風蕭蕭_Frank
以文會友
“我們時代的關鍵問題”：與亨利·基辛格談中美關係
2018 年 9 月 20 日
9月13日，威爾遜中心舉辦慶祝成立50周年暨基辛格中美研究所成立10周年慶典活動。 1973 年至 1977 年擔任美國國務卿的亨利·基辛格榮獲首屆威爾遜精神獎，並參加了與基辛格研究所名譽創始所長、傑出學者 J. Stapleton “Stape” Roy 大使的對話。
基辛格中美研究所
美國外交政策WILSON@50中國大陸
9月13日，威爾遜中心舉辦慶祝成立50周年暨基辛格中美研究所成立10周年慶典活動。 1973 年至 1977 年擔任美國國務卿的亨利·基辛格榮獲首屆威爾遜精神獎，並參加了與基辛格研究所名譽創始所長、傑出學者 J. Stapleton “Stape” Roy 大使的對話。
這是他們的談話記錄：
Stape Roy：亨利，我們真的很高興，通過你的意誌力，你能夠將颶風轉移到更南的地方（笑聲），並從紐約來到這裏。 在理查德·艾克森的非凡介紹之後，我覺得我真的應該向您詢問銅價和此類問題。 但我不會。
五十年前，威爾遜中心成立的同一年，您還是納爾遜·洛克菲勒的外交政策顧問，蘇聯是我們的主要敵人。 當時您寫了一篇關於“美國外交政策的核心問題”的非常有洞察力的文章。 盡管國際體係已經發生了巨大變化，您當時的許多觀察仍然具有現實意義。
[對觀眾。]你可以在網上找到這篇文章。 我想你會驚訝地發現他當時的評論與當前的情況有多麽相關。 [對基辛格博士]你當時說過，“在未來的歲月裏，美國政策麵臨的最深刻的挑戰將是哲學上的，即在世界上發展某種秩序概念，這個世界在軍事上是兩極的，但在政治上是多極的。” 當然，當時的軍事兩極化是在美國和蘇聯之間。 50年後的今天，許多美國人看到美國和中國之間正在出現軍事兩極化，而政治多極化涉及的國家在經濟和軍事上都比50年前強大得多。
您認為您當時的觀察今天仍然適用嗎？ 美國和中國能否共同努力創建穩定的世界新秩序？ 或者我們注定會因為對世界秩序的不同看法而與中國陷入對抗性鬥爭嗎？ 這與當前美國和中國之間迫在眉睫的貿易戰有關，而貿易戰是現有世界秩序的重要組成部分。
亨利·基辛格：首先，讓我表達我對被邀請來到這裏的感激之情，與這麽多來自我們兩黨的朋友和人士一起，我有幸與他們一起工作了幾十年。 斯塔普是我關於中國的老師。 當我開始研究中國關係時，我認為我的主要資格是尼克鬆總統得出的結論，因為我是他的幕僚，所以我是在到達那裏之前最不可能泄露此事的人[笑聲]。 因此，對我來說，與中國的關係是一個教育和經曆的過程。 幾十年來我形成的一個基本信念是，我們兩國擁有獨特的曆史機遇。
我們是兩個具有相當大破壞能力的國家。 我們兩個國家都相信自己在政策實施方麵具有特殊性：我們以民主憲政的政治製度為基礎；我們以民主憲政為基礎。 中國的演變至少可以追溯到孔子和幾個世紀的獨特實踐。
這是我們這個時代的關鍵問題。 我們每個人都足夠強大，能夠在世界各地創造可以強加自己偏好的局麵，但這種關係的重要性在於雙方是否能夠相信他們已經取得了足夠的成就，足以與他們的信念和曆史相一致。
但我們現在所處的位置遠遠超出了我在 Stape 善意提及的文章中所寫的內容。 因為我們所處的位置是，世界的和平與繁榮取決於中國和美國是否能夠找到一種合作的方法，並不總是達成一致，而是處理我們的分歧。
而且，還要製定目標，使我們更加緊密地聯係在一起，並使世界能夠找到一種結構。
這是我們這個時代的關鍵問題。 我們每個人都足夠強大，能夠在世界各地創造可以強加自己偏好的局麵，但這種關係的重要性在於雙方是否能夠相信他們已經取得了足夠的成就，足以與他們的信念和曆史相一致。 這是一項艱巨的任務。 世界上從未有任何兩個國家進行過係統性的嚐試。 但是，當我讀到當代爭端時，例如，關於貿易問題的爭端，當然，作為一個美國人，我看到了我們提出的一些主張的相當大的優點。
但我也希望能夠找到一種方式，讓雙方在達成協議後都能相信這是他們能夠繼續運作的基礎。 因此，這確實是伍德羅·威爾遜中心值得反思的一個好問題。 這裏的問題不是勝利。 問題是連續性、世界秩序和世界正義，看看我們兩國能否找到一種方式來相互討論。 他們將無法欺騙對方； 他們都足夠聰明，能夠理解他們正在做的事情的含義。
