風蕭蕭_Frank
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這是一個讓我很緊張的問題
約翰·米爾斯海默談美中競爭
https://oxfordpoliticalreview.com/2023/01/12/this-is-an-issue-that-makes-me-very-nervous-john-mearsheimer-on-the-us-china-rivalry/
傑森·周 & 安德魯·王 2023 年 1 月 12 日
約翰·米爾斯海默教授是芝加哥大學溫德爾·哈裏森傑出服務教授，也是當今最著名的國際關係學者之一。 在這個由兩部分組成的采訪中，編輯 Jason Chau 和 Andrew Wang 向米爾斯海默教授詢問了影響當今國際政治的一些主要力量。 本係列的第一部分重點關注中國，特別是中美競爭。
讓我們先從中國目前正在發生的事情開始。 習近平最近在黨的二十大後鞏固了自己的權力，但針對該政權的零新冠政策引發了廣泛的抗議，其中許多抗議言論已升級為挑戰政權本身。 這種國內動蕩是否會激勵習近平采取轉移注意力的策略，特別是采取更具侵略性的外交政策？
我認為這根本不可能發生。 我很難想象中國會爆發一場值得發動的戰爭，並有理由利用這場衝突來鎮壓國內的抗議活動。 我認為習近平和他的副手們要做的就是集中精力想辦法同時解決新冠病毒問題和封鎖（抗議）問題。 這裏的主要焦點將是內在的，而不是外在的。
您是否擔心中國在國際舞台上利用規範轉變和其他工具來分散人們對國內人權問題等國內問題的注意力？
我認為中國在各個層麵上都深入參與了國際政治，而且我認為中國人今天認為最好不要破壞現狀並不必要地與其他國家對抗。 我認為他們得出的結論是“戰狼”外交適得其反，如果有的話，他們想從另一個方向切入並強調軟實力。 我認為這是一個明智的策略，而且我很難相信他們會采取一些頑固的外交策略來解決國內問題。
由於中美之間存在深刻的意識形態差異，您認為兩國可以在氣候變化等重要問題上進行合作嗎？
中美之間不存在意識形態衝突，而是實力衝突。 中國是共產主義國家，美國是自由民主國家，但從1990年到2017年左右，他們相處得很好。那段時間發生了一些變化，但不是意識形態的變化。
改變的是力量平衡：中國和美國現在是激烈的競爭對手，因為中國已經成為美國的同等競爭對手，而中國有興趣像美國統治西半球那樣統治亞洲。 從中國的角度來看，這是完全有道理的，但從美國的角度來看，這是完全不可接受的。 這引發了激烈的安全競爭，並可能導致未來的熱戰。 希望情況不會如此，但這種可能性很大。 喬·拜登和習近平是否聚在一起討論如何改善安全競爭並不重要。 無論他們互相說什麽，安全競爭都會發生。 因此，當我聽說這兩位領導人之間舉行了會晤，並且有希望我們能夠大大改善安全競爭時，我不相信。 美國和中國注定要相互競爭。
在您的寫作和研究中，一個始終如一的主題是權力平衡的想法。 您認為這是超級大國領導人所認同的國際關係敘述嗎？ 或者他們可能將意識形態視為重要工具？
我認為意識形態是覆蓋郵寄拳頭的天鵝絨手套。 從美國的例子來看，在兩極或多極世界中，他們的行為方式非常現實。 然而，他們用自由主義言論掩蓋了現實主義行為。 自由主義言論對於美國來說就像是天鵝絨手套。
我想，就中國而言，他們在未來幾年的表現將與過去幾年一樣，以一種非常現實的政治方式。 他們會用意識形態論據來掩蓋這一點，讓他們看起來是好人，而美國是壞人。 我在過去訪問中國時發現，我的中國對話者喜歡提出這樣的論點：中國是儒家文化，儒家思想是一種防禦性意識形態——中國人從來不是侵略者，永遠是受害者。 這聽起來很像美國例外論：美國人也喜歡認為自己是好人，他們從不做錯事，行為不端的總是對方。 所以意識形態是我
掩蓋所有大國現實政治的工具。
最重要的是力量平衡，像中國和美國這樣的國家認識到，擁有盡可能多的權力對它們的生存很重要。 中國人大篇幅談論從1840年代末到1940年代末的“世紀國恥”。 究其原因，是中國實力弱，被體係內的大國利用了。 所以如果你是今天的中國人，你就很清楚你不想成為弱者，因為你不想再遭受一個世紀的國恥。 中國人現在正在努力做的是讓中國比現在更加強大，以優化其在這場大國政治遊戲中的生存機會。
你提到美國和中國基本上是注定要競爭的。 在這種情況下，您認為戰爭有可能發生嗎？
我確實認為冷戰，我指的是激烈的安全競爭，已經在發生。 中美之間爆發熱戰的可能性很大； 比冷戰時期美國和蘇聯之間發生戰爭的可能性更大。
冷戰時期美蘇競爭的焦點是中歐，北約與華沙條約組織在這裏對峙。 因為在中歐，德國邊境兩側都有兩支龐大的軍隊，每支軍隊都武裝到牙齒，擁有數千件核武器，因此發動戰爭的可能性極小，因為存在以下風險： 升級到熱核水平是如此之大。 歐洲非常穩定。
如果你看看中美競爭，就會發現三個主要的潛在衝突點：南海、台灣和東海。 想象因台灣或南中國海爆發戰爭要容易得多。 這些地方的戰爭不會涉及擁有數千枚核武器的大規模軍隊在大陸上相互碰撞。 從這個意義上說，戰爭的可能性更大。
台灣的局勢尤其危險，因為中國人堅定地致力於將台灣重新納入大陸——他們將台灣視為神聖的領土。 與此同時，美國人堅定地致力於維持台灣的獨立，因為美國認為這對於應對中國的威脅具有重要的戰略意義。 因此，我們麵臨的情況是，中國人越致力於收回台灣，美國人就越致力於讓台灣脫離中國的控製。 這是一個讓我非常緊張的問題。
