William Reinsch 美國偏執狂 害怕每個人

Paranoia Strikes Deep . . . It Starts When You’re Always Afraid

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch March 13, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

偏執狂襲得很深。 。 。 當你總是害怕的時候它就開始了
William Alan Reinsch 的評論 2023 年 3 月 13 日

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

我以前寫過有關 TikTok 的文章，但當前禁止它的提案浪潮說服我再次寫下去。 另外，我承認自上次以來我的觀點有所改變，本專欄的標題應該能讓您了解我的前進方向。

至少三年來，政府一直在試圖弄清楚如何處理 TikTok，但未能得出結論，說明問題有多麽困難。 一方麵，我們有一個流行的應用程序，被數百萬美國人使用和享受，其中至少有一些人已經到了投票的年齡，而且如果它消失了，所有人都到了可以向父母苦苦抱怨的年齡。

另一方麵，人們對此提出了兩個基本的安全擔憂：它獲得的大量個人數據可能最終落入中國人手中，而中國可以通過提供有偏見的內容或通過審查將其用於虛假信息目的。 內容不討好中國。

深入研究第一個問題，至少對我來說，尚不清楚中國人可以將這些數據用於什麽邪惡目的，這些數據與 Facebook、LinkedIn 和其他應用程序收集的數據基本相同； 唯一的區別似乎在於誰可以訪問它。 所以，如果問題是隱私的話，那艘船很久以前就已經航行了。 如果禁令要向前推進，其支持者必須更具體地說明中國可能會如何處理可能構成一定規模安全威脅的數據。

第二個擔憂是不言而喻的，盡管禁令支持者必須再次解釋為什麽他們擔心的 TikTok 媒體偏見與我們每天讀到的美國應用程序和媒體機構的媒體偏見不同。 所有這些都涉及謊言勝過真相。 無論是中國的謊言、俄羅斯的謊言還是美國的謊言，並不重要。 這個問題在我們的社會中普遍存在，我希望美國人最終能夠變得有足夠的洞察力，能夠自己區分事實與虛構。

這場辯論受到一係列“可能”的阻礙。 如果我們不禁止它，中國“可能”將其用於各種不受歡迎的目的，包括旨在影響美國政策和/或美國選民的虛假信息。 問題是，雖然這種情況發生的可能性很小，但也不為零，所以反對禁令的人不可能說人們擔心的事情不可能發生。

我在商務部管理現在的工業和安全局 (BIS) 的經曆告訴我，零風險是不可能實現的。 更合理的方法是風險管理，它需要仔細分析風險以及它們對我們的安全造成的威脅程度，並根據試圖消除風險的成本來衡量。

就 TikTok 而言，我的結論是，它在美國麵臨的安全風險清單上排名相當靠後，消除它的成本將非常高，無論是從實際實施禁令的角度還是從其禁令的角度來看。 對第一修正案的影響。 任何養育青少年的人都會告訴你，嚐試禁止訪問應用程序是徒勞的，並且嚐試在國家層麵上做到這一點並不比嚐試在家庭層麵上做到這一點更容易。 從憲法上講，我們相信言論自由，這種自由隻有在有人說出不受歡迎或具有顛覆性的言論時才會受到考驗。 我們應該仔細考慮禁止某個平台，因為我們害怕它所說的內容。 這正是我們不應該禁止的時候。 前總統特朗普在法庭上的失敗具有啟發性。

這裏還有一個政治角度——不是一直都有嗎？ 如果國會想要禁止 TikTok，勇敢的事情就是站出來去做。 相反，一些懸而未決的法案將這一責任推給了總統。 這是一個對他沒有好處的政治陷阱。 如果他禁止 TikTok，就會有數百萬不滿的青少年對他大喊大叫，如果他不禁止，他就會給他的政治對手提供又一個論點，讓他們可以用來說他對中國態度軟弱。 此外，如果他禁止這項權利，在最高法院對同性婚姻和墮胎做出裁決之後，他會被提醒，確認一項權利比剝奪一項權利更容易。 此時，更好的途徑是讓政府繼續嚐試尋找解決方案，使應用程序能夠以最小化安全威脅的方式運行。

最後，我擔心我們正在陷入大規模歇斯底裏的時期，尤其是在國會，幾乎每天都會有攻擊中國的新提案出現。 公眾對中國的看法變得越來越負麵，這是有充分理由的，很大程度上是由於中國采取的行動。

