舉還有 18 個月的情況下，Körber 基金會進行的一項調查顯示，72% 的德國受訪者支持增加國防資金並實現北約將 GDP 的 2% 用於安全的目標，66% 的人支持進一步向烏克蘭運送武器。然而，71% 的人拒絕讓德國在歐洲發揮軍事領導作用——這一數字在總理府可能眾所周知。
調查結果反映了歐洲對德國政府的舊批評，這與 Scholz 及其前任有關。資金充足，德國人可以維持現狀。但在開發新想法、向前邁進以及在不斷變化的世界中重新定位歐盟方麵，柏林是不可信賴的。現任政府的聯合協議在紙麵上極具野心，並規定就“歐洲聯邦國家”的道路進行討論。然而，中左翼社會民主黨 (SPD)、綠黨和親商界的自由民主黨 (FDP) 之間的爭端以及布魯塞爾所謂的“德國投票”（由於三個執政黨意見不一致而被迫棄權）並沒有推動相應的改革，現在比以往任何時候都更加阻礙了這一進程。許多歐盟夥伴的印象是，德國阻礙了變革。
法國的失望
隨著柏林退出，人們的目光轉向巴黎，埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍總統希望在那裏領導歐洲。從 2017 年 9 月在索邦大學的演講到 2023 年 5 月在布拉迪斯拉發的演講，在他擔任總統期間，留下歐洲政策遺產的願望是顯而易見的。在此期間，法德和歐洲取得了一些顯著的成功：2017 年啟動了大型軍備項目； 2019 年，一項雄心勃勃的新雙邊條約在亞琛簽署；2022 年，法國擔任歐盟理事會主席國期間，戰略指南針被采納。此後不久，歐盟成員國簽署了加強歐盟軍備工業的“凡爾賽議程”。
盡管如此，馬克龍離他的最終目標還很遠。歐盟今天根本不是主權國家。這位法國總統特別指責奧拉夫·肖爾茨，因為自俄羅斯對烏克蘭開戰以來，歐盟的共同安全與防務政策 (CSDP) 幾乎沒有取得任何進展，除了新的融資手段。2017 年的團結時刻已經消失。當時，時任德國總理安格拉·默克爾在唐納德·特朗普就任美國總統幾個月後與特朗普舉行了首次會晤，她說：“我們完全可以依賴別人的時代已經結束了。”默克爾顯然指的是美國，巴黎人豎起了耳朵。她在 2017 年 5 月，也就是馬克龍當選後不久發表講話，這意味著法德在安全政策方麵建立主權歐盟的曆史性倡議的基礎似乎已經到位。
然而，默克爾沒有跟進。最遲從 2022 年 2 月開始，她的繼任者奧拉夫·舒爾茨就毫不掩飾他想再次與華盛頓盡可能緊密地聯係在一起的意圖。這是回歸冷戰時期的德國身份——也是對 2017 年立場的修改。因此，這一時期的法德協議受到了根本性的質疑。從法國的角度來看，未來作戰航空係統 (FCAS) 和主地麵作戰係統 (MGCS) 軍備項目基於這樣的信念：從長遠來看，歐盟必須在 21 世紀獨自維護自己的權利。《亞琛條約》包含雙邊互助條款，兩國武裝部隊將更接近“共同文化”，這並非巧合。現在人們對特朗普可能重返白宮的擔憂使這些考慮變得更加緊迫。
一個難纏的盟友
巴黎正在積極為特朗普第二次擔任總統做準備。然而，與 2017 年不同，馬克龍現在對他的歐洲夥伴的不信任已經習以為常。法國對領導地位的宣稱有著悠久而複雜的曆史，可以追溯到法國發起的歐洲防務共同體 (EDC)，該共同體於 1954 年因法國國民議會的抵製而失敗。1966 年，當時由戴高樂領導的法國在擁有自己的核威懾力量後離開了北約的軍事指揮結構。1989 年柏林牆倒塌時，許多法國政客預計北約將終結，他們認為北約是多餘的。同時，他們對歐盟隨後的發展猶豫不決，尤其是 2004 年的東擴和小成員國的日益增長的影響力。
幾十年來，法國在西方聯盟結構（無論是歐盟還是北約）中的影響力一直受到戴高樂主義遺產的影響。法國對國家主權的所謂無條件堅持，使得法國提出的更多合作倡議至今仍不可信，這一點在安全和防務政策中表現得非常明顯。那些不斷強調自己可以獨立完成一切的人很難培養合作夥伴。自俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭以來，馬克龍和他的政府就一再被這一障礙所困擾，最近一次是在討論法國核威懾力量可能歐洲化的過程中。到目前為止，沒有任何一個夥伴，無論是歐盟還是北約，能夠想象出由法國主導的現有美國核保護傘的替代方案。
自 2017 年以來，馬克龍還本能地遵循戴高樂主義的格言，認為國際政治是“多極的”，並希望不惜一切代價阻止新的集團形成。一個突出的例子——還有更多——是他關於歐盟在中國和美國之間的獨立立場的聲明，他在 2023 年 4 月訪華歸來時用這個聲明來冷落他的西方夥伴。馬克龍知道，這些立場在今天的法國仍然很受歡迎。畢竟，法國外交近年來最大的成功不是 2015 年的《巴黎氣候協定》，而是 2003 年法國對美國入侵伊拉克說“不”，以及時任外交部長多米尼克·德維爾潘在聯合國安理會的講話。
第一次改變方向
