Chas Freeman 烏克蘭戰爭的諸多教訓

烏克蘭戰爭的諸多教訓

The Many Lessons of the Ukraine War

https://chasfreeman.net/the-many-lessons-of-the-ukraine-war/

查斯·弗裏曼 2023-09-26

弗裏曼大使是 Projects International, Inc. 的主席。他是一位退休的美國國防官員、外交官和口譯員，獲得過無數崇高榮譽和獎項，是一位受歡迎的公眾演講家，也是五本書的作者。Ambassador Freeman chairs Projects International, Inc. He is a retired U.S. defense official, diplomat, and interpreter, the recipient of numerous high honors and awards, a popular public speaker, and the author of five books.

弗裏曼的文章  https://chasfreeman.net/category/speeches/ 

烏克蘭戰爭的諸多教訓
致東灣和平公民的致辭

Chas W. Freeman, Jr. 大使（USFS，退役）
布朗大學沃森國際與公共事務研究所訪問學者
巴靈頓圖書館，巴靈頓，羅德島州，2023 年 9 月 26 日

今晚我想和大家談談烏克蘭——它發生了什麽、為什麽發生、它可能如何擺脫大國競爭所帶來的磨難； 以及我們可以從中學到什麽。 我這樣做是帶著一些惶恐和對觀眾的警告。 我的演講就像烏克蘭衝突一樣，是一篇漫長而複雜的演講。 它與非常有說服力的宣傳相矛盾。 我的講話會冒犯任何相信官方敘述的人。 美國媒體處理烏克蘭戰爭的方式讓人想起馬克·吐溫的一句話：“許多評論家的研究已經給這個問題蒙上陰影，如果他們繼續下去，我們很可能很快就會一無所知。” 根本不關心這件事。”

有人說，在戰爭中，真理是第一個傷亡的。 戰爭通常伴隨著官方謊言的迷霧。 烏克蘭戰爭中的迷霧從未如此濃重。 盡管數十萬人在烏克蘭戰鬥並死亡，但布魯塞爾、基輔、倫敦、莫斯科和華盛頓的宣傳機器加班加點地工作，以確保我們站在熱情的一邊，相信我們願意相信的，並譴責任何 質疑我們已經內化的敘述。 不在前線的人都不知道這場戰爭中發生了什麽。 我們所知道的隻是我們的政府和其他戰爭支持者希望我們知道的。 他們養成了吸納自己的宣傳的壞習慣，這保證了妄想性的政策。

烏克蘭戰爭的每一個參與方政府——基輔、莫斯科、華盛頓和其他北約國家首都——都犯有不同程度的自欺欺人和錯誤行為。 對所有人來說，後果都是可怕的。 對於烏克蘭來說，這是災難性的。 所有有關方麵早就應該對政策進行徹底的反思。

北約從何而來、往何處去？

首先，一些必要的背景。 北約（北大西洋公約組織）的成立是為了保衛二戰後美國勢力範圍內的歐洲國家對抗蘇維埃社會主義共和國聯盟（蘇聯）及其衛星國。 北約的責任範圍是其成員國在北美和西歐的領土，但除此之外別無其他。 在冷戰的四十多年中，該聯盟幫助維持了歐洲的力量平衡和和平。 然而1991年，蘇聯解體，冷戰結束。 這消除了對北約成員國領土的任何可信威脅，並提出了這個問題：如果北約仍然是某些問題的答案，那麽問題是什麽？

美國武裝部隊毫無問題地應對這一難題。 他們在維護北約方麵擁有令人信服的既得利益。

北約為美國軍隊創造並維持了二戰後的歐洲角色和存在，
這證明了美國軍隊結構要大得多，並且為軍官[1]提供比其他情況下更理想的職位是合理的，
北約提高了美國武裝部隊的國際地位，同時培養了美國在多國聯盟和聯盟管理方麵的獨特能力，
它提供了歐洲服役的機會，這使得和平時期的兵役對美國士兵、水手、飛行員和海軍陸戰隊更具吸引力。
然後，20世紀似乎也強調了美國的安全與其他北大西洋國家的安全密不可分。 歐洲帝國的存在使得歐洲列強之間的戰爭——拿破侖戰爭、第一次世界大戰和第二次世界大戰——很快演變成世界大戰。 北約是美國在冷戰時期主導和管理歐洲大西洋地區的方式。 可以說，解散北約或美國退出北約隻會讓歐洲人重新開始爭吵，並引發另一場可能不限於歐洲的戰爭。

因此，北約必須繼續運轉。 實現這一目標的明顯方法是為該組織尋找一個新的、非歐洲的角色。 有人說，北約必須“撤出該地區或停止業務”。 換句話說，該聯盟必須重新調整目標，將軍事力量投射到西歐和北美成員國領土之外。

1998年，北約與塞爾維亞開戰，並於1999年轟炸塞爾維亞，使科索沃脫離塞爾維亞。 2001年，為應對紐約和華盛頓的“9/11”恐怖襲擊，它與美國一起占領並試圖安撫阿富汗。 [2] 2011年，北約派遣部隊在利比亞策劃政權更迭。

基輔、克裏米亞政變和俄羅斯叛亂

講烏克蘭語

2014年，在美國支持的基輔反俄政變後[3]，烏克蘭極端民族主義者禁止在本國官方使用俄語和其他少數民族語言，同時申明烏克蘭有意成為烏克蘭的一部分。 北約。 除其他後果外，烏克蘭加入北約將使俄羅斯位於克裏米亞城市塞瓦斯托波爾擁有 250 年曆史的海軍基地置於北約之下，從而受到美國的控製。 克裏米亞是俄語國家，曾多次投票不加入烏克蘭。 於是，俄羅斯借鑒北約暴力幹預科索沃脫離塞爾維亞的先例，在克裏米亞組織了公投，支持克裏米亞重新並入俄羅斯聯邦。 結果與之前對該問題的投票結果一致。

與此同時，為了回應烏克蘭禁止在政府辦公室和教育中使用俄語，該國頓巴斯地區主要講俄語的地區試圖脫離。 基輔派出軍隊鎮壓叛亂。 莫斯科的回應是支持烏克蘭俄語使用者的要求，即政變前的烏克蘭憲法和歐洲安全與合作組織（歐安組織）的原則保障了他們的少數群體權利。 北約支持基輔對抗莫斯科。 烏克蘭人之間的內戰隨之升級。 這很快演變成美國、北約和俄羅斯之間在烏克蘭愈演愈烈的代理人戰爭。

在歐安組織的斡旋下，在法國和德國的支持下，明斯克談判促成基輔和莫斯科就一攬子措施達成協議，其中包括：

停火，
從前線撤出重型武器，
釋放戰俘，
烏克蘭憲法改革賦予頓巴斯某些地區自治權，以及
恢複基輔對叛亂地區與俄羅斯邊界的控製。
聯合國安理會批準了這些條款。 它們代表莫斯科接受烏克蘭的俄語省份將仍然是統一但聯邦化的烏克蘭的一部分，隻要它們享有魁北克式的語言自治權。 但是，在美國的支持下，烏克蘭拒絕執行其同意的事情。 多年後，法國和德國承認，他們在明斯克的調解努力是一個詭計，旨在為基輔武裝對抗莫斯科贏得時間，而烏克蘭總統弗拉基米爾·澤連斯基（像他的前任彼得·波羅申科一樣）承認，他從未計劃實施 協議。

莫斯科和北約東擴

1990年，在德國統一、華沙條約解體、俄羅斯放棄中東歐政治經濟勢力範圍的背景下，西方多次略顯狡猾卻鄭重地承諾，不會填補由此產生的戰略空白。 通過將北約擴大到其中來消除真空。 但隨著 20 世紀 90 年代的深入，盡管其他一些北約成員國缺乏熱情，美國仍堅持這樣做。 北約的東擴逐漸消除了東歐對獨立中立國家的封鎖，莫斯科曆屆政府都認為這些國家對俄羅斯的安全至關重要。 隨著前華約成員國加入北約，美國的武器、軍隊和基地出現在他們的領土上。 2008年，作為將美國勢力範圍擴大到俄羅斯邊境的最後一步，華盛頓說服北約宣布有意接納烏克蘭和格魯吉亞為成員國。

美軍向東部署在羅馬尼亞和波蘭都部署了彈道導彈防禦發射器。 從技術上講，它們能夠快速重新配置，以對莫斯科發動短程打擊。 他們的部署加劇了俄羅斯對美國突然襲擊的恐懼。 如果烏克蘭加入北約並且美國在那裏進行類似的部署，俄羅斯將隻收到大約五分鍾的對莫斯科發動襲擊的警告。 北約在科索沃脫離塞爾維亞、美國在阿富汗和利比亞的政權更迭和綏靖行動中所發揮的作用，以及對烏克蘭反俄力量的支持，讓莫斯科相信它不能再將北約視為純粹的防禦性聯盟。