但我們之前已經在 20 年代的紅色恐慌、1950 年代的麥卡錫（喬，不是凱文）時代以及 1980 年代規模較小的日本攻擊中看到過這種情況。 這些並沒有讓我們作為一個社會享有尊嚴，而且在實踐中它們也沒有取得什麽成就。 我們應該比那更好。 布法羅·斯普林菲爾德說得對——偏執症確實會根深蒂固，而且當你總是感到害怕時，它就會開始。 我們不應該出於恐懼而行動，而應該出於力量而行動，這正是拜登總統“跑得更快”計劃的目的——讓我們變得更強大，以便我們能夠更有效地競爭。

偏執狂襲擊：第二部分

威廉·艾倫·賴因施 (William Alan Reinsch) 評論 2023 年 10 月 10 日

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-part-ii

我經常評論國會中越來越多的反華提案以及國會議員之間競相提出越來越嚴厲的法案。 其中許多是賬單賬單。 它們永遠不會成為法律，而且它們的作者可能不會特別關心這一點，因為他們更感興趣的是發表聲明而不是實際立法。 然而，最近這些提案不斷升級，其獲得通過的可能性也有所增加。 最新也是最好的例子是《2023 年中國軍事和監視公司製裁法案》，俗稱《巴爾法案》，以其作者國會議員安迪·巴爾 (R-KY) 的名字命名。 該法案已獲得眾議院金融服務委員會的批準，但其支持者似乎並沒有試圖在眾議院全體會議上通過該法案，而是尋求在會議上將其添加到年度國防授權中。

討論該法案需要一些背景知識。 聯邦政府保存著一係列壞人名單，包括決心從事被視為不利於美國各種利益的活動的公司和個人。 這些名單包括中國軍工公司名單、中國軍工公司名單、實體名單、軍事最終用戶名單和被拒絕人員名單。 這些清單各自具有不同的法定依據，並且出於不同的原因而製定。 例如，中國軍工公司名單是與中國軍方開展業務的中國公司的名單。 值得注意的是，名單上的公司不會受到任何處罰。 相比之下，列入商務部實體名單意味著向該實體的所有出口都需要獲得許可證，這可能會嚴重限製貿易。

所有名單之母是財政部的特別指定國民和被封鎖人員名單（SDN 名單）。 如果您在該名單上，您的美國資產將被凍結； 美國各方與您進行交易是非法的； 您會發現世界上很少有金融機構願意與您進行美元計價的交易。 巴爾法案的目的是推動財政部將這些其他名單上的實體添加到其 SDN 名單中（如果它們尚未存在）。 其結果將是對政府尚未確定應得的實體強加經濟“核選擇”。 此外，采取這樣的行動會給試圖在中國開展業務的美國公司帶來巨大的問題。 例如，中國移動通信集團有限公司、中國聯合網絡通信集團有限公司（中國聯通）和中國電信有限公司這三家在中國運營蜂窩電話網絡的中國公司都在一台網絡上。 其他列表中的。 如果它們被列入SDN名單，美國人和在華美國公司將被禁止與它們或其中國子公司就在中國的電信服務簽訂合同。 美國電信公司也無法與他們簽訂合同，為訪問中國的美國人提供漫遊服務。 這三家公司還負責測試和批準在中國手機中使用的芯片。 如果美國製造商被列入SDN名單，他們的芯片產品將無法獲得認證，不僅美國手機，而且汽車和電器等含有連接物聯網芯片的產品也被排除在中國市場之外。 這隻是一個例子。

巴爾法案的捍衛者認為，該法案要求財政部考慮將更多實體列入名單，但並不要求財政部這樣做，而且財政部將負責任地使用其權力。 如果我們有一個像現任政府那樣負責任的政府，這可能是真的，但在另一位總統的領導下，情況就很難確定了。 它還引出了一個問題：如果你隻想財政部負責任地行事，為什麽還要鼓勵它不負責任地行事？

可悲的是，這並不是偏執的唯一例子。 德克薩斯州立法機構已提出法案，禁止中國學生（以及伊朗人、俄羅斯人和朝鮮人）就讀德克薩斯州公立學院和大學以及在德克薩斯州購買房產。 我們還看到一波阻止中國人購買農田的法案，盡管政府已經有權出於國家安全原因阻止任何特定投資，例如該地產毗鄰軍事設施。 諸如此類的措施隻會讓我們更加疏遠。 人們會認為在美國教育中國學生是一件好事。 他們將了解中國宣傳之外的民主以及我國的曆史和文化。 如果他們最終留在這裏，我們就會受益於他們的才華。 如果他們回到中國，他們就會帶著我們一起去。 不管怎樣我們都會贏。 人們擔心的似乎是他們中的一些人是間諜。 其中一些可能是，但禁止所有這些是一個典型的把嬰兒和洗澡水一起倒掉的例子。 這也貶低了我們作為一個害怕與可能有不同觀點的其他人互動的人。