盡管馬克龍致力於法國外交政策的戴高樂主義指導方針，但他最近改變了方向，最顯著的變化是他在布拉迪斯拉發的講話。法國總統成為烏克蘭和格魯吉亞加入北約的倡導者，這無異於 2023 年的一場革命。很快就有人談論布拉迪斯拉發的“反布加勒斯特時刻”，暗指法國（和德國）曆史上反對這兩個國家加入北約，這在 2008 年北約布加勒斯特峰會上引起了爭議。從那時起，政府代表就喜歡談論“布拉迪斯拉發議程”，這與法國傳統的外交和安全政策立場背道而馳。
馬克龍本人似乎從過去的錯誤中吸取了教訓。在布拉迪斯拉發，他首先修改了自己 2019 年對北約“腦死亡”的診斷。俄羅斯對烏克蘭的襲擊是一次“電擊”，使跨大西洋聯盟（而不是歐盟）複活。“布拉迪斯拉發議程”沒有堅持對歐盟主權的曆史要求，也沒有用對北約的爭論性言論冒犯其合作夥伴，而是代表了法國外交政策的新實用主義，試圖適應歐洲大陸不斷變化的地緣政治環境。馬克龍本人不再將歐洲安全定義為“與俄羅斯同在”，而是反對俄羅斯。法國官員明顯傾向於加強“北約內部的歐洲支柱”。
馬克龍沒有孤立自己，而是將自己定位為西方聯盟結構的先驅。這樣做，他從德國總理和美國總統喬·拜登的弱點中獲益，後者顯然很難將自己拖入美國大選。今年 2 月在巴黎舉行的會議後，馬克龍關於西方地麵部隊在烏克蘭的言論引發爭議，這隻是這一新路線的一個例子。這位法國總統繼續堅持歐盟自治的長期必要性，這種對主權的堅持對於國內政治辯論仍然至關重要，包括在歐洲選舉活動期間。然而，與此同時，馬克龍也表示他願意在短期內將法國關於歐洲的長期目標放在次要位置。他對烏克蘭非歐洲彈藥采購的讓步就是一個例子。
法國的抵抗
然而，馬克龍發起的方向轉變能否持續尚不確定。政治路徑依賴和官僚主義的程度
2023 年通過的國防政策預算談判中，巴黎的惰性顯現出來。人們對相應的法律《軍事規劃法》（LPM）寄予厚望，因為 2024-2030 年期間的資金分配提供了未來幾年法國優先事項的信息。政治承諾很快就會被修改，LPM 中的數字不會撒謊。陸軍沒有成為相應談判的贏家，而是海軍——國防部整體的資金大幅增加——這一事實不僅在巴黎引起了震驚。
畢竟，馬克龍在 2023 年宣布了“轉向高強度戰爭”，旨在為法國在北約東翼的聯盟團結保證提供新的分量。未來幾年，法國將花費大量資金建造一艘新航空母艦或監視法國海外領土，而這在加強軍隊結構以及歐洲可用的武器係統和彈藥方麵卻會有所欠缺，這一事實讓那些懷疑“布拉迪斯拉發議程”嚴肅性的聲音更加響亮。
“塔希提島仍然比華沙更重要”，一位熟悉今年年初事件的記者打趣道。此前曾有人猜測，馬克龍對歐洲安全和北約東翼的承諾與他近年來在西非的失敗有多大關係。法國軍隊於 2022 年 2 月宣布從馬裏撤軍，就在俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭前幾天。此後，法國進一步被迫從布基納法索和尼日爾撤軍，並宣布減少塞內加爾、加蓬和科特迪瓦基地的部隊。盡管國防部代表否認存在直接聯係，但問題顯而易見：法國是否正在實施“重返歐洲”戰略？
重返歐洲是機遇
法國“重返”歐洲對法德關係和歐洲安全來說都是好消息。法國主權主義者喜歡強調，自 1956 年蘇伊士運河危機以來，英國已經接受了大英帝國的終結，並接受了其在與美國的特殊關係中扮演的次要角色。自那時起，法國就成為唯一具有全球政治影響力的歐洲大國。英國脫歐和與“全球英國”口號相關的野心並沒有對巴黎的自我評估產生重大影響。相反，西非前殖民帝國在許多法語國家的影響力日漸減弱，引發了一場在某些情況下具有生存意義的辯論。當尼日爾政變後法國大使被要求離開該國時，巴黎的一些評論家認為這是又一個“蘇伊士危機”，甚至又一個“奠邊府危機”，暗指法國在 1954 年第一次印度支那戰爭中的失敗。
法國大使撤離西非，由俄羅斯、中國或土耳其的代表接替，這一事實觸及了法國外交政策身份的基礎。作為啟蒙運動和法國大革命普世主義思想的繼承者，法國聲稱在 21 世紀“有話要說”，其基礎遠遠超出了外交。任何人隻要願意，都可以把法國身份危機看作整個西方及其人權和民主普世信息的危機的表現。
但也許我們仍然可以從反思歐洲中找到機會：對法國、對法德關係、對歐盟。畢竟，鑒於烏克蘭爭取自決和安全的鬥爭，捍衛民主和人權在歐洲顯然也是必要的。埃馬紐埃爾·馬克龍似乎抓住了機會，利用他任期的剩餘三年，讓法國成為主權歐盟的領導力量。
雅各布·羅斯是德國外交關係委員會（DGAP）法國和法德關係研究員。
France's Pivot to Europe
https://ip-quarterly.com/en/frances-pivot-europe
The European Union seems disoriented in 2024. The German chancellor is turning to Washington when leadership is needed. That leaves French President Emmanuel Macron.