早在 1994 年，曆屆俄羅斯政府就開始警告美國和北約，北約的持續擴張 — — 特別是對烏克蘭和格魯吉亞 — — 將迫使其做出強有力的反應。 華盛頓從多個來源了解到俄羅斯決心這樣做，包括其駐莫斯科大使的報告。 2007年2月，俄羅斯總統弗拉基米爾·普京在慕尼黑安全會議上發言時宣稱：“我認為北約的擴張顯然是一種嚴重的挑釁……我們有權問：這種擴張是針對誰的？ 華約解體後我們的西方夥伴做出的保證又去了哪裏？” 2008年2月1日，時任中央情報局局長的比爾·伯恩斯大使在一份電報中警告說：

來自莫斯科的消息稱，在這個問題上，俄羅斯人是團結而嚴肅的。 伯恩斯對北約向烏克蘭擴張的後果感到如此強烈，以至於他在電報中的主題是“Nyet Means Nyet”（“不就是不”）。

盡管如此，2008年4月，北約仍然邀請烏克蘭和格魯吉亞加入。 莫斯科抗議稱，他們“加入該聯盟是一個巨大的戰略錯誤，將對泛歐洲安全造成最嚴重的後果”。 到了 2008 年 8 月，似乎是為了強調這一點，當膽大妄為的格魯吉亞試圖將其統治擴大到俄羅斯邊境叛亂的少數民族地區時，莫斯科發動了戰爭以鞏固他們的獨立。

烏克蘭的內戰和代理人戰爭

2014 年美國策劃的政變在基輔建立了反俄羅斯政權，不到一天後，華盛頓正式承認了這個新政權。 當俄羅斯吞並克裏米亞並與烏克蘭俄語國家爆發內戰時，美國支持並武裝了烏克蘭極端民族主義者，他們的政策疏遠了克裏米亞並激怒了俄語分離主義者。 美國和北約開始斥資數十億美元重組、重新訓練和重新裝備基輔武裝部隊。 其公開宣稱的目的是讓基輔能夠重新征服頓巴斯並最終征服克裏米亞。 烏克蘭的正規軍當時已經日漸衰弱。 基輔對烏克蘭東部和南部地區講俄語的人的最初襲擊主要是由極端民族主義民兵發動的。 [4] 到 2015 年，俄羅斯士兵已與頓巴斯叛軍並肩作戰。 一場未公開的美國/北約與俄羅斯的代理人戰爭已經開始。

在接下來的八年裏（烏克蘭內戰仍在繼續），基輔建立了一支由北約訓練的 70 萬人軍隊（不包括 100 萬後備軍），並在與俄羅斯支持的分裂分子的戰鬥中加強了這支軍隊。 烏克蘭正規軍人數僅略少於俄羅斯當時的 83 萬現役軍人。 八年來，烏克蘭擁有的軍隊數量超過了除美國和土耳其之外的任何北約成員國，數量超過了英國、法國和德國武裝部隊的總和。 毫不奇怪，俄羅斯將此視為威脅。

與此同時，隨著與俄羅斯的緊張局勢升級，美國於 2019 年初單方麵退出了《中程核力量條約》，該條約禁止在歐洲部署射程達 3,420 英裏的地麵發射導彈。 俄羅斯譴責這是一種“破壞性”行為，會引發安全風險。 盡管其他一些北約成員國仍心存疑慮，但在美國的堅持下，北約繼續定期重申將烏克蘭納入其成員國的提議，並於 2021 年 9 月 1 日再次這樣做。 經過訓練和武器轉讓，基輔判斷它終於準備好鎮壓講俄語的叛亂及其俄羅斯盟友了。 2021 年結束時，烏克蘭加大了對頓巴斯分裂分子的壓力，並部署部隊定於 2022 年初對他們發動大規模攻勢。

莫斯科要求談判

大約在同一時間，即 2021 年 12 月中旬，即莫斯科首次向華盛頓發出警告 28 年後，弗拉基米爾·普京正式要求提供書麵安全保證，以通過恢複烏克蘭的中立性來減少北約東擴對俄羅斯的明顯威脅。 美軍在俄羅斯邊境駐紮，並恢複對在歐洲部署中程和短程導彈的限製。 隨後，俄羅斯外交部向華盛頓提交了一份包含這些條款的條約草案，該草案呼應了俄羅斯前總統鮑裏斯·葉利欽在 1997 年提出的類似要求。同時，這顯然既是為了強調莫斯科的嚴肅性，也是為了反擊基輔計劃對頓巴斯發動的進攻。 為了對付分裂分子，俄羅斯在與烏克蘭接壤的邊境集結了軍隊。

2022年1月26日，美國正式回應稱，美國和北約都不會同意與俄羅斯就烏克蘭中立或其他此類問題進行談判。 幾天後，俄羅斯外長拉夫羅夫在俄羅斯安理會會議上闡述了他對美國和北約立場的理解：

“[我們的]西方同事不準備接受我們的主要提案，主要是關於北約東擴的提案。 這一要求被拒絕，理由是歐盟所謂的門戶開放政策以及每個國家選擇自己的安全方式的自由。 美國和[北約]……都沒有提出這一關鍵條款的替代方案。”

莫斯科希望進行談判，但在談判缺席的情況下，俄羅斯準備發動戰爭以消除其所反對的威脅。 華盛頓在拒絕與莫斯科談判時就知道這一點。 美國拒絕對話是一個明確的決定，它接受戰爭風險，而不是尋求與俄羅斯的任何妥協或和解。 美國及其盟國情報部門 IMM

立即開始發布旨在描述俄羅斯即將采取的軍事行動的信息[5]，他們稱這是為了阻止這些行動。

俄羅斯入侵烏克蘭

2月中旬，烏克蘭軍隊和頓巴斯分裂主義勢力之間的戰鬥加劇，歐安組織觀察員報告稱，雙方違反停火的事件迅速增加，但據稱大多數是由基輔發起的。 也許不誠實的是，頓巴斯分裂分子呼籲莫斯科保護他們，並下令將平民全麵疏散到俄羅斯的安全避難所。 2月21日，俄羅斯總統普京承認頓巴斯兩個“人民共和國”的獨立，並命令俄羅斯軍隊保護它們免受烏克蘭的襲擊。

2022 年 2 月 24 日，普京在向俄羅斯全國發表的講話中宣稱，“在現代烏克蘭領土不斷發出的威脅下，俄羅斯無法感到安全、發展和存在”，並宣布他已下令“ 特別軍事行動”“保護遭受欺淩和種族滅絕的人們。 。 。 過去八年”並“努力實現烏克蘭的非軍事化和去納粹化”。 他補充說：

“事實是，過去30年來，我們一直耐心地試圖與北約主要國家就歐洲平等和不可分割的安全原則達成協議。 為了回應我們的建議，我們總是麵臨憤世嫉俗的欺騙和謊言，或者試圖施壓和勒索，而北大西洋聯盟則不顧我們的抗議和擔憂繼續擴大。 它的軍事機器正在移動，正如我所說，正在逼近我們的邊境。”

美國和北約在針對俄羅斯的信息戰中提出的官方說法與普京總統聲明的每一個要素都相矛盾，但記錄證實了這一點。

美俄烏克蘭代理人戰爭的前奏

在後蘇聯時代：

盡管俄羅斯的警告和抗議不斷升級，北約——美國在歐洲的勢力範圍和軍事存在——不斷向俄羅斯邊境擴張。
相比之下，莫斯科則不斷撤退。 它已經放棄了在東歐的勢力範圍。 它沒有做出任何努力來重建它。
莫斯科一再警告稱，北約東擴和美國前沿部署可能威脅其的部隊，尤其是來自烏克蘭的部隊，對俄羅斯來說是一個嚴重威脅，俄羅斯必須對此做出反應。
鑒於北約已從純粹防禦性的、以歐洲為中心的聯盟轉變為支持美國政權更迭和其他成員國境外軍事行動的力量投送工具，莫斯科有合理的理由擔心烏克蘭加入北約將構成對北約的威脅。 對其安全構成積極威脅。 美國退出阻止其在歐洲（包括烏克蘭）部署中程核武器的條約，凸顯了這一威脅。
莫斯科一貫要求烏克蘭保持中立。 中立將使烏克蘭成為其與歐洲其他國家之間的緩衝和橋梁，而不是俄羅斯的一部分或俄羅斯針對歐洲其他國家投射力量的平台。
相比之下，美國試圖讓烏克蘭成為北約成員——成為其勢力範圍的一部分——並成為美國針對俄羅斯部署軍事力量的平台。
莫斯科在明斯克同意尊重烏克蘭在頓巴斯地區的持續主權，前提是該地區講俄語的人的權利得到保障。 但在美國和北約的支持下，烏克蘭拒絕執行明斯克協議，並加倍努力征服頓巴斯。
當華盛頓拒絕聽取俄羅斯在歐洲提出的相互妥協的主張，而是堅持讓烏克蘭加入北約時，美國政府知道這將引起俄羅斯的軍事回應。 事實上，華盛頓公開預測了這一點。
在由此引發的戰爭初期，當第三方調解達成了俄羅斯和烏克蘭之間的和平協議草案時，以英國為代表的西方堅持要求烏克蘭否認該協議。
這個悲傷的事件讓我想到了戰爭參與者的戰爭目標。