美國人列出了他們想要在不久的將來解決的問題清單； 中國人有一個他們想要努力實現的目標。 所以我們雙方都可以互相學習，也需要互相學習。
因此，這就是我想傳達的主要信息：中國有一種概念性的政策方法。 他們將其視為一個過程，回溯到某個時期並無限期地向前推進。 美國人非常務實，當美國和中國談判代表見麵時，他們通常有兩個不同的議程。 美國人列出了他們想要在不久的將來解決的問題清單； 中國人有一個他們想要努力實現的目標。 所以我們雙方都可以互相學習，也需要互相學習。
我們還有一個額外的問題，那就是：技術的快速發展使我們陷入了這樣一種境地：世界不僅會受到我們自己設定的目標的影響，還會受到我們的機器在運行過程中為自己設定的目標的影響。 符合我們認為的原創設計。 前所未有的挑戰。 所以，我有信心我們會遇到它，因為我們別無選擇。
因此，當你在報紙上讀到潛在的衝突時，我們應該記住第一次世界大戰的曆史。如果參加那場戰爭的領導人知道結果會怎樣，他就不會這樣做。 沒有一位領導人認為這會擾亂原本的生活結構。 我們知道衝突會造成什麽後果，因此我相信我們會取得進展。 對於那些想知道這裏是否提供早餐的人，我將簡短地闡述我的其他觀點。 [笑聲，掌聲。]
Stape Roy：讓我們提前 50 年。 幾周前，《每日野獸報》撰文稱，您曾建議特朗普總統與俄羅斯合作，在中國打拳擊。 這讓我想到了把中國放進盒子裏的想法，我認為這並不能反映你的確切觀點。 但這是否準確地描述了您的觀點，或者是否丟失了一些重要的細微差別？ 您對處理美國與俄羅斯和中國的關係有何看法？
亨利·基辛格：我希望我能在某個場合被邀請，在觀眾麵前向特朗普總統講述我對這種關係的戰略看法。 那篇特別的文章是一篇偉大的小說。 [笑聲]但是理解這一點很重要，我之前已經向你們描述過。
我將中國視為構建世界秩序的潛在合作夥伴。 當然，如果不成功，我們就會處於衝突的境地，但我的想法是基於避免這種情況的需要。 因此，我們的問題不是在世界各地尋找盟友來對抗中國。
我們的根本問題應該是找到解決我們雙方都關心的一些問題的辦法。 因此，這種通過尋找額外盟友來對抗一個我們應該與之建立合作關係的國家來組建新政府的特殊做法是不正確的。 談論它的唯一原因是因為它說明了當今世界的一些重要問題：中國和美國都不需要盟友來互相爭鬥。 我們需要的是我們可以共同努力限製衝突的概念。 這就是我的基本觀點。
我們都是愛國者，如果發生衝突，我們會支持我們的國家。 但我們的任務是防止並超越這種衝突。
斯塔普·羅伊：謝謝。 [掌聲]我還有數千個問題要問你們，但我被告知我有責任讓你們回到——
亨利·基辛格：好吧，我們再談一個。
斯塔普·羅伊：好的。 [笑聲，掌聲]好吧，讓我們為你嚐試另一個簡單的，這樣你就可以休息一會兒。 [笑聲]最近有各種各樣的說法稱美中政策是失敗的，因為其核心原則之一是經濟發展將把中國轉變為自由民主國家，而這也被作為我們政策的目標提出。 。 但這顯然還沒有發生。
然而，在 50 年前那篇關於美國外交政策核心問題的文章中，你寫道，我引用了：“美國關於政治結構的主流觀點是，政治結構將或多或少自動地跟隨經濟進步，並且 它將采取憲政民主的形式。” 所以，這個概念是經濟發展產生政治變革，而這種變革的本質就是憲政民主。
但你接著說：“這兩種假設都受到嚴重質疑。” 正如您在文章中所解釋的那樣，在您的評估中，“在每一個發達國家，政治穩定都是在工業化進程之前發生的，而不是在工業化進程中產生的。事實上，帶來工業化的政府製度，無論是民眾的還是專製的，都傾向於 這一成就將得到證實，而不是徹底改變。” 本書寫於中國實施改革開放政策之前的十年，開啟了數十年的經濟快速發展。
您認為中國40年的發展證實了您50年前的假設嗎？
亨利·基辛格：這是兩個不同的問題。 一，就是你提出的：中國過去40年的發展證明了政治演變的過程是什麽？
斯塔普·羅伊：對。
亨利·基辛格：第二個問題是：美國外交政策的目的是不是希望我們采取的具體措施能夠產生一定的效果？
這裏有幾個階段。 在中美關係的第一階段，我認為中美雙方都將對方視為對抗蘇聯威脅的製衡力量，這一說法是正確的。 我們向當時與我們沒有任何關係的中國開放，以便為俄羅斯人、蘇聯人引入額外的計算要素。 而且，為了給我們自己的人民帶來希望，在越南戰爭和國內分裂時期，他們的政府有一個和平世界的願景，其中包括了被排除在外的因素。