請繼續關注 OPR 采訪米爾斯海默的第二部分，我們將討論俄羅斯、烏克蘭、北約等問題。
This is an issue that makes me very nervous
John Mearsheimer on the US-China Rivalry
Jason Chau & Andrew Wang January 12, 2023
Professor John Mearsheimer is the R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor at the University of Chicago and one of the most well-known international relations scholars today. In this two-part interview, editors Jason Chau and Andrew Wang ask Prof Mearsheimer about some of the primary forces influencing international politics today. The first part of this series focuses on China, and particularly the US-China rivalry.
Let’s start with what’s happening in China right now. Xi Jinping has recently cemented his grip on power after the 20th Party Congress, but there have been widespread protests over the regime’s zero-COVID policies, in many of which the language has escalated to challenging the regime itself. Might this domestic unrest create incentive for Xi to pursue diversionary tactics, particularly in the form of a more aggressive foreign policy?
I don’t think that’s likely to happen at all. I find it hard to imagine that there is a war worth starting for China that would justify using that conflict as a way of dampening down the protests at home. I think what Xi Jinping and his lieutenants will do is concentrate on figuring out a way to deal with the COVID problem and the lockdown [protests] problem at the same time. The main focus here will be inward, not outward.
Are you concerned about China using normative shifts and other tools on the international stage to distract from domestic problems such as human rights issues at home?
I think China is deeply involved in international politics at all levels, and I think what the Chinese believe today is that it’s best for them not to rock the boat and antagonise other countries unnecessarily. I think they’ve come to the conclusion that ‘Wolf Warrior’ diplomacy backfired, and if anything they want to cut in the other direction and emphasise soft power. I think that’s a smart strategy, and I find it difficult to believe that they would pursue some hard-nosed diplomatic strategy to deal with the problems at home.
With deep ideological differences between the US and China, do you think the two can collaborate on important issues like climate change?