烏克蘭的戰爭目標

基輔並沒有動搖其目標：

打造純粹的烏克蘭民族認同，將俄羅斯和其他語言、文化和宗教權威排除在外。
征服那些因強行同化而反抗的俄語使用者。
獲得美國和北約的保護並與歐盟一體化。
重新征服莫斯科從烏克蘭非法吞並的俄語領土，包括頓巴斯州和克裏米亞。
莫斯科在 2021 年 12 月 17 日向華盛頓提交的條約草案中明確闡述了其最高和最低目標。俄羅斯的核心利益過去和現在仍然是：

（1）通過強製手段將烏克蘭排除在美國吞沒東歐其他國家的勢力範圍之內

烏克蘭確認美國/北約與俄羅斯之間的中立，以及
（2）保護和保障烏克蘭俄語使用者的基本權利。
華盛頓的目標 — — 北約已盡職盡責地將其作為自己的目標 — — 更加開放且不具體。 正如國家安全顧問傑克·沙利文 (Jake Sullivan) 在 2022 年 6 月所說的那樣，

“我們有 。 。 。 沒有列出我們所看到的結局。 。 ..我們一直專注於今天、明天、下周我們能做些什麽，以最大程度地增強烏克蘭人的力量，首先是在戰場上，然後最終在談判桌上。”

由於戰爭的首要原則是製定現實的目標、實現目標的戰略以及終止戰爭的計劃，這完美地描述了如何醞釀一場“永遠的戰爭”。 正如越南、阿富汗、伊拉克、索馬裏、利比亞、敘利亞和也門所證明的那樣，這已成為美國的既定戰爭方式。 沒有明確的目標，沒有實現這些目標的計劃，也沒有關於如何結束戰爭、以什麽條件以及與誰結束戰爭的概念。

關於美國在這場戰爭中的目標最有說服力的聲明是拜登總統在戰爭開始時提出的。 他表示，他對俄羅斯的目標是“在未來幾年削弱其經濟實力並削弱其軍事力量”——不惜一切代價。 美國政府或北約從未宣稱，保護烏克蘭或烏克蘭人，而不是利用他們的勇氣來打倒俄羅斯，是中美洲的目標。 2022年4月，國防部長勞埃德·奧斯汀重申，美國對烏克蘭的援助旨在削弱和孤立俄羅斯，從而剝奪其未來發動戰爭的任何可信能力。 相當多的美國政客和專家都稱讚烏克蘭人而不是美國人為此而犧牲生命的好處。 有些人走得更遠，主張將俄羅斯聯邦解體作為戰爭目標。 如果你是俄羅斯人，你不必偏執地認為這種威脅是存在的。 俄羅斯總統普京評估美國的戰爭目標是在戰略上羞辱俄羅斯聯邦，如果可能的話，推翻並肢解其政府。 [6] 美國並未對這一評估提出異議。

和平擱置一邊

2022 年 3 月中旬，土耳其政府和以色列總理納夫塔利·貝內特在俄羅斯和烏克蘭談判代表之間進行斡旋，雙方初步同意通過談判達成臨時解決方案的大綱。 該協議規定，俄羅斯將於2月23日撤回其控製頓巴斯地區部分地區和整個克裏米亞的立場，作為交換，烏克蘭將承諾不尋求加入北約，而是接受一些國家的安全保證。 俄羅斯總統普京和烏克蘭總統澤倫斯基正在安排一次會晤，以敲定這項協議，談判代表已草簽了該協議，這意味著該協議尚待上級批準。

2022 年 3 月 28 日。澤連斯基總統公開申明，作為與俄羅斯和平協議的一部分，烏克蘭已準備好保持中立並提供安全保障。 但4月9日，英國首相鮑裏斯·約翰遜突然訪問基輔。 據報道，在這次訪問期間，他敦促澤連斯基不要會見普京，因為（1）普京是一名戰犯，而且比他看上去的要弱。 他應該而且可能被壓垮而不是被容納； (2)即使烏克蘭準備好結束戰爭，北約也沒有準備好。

澤連斯基與普京的會麵計劃隨後被取消。 普京宣稱與烏克蘭的談判已陷入僵局。 澤倫斯基解釋說：“莫斯科希望達成一項能夠解決所有問題的條約。 然而，並非所有人都認為自己與俄羅斯坐在談判桌上。 對他們來說，烏克蘭的安全保障是一個問題，與俄羅斯聯邦的協議是另一個問題。” 這標誌著俄羅斯-烏克蘭雙邊談判的結束，也標誌著除戰場之外任何地方解決衝突的前景。

發生了什麽以及誰贏得了什麽

這場戰爭是由於各方的誤判而產生並持續的。 北約的擴張是合法的，但可以預見的是，它具有挑釁性。 俄羅斯的反應即使是非法的，也是完全可以預見的，而且事實證明它付出了巨大的代價。 烏克蘭實際上加入北約的軍事一體化導致了其毀滅性的後果。

美國認為，俄羅斯因烏克蘭中立而威脅發動戰爭是虛張聲勢，可以通過概述和詆毀華盛頓所理解的俄羅斯計劃和意圖來嚇阻。 俄羅斯認為美國更願意談判而不是戰爭，並希望避免歐洲重新劃分為敵對集團。 烏克蘭人指望西方保護他們的國家。 當俄羅斯在戰爭頭幾個月的表現乏善可陳時，西方得出結論，烏克蘭可以擊敗它。 這些都沒有

事實證明計算是正確的。

然而，在屈從的主流媒體和社交媒體的放大下，官方宣傳讓大多數西方國家相信，拒絕北約擴張談判並鼓勵烏克蘭與俄羅斯作戰在某種程度上是“親烏克蘭的”。 對烏克蘭戰爭努力的同情是完全可以理解的，但是，正如越南戰爭應該告訴我們的那樣，當啦啦隊取代了報道的客觀性，而政府更喜歡自己的宣傳而不是戰場上發生的事情的真相時，民主國家就會失敗。

判斷政策成功或失敗的唯一方法是參考政策旨在實現的目標。 那麽，烏克蘭戰爭的參與者在實現他們的目標方麵表現如何？

讓我們從烏克蘭開始。

2014年至2022年，頓巴斯內戰奪去了近15,000人的生命。 自 2022 年 2 月美國/北約-俄羅斯代理人戰爭開始以來，有多少人在行動中喪生尚不清楚，但肯定有數十萬人。 空前激烈的信息戰掩蓋了傷亡數字。 西方關於死傷者的唯一信息是基輔的宣傳，聲稱有大量俄羅斯人死亡，但對烏克蘭人的傷亡情況卻隻字不提。 然而，眾所周知，目前有 10% 的烏克蘭人加入了武裝部隊，78% 的烏克蘭人有親友被殺或受傷。 據估計，現在有 50,000 名烏克蘭人被截肢。 （相比之下，第一次世界大戰期間隻有 41,000 名英國人不得不接受截肢手術，而手術往往是唯一可以避免死亡的方法。參與阿富汗和伊拉克入侵的美國退伍軍人不到 2,000 名接受了截肢手術。）大多數觀察家認為，烏克蘭軍隊 他們遭受的損失比他們的俄羅斯敵人要嚴重得多，數十萬人在保衛祖國和奪回被俄羅斯占領的領土的努力中獻出了生命。

戰爭開始時，烏克蘭人口約為三千一百萬。 此後，該國已經失去了至少三分之一的人民。 超過六百萬人在西方避難。 還有兩百萬人前往俄羅斯。 另有八百萬烏克蘭人被趕出家園，但仍留在烏克蘭。

烏克蘭的基礎設施、工業和城市遭到破壞，經濟遭到破壞。 正如戰爭中常見的情況一樣，腐敗 — — 長期以來烏克蘭政治的一個突出特點 — — 一直很猖獗。 烏克蘭新生的民主已不複存在，所有反對黨、不受控製的媒體和異見均被取締。

另一方麵，俄羅斯的侵略使烏克蘭人（包括許多講俄語的人）團結到了前所未有的程度。 因此，莫斯科無意中強化了烏克蘭的獨立身份，而俄羅斯神話和普京總統都試圖否認這一身份。 烏克蘭在領土上失去的東西，卻因強烈反對莫斯科而獲得了愛國凝聚力。

另一方麵，烏克蘭講俄語的分裂分子的俄羅斯身份也得到了強化。 俄羅斯境內的烏克蘭難民是要求基輔進行報複的最強硬派。 現在講俄語的人幾乎不可能接受統一的烏克蘭的地位，就像《明斯克協議》中的情況一樣。 而且，隨著烏克蘭“反攻”的失敗，頓巴斯或克裏米亞不太可能恢複烏克蘭主權。 隨著戰爭的繼續，烏克蘭很可能會失去更多領土，包括進入黑海的通道。 戰場上、人心中失去的東西，是無法在談判桌上挽回的。 烏克蘭在這場戰爭中將遭受重創、癱瘓，領土和人口都將大大減少。

最後，烏克蘭加入北約目前不存在現實前景。 正如國家安全委員會顧問沙利文所說，“每個人都需要正視事實”，允許烏克蘭在此時加入北約“意味著與俄羅斯的戰爭”。 北約秘書長斯托爾滕貝格表示，烏克蘭加入北約的前提是與俄羅斯簽署和平條約。 目前還看不到這樣的條約。 西方繼續堅持烏克蘭將在戰爭結束後成為北約成員國，這反常地激勵俄羅斯不同意結束戰爭。 但最終，烏克蘭將不得不與俄羅斯實現和平，幾乎可以肯定主要是按照俄羅斯的條件。