我想說，我們希望雙方的價值觀能夠更加接近。 但我們認為，為了維護和平與穩定，我們有義務不把中國的轉型作為一個阻礙其他一切的目標。
這是我們的兩個主要目標。 這些目標之所以能夠實現，是因為中國有著同樣的目標。 隨著時間的推移，中國經濟的發展速度遠遠超出了任何人的預期。 一開始，我們達成了一些交易，從純粹的經濟角度來看，這些交易似乎對中國有利。 但我們製造它們是因為我們認為中國實力的增長彌補了蘇聯的不平衡。
然後，隨著時間的推移，中國的發展如此之快，以至於為早期沒有人預見到的經濟發展創造了可能性。 在此過程中，需要某種程度平等平衡的正常商業考慮變得越來越占主導地位。 這是目前討論的基礎，我相信，當雙方冷靜考慮時，一定會找到解決方案。
另一個問題是，美國的政策是否係統地試圖在中國實現民主？ 這是一個非常難以回答的問題。
作為美國人，尤其是像我這樣的移民，美國民主是一次奇妙的經曆。 當我來到這個國家時，我 15 歲，有人要求我寫一篇關於作為美國人意味著什麽的文章。 我寫道，“對我來說，最重要的事情是能夠昂首挺胸地走在街上”，所以這很重要。 但當你製定外交政策時，有時你必須權衡短期內可以實現的目標與需要演變的目標。 中國人幾千年來一直在辦自己的事。
所以，我想說，我們希望雙方的價值觀能夠更加接近。 但我們認為，為了維護和平與穩定，我們有義務不把中國的轉型作為一個阻礙其他一切的目標。
所以，這仍然是我目前對美國總體態度的看法。 我們無法解決世界上所有的問題和世界上所有國家的國內結構。 作為一項國家努力，我們必須在這個方向上有目標，並且我們必須盡可能地推動它。
根據我的經驗——不是與中國——我們在猶太移民問題上與俄羅斯發生了問題，尼克鬆上台時，猶太移民數量約為 700 人。我打電話給俄羅斯大使，我說：“通常不考慮移民問題。” 一個國際問題。但我們會觀察你的所作所為，不是作為條件，而是我們會觀察，我們會根據你的行為做出回應。” 因此，我們試圖將其從討價還價轉變為哲學問題，三年內移民人數從 700 人增加到 37,000 人。 然後它成為美國國內政治的一個問題，人數再次大幅下降，降至 15,000。
所以，我對中國的看法是，就我們對世界的影響而言，美國的表現是影響其他國家的最佳方式。 而且，雖然我當然更喜歡——出於我給出的原因——我們的製度，但我也相信我們必須對其持久影響有足夠的信心，不讓它成為我們和其他國家之間的強權政治問題，具體取決於具體情況 。 這是我的總體看法。
但我的觀點重要的是，你應該選擇促進和平與進步的目標，你必須努力實現合作，但你不能用短期壓力來逆轉曆史的演變。
我認為，隨著國家的發展，存在一定的現實——人們從農村向城市流動的影響、教育製度調整的影響——而這些現實帶來了變化。 我們會堅持我們所宣誓的，但我們不會把它變成我們和中國之間的權力問題。
有很多我非常尊敬的人有不同的觀點。 但我的觀點重要的是，你應該選擇促進和平與進步的目標，你必須努力實現合作，但你不能用短期壓力來逆轉曆史的演變。
這是一個重要的話題，將在我們國家進行討論。 我希望有些人認為我們必須永久地尋求強加我們的偏好。 威爾遜中心將舉辦許多關於該主題的研討會。
Stape Roy：最後一個簡單的問題。 這是一個“是否”的問題，而不是一個“如何”的問題。 不久前，參謀長聯席會議主席向國會作證稱，到2025年，中國將成為美國的主要威脅。 如果你是國務卿，你會接受這一評估作為已成定局嗎？ 或者你是否相信巧妙的外交有可能使中國變得更強大，而不對美國構成威脅？
亨利·基辛格：這個問題可以從兩個層麵來回答。 第一，我不希望2025年出現中國軍事力量強於美國的情況。 我始終讚成一項能讓我們強大到足以應對可預見的危險的軍事政策。 因此，隨著中國或俄羅斯或其他國家的發展，我會努力確保我們永遠不會陷入這種境地。 但同時，我認為，中國和美國在尋求安全的同時，必須進行對話，避免威脅彼此的利益，並尋求發展一些合作項目， 讓人們更加緊密地聯係在一起。
當我成為國家安全顧問時，我當然意識到了我們的戰爭計劃，並且我意識到戰爭的後果是巨大的。 因此，在某種程度上，我們被迫討論這些影響。 現在我們已經領先了很多步。 危險要大得多。