In spring 2024, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz is once again facing massive criticism, both nationally and internationally. After he presented himself as a European leader at the beginning of the year, emphasizing Germany's lead in aid to Ukraine and calling on European Union allies to do more, the “Taurus debate” has now caught up with him again. His refusal to take the initiative and agree to the delivery of the powerful cruise missile to Ukraine reinforces doubts at home and abroad about the seriousness of Germany’s turnaround, its so-called Zeitenwende.
Germany as a civilian power and the EU as a peace project—both principles are being challenged by Russia’s imperialism, which continues to shift borders by force in the 21st century. In response to this, German leadership in Europe is called for, but the signs are bad. With 18 months before the next federal elections, 72 precent of respondents in Germany were in favor of more money for defense and achieving NATO’s spending goal of 2 percent of GDP for security, and 66 percent were in favor of further arms deliveries to Ukraine, in a survey conducted by the Körber Foundation. However, 71 percent rejected a leading military role for Germany in Europe—a figure that is likely to be well known in the chancellery.
The survey results reflect an old European criticism of the German government, which relates to Scholz as well as his predecessor. Money is available, and the Germans can manage the status quo. But when it comes to developing new ideas, moving forward, and repositioning the EU in a changing world, Berlin cannot be counted on. The current government’s coalition agreement is extremely ambitious on paper and provides for discussions on the path to a "European federal state." However, instead of promoting corresponding reforms, disputes between the center-left Social Democrats (SPD), the Greens, and the pro-business Free Democrats (FDP) and the so-called “German vote” in Brussels (a forced abstention because the three governing parties do not agree) are now obstructing the process more than ever. The impression among many EU partners is that Germany is standing in the way of change.