無論戰爭可能取得什麽成果，對烏克蘭來說都沒有好處。 烏克蘭相對於俄羅斯的討價還價地位已被大大削弱。 但話說回來，基輔的命運一直是美國政策圈子裏的事後諸葛亮。 相反，華盛頓尋求利用烏克蘭的勇氣來打擊俄羅斯、重振北約並加強美國在歐洲的主導地位。 而且它根本沒有花任何時間思考如何恢複和平

到歐洲。

俄羅斯呢？

它是否成功地驅逐了美國對烏克蘭的影響，迫使基輔宣布中立，或者恢複了烏克蘭境內講俄語的人的權利？ 顯然不是。

至少目前，烏克蘭已經完全成為美國及其北約盟國的依賴。 基輔是莫斯科的長期對手。 基輔堅持加入北約的雄心。 烏克蘭的俄羅斯人是當地取消文化的目標。 無論戰爭結果如何，相互的敵意已經抹去了俄羅斯與烏克蘭基於基輔羅斯共同起源的兄弟情誼的神話。 俄羅斯不得不放棄三個世紀以來認同歐洲的努力，轉而轉向中國、印度、伊斯蘭世界和非洲。 與嚴重疏遠的歐盟實現和解，即使有的話，也絕非易事。 俄羅斯或許沒有在戰場上失敗，也沒有被削弱或戰略孤立，但它卻付出了巨大的機會成本。

隨後，北約也擴大到芬蘭和瑞典。 這不會改變歐洲的軍事平衡。 盡管西方將俄羅斯描繪成天生的掠奪者，但莫斯科既沒有意願也沒有能力攻擊這兩個以前與西方非常結盟、武裝強大但名義上“中立”的國家。 芬蘭和瑞典也無意加入對俄羅斯的無端攻擊。 但他們加入北約的決定在政治上對莫斯科造成了傷害。

由於西方不願意照顧俄羅斯的安全關切，如果莫斯科要實現其目標，除了繼續戰鬥之外，它現在沒有明顯的選擇。 此舉將刺激歐洲決心實現此前被忽視的北約國防開支目標，並獲得獨立於美國的獨立軍事能力來對抗俄羅斯。 波蘭正在重新成為俄羅斯邊境強大的敵對勢力。 這些趨勢正在改變歐洲的軍事平衡，使莫斯科長期處於不利地位。

美國呢？

僅2022年，美國就批準向烏克蘭提供1130億美元的援助。 當時俄羅斯的國防預算還不到這個數字的一半——540 億美元。 此後大約增加了一倍。 俄羅斯國防工業得到重振。 現在，有些國家一個月生產的武器數量比以前一年生產的武器數量還要多。 俄羅斯自給自足的經濟經受住了美國和歐盟長達 18 個月的全麵戰爭。 以購買力平價計算，它剛剛超越德國，成為世界第五富有的經濟體和歐洲最大的經濟體。 盡管西方一再聲稱俄羅斯已經耗盡了彈藥並在烏克蘭的消耗戰中失敗，但事實並非如此，而西方卻如此。 烏克蘭的勇敢令人印象深刻，但無法與俄羅斯的火力相抗衡。

與此同時，所謂的俄羅斯對西方的威脅曾經是北約團結的有力論據，但現在已經失去了可信度。 事實證明，俄羅斯武裝力量無法征服烏克蘭，更不用說歐洲其他地區了。 但這場戰爭教會了俄羅斯如何對抗和戰勝美國和其他西方國家的許多最先進的武器。

在美國和北約拒絕談判之前，俄羅斯準備接受一個中立且聯邦化的烏克蘭。 在入侵烏克蘭的初期，俄羅斯在與烏克蘭的和平條約草案中重申了這一意願，美國和北約阻止基輔簽署該條約。 西方外交上的頑固態度未能說服莫斯科容納烏克蘭民族主義或接受烏克蘭加入北約和美國在歐洲的勢力範圍。 相反，代理人戰爭似乎讓莫斯科相信，它必須摧毀烏克蘭，保留其非法吞並的烏克蘭領土，並可能增加更多領土，從而確保烏克蘭成為一個功能失調的國家，既無法加入北約，也無法履行極端民族主義、反恐怖主義的目標。 俄羅斯對二戰新納粹英雄斯捷潘·班德拉的想象。

戰爭導致北約表麵上團結，但成員國之間卻存在明顯裂痕。 對俄羅斯實施的製裁對歐洲經濟造成了嚴重損害。 如果沒有俄羅斯的能源供應，一些歐洲工業將不再具有國際競爭力。 正如北約最近在維爾紐斯舉行的峰會所表明的那樣，成員國對於接納烏克蘭的意願存在分歧。 北約的團結似乎不太可能在戰爭結束後持續下去。 這些現實有助於解釋為什麽美國的大多數歐洲夥伴都希望盡快結束戰爭。

烏克蘭戰爭顯然給歐洲後蘇聯時代畫上了句號，但它並沒有讓歐洲在任何方麵變得更加安全。 它沒有提高美國的國際聲譽或鞏固美國的主導地位。 這場戰爭反而加速了後美國多極世界秩序的出現。 其特征之一是抗 A

俄羅斯和中國之間的美國軸心。

為了削弱俄羅斯，美國采取了前所未有的侵入性單邊製裁，包括針對不涉及美國關係且在交易方管轄範圍內合法的正常商業活動的二級製裁。 華盛頓一直在積極阻止與烏克蘭或那裏的戰爭無關的國家之間的貿易，因為它們不會追隨美國的潮流。 因此，世界大部分地區現在都在尋求獨立於美國控製的金融和供應鏈聯係。 這包括加強國際社會努力結束美元霸權，而美元霸權是美國全球霸主的基礎。 如果這些努力取得成功，美國將不再能夠維持貿易和國際收支赤字，從而維持其目前的生活水平和作為地球上最強大社會的地位。

華盛頓利用政治和經濟壓力迫使其他國家遵守其反俄反華政策，顯然適得其反。 它甚至鼓勵美國的前附庸國尋找方法，避免卷入他們不支持的未來美國衝突和代理人戰爭，就像烏克蘭那樣。 為此，他們正在放棄對美國的完全依賴，並與多個經濟和政治軍事夥伴建立聯係。 美國的脅迫外交非但沒有孤立俄羅斯或中國，反而幫助莫斯科和北京加強了在非洲、亞洲和拉丁美洲的關係，從而削弱了美國的影響力，有利於他們自己。

總結一下：

簡而言之，美國的政策給烏克蘭帶來了巨大苦難，並導致這裏和歐洲的國防預算不斷增加，但未能削弱或孤立俄羅斯。 更多同樣的做法將無法實現美國經常聲明的任何一個目標。 俄羅斯接受了如何對抗美國武器係統的教育，並開發出了有效的對抗手段。 它的軍事力量得到了加強，而不是削弱。 它已經重新定位並擺脫了西方的影響，而不是孤立的。

如果戰爭的目的是建立更好的和平，那麽這場戰爭並沒有達到這個目的。 烏克蘭正在仇俄症的祭壇上被肢解。 目前，沒有人能夠自信地預測當戰鬥停止或何時以及如何停止戰鬥時，烏克蘭將剩下多少領土或多少烏克蘭人。 基輔隻是未能實現其招募目標的一小部分。 與俄羅斯作戰直到最後一個烏克蘭人一直是一個令人厭惡的策略。 但當北約即將耗盡烏克蘭人時，他們不僅憤世嫉俗，而且還感到憤世嫉俗。 它不再是一個可行的選擇。

烏克蘭戰爭的教訓

我們可以從這次災難中學到什麽？ 它對治國之道的基本原則提出了許多不受歡迎的提醒。

戰爭並不能決定誰是對的。 他們決定剩下誰。
避免戰爭的最好方法是減少或消除引起戰爭的憂慮和不滿。
當你拒絕聽取受害方要求調整你的政策的訴求時，更不用說解決它了，你就麵臨著遭受暴力反應的風險。

如果沒有現實的目標、實現這些目標的戰略以及結束戰爭的計劃，任何人都不應參加戰爭。

自以為是和勇敢並不能替代軍事力量、火力和耐力。最終，戰爭的勝負取決於戰場，而不是靠一廂情願的宣傳來實現。在戰場上失去的東西很少能夠在談判桌上挽回。當戰爭無法獲勝時，通常最好尋求結束戰爭的條件，而不是加劇戰略失敗。

現在是優先考慮盡可能多地拯救烏克蘭的時候了。 這場戰爭對它來說已經變得生死存亡。 烏克蘭需要外交支持才能與俄羅斯實現和平，否則烏克蘭的軍事犧牲不會白費。 它正在被摧毀。 它必須被重建。 保護烏克蘭的關鍵是賦予基輔權力並支持基輔以最好的條件結束戰爭，促進難民返回，並利用加入歐盟的進程推進自由主義改革並在中立的烏克蘭建立廉潔政府 。

不幸的是，就目前情況而言，莫斯科和華盛頓似乎都決心堅持對烏克蘭的持續破壞。 但無論戰爭結果如何，基輔和莫斯科最終都必須找到共存的基礎。 華盛頓需要支持基輔挑戰俄羅斯，讓其認識到尊重烏克蘭中立和領土完整的智慧和必要性。

最後，這場戰爭應該引發莫斯科和北約對無外交、軍事化外交政策後果的清醒反思。 如果美國同意與莫斯科對話，即使美國繼續拒絕莫斯科的大部分要求，俄羅斯也不會像現在這樣入侵烏克蘭。 如果西方沒有幹預

為了阻止烏克蘭批準該條約，其他人在戰爭開始時幫助它與俄羅斯達成一致，烏克蘭現在將完好無損並處於和平狀態。

這場戰爭沒有必要發生。 各方所失去的遠多於所獲得的。 從烏克蘭境內和烏克蘭發生的事情中可以學到很多東西。 這些教訓我們應該認真學習、吸取教訓。

[1] 將軍和海軍上將.