因為，作為戰略學的學生，我們不能以以往戰爭的模式來想象先進高科技國家之間的戰爭。 它們涉及一定程度的破壞、一定程度的溝通和相互影響，可以肯定地說，世界將永遠不再一樣。 因此，我認為實現這一政治條件應該成為美國外交政策的目標。 我還認為，我們永遠不應該處於無法尋求安全的境地。 所以我會嚐試兩者兼而有之，但我會嚐試在牢記對話的同時完成安全要素。
我隻想回到我之前提出的一個技術觀點。 當我成為國家安全顧問時，我當然意識到了我們的戰爭計劃，並且我意識到戰爭的後果是巨大的。 因此，在某種程度上，我們被迫討論這些影響。 現在我們已經領先了很多步。 危險要大得多。 這些武器的複雜性甚至還沒有被完全了解。 因此，這種討論總是必須進行，這樣我們就不會因溝通不暢或意外而隨波逐流。
但我想讓你們所有人相信，我認為這是可以解決的，而且我不認為這是不可避免的，而且我認為這應該在沒有戰爭的情況下實現。 這些是基本原則。
斯塔普·羅伊：謝謝。 [掌聲]
'The Key Problem of Our Time': A Conversation with Henry Kissinger on Sino-U.S. Relations
September 20, 2018
On September 13, the Wilson Center hosted a gala event to mark the 50th anniversary of its founding and the 10th anniversary of its Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. Henry Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, was presented with the inaugural Spirit of Wilson Award and participated in a conversation with Ambassador J. Stapleton “Stape” Roy, founding director emeritus and a distinguished scholar at the Kissinger Institute.
On September 13, the Wilson Center hosted a gala event to mark the 50th anniversary of its founding and the 10th anniversary of its Kissinger Institute on China and the United States. Henry Kissinger, U.S. secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, was presented with the inaugural Spirit of Wilson Award and participated in a conversation with Ambassador J. Stapleton “Stape” Roy, founding director emeritus and a distinguished scholar at the Kissinger Institute.
This is a transcript of their conversation:
Stape Roy: Henry, we are really delighted that, through the power of your will, you were able to divert the hurricane further south [laughter], and make it here from New York. After that extraordinary introduction by Richard Ackerson, I feel I really should be asking you about copper prices and issues of that sort. But I'm not going to.