French Disappointment
With Berlin out of the picture, eyes are turning to Paris, where President Emmanuel Macron would love to lead Europe. The desire to leave behind a European policy legacy has been unmistakable throughout his presidency, from the speech at Sorbonne University in September 2017 to the speech in Bratislava in May 2023. In between, there have been some notable Franco-German and European successes: huge armaments projects were initiated in 2017; an ambitious new bilateral treaty was signed in Aachen in 2019; the strategic compass was adopted in 2022 under the French EU Council presidency. Shortly afterwards, the EU member states signed the "Versailles Agenda" to strengthen the EU armaments industry.
Nevertheless, Macron has come no closer to his ultimate goal. The EU is anything but sovereign today. The French president blames Olaf Scholz in particular for the fact that the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) has made hardly any progress since the start of Russia’s war against Ukraine, apart from new financing instruments. The moment of unity of 2017 has evaporated. At the time, then German Chancellor Angela Merkel, having returned from a first meeting with Donald Trump just months after his inauguration as US president, said that “the times when we could completely rely on others are over.” Merkel was clearly referring to the United States, and people in Paris pricked up their ears. The fact that she spoke in May 2017, shortly after Macron’s election, meant that the basis for historic Franco-German initiatives for a sovereign EU in terms of security policy seemed to be in place.
However, Merkel did not follow up. And since February 2022 at the latest, her successor Olaf Scholz has made no secret of his intention to tie himself as closely as possible to Washington once again. It is a return to the German identity of the Cold War—and a revision of the positions of 2017. Franco-German agreements from this period are therefore being fundamentally called into question. From the French perspective, the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) and Main Ground Combat System (MGCS) armaments projects are based on the conviction that the EU will have to assert itself alone in the 21st century in the long term. It is no coincidence that the Treaty of Aachen contains a bilateral mutual assistance clause and that the armed forces of both countries are to move closer to a “common culture.” Concerns about Trump’s potential return to the White House are now lending new urgency to these considerations.
A Difficult Ally
Paris is actively preparing for the scenario of a second Trump presidency. However, unlike in 2017, Macron is now familiar with the mistrust of his European partners. French claims to leadership have a long and complicated history reaching back to the European Defense Community (EDC), a French initiative, failing in 1954 due to resistance from France’s National Assembly, of all things. In 1966, France, then led by Charles de Gaulle, left NATO’s military command structures once its own nuclear deterrent was available. And when the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, many French politicians expected the end of NATO, which they considered superfluous. At the same time, they were hesitant about the subsequent development of the EU, in particular the eastward enlargement of 2004 and the growing weight of small member states.
France’s influence in Western alliance structures, in the EU and NATO alike, has been suffering from the legacy of Gaullism for decades. Its supposedly unconditional insistence on national sovereignty has made French initiatives for more cooperation less credible to this day, and this is abundantly clear in security and defense policy. Those who constantly emphasize that they can do everything on their own find it difficult to cultivate partners. Since the beginning of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Macron and his government have repeatedly stumbled over this handicap, most recently in the course of discussions about the possible Europeanization of the French nuclear deterrent. So far, no partner, not in the EU and certainly not in NATO, can imagine French-led alternatives to the existing US nuclear umbrella.
Since 2017, Macron has also instinctively followed the Gaullist maxim that sees international politics as “multipolar” and wants to prevent new bloc formations at all costs. One prominent example—and there are many more—was his statement on independent EU positions between China and the United States, which he used to snub his Western partners on his return from a visit to China in April 2023. Macron knows that these positions are still very popular in France today. After all, the greatest success of French diplomacy in recent years was not the Paris Climate Agreement of 2015, but the French “no” to the US invasion of Iraq in 2003 and then Foreign Minister Dominique de Villepin’s speech at the UN Security Council.
First Change of Direction
Despite his commitment to the Gaullist guidelines of French foreign policy, Macron has recently changed course, the most significant change being his speech in Bratislava. The fact that a French president became an advocate of Ukrainian and Georgian NATO membership was tantamount to a revolution in 2023. There was soon talk of an "anti-Bucharest moment" in Bratislava, alluding to France's (and Germany's) historic opposition to both countries joining NATO, which had caused controversy at the alliance’s Bucharest summit in 2008. Since then, government representatives have liked to talk about the “Bratislava agenda,” which breaks with traditional French foreign and security policy positions.