[2] 烏克蘭盡管不是北約成員國，但仍向這次北約行動派遣了部隊。

[3] 據報道，截至2014年，美國政府各機構已累計承諾提供總計50億美元或更多的政治補貼和教育資金，以支持烏克蘭政權更迭。

[4] 在美國和北約決定援助烏克蘭打擊俄羅斯支持的分裂分子之前，這些民兵通常被西方媒體視為新納粹分子。 他們自稱是斯捷潘·班德拉（Stepan Bandera）的追隨者，後者現已被基輔視為受人尊敬的國家人物。 班德拉因其極端的烏克蘭民族主義、法西斯主義、反猶太主義、仇外心理和暴力而聞名。 據稱，他和他的追隨者屠殺了 50,000 至 100,000 名波蘭人，並與納粹勾結謀殺了更多的猶太人。 美國/北約代理人戰爭爆發後，盡管他們的製服上繼續展示納粹標誌和標誌，並與其他國家的新納粹組織有聯係，但西方媒體不再將這些民兵定性為新納粹分子。

[5] 俄羅斯發起的“特別軍事行動”與這場信息戰中提出的具體預測幾乎沒有什麽相似之處，信息戰的目的似乎是為了團結對烏克蘭的支持並提高其士氣，同時也是為了威懾俄羅斯。

The Many Lessons of the Ukraine War

https://chasfreeman.net/the-many-lessons-of-the-ukraine-war/

Chas Freeman 2023-09-26 

The Many Lessons of the Ukraine War
Remarks to the East Bay Citizens for Peace

Ambassador Chas W. Freeman, Jr. (USFS, Ret.)
Visiting Scholar, Watson Institute for International and Public Affairs, Brown University
The Barrington Library, Barrington, Rhode Island, 26 September 2023

I want to speak to you tonight about Ukraine – what has happened to it and why, how it is likely to emerge from the ordeal to which great power rivalry has subjected it; and what we can learn from this.  I do so with some trepidation and a warning to this audience.  My talk, like the conflict in Ukraine, is a long and complicated one.  It contradicts propaganda that has been very convincing.  My talk will offend anyone committed to the official narrative.  The way the American media have dealt with the Ukraine war brings to mind a comment by Mark Twain: “The researches of many commentators have already thrown much darkness on this subject, and it is probable that, if they continue, we shall soon know nothing at all about it.”

It is said that, in war, truth is the first casualty.  War is typically accompanied by a fog of official lies.  No such fog has ever been as thick as in the Ukraine war.  While many hundreds of thousands of people have fought and died in Ukraine, the propaganda machines in Brussels, Kyiv, London, Moscow, and Washington have worked overtime to ensure that we take passionate sides, believe what we want to believe, and condemn anyone who questions the narrative we have internalized.  No one not on the front lines has any real idea of what has been happening in this war.  What we know is only what our governments and other supporters of the war want us to know.  And they have developed the bad habit of inhaling their own propaganda, which guarantees delusional policies.

Every government that is a party to the Ukraine War – Kyiv, Moscow, Washington, and other NATO capitals – has been guilty of various degrees of self-deception and blundering misfeasance.  The consequences for all have been dire.  For Ukraine, they have been catastrophic.  A radical rethinking of policy by all concerned is long overdue.

Whence and Whither NATO?

First, some necessary background.  NATO (the North Atlantic Treaty Organization) came into being to defend the European countries within the post-World War II American sphere of influence against the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and its satellite nations.  NATO’s area of responsibility was the territory of its members in North America and Western Europe, but nowhere beyond that.  The alliance helped maintain a balance of power and keep the peace in Europe during the four-plus decades of the Cold War.  In 1991, however, the USSR dissolved, and the Cold War ended.  That eliminated any credible threat to NATO members’ territory and raised this issue: if NATO was still the answer to something, what was the question?

The U.S. armed forces had no problem responding to that conundrum.  They had compelling vested interests in the preservation of NATO.

• NATO had created and sustained a post-World War II European role and presence for the U.S. military,
• This justified a much larger U.S. force structure and many more highly desirable billets for flag officers[1] than would otherwise exist,
• NATO enhanced the international stature of the American armed forces while fostering a unique U.S. competence in multinational alliance and coalition management, and
• It offered tours of duty in Europe that made peacetime military service more attractive to U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.

Then, too, the 20th century had appeared to underscore that U.S. security was inseparable from that of other north Atlantic countries.  The existence of European empires ensured that wars among the great powers of Europe – the Napoleonic wars, World War I and World War II – soon morphed into world wars.  NATO was how the United States dominated and managed the Euro-Atlantic region in the Cold War.  Disbanding NATO or a U.S. withdrawal from it would, arguably, just free Europeans to renew their quarreling and start yet another war that might not be confined to Europe.

So, NATO had to be kept in business.  The obvious way to accomplish that was to find a new, non-European role for the organization.  NATO, it came to be said, had to go “out of area or out of business.”  In other words, the alliance had to be repurposed to project military power beyond the territories of its Western European and North American member states.

In 1998, NATO went to war with Serbia, bombing it in 1999 to detach Kosovo from it.  In 2001, in response to the ‘9/11’ terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, it joined the U.S. in occupying and attempting to pacify Afghanistan.[2]  In 2011, NATO fielded forces to engineer regime change in Libya.

The Coup in Kyiv, Crimea, and the Rebellion of Russian Speaking Ukrainians

In 2014, after a well-prepared[3] US-sponsored anti-Russian coup in Kyiv, Ukrainian ultranationalists banned the official use of Russian and other minority languages in their country and, at the same time, affirmed Ukraine’s intention to become part of NATO.  Among other consequences, Ukrainian membership in NATO would place Russia’s 250-year-old naval base in the Crimean city of Sebastopol under NATO and hence U.S. control.  Crimea was Russian-speaking and had several times voted not to be part of Ukraine.  So, citing the precedent of NATO’S violent intervention to separate Kosovo from Serbia, Russia organized a referendum in Crimea that endorsed its reincorporation in the Russian Federation.  The results were consistent with previous votes on the issue.

Meanwhile, in response to Ukraine’s banning of the use of Russian in government offices and education, predominantly Russian-speaking areas in the country’s Donbas region attempted to secede.  Kyiv sent forces to suppress the rebellion.  Moscow responded by backing Ukrainian Russian speakers’ demands for the minority rights guaranteed to them by both the pre-coup Ukrainian constitution and the principles of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE).  NATO backed Kyiv against Moscow.  An escalating civil war among Ukrainians ensued.  This soon evolved into an intensifying proxy war in Ukraine between the United States, NATO, and Russia.

Negotiations at Minsk, mediated by the OSCE with French and German support, brokered agreement between Kyiv and Moscow on a package of measures, including:

• a ceasefire,
• the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the front line,
• the release of prisoners of war,
• constitutional reform in Ukraine granting self-government to certain areas of Donbas, and
• the restoration of Kyiv’s control of the rebel areas’ borders with Russia.

The United Nations Security Council endorsed these terms.  They represented Moscow’s acceptance that Russian-speaking provinces in Ukraine would remain part of a united but federalized Ukraine, provided they enjoyed Québec-style linguistic autonomy.  But, with U.S. support, Ukraine refused to carry out what it had agreed to.  Years later, the French and Germans admitted that their mediation efforts at Minsk had been a ruse directed at gaining time to arm Kyiv against Moscow and Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky (like his predecessor in office, Petro Poroshenko) confessed that he had never planned to implement the accords.

Moscow and NATO Enlargement

In 1990, in the context of German reunification, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, and Russia’s abandonment of its politico-economic sphere of influence in Central and Eastern Europe, the West had several times somewhat slyly but solemnly promised not to fill the resulting strategic vacuum by expanding NATO into it.  But as the 1990s proceeded, despite a lack of enthusiasm on the part of some other NATO members, the United States insisted on doing just that.  NATO enlargement steadily erased the Eastern European cordon sanitaire of independent neutral states that successive governments in Moscow had considered essential to Russian security.  As former members of the Warsaw Pact entered NATO, U.S. weaponry, troops, and bases appeared on their territory.  In 2008, in a final move to extend the U.S. sphere of influence to Russia’s borders, Washington persuaded NATO to declare its intention to admit both Ukraine and Georgia as members.