Fifty years ago, the same year when the Wilson Center was established, you were still a foreign policy advisor to Nelson Rockefeller, and the Soviet Union was our principal enemy. At that time, you wrote a very perceptive essay on "Central Issues of American Foreign Policy." Many of your observations at that time are still relevant today, even though the international system has changed enormously.
[To the audience.] You can find that essay online. I think you will be stunned to find how relevant his comments at that time are to the current situation. [To Dr. Kissinger.] You said then, "In the years ahead, the most profound challenge to American policy will be philosophical, to develop some concept of order in the world, which is bipolar militarily but multipolar politically." At that time, of course, the military bipolarity was between the United States and the Soviet Union. Now, 50 years later, many Americans see an emerging military bipolarity between the United States and China, while the political multipolarity involves countries economically and militarily much more powerful than the countries were 50 years ago.
Do you think that your observations at that time are still relevant today? Can the United States and China work together to create a stable new world order? Or are we doomed to end up in confrontational struggle with China over our differing views of what the world order should be? This is relevant to the current trade war looming between the United States and China, which is an important part of the existing world order.
Henry Kissinger: Well, first of all, let me express my appreciation for having been asked to come here, with so many friends and people from both of our parties with whom I've had the honor of working over all these decades. And Stape was my teacher about China. When I started on Chinese relations, I think my principal qualification was that President Nixon concluded, since I was on his staff, I was the least likely person to leak about it before I got there [laughter]. So, for me, relations with China have been a process of education and experience. And a fundamental conviction I developed, over the decades, is that our two countries have a unique historic opportunity.
We are two countries that have considerable destructive capabilities. We are two countries that believe they have an exceptional nature in the conduct of policy: we on the basis of the political system of democratic constitutionalism; China on the basis of an evolution that goes back at least to Confucius and centuries of unique practice.
This is the key problem of our time. Each of us is strong enough to create situations around the world in which it can impose its preferences, but the importance of the relationship will be whether each side can believe that they have achieved enough to be compatible with their convictions and with their histories.
But we are now in a position that goes far beyond what I wrote about in the article that Stape has been kind enough to mention. Because we're in a position in which the peace and prosperity of the world depend on whether China and the United States can find a method to work together, not always in agreement, but to handle our disagreements. But also, to develop goals which bring us closer together and enable the world to find a structure.
This is the key problem of our time. Each of us is strong enough to create situations around the world in which it can impose its preferences, but the importance of the relationship will be whether each side can believe that they have achieved enough to be compatible with their convictions and with their histories. That is a huge task. It's never been attempted systematically by any two nations in the world. But when I read about contemporary disputes, say, about trade issues, of course, as an American, I see considerable merit in some of the propositions we have put forward.
But I also hope that a way can be found by which, when an agreement is reached, both sides can believe that this is a basis from which they can continue to operate. And so, this really is a good question for the Woodrow Wilson Center to reflect on. The issue is not victory, here. The issue is continuity, and world order, and world justice, and to see whether our two countries can find a way of talking about it to each other. And they will not be able to fool each other; they're both intelligent enough to understand the implications of what they're doing.
The Americans have a list of things that they want to fix in the immediate future; the Chinese have an objective towards which they want to work. So we both can learn from each other, and we need to learn from each other.
So, that is the main message I want to leave, that China has a conceptual approach to policy. They look at it as a process, going back a certain period and going forward indefinitely. Americans are very pragmatic, and when American and Chinese negotiators meet, they usually have two different agendas. The Americans have a list of things that they want to fix in the immediate future; the Chinese have an objective towards which they want to work. So we both can learn from each other, and we need to learn from each other.
And we have one additional problem, which is: the rapid evolution of technology has put us into a situation where the world can be affected not only by the goals we set ourselves but the goals our machines decide to set for themselves, as they go along meeting what we think is our original design. An unprecedented challenge. So, I am confident that we will meet it, because we have no other choice.
And so, when you read in the newspapers about a potential conflict, we should remember the history of World War I. Not one of the leaders who entered that war would have done so if he had known what the outcome would be like. Not one of the leaders thought that this would upset the structure of life as it had been. We know what conflict will do, and, therefore, I'm confident that we will make progress. And I'll make my other points shorter, for those of you who wonder whether breakfast will be served here. [Laughter, applause.]