Macron himself seems to have learned from past mistakes. In Bratislava, he began by revising his own 2019 diagnosis of NATO’s “brain death.” Russia’s attack on Ukraine was an “electric shock” that revived the transatlantic alliance (and not the EU). Instead of insisting on historical demands for EU sovereignty and offending its partners with polemical statements on NATO, the “Bratislava agenda” has since stood for the new pragmatism in French foreign policy, which is attempting to adapt to changed geopolitical circumstances on the European continent. Macron himself no longer defines European security “with Russia,” but against it. And French officials are noticeably swinging toward talk of strengthening the “European pillar within NATO.”
Instead of isolating himself, Macron is positioning himself as a pioneer of Western alliance structures. In doing so, he is benefiting from the weakness of the German chancellor and a US president, Joe Biden, who is visibly dragging himself into the US election campaign with difficulty. The controversy surrounding Macron’s statements on Western ground troops in Ukraine after a conference in Paris in February were just one example of this new line. The French president continues to insist on the long-term necessity of EU autonomy and this insistence on sovereignty remains essential for domestic political debates, including during the European election campaign. At the same time, however, Macron is signaling his willingness to put France’s long-term goals regarding Europe on the back burner in the short term. His concession on non-European ammunition procurement for Ukraine is one example of this.
Resistance in France
However, it is uncertain how sustainable the change of direction that Macron has initiated will be. The extent of the political path dependencies and bureaucratic inertia in Paris became apparent during the negotiations on the defense policy budget, which was passed in 2023. Expectations of the corresponding law, the loi de programmation militaire (LPM), were high, as the allocation of funds for the period 2024-2030 provides information on French priorities for the coming years. Political promises are quickly revised, and the figures in the LPM do not lie. The fact that the army did not emerge as the winner from the corresponding negotiations, but rather the navy—with significant increases in funding for the defense ministry as a whole—caused astonishment not only in Paris.
After all, Macron had announced a “pivot to high-intensity warfare” in 2023, which was intended to give new weight to French assurances of alliance solidarity on NATO’s eastern flank. The fact that a lot of money will now be spent over the next few years on a new aircraft carrier or the surveillance of French overseas territories—which at the same time will be lacking when it comes to strengthening the army structure and the weapons systems and ammunition available in Europe—is making those voices that doubt the seriousness of the “Bratislava agenda” louder.
“Tahiti remains more important than Warsaw,” quipped a journalist who is well acquainted with the events at the beginning of the year. There had previously been speculation about the extent to which Macron’s commitment to European security and NATO’s eastern flank was linked to his failures in West Africa in recent years. The withdrawal of French troops from Mali was announced in February 2022, just days before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Since then, further forced withdrawals from Burkina-Faso and Niger have followed, as well as the announcement of a reduction in troop contingents at bases in Senegal, Gabon, and Côte d'Ivoire. Although representatives of the defense ministry deny a direct connection, the question is obvious: Is France conducting a “pivot to Europe” here?
The Pivot as an Opportunity
The French “return” to Europe would be good news for Franco-German relations and European security. French sovereigntists like to emphasize that since the Suez Crisis of 1956, the United Kingdom has resigned itself to the end of the British Empire and accepted its junior role in the special relationship with the United States. Since then, France has been the only European power with global political weight. Brexit and the ambitions associated with the “Global Britain” slogan have not significantly affected this self-assessment in Paris. Instead, the dwindling influence in many francophone states of the former colonial empire in West Africa has triggered a debate that in some cases has existential overtones. When the French ambassador was asked to leave the country after the coup in Niger, some commentators in Paris saw a new “Suez,” or even another “?i?n Biên Ph?,” alluding to the defeat of France in the First Indochina War in 1954.
The fact that French ambassadors are withdrawing and being replaced in West Africa by representatives from Russia, China, or Turkey is touching on the foundations of France’s foreign policy identity. As the heir to the universalist ideas of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution, its claim to “have something to say” to the world in the 21st century is anchored far beyond diplomacy. And anyone who wants to can certainly see the French identity crisis as a manifestation of the crisis of the entire West and its universal messages of human rights and democracy.
But perhaps there is still an opportunity to be found in reflecting on Europe: for France, for Franco-German relations, and for the EU. After all, in view of the Ukrainian struggle for self-determination and security, it is obvious that the defense of democracy and human rights is also necessary in Europe. Emmanuel Macron seems to seize the opportunity and use the remaining three years of his term of office to make France the leading power of a sovereign EU.
Jacob Ross is Research Fellow for France and Franco-German Relations at the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP).