The eastward deployment of U.S. forces placed ballistic missile defense launchers in both Romania and Poland.  These were technically capable of rapid reconfiguration to mount short-range strikes on Moscow.  Their deployment fueled Russian fears of a decapitating U.S. surprise attack.  If Ukraine entered NATO and the U.S. made comparable deployments there, Russia would have only about five minutes’ warning of a strike on Moscow.  NATO’s role in detaching Kosovo from Serbia and in U.S. regime-change and pacification operations in Afghanistan and Libya as well as its support of anti-Russian forces in Ukraine, had convinced Moscow that it could no longer dismiss NATO as a purely defensive alliance.

As early as 1994, successive Russian governments began to warn the U.S. and NATO that continued NATO expansion – especially to Ukraine and Georgia – would compel a forceful response.  Washington was aware of Russian determination to do this from multiple sources, including reports from its ambassadors in Moscow.  In February 2007. Russian President Vladimir Putin, speaking at the Munich Security Conference, declared: “I think it is obvious that NATO expansion … represents a serious provocation …  And we have the right to ask: against whom is this expansion intended? And what happened to the assurances our western partners made after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact?”  On February 1, 2008, Ambassador Bill Burns, now the director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), warned in a telegram from Moscow that, on this subject Russians were united and serious.  Burns felt so strongly about the consequences of NATO expansion into Ukraine that he gave his cable the subject line, “Nyet Means Nyet” [“No means no.”]

In April 2008, NATO nonetheless invited both Ukraine and Georgia to join it.  Moscow protested that their “membership in the alliance is a huge strategic mistake which would have most serious consequences for pan-European security.”  By August 2008, as if to underscore this point, when an emboldened Georgia sought to extend its rule to rebellious minority regions on the Russian border, Moscow went to war to consolidate their independence.

Civil and Proxy War in Ukraine

Less than a day after of the US-engineered coup that installed an anti-Russian regime in Kyiv in 2014, Washington formally recognized the new regime.  When Russia then annexed Crimea and civil war broke out with Ukraine’s Russian speakers, the United States sided with and armed the Ukrainian ultranationalists whose policies had alienated Crimea and provoked the Russian-speaking secessionists.  The United States and NATO began a multi-billion-dollar effort to reorganize, retrain, and re-equip Kyiv’s armed forces.  The avowed purpose was to enable Kyiv to reconquer the Donbas and eventually Crimea.  Ukraine’s regular army was then decrepit.  Kyiv’s initial attacks on Russian speakers in the Ukrainian eastern and southern regions were largely conducted by ultranationalist militias.[4]  By 2015, Russian soldiers were fighting alongside the Donbas rebels.  An undeclared US/NATO proxy war with Russia had begun.

Over the course of the next eight years – during which the Ukrainian civil war continued – Kyiv built a NATO-trained army of 700,000 – not counting one million reserves – and hardened it in battle with Russian-supported separatists.  Ukrainian regulars numbered only slightly less than Russia’s then 830,000 active-duty military personnel.  In eight years, Ukraine had acquired a larger force than any NATO member other than the United States or Türkiye, outnumbering the armed forces of Britain, France, and Germany combined. Not surprisingly, Russia saw this as a threat.

Meanwhile, as tensions with Russia escalated, in early 2019 the United States unilaterally withdrew from the Intermediate Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty, which had barred ground-launched missiles with ranges of up to 3,420 miles from deployment in Europe.  Russia condemned this as a “destructive” act that would stoke security risks.  Despite ongoing misgivings on the part of some other NATO members, at American insistence, NATO continued periodically to reiterate its offer to incorporate Ukraine as a member, doing so once more on September 1, 2021.  By that time, after billions of dollars of U.S. training and arms transfers, Kyiv judged it was finally ready to crush its Russian speakers’ rebellion and their Russian allies.  As 2021 ended, Ukraine stepped up pressure on the Donbas separatists and deployed forces to mount a major offensive against them timed for early 2022.

Moscow Demands Negotiations

At about the same time, in mid-December 2021, twenty-eight years after Moscow’s first warning to Washington, Vladimir Putin issued a formal demand for written security guarantees to reduce the apparent threats to Russia from NATO enlargement by restoring Ukrainian neutrality, banning the stationing of U.S. forces on Russia’s borders, and reinstating limits on the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles in Europe.  The Russian foreign ministry then presented a draft treaty to Washington incorporating these terms – which echoed similar demands put forward by former Russian President Boris Yeltsin in 1997.  At the same time, apparently both to underscore Moscow’s seriousness and to counter Kyiv’s planned offensive against the Donbas secessionists, Russia massed troops along its borders with Ukraine.

On January 26, 2022, the U.S. formally responded that neither it nor NATO would agree to negotiate Ukrainian neutrality or other such issues with Russia.  A few days later, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov laid out his understanding of the American and NATO positions at a meeting of Russia’s Security Council as follows:

“[Our] Western colleagues are not prepared to take up our major proposals, primarily those on NATO’s eastward non-expansion. This demand was rejected with reference to the bloc’s so-called open-door policy and the freedom of each state to choose its own way of ensuring security. Neither the United States, nor [NATO] … proposed an alternative to this key provision.”

Moscow wanted negotiations but, in their absence, was prepared to go to war to remove the threats to which it objected.  Washington knew this when it rejected talks with Moscow.  The American refusal to talk was an unambiguous decision to accept the risk of war rather than explore any compromise or accommodation with Russia.  U.S. and allied intelligence services immediately began releasing information purporting to describe impending Russian military operations[5] in what they described as an attempt to deter them.

Russia Invades Ukraine

In mid-February, fighting between Ukrainian army and secessionist forces in Donbas intensified, with OSCE observers reporting a rapid rise in ceasefire violations by both sides but with most allegedly initiated by Kyiv.  Perhaps disingenuously, the Donbas secessionists appealed to Moscow to protect them and ordered a general evacuation of civilians to safe havens in Russia.  On February 21, Russian President Putin recognized the independence of the two Donbas “people’s republics” and ordered Russian forces to secure them against Ukrainian attacks.

On February 24, 2022, in an address to the Russian nation, Putin declared that “Russia cannot feel safe, develop, and exist with a constant threat emanating from the territory of modern Ukraine” and announced that he had ordered what he called a “special military operation” “to protect people who have been subjected to bullying and genocide . . . for the last eight years” and to “strive for the demilitarization and denazification of Ukraine.”  He added that:

“It is a fact that over the past 30 years we have been patiently trying to come to an agreement with the leading NATO countries regarding the principles of equal and indivisible security in Europe. In response to our proposals, we invariably faced either cynical deception and lies or attempts at pressure and blackmail, while the North Atlantic alliance continued to expand despite our protests and concerns. Its military machine is moving and, as I said, is approaching our very border.”

The official narrative put forward in U.S. and NATO information warfare against Russia contradicts every element of this statement by President Putin, but the record affirms it.

The Run-up to the U.S.-Russian Proxy War in Ukraine

In the post-Soviet era:

• NATO – the U.S. sphere of influence and military presence in Europe – constantly expanded toward Russia’s borders despite escalating Russian warnings and protests.
• By contrast, Moscow was in constant retreat. It had abandoned its sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.  It made no effort to reestablish it.
• Moscow repeatedly warned that NATO enlargement and U.S. forward deployment of forces that might threaten it, especially from Ukraine, were a grave threat to it to which it would feel compelled to react.
• Given NATO’s transformation from a purely defensive, Europe-focused alliance into an instrument for power projection in support of U.S. regime-change and other military operations beyond its members’ borders, Moscow had a reasonable basis for concern that Ukrainian membership in NATO would pose an active threat to its security. This threat was underscored by U.S. withdrawal from the treaty that had prevented it from stationing intermediate-range nuclear weapons in Europe, including in Ukraine.
• Moscow consistently demanded neutrality for Ukraine. Neutrality would make Ukraine both a buffer and bridge between itself and the rest of Europe, rather than part of Russia or a platform for Russian power projection against the rest of Europe.
• By contrast, the United States sought to make Ukraine a member of NATO – part of its sphere of influence – and a platform for the deployment of U.S. military power against Russia.
• Moscow agreed at Minsk to respect continued Ukrainian sovereignty in the Donbas region, provided the rights of Russian speakers there were guaranteed. But, with support from the U.S. and NATO, Ukraine declined to implement the Minsk agreement and redoubled its effort to subjugate the Donbas.
• When Washington refused to hear the Russian case for mutual accommodation in Europe and instead insisted on Ukrainian membership in NATO, the U.S. government knew that this would produce a Russian military response. In fact, Washington publicly predicted this.
• Early in the resulting war, when third-party mediation achieved a draft peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine, the West – represented by the British – insisted that Ukraine repudiate it.

This sad incident brings me to the war aims of the participants in the war.

War Aims in Ukraine

Kyiv has not wavered from its objectives of:

• Forging a purely Ukrainian national identity from which Russian and other languages, cultures, and religious authorities are excluded.
• Subjugating the Russian speakers who rebelled in response to this attempt at their forced assimilation.
• Obtaining U.S. and NATO protection and integrating with the EU.
• Reconquering the Russian-speaking territories Moscow has illegally annexed from Ukraine, including both the Donbas oblasts and Crimea.