巴爾法案和其他提案讓人想起布法羅·斯普林菲爾德（Buffalo Springfield）的《For What It’s Worth》中的台詞——這是我們這一代人的歌曲。 “偏執狂襲得很深/。 。 。 /當你總是害怕的時候，一切就開始了。” 過去，美國人不懼怕任何人。 現在我們似乎害怕每個人。

Paranoia Strikes Deep . . . It Starts When You’re Always Afraid

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch March 13, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-deep-it-starts-when-youre-always-afraid

I’ve written about TikTok before, but the current wave of proposals to ban it persuade me to write again. Plus, I confess my views have changed somewhat since the last time, and the title of this column should give you some idea where I’m heading.

The government has been trying to figure out what to do about TikTok for at least three years, and its inability to come to a conclusion illustrates how difficult the problem is. On the one hand, we have a popular app used and enjoyed by millions of Americans, at least some of whom are old enough to vote, and all of whom are old enough to complain bitterly to their parents if it goes away.

On the other hand, two basic security concerns have been raised about it: the massive amounts of personal data it obtains could end up in the hands of the Chinese, and China could use it for disinformation purposes, either by providing biased content or by censoring content that is not flattering to China.

Drilling down a bit on the first one, it is not clear, at least to me, for what nefarious purposes the Chinese could use the data, which is essentially the same as Facebook, LinkedIn and other apps gather; the only difference appears to be who might have access to it. So, if the issue is privacy, that ship sailed a long time ago. If a ban is to move forward, it is important for its proponents to be more specific about exactly what China might do with the data that would constitute a security threat at some scale.

The second concern is self-explanatory, although here again, ban proponents must explain why the media bias they are concerned about with TikTok is different from the media bias from U.S. apps and media outlets we read about every day. All involve the purveyance of lies over truth. Whether they Chinese lies, Russian lies, or American lies, is not critical. This problem is pervasive in our society, and I hope eventually Americans will become discerning enough to distinguish fact from fiction on their own.

This debate is encumbered by a parade of “coulds.” If we don’t ban it, the Chinese “could” use it for a variety of unwelcome purposes, including disinformation designed to influence American policy and/or American voters. The problem is that while the likelihood of that happening is very small, it is not zero, so it is impossible for opponents of a ban to say that the things people are worried about could not possibly happen.

My time at the Commerce Department running what is now the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS), taught me that zero risk is unattainable. The sounder approach is risk management, which requires a close analysis of the risks and the degree of threat they pose to our security measured against the costs of trying to eliminate them.

In the case of TikTok, my conclusion is that it is fairly far down on the list of security risks the United States faces and that the cost of eliminating it would be very high, both in terms of actually implementing a ban and in terms of its impact on the First Amendment. Anyone raising teenagers can tell you the futility of trying to ban access to an app, and trying to do it on a national level would not be easier than trying to do it on a family level. Constitutionally, we believe in freedom of speech, a freedom that is only tested when someone is saying something unpopular or subversive. We should think carefully about banning a platform because we are afraid of what it says. That is precisely the time when we should not ban it. Former president Trump’s failure to succeed in the courts is instructive.

There is also a political angle here—isn’t there always? If Congress wants to ban TikTok, the courageous thing is to stand up and do it. Instead, some of the pending bills dump that duty on the president. That is a political trap that does him no favors. If he bans TikTok, he’ll have millions of unhappy teenagers yelling at him, and if he doesn’t, he gives his political opponents one more argument they can use to say he is soft on China. In addition, if he bans it, he will be reminded, in the wake of the Supreme Court’s decisions on same sex marriage and abortion, that it is easier to affirm a right than it is to take one away. At this point, the better route would be to let the government continue to try to find a solution that would allow the app to operate in a way that minimizes the security threat.

Finally, I fear we are moving headlong into a period of mass hysteria, particularly in Congress, where new proposals for attacking China arrive virtually every day. The public’s view on China has become ever more negative, and there is good reason for that, largely due to actions China has taken. But we’ve seen this before in the Red Scare of the 1920s, the McCarthy (Joe, not Kevin) era in the 1950s, and on a lesser scale Japan bashing in the 1980s. Those did not dignify us as a society, and in practical terms they accomplished very little. We should be better than that. Buffalo Springfield got it right—paranoia does strike deep, and it does start when you’re always afraid. Instead of acting out of fear, we should be acting out of strength, which is exactly what President Biden’s “running faster” programs are designed to do—to make us stronger so we can compete more effectively.