Stape Roy: Let's jump ahead 50 years. Several weeks ago, The Daily Beast wrote an article claiming that you had advised President Trump to work with Russia to box in China. It brought to my mind the idea of putting China into a box, which I didn't think reflected your precise views. But was this an accurate depiction of your views, or were some important nuances somehow lost? What are your thoughts on managing US relations with Russia and China?
Henry Kissinger: I wish I had been invited, on some occasion, to tell President Trump, in front of the audience described, about my strategic views of that relationship. That particular article was a great piece – of fiction. [Laughter.] But the reason it's important to understand this, I've described to you before.
I visualize China as a potential partner in the construction of a world order. Of course, if that does not succeed, we will be in a position of conflict, but my thinking is based on the need to avoid that situation. So, our problem is not to find allies around the world with which to confront China.
Our fundamental problem should be to find solutions to some of the problems that concern us both. So, this particular approach of beginning a new administration with finding an additional ally against a country with which we should have a cooperative relationship is simply not correct. And the only reason to even talk about it is because it illustrates something important about the present world: neither China nor America need allies to fight each other. What we need is concepts by which we can work together to set limits to conflicts. So that is my basic view.
All of us are patriots, and if a conflict arises, we will support our country. But the task is to prevent that conflict, and to transcend it.
Stape Roy: Thank you. [Applause] I have thousands of more questions to ask you, but I am told that I have a responsibility to get you back to –
Henry Kissinger: Well, let's go for another.
Stape Roy: Okay. [Laughter, Applause.] Well, let's try another easy one for you, so you can rest for a moment. [Laughter.] There have been a variety of recent claims that U.S.-China policy has been a failure, because one of its central tenets was that economic development would transform China into a liberal democracy, and that was presented as the goal of our policy. And that clearly has not occurred.
Yet, in that essay on central issues in American foreign policy, 50 years ago, you wrote, and I quote: "The dominant American view about political structure has been that it will follow, more or less automatically, upon economic progress, and that it will take the form of constitutional democracy." So, the concept was that economic development produces political change, and the nature of that change would be constitutional democracy.
But you went on to say: "Both assumptions are subject to serious question." In your assessment then, as you explained in your essay, "In every advanced country, political stability preceded rather than emerged from the process of industrialization. In fact, the system of government which brought about industrialization, whether popular or authoritarian, has tended to be confirmed rather than radically changed by this achievement." This was written 10 years before China adopted its reform and openness policies, which launched its decades of rapid economic development.
Do you believe that China's development over the last 40 years has confirmed your assumptions of 50 years ago?
Henry Kissinger: They're two separate questions. One, it's the one you put: what does Chinese development in the last 40 years prove about the process of evolution of politics?
Stape Roy: Right.
Henry Kissinger: And the second is: was it the purpose of American foreign policy that the specific measures we took would produce certain results?
There have been phases, here. In the first phase of Sino-American relations, I believe it is correct to say that both China and the United States saw in the other a counterweight against a threatening Soviet Union. We opened to China, with which we had no relations to speak of at the time, in order to introduce an additional element of calculation for the Russians, for the Soviets. And also, to give our own people hope that in the period of the Vietnam War and domestic divisions, their government had a vision of a peaceful world that included elements that had been excluded.
I would say our hope was that the values of the two sides would come closer together. But we felt we had an obligation, for the preservation of peace and stability, not to make the transformation of China such a goal that it would stop everything else.
Those were our two principal objectives. And they were achieved because China had the same objective from its side. As time evolved, China developed economically at a pace that was much faster than anybody predicted. And at the beginning, we made a number of deals which, in purely economic terms, seemed to be balanced in favor of China. But we made them because we thought growth in Chinese strength compensated for that imbalance in the Soviet Union.
Then, as time developed, the Chinese evolution was so rapid that it created possibilities for economic development nobody foresaw in the early period. And in the process, normal commercial considerations, which require some degree of equal balance, became more and more dominant. That is the basis for the present discussions, which I believe, when they are calmly considered, will lead both sides to a solution.
The other question is, has American policy systematically attempted to bring about democracy in China? That's a very difficult issue to answer.