Moscow clearly stated its maximum and minimum objectives in the draft treaty that it presented to Washington on December 17, 2021.  Core Russian interests have been and remain:

• (1) to deny Ukraine to the American sphere of influence that has engulfed the rest of Eastern Europe by compelling Ukraine to affirm neutrality between the United States / NATO and Russia, and
• (2) to protect and ensure the basic rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine.

Washington’s objectives – which NATO has dutifully adopted as its own – have been much more open-ended and unspecific.  As National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan put it in June 2022,

“We have . . .  refrained from laying out what we see as an endgame. . .. We have been focused on what we can do today, tomorrow, next week to strengthen the Ukrainians’ hand to the maximum extent possible, first on the battlefield and then ultimately at the negotiating table.”

Inasmuch as the first principle of warfare is to establish realistic objectives, a strategy to achieve them, and a plan for war termination, this is a perfect description of how to brew up a “forever war.”  As Vietnam, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Libya, Syria, and Yemen attest, this has become the established American way of war.  No clear objectives, no plan to achieve them, and no concept of how to end the war, on what terms, and with whom.

The most cogent statement of U.S. objectives in this war was offered by President Biden as it began.  He said his goal with Russia was to “sap its economic strength and weaken its military for years to come” – whatever it takes.  At no point has the United States government or NATO declared that the protection of Ukraine or Ukrainians, as opposed to exploiting their bravery to take down Russia, is the central American objective.  In April 2022, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin reiterated that U.S. aid to Ukraine was intended to weaken and isolate Russia and thereby deprive it of any credible capacity to make war in future.  Quite a few American politicians and pundits have extolled the benefits to having Ukrainians rather than Americans sacrifice their lives for this purpose.  Some have gone farther and advocated the breakup of the Russian Federation as a war aim.  If you are Russian, you don’t have to be paranoid to see such threats as existential.  Russian President Putin assesses U.S. war aims as directed at humbling the Russian Federation strategically and, if possible, overthrowing its government, and dismembering it.[6]  The United States has not disputed this assessment.

Peace Set Aside

In mid-March 2022, the government of Turkey and Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett mediated between Russian and Ukrainian negotiators, who tentatively agreed on the outlines of a negotiated interim settlement.  The agreement provided that Russia would withdraw to its position on February 23, when it controlled part of the Donbas region and all of Crimea, and in exchange, Ukraine would promise not to seek NATO membership and instead receive security guarantees from a number of countries.  A meeting between Russian President Putin and Ukrainian President Zelensky was in the process of being arranged to finalize this agreement, which the negotiators had initialed ad referendum – meaning subject to the approval of their superiors.

On March 28, 2022. President Zelensky publicly affirmed that Ukraine was ready for neutrality combined with security guarantees as part of a peace agreement with Russia.  But on April 9 British Prime Minister Boris Johnson made a surprise visit to Kyiv.  During this visit, he reportedly urged Zelensky not to meet Putin because (1) Putin was a war criminal and weaker than he seemed.  He should and could be crushed rather than accommodated; and (2) even if Ukraine was ready to end the war, NATO was not.

Zelensky’s proposed meeting with Putin was then called off.  Putin declared that talks with Ukraine had come to a dead end.  Zelensky explained that “Moscow would like to have one treaty that would resolve all the issues. However, not everyone sees themselves at the table with Russia. For them, security guarantees for Ukraine is one issue, and the agreement with the Russian Federation is another issue.”  This marked the end of bilateral Russian-Ukrainian negotiations and thus of any prospect of a resolution of the conflict anywhere but on the battlefield.

What Happened and Who’s Winning What

This war was born in and has been continued due to miscalculations by all sides.  NATO expansion was legal but predictably provocative.  Russia’s response was entirely predictable, if illegal, and has proven very costly to it.  Ukraine’s de facto military integration into NATO has resulted in its devastation.

The United States calculated that Russian threats to go to war over Ukrainian neutrality were bluffs that might be deterred by outlining and denigrating Russian plans and intentions as Washington understood them.  Russia assumed that the United States would prefer negotiations to war and would wish to avoid the redivision of Europe into hostile blocs.  Ukrainians counted on the West protecting their country.  When Russian performance in the first months of the war proved lackluster, the West concluded that Ukraine could defeat it.  None of these calculations has proved correct.

Nevertheless, official propaganda, amplified by subservient mainstream and social media, has convinced most in the West that rejecting negotiations on NATO expansion and encouraging Ukraine to fight Russia is somehow “pro-Ukrainian.”  Sympathy for the Ukrainian war effort is entirely understandable, but, as the Vietnam War should have taught us, democracies lose when cheerleading replaces objectivity in reporting and governments prefer their own propaganda to the truth of what is happening on the battleground.

The only way you can judge the success or failure of policies is by reference to the objectives they were designed to achieve.  So, how are the participants in the Ukraine War doing in terms of achieving their objectives?

Let’s start with Ukraine.

From 2014 to 2022, the civil war in Donbas took nearly 15,000 lives.  How many have been killed in action since the US/NATO-Russian proxy war began in February 2022 is unknown but is certainly in the several hundreds of thousands.  Casualty numbers have been concealed by unprecedentedly intense information warfare.  The only information in the West about the dead and wounded has been propaganda from Kyiv claiming vast numbers of Russian dead while revealing nothing at all about Ukrainian casualties.  It is known, however, that ten percent of Ukrainians are now involved with the armed forces and 78 percent have relatives or friends who have been killed or wounded.  An estimated 50,000 Ukrainians are now amputees.  (By comparison, only 41,000 Britons had to have amputations in World War I, when the procedure was often the only one available to prevent death.  Fewer than 2,000 U.S. veterans of the Afghanistan and Iraq invasions had amputations.)  Most observers believe that Ukrainian forces have taken much heavier losses than their Russian enemies and that hundreds of thousands of them have given their lives in their country’s defense and efforts to retake territory occupied by the Russians.

When the war began, Ukraine had a population of about thirty-one million.  The country has since lost at least one-third of its people.  Over six million have taken refuge in the West.  Two million more have left for Russia. Another eight million Ukrainians have been driven from their homes but remain in Ukraine.

Ukraine’s infrastructure, industries, and cities have been devastated and its economy destroyed.  As is usual in wars, corruption – long a prominent feature of Ukrainian politics – has been rampant.  Ukraine’s nascent democracy is no more, with all opposition parties, uncontrolled media outlets, and dissent outlawed.

On the other hand, Russian aggression has united Ukrainians, including many who are Russian speaking, to an extent never seen before.  Moscow has thereby inadvertently reinforced the separate Ukrainian identity that both Russian mythology and President Putin have sought to deny.  What Ukraine has lost in territory it has gained in patriotic cohesion based on passionate opposition to Moscow.

The flip side of this is that Ukraine’s Russian-speaking separatists have also had their Russian identity reinforced.  Ukrainian refugees in Russia are the hardest of hardliners demanding retribution from Kyiv.  There is now little to no possibility of Russian speakers accepting a status in a united Ukraine, as would have been the case under the Minsk Accords.  And, with the failure of Ukraine’s “counteroffensive,” it is very unlikely that Donbas or Crimea will ever return to Ukrainian sovereignty.   As the war continues, Ukraine may well lose still more territory, including its access to the Black Sea.  What has been lost on the battlefield and in the hearts of the people cannot be regained at the negotiating table.  Ukraine will emerge from this war maimed, crippled, and much reduced in both territory and population.

Finally, there is now no realistic prospect of Ukrainian membership in NATO.  As NSC Advisor Sullivan has said, “everyone needs to look squarely at the fact” that allowing Ukraine to join NATO at this point “means war with Russia.”  NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has stated that the prerequisite for Ukrainian membership in NATO is a peace treaty between it and Russia.  No such treaty is anywhere in sight.  In continuing to insist that Ukraine will become a NATO member once the war is concluded, the West has perversely incentivized Russia not to agree to end the war.  But, in the end, Ukraine will have to make its peace with Russia, almost certainly largely on Russian terms.

Whatever else the war may be achieving, it has not been good for Ukraine.  Ukraine’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia has been greatly weakened.  But then, Kyiv’s fate has always been an afterthought in U.S. policy circles.  Washington has instead sought to exploit Ukrainian courage to thrash Russia, reinvigorate NATO, and reinforce U.S. primacy in Europe.  And it has not spent any time at all thinking about how to restore peace to Europe.

How about Russia?

Has it succeeded in expelling American influence from Ukraine, forced Kyiv to declare neutrality, or reinstating the rights of Russian speakers in Ukraine?  Clearly not.

For now, at least, Ukraine has become a complete dependency of the United States and its NATO allies.  Kyiv is an embittered, long-term antagonist of Moscow.  Kyiv clings to its ambition to join NATO.  Russians in Ukraine are the targets of the local version of cancel culture.  Whatever the outcome of the war, mutual animosity has erased the Russian myth of Russian-Ukrainian brotherhood based on a common origin in Kievan Rus.  Russia has had to abandon three centuries of efforts to identify with Europe and instead pivot to China, India, the Islamic world, and Africa.  Reconciliation with a seriously alienated European Union will not come easily, if at all.  Russia may not have lost on the battlefield or been weakened or strategically isolated, but it has incurred huge opportunity costs.