Paranoia Strikes: Part II

Commentary by William Alan Reinsch Oct 10, 2023

https://www.csis.org/analysis/paranoia-strikes-part-ii

I have frequently commented on the growing number of anti-China proposals in the Congress and the competition among members of Congress to produce ever-more stringent bills. Many of these are statement bills. They will never become law, and their authors may not particularly care about that, since they are more interested in making a statement than in actually legislating. Lately, however, the proposals have escalated, and their chances of enactment have also increased. The latest and best example is the Chinese Military and Surveillance Company Sanctions Act of 2023, popularly known as the Barr bill, named after its author Congressman Andy Barr (R-KY). The bill has been approved by the House Financial Services Committee, but rather than attempting to pass it in the full House, it appears its proponents may seek to add it in conference to the annual defense authorization.

Discussing the bill requires a bit of context. The federal government maintains a number of lists of bad guys—companies and individuals determined to have engaged in activities deemed inimical to a variety of U.S. interests. The lists include the Chinese Military Companies list, the Chinese Military-Industrial Companies list, the Entity List, the Military End User List, and the Denied Persons List. These lists each have a different statutory basis and were developed for different reasons. The Chinese Military Companies list, for example, is a list of Chinese companies doing business with China’s military. It is cautionary—there is no penalty imposed on companies on the list. Placement on the Commerce Department’s Entity List, in contrast, means a license is required for all exports to that entity, potentially significantly restricting trade.

The mother of all lists is the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons List, or SDN list. If you are on that list, your U.S. assets are frozen; it is illegal for U.S. parties to engage in transactions with you; and you will find very few financial institutions anywhere in the world willing to engage in dollar-denominated transactions with you. The intention of the Barr bill is to push the Treasury Department to add the entities on these other lists to its SDN list if they are not already there. The effect of that would be to impose an economic “nuclear option” on entities the government has not determined deserve it. In addition, taking such an action would create enormous problems for U.S. companies trying to do business in China. For example, the three China companies that operate cellular telephone networks in China, China Mobile Communications Group Co., Ltd., China United Network Communications Group Co., Ltd. (China Unicom), and China Telecom Corporation Limited, are all on one of the other lists. If they are put on the SDN list, Americans and U.S. companies in China would be prohibited from contracting with them or their Chinese subsidiaries for telecommunications services in China. U.S. telecom companies would also be unable to contract with them to provide roaming services for Americans visiting China. The three companies also are responsible for testing and approving chips being incorporated into cell phones in China. If they were on the SDN list, U.S. manufacturers would not be able to get their chip-containing products certified, excluding from the Chinese market not only U.S. phones but products like autos and appliances that contain chips to connect to the internet of things. And this is only one example.

Defenders of the Barr bill argue that it requires the Treasury Department to consider putting additional entities on their list but does not require it to do so, and the Treasury Department will use its authority responsibly. That may be true if we have a responsible administration, like the current one, but that would be far from certain under a different president. It also begs the question: if you only want the Treasury Department to act responsibly, why encourage it to act irresponsibly?

Sadly, this is not the only example of paranoia. Bills have been introduced in the Texas legislature to bar Chinese students (and Iranians, Russians, and North Koreans) from attending Texas public colleges and universities and from buying property in Texas. We are also seeing a wave of bills preventing Chinese from buying farmland, even though the government already has authority to block any specific investment for national security reasons such as the property being adjacent to a military facility. Measures like these only serve to drive us further apart. One would think that educating Chinese students in the United States would be a good thing. They would learn about democracy and the history and culture of our country outside the reach of Chinese propaganda. If they end up staying here, we get the benefit of their talent. If they go back to China, they take part of us with them. We win either way. The fear seems to be that some of them are spies. Some of them probably are, but banning all of them is a classic case of throwing the baby out with the bathwater. It also demeans us as a people afraid to interact with others that might have different points of view.

The Barr bill and these other proposals bring to mind lines from “For What It’s Worth” by Buffalo Springfield—a song of my generation. “Paranoia strikes deep / . . . / It starts when you’re always afraid.” In the past, Americans weren’t afraid of anybody. Now we seem to be afraid of everybody.