There is no ideological conflict between the US and China, but a conflict about power. China is a communist country and the United States is a liberal democracy, and yet they got along perfectly well from 1990 up until around 2017. Something changed around then, and it wasn’t an ideological change.
What changed was the balance of power: China and the United States are now bitter rivals because China has become a peer competitor of the United States, and China is interested in dominating Asia the way the United States dominates the Western hemisphere. This makes perfect sense from China’s perspective, but from America’s perspective this is completely unacceptable. That has caused an intense security competition, which might lead to a hot war down the road. Hopefully, that won’t be the case, but there is a serious possibility of that. Whether Joe Biden and Xi Jinping get together and talk about how to ameliorate the security competition matters little. The security competition is going to take place regardless of what they say to each other. So when I hear that there was a meeting between these two leaders and that there is some hope that we could greatly ameliorate the security competition, I don’t believe it. The United States and China are destined to compete against each other.
One consistent theme throughout your writing and research is the idea of balance of power. Do you think this is an account of international relations that the leaders of superpowers subscribe to? Or might they see ideology as an important tool?
I think that ideology is the velvet glove that covers the mailed fist. What you see in the American case, in a bipolar or multipolar world, is that they behave in a very realist fashion. However, they cover up that realist behaviour with liberal rhetoric. Liberal rhetoric is the velvet glove in the American case.
I would imagine, in the Chinese case, that they will behave in the years ahead as they have behaved in past years, in a very realpolitik fashion. And they will cover it up with ideological arguments that make it look like they are the good guy and America is the bad guy. What I have discovered in my past visits to China is that my Chinese interlocutors like to make the argument that China is a Confucian culture, and Confucianism is a defensive ideology – the Chinese are never the aggressors, always the victims. It sounds a lot like American exceptionalism: Americans also like to think that they are the good guys, that they never do anything wrong, that it’s always the other side that misbehaves. So ideology is the instrument that is disguising realpolitik in all great powers.
What matters the most is the balance of power, and states like China and the United States recognize that it’s important for their survival to have as much power as they can possibly garner. The Chinese talk at great lengths about the “Century of National Humiliation,” which ran from the late 1840’s to the late 1940’s. The cause of that was that China was weak, of which the Great Powers in the system took advantage. So if you’re Chinese today, you understand full well that you don’t want to be weak, because you don’t want to suffer another Century of National Humiliation. What the Chinese are trying to do now is make China even more powerful than it is now to optimise its chances for survival in this game of Great Power politics.
You mentioned that the US and China are basically destined for competition. In this dynamic, do you think war is likely?
I do think a cold war, by which I mean an intense security competition, is already taking place. There is a serious possibility of a hot war between the US and China; more likely than a war was between the US and the Soviet Union in the Cold War.
The focal point of the competition between the US and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was central Europe, where NATO was faced off against the Warsaw Pact. Because you had a situation in central Europe where there were two massive armies on either side of the inter-German border, each armed to the teeth with thousands of nuclear weapons, it was extremely unlikely that you could get a war started because the risk of escalation to the thermonuclear level was so great. Europe was remarkably stable.
If you look at the US-China competition, there are three main potential points of conflict: the South China Sea, Taiwan, and the East China Sea. It’s much easier to imagine a war breaking out over Taiwan or the South China Sea. A war in these places would not involve massive armies crashing into each other on the mainland with thousands of nuclear weapons. In that sense, war is more likely.
The situation in Taiwan is especially dangerous because the Chinese are deeply committed to reintegrating Taiwan into the mainland – they view it as sacred territory. At the same time, the Americans are deeply committed to maintaining an independent Taiwan because the US believes it is of great strategic importance to dealing with the Chinese threat. So here we have a situation where the more committed the Chinese are to getting Taiwan back, the more committed the Americans are to keeping Taiwan out of China’s hands. This is an issue that makes me very nervous.
Stay tuned for Part Two of the OPR’s interview with Mearsheimer, where we will discuss Russia, Ukraine, NATO, and more.