Then, too, NATO has expanded to include Finland and Sweden.  This does not change the military balance in Europe.  Western portrayal of Russia as inherently predatory notwithstanding, Moscow has had neither the desire nor the capability to attack either of these two formerly very Western-aligned and formidably armed but nominally “neutral” states.  Nor does either Finland or Sweden have any intention of joining an unprovoked attack on Russia.  But their decision to join NATO is politically wounding for Moscow.

Since the West shows no willingness to accommodate Russian security concerns, if Moscow is to achieve its goals, it now has no apparent alternative to battling on.  As it does so, it is stimulating European determination to meet previously ignored NATO targets for defense spending and to acquire self-reliant military capabilities directed at countering Russia independently of those of the United States.  Poland is reemerging as a powerful hostile force on Russia’s borders.  These trends are changing the European military balance to Moscow’s long-term disadvantage.

What about the United States?

In 2022 alone the United States approved $113 billion in aid to Ukraine.  The Russian defense budget then was then less than half of that — $54 billion.  It has since roughly doubled.  Russian defense industries have been revitalized.  Some now produce more weaponry in a month than they previously did in a year.  Russia’s autarkic economy has weathered 18 months of all-out war against it from both the U.S. and the EU.  It just overtook Germany to become the fifth wealthiest economy in the world and the largest in Europe in terms of purchasing power parity.  Despite repeated Western claims that Russia was running out of ammunition and losing the war of attrition in Ukraine, it has not, while the West has.  Ukrainian bravery, which has been hugely impressive, has been no match for Russian firepower.

Meanwhile, the alleged Russian threat to the West, once a powerful argument for NATO unity, has lost credibility.  Russia’s armed forces have proven unable to conquer Ukraine, still less the rest of Europe.  But the war has taught Russia how to counter and overcome much of the most advanced weaponry of the United States and other Western countries.

Before the United States and NATO rejected negotiations, Russia was prepared to accept a neutral and federalized Ukraine.  In the opening phase of its invasion of Ukraine, Russia reaffirmed this willingness in a draft peace treaty with Ukraine which the United States and NATO blocked Kyiv from signing.  Western diplomatic intransigence has failed to persuade Moscow to accommodate Ukrainian nationalism or accept Ukraine’s inclusion in NATO and the American sphere of influence in Europe.  The proxy war seems instead to have convinced Moscow that it must gut Ukraine, keep the Ukrainian territories it has illegally annexed, and likely add more, thus ensuring that Ukraine is a dysfunctional state unable either to join NATO or to fulfill the ultranationalist, anti-Russian vision of its World War II neo-Nazi hero, Stepan Bandera.

The war has led to the superficial unity of NATO but there are obvious fissures among members.  The sanctions imposed on Russia have done heavy damage to European economies.  Without Russian energy supplies, some European industries are no longer internationally competitive.  As NATO’s recent summit at Vilnius showed, member countries differ on the desirability of admitting Ukraine.  NATO unity seems unlikely to outlast the war.  These realities help explain why most of America’s European partners want to end the war as soon as possible.

The Ukraine War has clearly put paid to the post-Soviet era in Europe, but it has not made Europe in any respect more secure.  It has not enhanced America’s international reputation or consolidated U.S. primacy.  The war has instead accelerated the emergence of a post-American multi-polar world order.  One feature of this is an anti-American axis between Russia and China.

To weaken Russia, the United States has resorted to unprecedentedly intrusive unilateral sanctions, including secondary sanctions targeting normal arms-length commercial activity that does not involve a U.S. nexus and is legal in the jurisdictions of the transacting parties.  Washington has been actively blocking trade between countries that have nothing to do with Ukraine or the war there because they won’t jump on the U.S. bandwagon.  As a result, much of the world is now engaged in pursuit of financial and supply-chain linkages that are independent of U.S. control.  This includes intensified international efforts to end dollar hegemony, which is the basis for U.S. global primacy.  Should these efforts succeed, the United States will no longer be able to run the trade and balance of payments deficits that sustain its current standard of living and status as the most powerful society on the planet.

Washington’s use of political and economic pressure to compel other countries to conform to its anti-Russian and anti-Chinese policies has clearly backfired.  It has encouraged even former U.S. client states to search for ways to avoid entanglement in future American conflicts and proxy wars they do not support, like that in Ukraine.  To this end, they are abandoning exclusive reliance on the United States and forging ties to multiple economic and politico-military partners.  Far from isolating Russia or China, America’s coercive diplomacy has helped both Moscow and Beijing to enhance relationships in Africa, Asia, and Latin America that reduce U.S. influence in favor of their own.

To summarize:

In short, U.S. policy has resulted in great suffering in Ukraine and escalating defense budgets here and in Europe but has failed to weaken or isolate Russia.  More of the same will not accomplish either of these oft-stated American objectives.  Russia has been educated in how to combat American weapons systems and has developed effective counters to them.  It has been militarily strengthened, not weakened.  It has been reoriented and freed from Western influence, not isolated.

If the purpose of war is to establish a better peace, this war is not doing that.  Ukraine is being eviscerated on the altar of Russophobia.  At this point, no one can confidently predict how much of Ukraine or how many Ukrainians will be left when the fighting stops or when and how to stop it.  Kyiv just failed to meet more than a fraction  of its recruitment goals.  Combating Russia to the last Ukrainian was always an odious strategy.  But when NATO is about to run out of Ukrainians, it is not just cynical; it is no longer a viable option.

Lessons to be Learned from the Ukraine War

What can we learn from this debacle?  It has provided many unwelcome reminders of the basic principles of statecraft.

• Wars do not decide who is right. They determine who is left.
• The best way to avoid war is to reduce or eliminate the apprehensions and grievances that cause it.
• When you refuse to hear, let alone address an aggrieved party’s case for adjustments in your policies toward it, you risk a violent reaction from it.
• No one should enter a war without realistic objectives, a strategy to achieve them, and a plan for war termination.
• Self-righteousness and bravery are no substitutes for military mass, firepower, and stamina.
• In the end, wars are won and lost on the battlefield, not with propaganda inspired by and directed at reinforcing wishful thinking.
• What has been lost on the battlefield can seldom, if ever, be recovered at the negotiating table.
• When wars cannot be won, it is usually better to seek terms by which to end them than to reinforce strategic failure.

It is time to prioritize saving as much as possible of Ukraine.  This war has become existential for it.  Ukraine needs diplomatic backing to craft a peace with Russia if its military sacrifices are not to have been in vain.  It is being destroyed.  It must be rebuilt. The key to preserving Ukraine is to empower and back Kyiv to end the war on the best terms it can obtain, to facilitate the return of its refugees, and to use the EU accession process to advance liberal reforms and institute clean government in a neutral Ukraine.

Unfortunately, as things stand, both Moscow and Washington seem determined to persist in Ukraine’s ongoing destruction.  But whatever the outcome of the war, Kyiv and Moscow will eventually have to find a basis for coexistence.  Washington needs to support Kyiv in challenging Russia to recognize both the wisdom and the necessity of respect for Ukrainian neutrality and territorial integrity.

Finally, this war should provoke some sober rethinking here, in Moscow, and by NATO of the consequences of diplomacy-free, militarized foreign policy.  Had the United States agreed to talk with Moscow, even if it had continued to reject much of what Moscow demanded, Russia would not have invaded Ukraine as it did.  Had the West not intervened to prevent Ukraine from ratifying the treaty others helped it agree with Russia at the outset of the war, Ukraine would now be intact and at peace.

This war did not need to take place.  Every party to it has lost far more than it has gained.  There’s a lot to be learned from what has happened in and to Ukraine.  We should study and learn these lessons and take them to heart.

[1] Generals and admirals.

[2] Ukraine contributed troops to this NATO operation despite not being a member of the alliance.

[3] Reportedly, by 2014, various agencies of the U.S. government had committed a cumulative total of $5 billion or more to political subsidies and education in support of regime change in Ukraine.

[4] Prior to the U.S. and NATO decision to aid Ukraine against its Russian-backed separatists, these militias were commonly identified as neo-Nazi in the Western media.  They professed to be followers of Stepan Bandera – who has now been adopted as a revered national figure by Kyiv.  Bandera was famous for his extreme Ukrainian nationalism, fascism, antisemitism, xenophobia, and violence.  He and his followers were allegedly responsible for massacring 50,000 – 100,000 Poles and for collaborating with the Nazis in the murder of an even larger number of Jews.  After the US/NATO proxy war broke out, despite their continuing display of Nazi regalia and symbols on their uniforms and their ties to neo-Nazi groups in other countries, Western media ceased to characterize these militias as neo-Nazis.

[5] The “special military operation’ mounted by Russia bore little resemblance to the specific predictions put forward in this information warfare, which appears have been designed as much to rally support for Ukraine and boost its morale as to deter Russia.

[6] See, e.g., https://jamestown.org/event/watch-the-video-preparing-for-the-dissolution-of-the-russian-federation/

Ambassador Freeman chairs Projects International, Inc. He is a retired U.S. defense official, diplomat, and interpreter, the recipient of numerous high honors and awards, a popular public speaker, and the author of five books.