As Americans, and particularly as an immigrant, as I am, American democracy is a wondrous experience. When I came to this country, I was 15, and I was asked to write an essay on what it meant to be an American. And I wrote, "The most important thing, to me, is to be able to walk on the street with my head erect," so that's important. But when you conduct foreign policy, you have to weigh, sometimes, the objectives that can be reached in the short-term against the objectives that require evolution. And the Chinese have conducted their own affairs for thousands of years.
So, I would say our hope was that the values of the two sides would come closer together. But we felt we had an obligation, for the preservation of peace and stability, not to make the transformation of China such a goal that it would stop everything else.
So, that is still my present view about the general attitude of the United States. We cannot solve all the problems of the world and the domestic structure of all the countries in the world. As a national effort, we must have objectives in that direction, and we must promote it where we can.
In my experience – not with China – we had a problem with Russia on the issue of Jewish immigration, which when Nixon came into office, amounted to about 700. And I called in the Russian ambassador and I said, "Immigration is not usually considered an international problem. But we will watch what you do, not as a condition, but we will watch and we will respond depending on your conduct." So, we tried to move it from a bargaining to a philosophical issue, and immigration went from 700 to 37,000, in 3 years. Then it became an issue of American domestic politics, and it went way down again, to 15,000.
So, my view on China has been that, in terms of our impact on the world, the American performance has been the best way to influence other countries. And, and while I prefer, of course – for the reasons I gave – our system, I also believe we must have faith enough in its lasting impact not to make it an issue of power politics between us and other countries, depending on the circumstances. That has been my general view.
But my view is importantly dominated by the fact that you should select objectives that promote peace and progress, that you must attempt to achieve cooperation, but you cannot undo historical evolution with short-term pressures.
I think as countries develop, there are certain realities – the impact of the movement of people from the countryside to the cities, the impact of adaptations of the educational system – and they were the ones that have produced changes. We will stand for what we have avowed, but we will not turn it into a power issue between us and China.
There are many people, whom I greatly respect, who have a different view. But my view is importantly dominated by the fact that you should select objectives that promote peace and progress, that you must attempt to achieve cooperation, but you cannot undo historical evolution with short-term pressures.
It's an important topic and it will be discussed in our country. I'd expect some have the view that we must permanently seek to impose our preference. The Wilson Center will have many seminars on that topic.
Stape Roy: One final simple question. It's a 'whether' question, not a 'how' question. Not long ago, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff testified to congress that, in 2025, China would be the principal threat to the United States. If you were secretary of state, would you accept that assessment as a foregone conclusion? Or would you believe that skillful diplomacy might have the possibility of enabling a stronger China to emerge that was not a threat to the United States?
Henry Kissinger: There are two levels of answering this. One, I would not want a situation to exist in 2025 where China is militarily stronger than the United States. And I would always favor a military policy that keeps us strong enough to deal with foreseeable dangers. And therefore, as China or Russia or countries grow, I would attempt to make sure that we will never get into that position. But simultaneously, I believe that it is essential that China and the United States, while looking for their security, are engaged in a dialogue in which they will seek to avoid threatening each other's interests, in which they will seek to develop some cooperative projects that bring the people closer together.
When I became National Security Advisor, I became conscious, of course, of our war plans, and I realized that the consequences of a war were monumental. And, therefore, in a way, we were driven to discuss these implications. Now we are many steps ahead of that. The danger is much greater.
Because, as a student of strategy, we cannot think of a war between advanced hi-tech countries, in anything like the patterns of previous wars. They involve a level of destruction and a level of communication and impact on each other that it is safe to say that the world will never be the same again. So, I would think it should be an objective of American foreign policy to achieve that political condition. I would also think we should never be in a position where we are not able to look for our security. So I would attempt to do both, but I would attempt to do the security element while keeping in mind a dialogue.
And I just want to come back to one technical point I made before. When I became National Security Advisor, I became conscious, of course, of our war plans, and I realized that the consequences of a war were monumental. And, therefore, in a way, we were driven to discuss these implications. Now we are many steps ahead of that. The danger is much greater. The complexity of the weapons is not even fully understood. So that discussion always has to take place, so that we don't drift by miscommunication or accident.
But I want to leave you all with the conviction that I think this is solvable, and I do not think it is inevitable, and I think it should be achieved without war. Those are the basic principles.
Stape Roy: Thank you. [Applause]
